Whatever is moved, is moved by another

[Linusthe2nd]

I am just trying to understand you here.

If accidents are not beings, what permits us to say, for example, “the rose is red”?

Aquinas would answer (and I agree with him ) that both the rose and the redness “are.” They differ, however, in their manner of being (modus entis): the rose subsists and the redness inheres the rose.

Isn’t that enough of a distinction to say what you want?

I know that accidents are real in that they get their being from the substance in which they inhere. So " red " is real in the substance of the Rose or in any other substance in which it inheres. Of course science would say that a lot more is going on here and with sound, etc.

I just think that certain kinds of accidents ( pushing, walking, twirling, etc ) are not beings even in an extended sense. They are the actions ( acts ) of a being. Now I am not a teacher, writer or commentator or anything. So when I talk of being I mean a substantial being, the kind of being of which Aristotle says we we are first aware. And when I talk about accidents, even quantity, I always say these are simply accidents of a being/substance/nature. But now I see that I shall have to say " accidents of being per se .

You have to admit that it would be very awkward if I said that " walking " was a being of a being or that it was the being of a substance. Such contortions would make conversation unbelievably complicated, if not impossible. So the normal expressions used would be something like, “…red is an accident inhering in a substance, " or " … in a real being…,” or " …in a being per se ( and even this is awkward ), " or perhaps, " …in a substantial being ( perhaps this would be the best expression ). "
I understand what you and Richa are saying, I just think that Aristotle misses the mark here that’s all. I don’t think I am the only one who has had a problem with his Categories. This is no slight to either Aristotle or Thomas, both were great men. But both were subject to error like all men. And even Thomas disagreed with Aristotle from time to time.

Pax
Linus2nd

 

[Richca]

I know that accidents are real in that they get their being from the substance in which they inhere. So " red " is real in the substance of the Rose or in any other substance in which it inheres. Of course science would say that a lot more is going on here and with sound, etc.

I just think that certain kinds of accidents ( pushing, walking, twirling, etc ) are not beings even in an extended sense. They are the actions ( acts ) of a being. Now I am not a teacher, writer or commentator or anything. So when I talk of being I mean a substantial being, the kind of being of which Aristotle says we we are first aware. And when I talk about accidents, even quantity, I always say these are simply accidents of a being/substance/nature. But now I see that I shall have to say " accidents of being per se .

You have to admit that it would be very awkward if I said that " walking " was a being of a being or that it was the being of a substance. Such contortions would make conversation unbelievably complicated, if not impossible. So the normal expressions used would be something like, “…red is an accident inhering in a substance, " or " … in a real being…,” or " …in a being per se ( and even this is awkward ), " or perhaps, " …in a substantial being ( perhaps this would be the best expression ). "
I understand what you and Richa are saying, I just think that Aristotle misses the mark here that’s all. I don’t think I am the only one who has had a problem with his Categories. This is no slight to either Aristotle or Thomas, both were great men. But both were subject to error like all men. And even Thomas disagreed with Aristotle from time to time.

Pax
Linus2nd

Hi Linus,
If accidents do not have being, then Imelahn’s statement above “the rose is red,” is not true. It should rather be, “the rose is not red.” However, the rose cannot be red and not red at one and the same time. This is the principle of non-contradiction which is simply that a thing cannot be and be in the same respect and at the same time. Similarly, the statement, “John is walking” expresses a subject or substance, namely John, and an accident or action verb, namely walking. Now if walking is not a being then walking does not exist, for being is that which exists. If then, walking does not exist then walking cannot be attributed to any thing or person walking. If walking is not a being and does not exist, then presumably neither does running, jogging or sprinting and consequently the whole sport of track and field does not exist and neither does motion for it is not possible to walk or run without the motion of the body. Now, all this is plainly absurd.

Furthermore, thinking and loving are action verbs and thus they are actions of a noun, subject, or substance. Nouns and verbs are not the same thing. If thinking and loving are not beings and consequently do not exist, then how can it be said that we think and love and why are these words in the dictionary? It is plain that thinking and loving are not substances for these actions do not exist by themselves but only in a subject such as a human being. St Paul says that love is the fulfillment of the law and Jesus said that the whole law and prophets are summed in the love of God and neighbor. Apparently, Jesus and St Paul believe that there is such a thing or being as love.

Another thing to consider is that created beings are not simple as God is. Created beings are composite, they are composed of parts, substance and accidents, matter and form, essence and existence, potency and act.

From the foregoing, I don’t think the question is whether Aristotle got it wrong here but rather what planet, Linus, are you living on?

Peace and blessings, Richca

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Hi Linus,
If accidents do not have being, then Imelahn’s statement above “the rose is red,” is not true. It should rather be, “the rose is not red.” However, the rose cannot be red and not red at one and the same time. This is the principle of non-contradiction which is simply that a thing cannot be and be in the same respect and at the same time. Similarly, the statement, “John is walking” expresses a subject or substance, namely John, and an accident or action verb, namely walking. Now if walking is not a being then walking does not exist, for being is that which exists. If then, walking does not exist then walking cannot be attributed to any thing or person walking. If walking is not a being and does not exist, then presumably neither does running, jogging or sprinting and consequently the whole sport of track and field does not exist and neither does motion for it is not possible to walk or run without the motion of the body. Now, all this is plainly absurd.

Furthermore, thinking and loving are action verbs and thus they are actions of a noun, subject, or substance. Nouns and verbs are not the same thing. If thinking and loving are not beings and consequently do not exist, then how can it be said that we think and love and why are these words in the dictionary? It is plain that thinking and loving are not substances for these actions do not exist by themselves but only in a subject such as a human being. St Paul says that love is the fulfillment of the law and Jesus said that the whole law and prophets are summed in the love of God and neighbor. Apparently, Jesus and St Paul believe that there is such a thing or being as love.

Another thing to consider is that created beings are not simple as God is. Created beings are composite, they are composed of parts, substance and accidents, matter and form, essence and existence, potency and act.

From the foregoing, I don’t think the question is whether Aristotle got it wrong here but rather what planet, Linus, are you living on?

Peace and blessings, Richca

Pluto of course. :juggle:

I reserve the right to be different.

Pax
Linus2nd

 

[lmelahn]

I know that accidents are real in that they get their being from the substance in which they inhere. So " red " is real in the substance of the Rose or in any other substance in which it inheres. Of course science would say that a lot more is going on here and with sound, etc.

Science, in my opinion, tells us the mechanism by which the redness inheres, but it does not disprove that the redness is inherent. (I am not saying that you say that, but this was a common error among philosophers of the Modern period, such as Descartes and Kant: they thought they could reduce qualities to quantity.)

I just think that certain kinds of accidents ( pushing, walking, twirling, etc ) are not beings even in an extended sense. They are the actions ( acts ) of a being. Now I am not a teacher, writer or commentator or anything.

I mostly agree. Aquinas calls those kinds of accidents operari (action), which corresponds to Aristotle’s categories of to poiein and to pathein (action and passion). Operari is certainly a notch below the accidents that are closest to substance, such as quality and quantity. However, see below.

So when I talk of being I mean a substantial being, the kind of being of which Aristotle says we we are first aware. And when I talk about accidents, even quantity, I always say these are simply accidents of a being/substance/nature. But now I see that I shall have to say " accidents of being per se .

Technically, for Aristotle per se and per accidens being refer to the manner of attributing, not the intrinsic ontological structure of a substance. “Being” (as a linguistic or logical term) is per se if you are trying to say that the predicate is associated with the subject necessarily (or at least mostly necessarily), and per accidens if you are saying that it is simply circumstantial. I probably could have explained that better in my previous post. You seldom have to add the words per se in a sentence; we understand it from the context.

You have to admit that it would be very awkward if I said that " walking " was a being of a being or that it was the being of a substance. Such contortions would make conversation unbelievably complicated, if not impossible. So the normal expressions used would be something like, “…red is an accident inhering in a substance, " or " … in a real being…,” or " …in a being per se ( and even this is awkward ), " or perhaps, " …in a substantial being ( perhaps this would be the best expression ). "
I understand what you and Richa are saying, I just think that Aristotle misses the mark here that’s all. I don’t think I am the only one who has had a problem with his Categories. This is no slight to either Aristotle or Thomas, both were great men. But both were subject to error like all men. And even Thomas disagreed with Aristotle from time to time.

It is obviously OK to disagree with either Aristotle or Aquinas, although (in tongue and cheek) you might want to choose better company than Descartes, Kant, Hegel, and Heidegger .

However, I still find it difficult to maintain that actions (operari) don’t participate in any way whatsoever in being: either you “are” walking, or you “aren’t;” the action either takes place, or it does not.

I don’t think we need to make any linguistic contortions to see that. We just say, “the rose ‘is’ red,” and understand that “to be” means “to inhere as a quality;” or “the rose ‘is’ growing,” and understand that " ‘to be’ growing" here indicates an action on the part of the rose. One of the great contributions of Aristotle (in my opinion) is to realize that “to be” is not a “univocal” term: its meaning changes according to the context; nevertheless, it is never completely ambiguous, since it always makes a reference to substance.

One of the common misreadings of Aristotle and Aquinas (in my opinion) is to look at substance and accident as if they were bricks making up a building: the substance would be the slab of concrete making up the foundation, and accidents would be the bricks added on top, as if each accident were a little mini-substance.

In reality, the better image would be that of a spring or water fountain: the accidents (and ultimately even the actions, or operari), flow forth from the substance, as the water from the spring.

So, neither Aquinas nor Aristotle would have considered accidents as “beings of a being,” but as emanations of a being (i.e., of a substance).

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Science, in my opinion, tells us the mechanism by which the redness inheres, but it does not disprove that the redness is inherent. (I am not saying that you say that, but this was a common error among philosophers of the Modern period, such as Descartes and Kant: they thought they could reduce qualities to quantity.)

I really don’t know much about Descartes, and even less about Kant. But from what I do know about them, I certainly don’t want to be associated with them .

I mostly agree. Aquinas calls those kinds of accidents operari (action), which corresponds to Aristotle’s categories of to poiein and to pathein (action and passion). Operari is certainly a notch below the accidents that are closest to substance, such as quality and quantity. However, see below.

Now that makes sense. That I can understand.

Technically, for Aristotle per se and per accidens being refer to the manner of attributing, not the intrinsic ontological structure of a substance. “Being” (as a linguistic or logical term) is per se if you are trying to say that the predicate is associated with the subject necessarily (or at least mostly necessarily), and per accidens if you are saying that it is simply circumstantial. I probably could have explained that better in my previous post. You seldom have to add the words per se in a sentence; we understand it from the context.

O.K. This is what I have trouble digesting. I’ll have to reread Meta. V again, when I get time. When Aristotle and Thomas get off on to their " predicates " my eyes start to glaze over.

It is obviously OK to disagree with either Aristotle or Aquinas, although (in tongue and cheek) you might want to choose better company than Descartes, Kant, Hegel, and Heidegger .

I certainly hope not.

However, I still find it difficult to maintain that actions (operari) don’t participate in any way whatsoever in being: either you “are” walking, or you “aren’t;” the action either takes place, or it does not.

Exactly. It is a problem. You have to admit that we cannot point to " walking " unless someone is doing it. Nor can we point to " red " unless something is red. But it is a lot easier to envision " red " as inhering in a subject than to envision " walking " as inhering in a subject. I really like that word operari, that means more to me than being an accident. My mind just cannot imagine operari as being an accident in the same way that " red " is an accident.

I don’t think we need to make any linguistic contortions to see that. We just say, “the rose ‘is’ red,” and understand that “to be” means “to inhere as a quality;” or “the rose ‘is’ growing,” and understand that " ‘to be’ growing" here indicates an action on the part of the rose. One of the great contributions of Aristotle (in my opinion) is to realize that “to be” is not a “univocal” term: its meaning changes according to the context; nevertheless, it is never completely ambiguous, since it always makes a reference to substance.

Yes I understand the concepts of analogy and attribution. But " to be growing " and " to be walking " are conceptionally different than simply " to be. "

One of the common misreadings of Aristotle and Aquinas (in my opinion) is to look at substance and accident as if they were bricks making up a building: the substance would be the slab of concrete making up the foundation, and accidents would be the bricks added on top, as if each accident were a little mini-substance.

In reality, the better image would be that of a spring or water fountain: the accidents (and ultimately even the actions, or operari), flow forth from the substance, as the water from the spring.

An excellent image.

So, neither Aquinas nor Aristotle would have considered accidents as “beings of a being,” but as emanations of a being (i.e., of a substance).

And that is the way I look at them, simply as actions of a particular, individual, existing nature.

This corresponds perfectly with Aristotle’s notion of nature and an existing nature is a substance ( a substantial being ). But the operari are in no sense substance/being on their own, they do not exist on their own, they " flow " from the existing subject. Weisheiple has an excellent chapter on this very subject.

I have understand perfectly what you have been saying and appreciate your and Richa’s efforts here. But I don’t want anyone to waste valuable time. Since I am not accountable for handing on the philosophy of Aristotle or Thomas in their mirror images, I will just speak of " acts of a being " or " acts of a substance. "

I guess my reluctance on this issue really goes back to when Aristotle said that being is the firs thing we know. And that has always meant a substance to me.

 

[lmelahn]

O.K. This is what I have trouble digesting. I’ll have to reread Meta. V again, when I get time. When Aristotle and Thomas get off on to their " predicates " my eyes start to glaze over.

Don’t worry, I get paid to philosophize. (It doesn’t pay much, but it is a lot of fun.)

The problem is that Aristotle only left us his lecture notes, not a proper treatise on metaphysics, so the language is often very obscure.

But what he is doing is surprisingly simple, once you get past his terminology: he says, basically, “Let’s look at how we use the verb ‘to be’ (to einai) in language and in logic. That will give us an insight into the different ways in which this principle that we call ‘being’ (to on) can be found in reality.”

So he comes up with those four fundamental ways to use ‘to be’ (one per accidens and three per se), and discards—for the purpose of his science of being—the per accidens and the use of “to be” that is purely logical.

My mind just cannot imagine operari as being an accident in the same way that " red " is an accident.

I totally agree.

Yes I understand the concepts of analogy and attribution. But " to be growing " and " to be walking " are conceptionally different than simply " to be. "

But that is Aristotle’s whole point: each “category” is a different manner of being. As you get further away from substance, so to speak, the degree of being diminishes. Like the fountain.

(As a side note, what we translate as “categories” would probably be better rendered as “figures of attribution,” or simply “ways to use a term.” Aristotle’s whole point is that you can’t say that the rose “is” red in the very same way that we say that it simply “is,” or, for that matter, that it “is” growing. All of these meanings—i.e., figures of attribution—of “to be” are obviously different conceptually; what Aristotle asks himself is, “Do these meanings have something in common?” He answers in the affirmative: yes, they all refer to one principally—namely, substance—to various degrees.)

This corresponds perfectly with Aristotle’s notion of nature and an existing nature is a substance ( a substantial being ). But the operari are in no sense substance/being on their own, they do not exist on their own, they " flow " from the existing subject. Weisheiple has an excellent chapter on this very subject.

I will have to read this, because that idea was central to my master’s thesis.

I guess my reluctance on this issue really goes back to when Aristotle said that being is the firs thing we know. And that has always meant a substance to me.

I agree completely. There is no such thing as an substance-less accident, or subject-less action. And we come to knowledge of the accidents only after knowing the substance (even though it is by means of the accidents that we know the substance).

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Don’t worry, I get paid to philosophize. (It doesn’t pay much, but it is a lot of fun.)

The problem is that Aristotle only left us his lecture notes, not a proper treatise on metaphysics, so the language is often very obscure.

But what he is doing is surprisingly simple, once you get past his terminology: he says, basically, “Let’s look at how we use the verb ‘to be’ (to einai) in language and in logic. That will give us an insight into the different ways in which this principle that we call ‘being’ (to on) can be found in reality.”

So he comes up with those four fundamental ways to use ‘to be’ (one per accidens and three per se), and discards—for the purpose of his science of being—the per accidens and the use of “to be” that is purely logical.

I totally agree.

But that is Aristotle’s whole point: each “category” is a different manner of being. As you get further away from substance, so to speak, the degree of being diminishes. Like the fountain.

(As a side note, what we translate as “categories” would probably be better rendered as “figures of attribution,” or simply “ways to use a term.” Aristotle’s whole point is that you can’t say that the rose “is” red in the very same way that we say that it simply “is,” or, for that matter, that it “is” growing. All of these meanings—i.e., figures of attribution—of “to be” are obviously different conceptually; what Aristotle asks himself is, “Do these meanings have something in common?” He answers in the affirmative: yes, they all refer to one principally—namely, substance—to various degrees.)

I will have to read this, because that idea was central to my master’s thesis.

I agree completely. There is no such thing as an substance-less accident, or subject-less action. And we come to knowledge of the accidents only after knowing the substance (even though it is by means of the accidents that we know the substance).

Always appreciate your (name removed by moderator)ut. Hope you get to teach philosophy.
Weisheiple should be in your library. The book Nature and Motion in the Middle Ages is a compilation of his addresses at various philosophical conferences and periodicals. And the footnotes cite where others may be found.

Pax
Linus2nd

 

[Richca]

So, neither Aquinas nor Aristotle would have considered accidents as “beings of a being,” but as emanations of a being (i.e., of a substance).

Hi Imelahn,
In ST, I, q.45, where St Thomas is considering the mode of emanation of things, in art. 4, St Thomas does use the espression that accidents are beings “of a being.”

“For being belongs to that which has being—that is, to what subsists in its own being. But forms and accidents and the like are called beings, not as if they themselves were, but because something is by them; as whiteness is called a being, inasmuch as its subject is white by it. Hence, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. vii, text 2) accident is more properly said to be “of a being” than “a being.” Therefore, as accidents and forms and the like non-subsisting things are to be said to co-exist rather than to exist, so they ought to be called rather “concreated” than “created” things; whereas, properly speaking, created things are subsisting beings.”

Fundamentally, as you know, a substance is a being that subsists or exists of itself. An accident is a being that exists in another, namely, a substance.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

A “being,” whatever you define that to be, is not needed. Just a force…simple motion…something as simple as the rupturing of a stationary single cell.

We are using philosophical terms. Everything that exists is a being or a substance, even " a force. " But things like " motion " are called beings only in reference to that in which the motion/change is taking place. For there is no motion simply, there is motion only in reference to a being/substance. And since ":force " is such a nebulous term it is really impossible to say whether it is a being/substance properly speaking or whether it is real only in reference to its source, whatever that may be.

Linus2nd

 

[lmelahn]

Hi Imelahn,
In ST, I, q.45, where St Thomas is considering the mode of emanation of things, in art. 4, St Thomas does use the espression that accidents are beings “of a being.”

“For being belongs to that which has being—that is, to what subsists in its own being. But forms and accidents and the like are called beings, not as if they themselves were, but because something is by them; as whiteness is called a being, inasmuch as its subject is white by it. Hence, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. vii, text 2) accident is more properly said to be “of a being” than “a being.” Therefore, as accidents and forms and the like non-subsisting things are to be said to co-exist rather than to exist, so they ought to be called rather “concreated” than “created” things; whereas, properly speaking, created things are subsisting beings.”

Fundamentally, as you know, a substance is a being that subsists or exists of itself. An accident is a being that exists in another, namely, a substance.

Hello, Richca. Good objection! You think like a Schoolman!

However, I think Aquinas’ point is that accidents are less properly called “beings” (entia) than substances are. It would be better to say that an accident is entis (“proper to” something that is) than ens (something that is), he says.

The expression I was objecting to was not this, but Linus2nd’s “beings of a being,” which, to my mind, makes it sound as if the accidents “are” in the same way as substances “are.”

I think Linus2nd was also trying to distance himself from that conception. However, it is, in fact, how many interpreters of Aristotle and Aquinas have imagined the accidents: almost as if they were mini substances. That is certainly the case with Bl. Duns Scotus and Thomas di Vio (also known as Cajetan).

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Hello, Richca. Good objection! You think like a Schoolman!

However, I think Aquinas’ point is that accidents are less properly called “beings” (entia) than substances are. It would be better to say that an accident is entis (“proper to” something that is) than ens (something that is), he says.

The expression I was objecting to was not this, but Linus2nd’s “beings of a being,” which, to my mind, makes it sound as if the accidents “are” in the same way as substances “are.”

I think Linus2nd was also trying to distance himself from that conception. However, it is, in fact, how many interpreters of Aristotle and Aquinas have imagined the accidents: almost as if they were mini substances. That is certainly the case with Bl. Duns Scotus and Thomas di Vio (also known as Cajetan).

Hi, Imelahn,

When I said that accidents were " beings of a being " what I was reaching for was exactly what Thomas said. In other words they have no existence or reality on their own, they get their existence or reality through the being/substance in which they inhere. And I still hold to my position that motion, including local motion, is not a being in any sense, it is merely the process of reducing a potentiality to actuality, it is the action ( act ) of a being in a process of change. I read a comment by a well known philosopher ( can’t remember who now ) who said " you can’t convince me that local motion changes a being from a potential being of some state to an actual being in a different state. And that is part of my problem. Motion from place " A " to place " B " does nothing to change the being that is moving ( actually it does but as a side effect of the motion, per the theory of General Relativity).

According to Richa’s reference, it kind of sounds like even Thomas had some doubts about Aristotle’s account accidents.

Pax
Linus2nd

 

[Richca]

Hi, Imelahn,

When I said that accidents were " beings of a being " what I was reaching for was exactly what Thomas said. In other words they have no existence or reality on their own, they get their existence or reality through the being/substance in which they inhere. And I still hold to my position that motion, including local motion, is not a being in any sense, it is merely the process of reducing a potentiality to actuality, it is the action ( act ) of a being in a process of change. I read a comment by a well known philosopher ( can’t remember who now ) who said " you can’t convince me that local motion changes a being from a potential being of some state to an actual being in a different state. And that is part of my problem. Motion from place " A " to place " B " does nothing to change the being that is moving ( actually it does but as a side effect of the motion, per the theory of General Relativity).

According to Richa’s reference, it kind of sounds like even Thomas had some doubts about Aristotle’s account accidents.

Pax
Linus2nd

Hi Linus,
Motion or change including local motion involves being because every change involves something new, a new existent, something that was not there before the change. A being in potency is not an actual being, it doesn’t have actual existence; whereas a being in act is an actual being, it actually exists. Since motion is the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality this means that some kind of new being which was only a being in potency is now an actual being, a being in act.

“I read a comment by a well known philosopher ( can’t remember who now ) who said " you can’t convince me that local motion changes a being from a potential being of some state to an actual being in a different state.”

A body at rest and a body in local motion are not the same thing. This is the reduction of a potentially moveable body to a body that is actually moving.

“Motion from place " A " to place " B " does nothing to change the being that is moving.”

Place is an extrinsic accident or being of a thing. This of course is not a substantial change but an accidental change. Place is something real, it exists and is therefore a being. For example, the place of San Francisco is not the same place as the place of New York but both places exist. If your at your home presently, this is one place, and you go to the store in an hour, you would be at a different place. Or, if you take a walk in the park, your substance is acquiring different places in the park as you walk and is therefore changing, not substantially but accidentally.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Hi Linus,
Motion or change including local motion involves being because every change involves something new, a new existent, something that was not there before the change. A being in potency is not an actual being, it doesn’t have actual existence; whereas a being in act is an actual being, it actually exists. Since motion is the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality this means that some kind of new being which was only a being in potency is now an actual being, a being in act.

A body at rest and a body in local motion are not the same thing. This is the reduction of a potentially moveable body to a body that is actually moving.

Place is an extrinsic accident or being of a thing. This of course is not a substantial change but an accidental change. Place is something real, it exists and is therefore a being. For example, the place of San Francisco is not the same place as the place of New York but both places exist. If your at your home presently, this is one place, and you go to the store in an hour, you would be at a different place. Or, if you take a walk in the park, your substance is acquiring different places in the park as you walk and is therefore changing, not substantially but accidentally.

I know the arguments Richa, I just do not accept them as regards motion. There is a big difference in changing from pink to red ( sun burn ) and walking from place to place. In my book " walking " is no accident. It does not change my being/substance at all, while the sun burn does change my being/substance. Like I said, I reserve the right to be a little different .

Pax
Linus2nd

 

[lmelahn]

Hi Linus,
Motion or change including local motion involves being because every change involves something new, a new existent, something that was not there before the change. A being in potency is not an actual being, it doesn’t have actual existence; whereas a being in act is an actual being, it actually exists. Since motion is the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality this means that some kind of new being which was only a being in potency is now an actual being, a being in act.

A body at rest and a body in local motion are not the same thing. This is the reduction of a potentially moveable body to a body that is actually moving.

Place is an extrinsic accident or being of a thing. This of course is not a substantial change but an accidental change. Place is something real, it exists and is therefore a being. For example, the place of San Francisco is not the same place as the place of New York but both places exist. If your at your home presently, this is one place, and you go to the store in an hour, you would be at a different place. Or, if you take a walk in the park, your substance is acquiring different places in the park as you walk and is therefore changing, not substantially but accidentally.

I think I am more in agreement with Linus2nd on this one. These are the ten figures of attribution (a.k.a. categories) given by Aristotle:

1. 
   *]“What is it” (substance or essence)
   *]“How much” (quantity)
   *]“Which” (quality)
   *]“Toward which” (relation)
   *]“Where” (location)
   *]“When” (time)
   *]“Lying down” (position)
   *]“Having” (possession)
   *]“Making or doing” (action)
   *]“Undergoing” (passion)
   
   (These come from Categories I and Topics A, 9. In some of his lists of categories, Aristotle omits the “lying down” and the “having.”)
   
   If you look carefully at the list, only quantity and quality entail an “inherence” in the full sense. Action and passion are actually produced (or undergone) by the substance’s qualities; hence they are one step further removed.
   
   The, the rest of the categories are actually all examples of relations: spatial relations (either extrinsic, as with location; or intrinsic, as with position), temporal relations (time), and relations of “ownership” (possession). They are all, so to speak two steps removed from substance.
   
   So it depends what you mean when you say, “A body at rest and a body in local motion are not the same thing.” In the case of local movement, the substance of the body remains the same (barring a substantial change); its external spatial relations (i.e., its location) change.
   
   If you read the Physics (especially Book IV), you may be surprised to discover that Aristotle has a surprisingly “modern” understanding of spatial relations, much more than modern physicists give him credit for. He understands that the “where” (location) of a body is always relative to the other bodies. The universe (the “heavens,” for Aristotle) is not located in a place, because outside the universe there is nothing (i.e., nothing material). (I don’t think that Aristotle quite got around thinking of the earth as the immobile point of reference for all bodies, but that is to be expected.)
   
   So, whenever there is local movement, the only thing that changes is the mutual spatial relations among bodies. Yes, relations are accidents, and as accidents they inhere in a substance, but they do so very weakly.

 

[Richca]

Note that being, purely and simply, is that which exists of itself, is a substance. it is something that has or is a nature in reality - man, angel, God, horse, iron, air, water, etc.

Being purely and simply does not mean that which exists of itself. That which exists or subsists of itself is the definition of substance. Being, as you indicate below, is defined as that or something which actually is or which actually exists. Being can also indicate something having existence.
God cannot properly be called a substance for a number of reasons. First, God is not in any genus and substance is the first category or genus of the kinds of beings in the ten categories. Second, substance which comes from the latin substantia and which literally means to stand under is the subject of accidents. God is neither a subject nor does He stand under any accidents.

Further being is defined even in the dictionaries as that which is

 

[Richca]

I think I am more in agreement with Linus2nd on this one. These are the ten figures of attribution (a.k.a. categories) given by Aristotle:

1. 
   *]“What is it” (substance or essence)
   *]“How much” (quantity)
   *]“Which” (quality)
   *]“Toward which” (relation)
   *]“Where” (location)
   *]“When” (time)
   *]“Lying down” (position)
   *]“Having” (possession)
   *]“Making or doing” (action)
   *]“Undergoing” (passion)
   
   (These come from Categories I and Topics A, 9. In some of his lists of categories, Aristotle omits the “lying down” and the “having.”)
   
   If you look carefully at the list, only quantity and quality entail an “inherence” in the full sense. Action and passion are actually produced (or undergone) by the substance’s qualities; hence they are one step further removed.
   
   The, the rest of the categories are actually all examples of relations: spatial relations (either extrinsic, as with location; or intrinsic, as with position), temporal relations (time), and relations of “ownership” (possession). They are all, so to speak two steps removed from substance.
   
   So it depends what you mean when you say, “A body at rest and a body in local motion are not the same thing.” In the case of local movement, the substance of the body remains the same (barring a substantial change); its external spatial relations (i.e., its location) change.
   
   If you read the Physics (especially Book IV), you may be surprised to discover that Aristotle has a surprisingly “modern” understanding of spatial relations, much more than modern physicists give him credit for. He understands that the “where” (location) of a body is always relative to the other bodies. The universe (the “heavens,” for Aristotle) is not located in a place, because outside the universe there is nothing (i.e., nothing material). (I don’t think that Aristotle quite got around thinking of the earth as the immobile point of reference for all bodies, but that is to be expected.)
   
   So, whenever there is local movement, the only thing that changes is the mutual spatial relations among bodies. Yes, relations are accidents, and as accidents they inhere in a substance, but they do so very weakly.

1. 
   Hi Imelahn,
   I think I understand what your getting at here but at the same time I sort of don’t. When you say that relations are accidents that inhere in a substance, but they do so very weakly, this makes me wonder whether relations and probably other accidents are sort of in between being and non being which would in turn probably make Linus think as he seems too that there are at least some accidents that are not beings at all. If they are not beings nor substances, I don’t know what you call them except a non being. If they are not a being, how do you name something that doesn’t exist?
   
   There is no middle ground or proportion between being and non-being. Either something is or it isn’t whether this be the least actual being or the greatest actual being.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Being purely and simply does not mean that which exists of itself. That which exists or subsists of itself is the definition of substance. Being, as you indicate below, is defined as that or something which actually is or which actually exists. Being can also indicate something having existence.
God cannot properly be called a substance for a number of reasons. First, God is not in any genus and substance is the first category or genus of the kinds of beings in the ten categories. Second, substance which comes from the latin substantia and which literally means to stand under

 

[lmelahn]

Hi Imelahn,
I think I understand what your getting at here but at the same time I sort of don’t. When you say that relations are accidents that inhere in a substance, but they do so very weakly, this makes me wonder whether relations and probably other accidents are sort of in between being and non being which would in turn probably make Linus think as he seems too that there are at least some accidents that are not beings at all. If they are not beings nor substances, I don’t know what you call them except a non being. If they are not a being, how do you name something that doesn’t exist?

There is no middle ground or proportion between being and non-being. Either something is or it isn’t whether this be the least actual being or the greatest actual being.

Between being and non-being there is no proportion (because non-being is what Thomas would call an ens rationis: something that “exists” only in our minds).

However, there is a proportion among beings. I respectfully disagree with Linus2nd if he says that some kinds of accidents are non-beings.

According to Aquinas, beings (entia) display a two-fold hierarchy: a “vertical” one (angels are more perfect beings than men, who are more perfect than animals, and so on); and a “horizontal” one (substance is more of a being than a quality, which is more of a being than an an action or passion, which is more of a being than a relation).

A good image is a light with a dimmer switch: there is a sharp distinction between the light being on or off; but assuming that the light is on, there are a lot of possible degrees of brightness.

An even better image, for the purposes of a substance and its inherent accidents, is a fountain: the “substance” is like the fountain itself. Its act of being is like the well or other store of water that is its source. The qualities and quantity, which are “proximate” to the substance, are like the water that bursts out at high pressure. The other, more derived accidents (action, passion, and the various relations) are like the water that trickles out of the fountain. It is all water (being), but some of it (i.e., the substance) participates more fully in the source (the act of being) than other parts (the accidents). And even among accidents, some participate more fully than others.

 

[lmelahn]

…]

We all know that St Thomas taught the real distinction between essence and existence in created beings as the ultimate composition in creatures. The english word existence here, however, does not quite capture St Thomas’ thought. Existence is a noun though it is some kind of derivative of the verb exist, possibly a participle (I’m not wholly up on my English grammer). The actual latin words St Thomas used for the distinction between essence and existence are essentia and the verb* esse*. Esse here for St Thomas means the act of being.

In Aquinas’ day, existentia still had its classical meaning, which comes from exsisto, “to emerge” or “to stand out” (ex-, “out of” + sisto, “to stand”). For example, a wolf exsistit from its den. Hence, existentia in Aquinas means roughly “manifestation” or “appearance.” (That is actually fairly close to the meaning that Kant gives the term later on.)

It was, so to speak, the philosophical rivals of St. Thomas (Henry of Ghent, Bl. Duns Scotus) who popularized the term existentia to mean the “the fact that something is.”

This terminology was then taken up by the commentators of St. Thomas, especially Thomas de Vio (Cajetan) in his commentary on the Summa. However, in doing so, the commentators, in my opinion, greatly reduced the richness of the term “to be” (esse). Even in English, “existence” has only a tiny sliver of the meaning that “being” does.

That is why I am not fond of the way the traditional English translation of the Summa continually translates esse as “existence.” (I expect that they were influenced by Cajetan’s commentary.)

 

[Richca]

In Aquinas’ day, existentia still had its classical meaning, which comes from exsisto, “to emerge” or “to stand out” (ex-, “out of” + sisto, “to stand”). For example, a wolf exsistit from its den. Hence, existentia in Aquinas means roughly “manifestation” or “appearance.” (That is actually fairly close to the meaning that Kant gives the term later on.)

It was, so to speak, the philosophical rivals of St. Thomas (Henry of Ghent, Bl. Duns Scotus) who popularized the term existentia to mean the “the fact that something is.”

This terminology was then taken up by the commentators of St. Thomas, especially Thomas de Vio (Cajetan) in his commentary on the Summa. However, in doing so, the commentators, in my opinion, greatly reduced the richness of the term “to be” (esse). Even in English, “existence” has only a tiny sliver of the meaning that “being” does.

That is why I am not fond of the way the traditional English translation of the Summa continually translates esse as “existence.” (I expect that they were influenced by Cajetan’s commentary.)

Imelahn,
Thank you for the information. I find it very interesting. I do have a few questions on which I’d like to see your opinion or thought on when you get a chance.
Apparently, we get our english word exist and existence from the latin existentia. As you note, the etymology of existentia means something like “to stand out.” This is like opposite of the word substance which means to stand under. We would think that existence should be something that underlies everything such as being and like a first act of everything as Aquinas gives to esse. Maybe this is why St Thomas didn’t use existentia for “to stand out” or emerge from seems to me more like an accident which is what some of the Arabian philosophers thought of existence I believe. What word these Arabian philosophers used that we normally find translated as existence, I don’t know, it may have been something like esse.

In the ST, I, q.2 , the title in latin is “Queastio 2, de Deo, an Deus sit.” The word “sit” is from the verb esse. The ST english translation from the Fathers of the English Dominican Province, 1920, have here for the title of question 2, The Existence of God. The Thomas Gilby and others new english translation, 1960’s, appears to be more accurate, they have “whether there is a God.” They are being more faithful to the verb esse which includes “is” in it.
The third article of question 2 is titled “an Deos sit.” Here again, the older translation has “whether God exists.” The newer translation has “is there a God.” Again the newer translation is more faithful to the word “sit,” which is our english “is.”

In the Merriam Webster dictionary I’m looking at under the word “exist,” they define this word mainly as to have being or real being This, I think, is similar to “ens” which involves an essence that has the act of being or esse. This is the being of a creature but not God who doesn’t have being but is being or esse.

You mention above, that in english ‘existence’ has only a tiny sliver of the meaing “being” does. I’m wondering if your referring to esse here and not ens. I’m also wondering if in today’s usage of the verb “exist” if we said “to exist” and thought of it as an act for it is a verb, and then said the act of existing, if this would be equivalent or somewhat equivalent to esse, the act of being?

If to exist or existence means the fact of being, then this obviously is not the act of being. Can to exist mean the act of existing though? If we go to the etymology of the verb exist or the noun existence, “to stand out” “emerge from,” then this I think is not what St Thomas has in mind about esse or the act of being. For it appears to me that everthing emerges from esse and not the other way around. It is the first act for if anything acts it must first be. This brings up another question, though being is the most universal concept we have, it applies to everything that is, it appears to me that St Thomas may be reducing ens (being) to esse (is). For esse is the root of ens just like be is the root of being. When St Thomas talks about God’s being, I believe he generally except in a few instances just uses esse. The being of creatures is ens. Being (ens) is composite and involves a subject with the act of being. Due to God’s absolute simplicity, he is not the subject of anything as this would imply He is composite. God is simply esse. Or if we do say ens for God, we can’t think of God as having an essence and an esse as if God is composite. They need to be fused into one with the esse possibly absorbing the essence. St Thomas says that God’s essence and esse are identical, or rather, God’s essence is esse. I think Avicenna thought that God doesn’t even have an essence but I don’t think St Thomas went quite this far. Although St Thomas does say God is IPSUM ESSE SUBSISTENS.

I guess I’m hung up on thinking that being and existing are like the same (this could be due to how in the present day we use the terms or think about them) although their etymology are different. Probably just best when expounding or trying to understand St Thomas to stick with the terms he used as well as what he meant by them. What adds to the possible confusion is that in a great many authors who write about St Thomas or the history of philosophy ( such as Frederick Copleston) or theology, many of them translate esse as existence. The problem here is that existence is a noun and esse is a verb and an act.

Thanks, God bless, Richca