What's wrong with this argument against the existence of God?

[Angela77]

#2 is flawed. If this person really wants to prove God doesn’t exist, they’re going to need more steps between 1 and 2.

1. I don’t understand #2.
2. Therefore, the rest of the argument is fallacious in my mind.

 

[Perplexity]

Perplexity

Ironically, if you can only object to this argument by appealing to your theology, your theology is severely undermined.

You perhaps did not notice that I also appealed to Plato, who was not a Catholic.

The syllogism to which you refer can only appeal to someone who is already an atheist.

How’s that for irony?

I don’t know what you mean that the syllogism can only appeal to atheists. Which premise presupposes atheism? It’s true you quoted Plato, but I’m not sure that’s any better. He simply asserts something…no reason to agree with him.

 

[Charlemagne_II]

Perplexity

**It’s true you quoted Plato, but I’m not sure that’s any better. He simply asserts something…no reason to agree with him. **

As any theist can tell you, no reason not to agree with him. And if one detects, as I do, a fundamental anger behind atheism, that alone gives one pause to suspect an unsettled mind.

I don’t know what you mean that the syllogism can only appeal to atheists. Which premise presupposes atheism?

#3 Reasonable non-belief occurs.

Why is non-belief reasonable unless you are already an atheist?

 

[GreggAlvarez]

The other objectors to (2) were Gregg and ASimon. But, Gregg thinks (2) is an assumption when it’s a premise and only says it’s false without explaining why so I won’t respond to that. ASimon wondered why reasonable non-belief means God isn’t all loving. I think my above explication responds to that as well.

I didn’t need to explain why. The OP didn’t ask for reasons. But, if you insist, I will explain later, so you could have even more things to rationalize against…

 

[tonyrey]

Correct me if I’m wrong, but you’re response is that (2) is still false because as long as reasonable non-belief doesn’t “dispose of your opportunity for a loving relationship with God”, then reasonable non-belief isn’t reason to think a loving God doesn’t exist?

My point is that reasonable non-belief ceases to be possible after you die when you become aware that God exists. Since a loving relationship with God cannot be fulfilled in this life it must be fulfilled in the next. Otherwise the whole foundation of your argument disappears…

“(4) A further misunderstanding that readers should beware of involves conflating what my argument claims-that if God exists, reasonable nonbelief does not occur-with “If God exists, reasonable nonbelievers receive evidence sufficient for belief.” What the former claim says is that if God exists, there is never a time when someone inculpably fails to believe (belief is made available as soon as there is a capacity for relationship with God). In other words, if there is a God, there are no reasonable nonbelievers about who may be treated in the imagined fashion. So it is no use showing that God would not interrupt the lives of reasonable nonbelievers with evidence; what we need is a way of understanding how God could have permitted them to become reasonable nonbelievers in the first place.” - p. ix.

1. You are setting up arbitrary conditions to suit your preconceived conclusion that if God exists reasonable nonbelief cannot occur.
2. It is absurd to claim that it is possible that there is never a time when someone inculpably fails to believe because that claim entails human infallibility with regard to God’s existence!
3. Precisely how would one be unerringly certain unless there were coercive evidence (not presented in your scenario) that God exists without any room for doubt whatsoever?
4. It is a highly unrealistic scenario which is totally at odds with daily life in this world. Being a philosopher have you never doubted your own existence or the existence of material objects, let alone the (non)existence of God? Is Hume’s “a bundle of perceptions” hypothesis an impossibility?
5. What we need is a way of understanding precisely how God could have prevented everyone from ever becoming a reasonable nonbeliever!

 

[tonyrey]

The answer to this argument lies in a joke:

Q: What is the difference between God and an atheist?

A: God doesn’t think He’s an atheist.

Most atheist arguments against God rely upon the atheist being able to state, with certainty, what God would or would not do, or should or should not do, to be able to satisfy the atheist’s philosophical demands. Assumption of the right to decide how God should and must act does not constitute a sound argument. It’s just a simple domain error on the part of the atheist.

Thus, the atheist may insist that God’s omnibenevolence requires that He must act this way or that, while the atheist overlooks that God is not only all-Good, but all-Just. The balance between those two attributes can be balanced only if God is also omniscient. As God sees The Big Picture from His proleptic perspective, only He can decide if an action is good and just, based on the almost infinite chain of events and actions and reactions that each moral choice and action cause to reverberate down through our perception of time.

So, if the need for humans to exercise free will is a greater good that, say, God treating us all like his special little pets and not permitting any harm or doubt to come to any of us - thus, abrogating our ability to show compassion, fortitude, courage, faith, hope, or charity - it would be difficult for an atheist to argue that his perspective is the “correct” one on the morality of how God should act. The atheist lacks the necessary perspective or knowledge to judge God’s actions.

All Schellenberg’s argument proves is that God is not an atheist, nor does He think like one. For which we should all be thankful.

I wouldn’t want to be obliged to refute your logic.

 

[maryh10000]

I said:
Schellenberg equates “reasonable doubt” and “reasonable non-belief”. It is not clear to me that the too are the same. I may have reasonable doubt about something and yet still believe it to be true. Or is the assumption that belief cannot exist in the presence of any reasonable doubt?

If what Schellenberg means by “reasonable non-belief” is in fact “reasonable doubt”, then he must first show the equivalence of the two. Has he?

Schellenberg draws all sorts of distinctions here. He devotes an entire chapter to this (and remarks about it elsewhere as well). I think the reason he interchanges these is because non-belief doesn’t involve ignorance. That is, it is a doubt. (in deliberately not believing, S is doubting)

It looks like you are stating that non-belief is equivalent to doubt either because, or when, they both don’t involve ignorance.

Again, it is perfectly possible/reasonable to believe something while still maintaining some reasonable doubt.

If that is what Schellenberg is actually saying, then his argument is not that a loving God should not allow reasonable non-belief but that a loving God should not allow reasonable doubt.

To show that the two are not necessarily the same:
I may believe when I go to the dentist for root canal work, I will not be killed by the procedure. That is reasonable.
However, sometimes things go wrong and people actually do die from the procedure. Therefore I harbor a small, albeit reasonable doubt, along with my belief.

Perhaps in the chapter you reference, he does a better job of showing the equivalence. But as the problem has been stated so far, there is no clear definition of what “reasonable non-belief” means - there is only a definition of what “reasonable doubt” means.

 

[Cleb_Calimutan]

1. If God exists, then God is all loving.
2. If an all loving God exists, reasonable non-belief does not occur.
3. Reasonable non-belief occurs.
4. Therefore, an all loving God doesn’t exist.
5. Therefore, God doesn’t exist.

Do you think this is a good argument? Does it prove logically that God does not exist? It does not look like a good argument to me.

Response: The error is on “reasonable non-belief occurs” for it is still begging he needs to prove first that statement before he could proceed to line no.4 and 5. I’s sorry but his argument is not appealing with me.

 

[Perplexity]

I said:
Schellenberg equates “reasonable doubt” and “reasonable non-belief”. It is not clear to me that the too are the same. I may have reasonable doubt about something and yet still believe it to be true. Or is the assumption that belief cannot exist in the presence of any reasonable doubt?

If what Schellenberg means by “reasonable non-belief” is in fact “reasonable doubt”, then he must first show the equivalence of the two. Has he?

It looks like you are stating that non-belief is equivalent to doubt either because, or when, they both don’t involve ignorance.

Again, it is perfectly possible/reasonable to believe something while still maintaining some reasonable doubt.

If that is what Schellenberg is actually saying, then his argument is not that a loving God should not allow reasonable non-belief but that a loving God should not allow reasonable doubt.

To show that the two are not necessarily the same:
I may believe when I go to the dentist for root canal work, I will not be killed by the procedure. That is reasonable.
However, sometimes things go wrong and people actually do die from the procedure. Therefore I harbor a small, albeit reasonable doubt, along with my belief.

Perhaps in the chapter you reference, he does a better job of showing the equivalence. But as the problem has been stated so far, there is no clear definition of what “reasonable non-belief” means - there is only a definition of what “reasonable doubt” means.

“Given present concerns, the expression “is in doubt about G” is to be preferred to “doubts whether (or that) G.” The latter is most naturally construed as “is inclined to disbelieve G,” and this is not a meaning I wish to convey. Doubt is also sometimes understood in such a way as to be compatible with belief, and this too is a view from which mine must be distinguished. On the understanding assumed here, one who doubts neither believes nor disbelieves that G. To put it another way: doubt is identified with the point midway between belief and disbelief.” - p. 59

“Again, it is perfectly possible/reasonable to believe something while still maintaining some reasonable doubt.”

In the sentence immediately above, ‘doubt’ means something different from what Schellenberg means by it. So, while we can grant that on the understanding of ‘doubt’ you’re working with, “it is perfectly possible/reasonable to believe something while still maintaining some reasonable doubt”, we couldn’t do so with Schellenberg’s clarified sense.

 

[Perplexity]

The answer to this argument lies in a joke:

Q: What is the difference between God and an atheist?

A: God doesn’t think He’s an atheist.

Most atheist arguments against God rely upon the atheist being able to state, with certainty, what God would or would not do, or should or should not do, to be able to satisfy the atheist’s philosophical demands. Assumption of the right to decide how God should and must act does not constitute a sound argument. It’s just a simple domain error on the part of the atheist.

Thus, the atheist may insist that God’s omnibenevolence requires that He must act this way or that, while the atheist overlooks that God is not only all-Good, but all-Just. The balance between those two attributes can be balanced only if God is also omniscient. As God sees The Big Picture from His proleptic perspective, only He can decide if an action is good and just, based on the almost infinite chain of events and actions and reactions that each moral choice and action cause to reverberate down through our perception of time.

So, if the need for humans to exercise free will is a greater good that, say, God treating us all like his special little pets and not permitting any harm or doubt to come to any of us - thus, abrogating our ability to show compassion, fortitude, courage, faith, hope, or charity - it would be difficult for an atheist to argue that his perspective is the “correct” one on the morality of how God should act. The atheist lacks the necessary perspective or knowledge to judge God’s actions.

All Schellenberg’s argument proves is that God is not an atheist, nor does He think like one. For which we should all be thankful.

I don’t think theists or atheists should find the above argument compelling. For starters, nobody actually thinks we can’t be certain that God could do or not do certain actions. If I were to ask you whether God could incarnate as a woman, get pregnant despite using contraceptives and then commit an abortion…you’ll probably say “no, that’s impossible.” lol. I could think of numerous examples of actions you’re certain God could or couldn’t commit. Further, you’re certain God will do or will not do certain things. For example, you’re certain that God will actually try and save sinners. You’re certain that God will not abandon the Catholic Church. etc. etc. ad infinitum.

What’s worse is that you think an action’s moral status can only be known by God. So, we can’t be sure that action (x) of stealing is actually immoral, because it could result in a chain of events culminating in a far greater good. And so forth for any of the other things we take ourselves to know the moral status of. I think this moral theory is devastating for everyone.

Finally, if it’s really true that God’s moral character is beyond our ken, then we can’t really be sure that God isn’t morally justified in lying to us. That is, if we take your argument seriously, we’re not in a position to know with any kind of confidence that God doesn’t have some unknown moral justification for deceiving everyone and telling them that if they believe Jesus is God they’ll be saved, or in telling them _______. If you disagree, you’re taking your stand with the very atheists you’ve tried to critique here.

 

[danserr]

This is the argument from divine hiddenness or “why doesn’t God make His existence more obvious?”

J.L. Schellenberg, and he presents the argument in his book entitled: Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason.

1. If God exists, then God is all loving.
2. If an all loving God exists, reasonable non-belief does not occur.
3. Reasonable non-belief occurs.
4. Therefore, an all loving God doesn’t exist.
5. Therefore, God doesn’t exist.

The theist can attack either premise 2 or premise 3. I think between the two premises there are at least three problems with the argument. Premise 2 seems dubitable on at least 2 grounds and premise 3 on one. So here are three possible objections to the argument.

1. Premise 2 is not obviously true, it argues that there is a contradiction between the existence of God and the existence of reasonable non-belief. But this is not obviously true, it would have to be argued. What is more, this premise seems obviously false since we can add another premise:

2’ God has morally sufficient reasons for allow the existence of reasonable unbelief.

The atheist, therefore, must show that God does not have such reasons, but how could he know this? He would have to say, “well the best I can see, God does not have such reasons, so there isn’t one.” This is a nonseum inference (I don’t see an elephant in the bedroom, so there isn’t one). But some nonseum inferences are bad (I don’t see bacteria in the bedroom, so there aren’t any. The first inference is good, the second bad. A nonseum inference is bad when a person is not well placed to make it. I am not well placed to see if there are bacteria in the bedroom, so to claim that there are none there because I do not see any is a flawed argument.

Similarly, as finite, limited creatures, we are not well placed to assess if an morally perfect, omnipotent, omniscient being has morally sufficient reasons for allowing the existence of rational unbelief. To assume there are none because we see none would be like a child, (or me) looking at a complicated mathematical equation and saying “because I do not see an answer to that question, there isn’t one."

In short, when one hears someone say “if God exists, he would do x,” our immediate response should be “how would you know?”

1. Even if one doubts the above, one can go further, and suggest that we can know why God would allow reasonable non-belief (or why God does not make his existence obvious). In short, God making his existence as obvious as skeptics demand would interfere with free will.

Michael Murray has pointed out that God values the free will of his creatures as a very great good (necessary to come into a loving relationship with Him). Yet for this free will to exist, there must be a lack of pervasive coercion. For instance, if there were a policeman on every street corner, no one would ever speed or run red lights. A world of pervasive coercion would be a world where morally significant freedom would be impossible. If God became the moral police, always telling us exactly what to do and think, then morally significant human freedom would be impossible.

To put it another way, a woman does not freely marry a man if she does so because he threatens to kill her. Similarly, one could not freely choose to belief in God were that choice preceded by a full guided tour of hell.

By decreasing the immediacy of his existence, God prevents this pervasive coercion and safeguards human freedom.

1. Premise 3 also seems dubitable. It is not obvious that reasonable unbelief occurs. Many people deny God on non-rational grounds.

• I have read Heidegger, the German atheist, quoted as saying “if God’s existence could be proven with a mathematical certainty, I would still deny it, because it would limit my freedom.”
• Satre said that “I reject God because he would limit my amours”
• One girl said she became “spiritual but not religious” when “I decided that I bow to no one.”

Certainly many people reject God on non-rational grounds. Christian sexual ethics are very unpopular (as they always have been), for instance; many will deny God simply because they don’t like Christian moral teaching.
John, for instance, says that “the light came into the world, but men loved the darkness rather than the light because their works were evil. St. Paul says something similar in Romans 1:18.

The main way atheists are apt to respond against this is to get offended, “how dare you say I am not rational?” But that is not an argument.

Another consideration 1: This is related to some above, but is another consideration. What God wants is not mere belief in him, but that people should enter into a saving relationship with him. It is not clear that more people would do so, if his existence were more obvious.

There is another consideration that suggests that maybe God uses his middle knowledge to ensure that those who would respond with an open mind and heart to his revelation get that revelation, and that anyone who does not receive sufficient evidence would not have responded even if they had received it. This would take more space to argue, but I mention it as a possibility.

I think the Christian can plausibly hold that God provides enough evidence to people who are open to seeking him, but not enough to compel those whose hearts are closed.

 

[Nate13]

“Given present concerns, the expression “is in doubt about G” is to be preferred to “doubts whether (or that) G.” The latter is most naturally construed as “is inclined to disbelieve G,” and this is not a meaning I wish to convey. Doubt is also sometimes understood in such a way as to be compatible with belief, and this too is a view from which mine must be distinguished. On the understanding assumed here, one who doubts neither believes nor disbelieves that G. To put it another way: doubt is identified with the point midway between belief and disbelief.” - p. 59

“Again, it is perfectly possible/reasonable to believe something while still maintaining some reasonable doubt.”

In the sentence immediately above, ‘doubt’ means something different from what Schellenberg means by it. So, while we can grant that on the understanding of ‘doubt’ you’re working with, “it is perfectly possible/reasonable to believe something while still maintaining some reasonable doubt”, we couldn’t do so with Schellenberg’s clarified sense.

So what your telling me is that his argument should have come with a P.S that said “This argument only applies if you have the same definition of doubt as I do”… It seems he is effectively saying it is impossible to ever say I believe in something or not believe in something. Who can reasonably say they believe something without even a shred of doubt? It might be considered negligible doubt but is that not still doubt? Maybe he applies a mulligan rule to doubt and when you get really really close to belief or disbelief you just call it good… I have to ask though, how good is an argument that stands on the fact that I can never say I completely believe it or disbelieve it?

 

[Perplexity]

1. Premise 2 is not obviously true…it would have to be argued.

Schellenberg’s book is divided into two parts, I’d say the first part (roughly 80 pages) is largely devoted to premise (2), although he obviously defends the other premises here as well.

What is more, this premise seems obviously false since we can add another premise:

2’ God has morally sufficient reasons for allow the existence of reasonable unbelief.

Cf. the following link to a post in which I offer an objection to skeptical theism.

1. Even if one doubts the above, one can go further, and suggest that we can know why God would allow reasonable non-belief (or why God does not make his existence obvious). In short, God making his existence as obvious as skeptics demand would interfere with free will.

Schellenberg devotes an entire chapter (Chp. 5) to arguing that his argument doesn’t imply any interference with free will. In fact, he lists free will as one of his assumptions.

The relationship Schellenberg argues God would have to propose to every person the instant they’re capable of entering into it is one of minimal confidence in God’s existence. Since this relationship is necessarily developmental there must be a base. He says the degree of confidence people would have could be overcome by things like self-deception. So, there is no coercion implied by Schellenberg’s argument.

1. Premise 3 also seems dubitable. It is not obvious that reasonable unbelief occurs. Many people deny God on non-rational grounds.

By reasonable non-belief, Schellenberg means:

“S is inculpably in doubt about the truth of G if (1) S believes that epistemic parity obtains between G and not-G, and (2) S has not knowingly (self-deceptively or non-self deceptively) neglected to submit this belief to adequate investigation.” - p. 64.

Further, he clarifies what he means by doubt as:

“Given present concerns, the expression “is in doubt about G” is to be preferred to “doubts whether (or that) G.” The latter is most naturally construed as “is inclined to disbelieve G,” and this is not a meaning I wish to convey. Doubt is also sometimes understood in such a way as to be compatible with belief, and this too is a view from which mine must be distinguished. On the understanding assumed here, one who doubts neither believes nor disbelieves that G. To put it another way: doubt is identified with the point midway between belief and disbelief.” - p. 59

So, I think he has more in mind sincere agnosticism. Surely, there are such people? Or at least have been?

Another consideration 1: This is related to some above, but is another consideration. What God wants is not mere belief in him, but that people should enter into a saving relationship with him. It is not clear that more people would do so, if his existence were more obvious.

Schellenberg stands this on its head: it’s precisely because God desires such a relationship, that everyone would have a minimal confidence in God’s existence (initially) unless and until they culpably deceived themselves.

There is another consideration that suggests that maybe God uses his middle knowledge to ensure that those who would respond with an open mind and heart to his revelation get that revelation, and that anyone who does not receive sufficient evidence would not have responded even if they had received it. This would take more space to argue, but I mention it as a possibility.

This is tricky because it doesn’t sound like the scenario you’re describing includes the reasonable non-belief Schellenberg discusses. If it does, I think Schellenberg would say Divine Love precludes such a world from being actualized.

 

[Charlemagne_II]

danserr

**I think the Christian can plausibly hold that God provides enough evidence to people who are open to seeking him, but not enough to compel those whose hearts are closed. **

You share in the genius of Blaise Pascal!

“It would not have been right, therefore, for Him [God] to appear in a way that was plainly divine and absolutely bound to convince all mankind; but it was not right either that he should come in a manner so hidden that He could not be recognized by those who sought Him sincerely. He chose to make Himself perfectly knowable to them; and thus, wishing to appear openly to those who sought Him with all their heart, and hidden from those who flee Him with all their heart, He tempered the knowledge of Himself, with the result that He had given signs of Himself which are visible to those who seek Him, and not to those who do not seek Him.” Pensees

 

[JDaniel]

Schellenberg’s book is divided into two parts, I’d say the first part (roughly 80 pages) is largely devoted to premise (2), although he obviously defends the other premises here as well.

Perplexity:

A plethora of words does not equal a truth proposition. You should know that. All you have to do is read, then re-read the premise a time or two to realize that it must be “colored” by the writer’s bias to pass it off as a truth-statement. That is prima facie obvious.

Cf. the following link to a post in which I offer an objection to skeptical theism.

Absurd.

Schellenberg devotes an entire chapter (Chp. 5) to arguing that his argument doesn’t imply any interference with free will. In fact, he lists free will as one of his assumptions.

Considering the personal bias coloration of his second premise, we’re supposed to believe that his entire chapter 5 is unimpeachable?

The relationship Schellenberg argues God would have to propose to every person the instant they’re capable of entering into it is one of minimal confidence in God’s existence.

Why? Are there no “cradle-Catholics?”

Since this relationship is necessarily developmental there must be a base. He says the degree of confidence people would have could be overcome by things like self-deception.

Or, by unimpeachable logical conclusions or Revelation.

So, there is no coercion implied by Schellenberg’s argument.

So?

By reasonable non-belief, Schellenberg means:
“S is inculpably in doubt about the truth of G if (1) S believes that epistemic parity obtains between G and not-G, and (2) S has not knowingly (self-deceptively or non-self deceptively) neglected to submit this belief to adequate investigation.” - p. 64.

The facts of the matter are: (1) cradle-Catholics exist, and (2) adherents exist that have undergone more than adequate a priori investigation. Many (if not most) of group (2) have specifically employed a rigorous means of disabusing self-deception. How? By themselves first becoming non-theists, then slowly climbing, or more appropriately, swimming, their way back.

Further, he clarifies what he means by doubt as:

“Given present concerns, the expression “is in doubt about G” is to be preferred to “doubts whether (or that) G.” The latter is most naturally construed as “is inclined to disbelieve G,” and this is not a meaning I wish to convey. Doubt is also sometimes understood in such a way as to be compatible with belief, and this too is a view from which mine must be distinguished. On the understanding assumed here, one who doubts neither believes nor disbelieves that G. To put it another way: doubt is identified with the point midway between belief and disbelief.” - p. 59

I would agree with almost all of the above except for one word, and his conclusion. I would exchange the word “compatible” for the word “synonymous.” And, I certainly would not agree that “doubt” is some “mid-point between belief and disbelief.” There is absolutely no warrant anywhere for that conclusion. It’s is another absurd, ground-less conclusion. Do you really think his two clarifications truly warrant his conclusion? If you do, then you are very much to the side of those who hold to his first clarification - which he says he disavows. I think you have bought the line, as is said.

So, I think he has more in mind sincere agnosticism. Surely, there are such people? Or at least have been?

I could accept this provided agnosticism is not pigeonholed into some “mid-way point between belief and disbelief.” No one is exactly mid-way. Agnostics, in general, more than likely range from the left to the right. The person who’s position is exactly mid-way, is probably a moron. Seriously. (No dis-respect intended to any readers, including me!)

Schellenberg stands this on its head: it’s precisely because God desires such a relationship, that everyone would have a minimal confidence in God’s existence (initially) unless and until they culpably deceived themselves.

Well, there you have it! Since he does not believe in God, in the least, he has no conception of, and gives no credence to, Grace and the Providential workings of the Holy Ghost. Thus, in his view, man is god.

This is tricky because it doesn’t sound like the scenario you’re describing includes the reasonable non-belief Schellenberg discusses. If it does, I think Schellenberg would say Divine Love precludes such a world from being actualized.

I believe any one of the Christians on this forum can see through his so-called “cogent” arguments. I am so glad that I didn’t have to wade through 80 pages! Thank you for sharing.

God bless,
jd

 

[Charlemagne_II]

As former atheist Peter Hitchens points out in The Rage against God, it isn’t that the atheist can objectively prove there is no God. It’s that he doesn’t want there to be a God. He then cobbles together arguments that fit his want, rather than arguments that fit the wants of logic and truth.

 

[Pieman333272]

I just recently learned about this argument for atheism on another thread. It is by a current professor of Oxford, J.L. Schellenberg, and he presents the argument in his book entitled: Divine Hiddennes and Human Reason.

1. If God exists, then God is all loving.
2. If an all loving God exists, reasonable non-belief does not occur.
3. Reasonable non-belief occurs.
4. Therefore, an all loving God doesn’t exist.
5. Therefore, God doesn’t exist.

Do you think this is a good argument? Does it prove logically that God does not exist? It does not look like a good argument to me.

How does one justify premise two at all? Even if we affirm that God actively reveals himself (which I do), the premise just doesn’t fly. Now, perhaps it could be rephrased to mean God doesn’t let RNB occur because atheists with RNB would go to hell. But that is disputable, and even so there is an abundance of scriptural evidence to indicate hell isn’t a place of torment as they like to imply.

Premise 3 also has problems, as it assumes some form of actual willed non-belief is reasonable, which is extremely debatable as well.

 

[danserr]

If it does, I think Schellenberg would say Divine Love precludes such a world from being actualized.

1. So, I ended up making 4 objections to the argument from divine hiddenness. I am going to start with the last in my reply, since it seems to be the one you and I come closest to agreeing is plausible.

I suggested: Perhaps God providentially arranges the world so that those who do not receive sufficient evidence of his existence (if indeed, there are any such) are people who would not have responded to that evidence even if they did have it.

• This view is compatible with there being rational atheists, it simply holds that those atheists would not believe believe in God(or more importantly- come to a saving relationship with Him) even if He did make his existence more obvious.

You respond: Since this allows for rational unbelief, it must be rejected.

• But I think my explanation shows why this is not true. Those rational unbelievers (if there be any) would not have accepted God even if he did reveal himself sufficiently clearly to render their unbelief irrational. Since they would not have responded anyway, God’s loving nature is not called into question.

under this heading I will add:

What God wants is not mere belief in him, but that people should enter into a saving relationship with him. It is not clear that more people would do so, if his existence were more obvious.

Schellenberg stands this on its head: it’s precisely because God desires such a relationship, that everyone would have a minimal confidence in God’s existence (initially) …

But we do not know that God making his existence more obvious would lead to more people entering into a saving relationship with him. To quote one writer:
“In fact, we have no way of knowing that in a world of free persons in which God’s existence is as obvious as the nose on one’s face that more people would come to love Him and know His salvation than in the actual world. But then the claim that if God existed, He would make His existence more evident than it is has little or no warrant.”

1. Rational unbelief does not occur.
   This also seems like a live option, for many of the reasons I mentioned. Obviously many people reject God on non-rational grounds. (I quoted a few widespread examples, there are others) This is hard for us to argue because all you say is really “surely there are or have been such people?” Well, I think that it is plausible there are not and have not been. The Bible says all men can know God from nature and the witness of the Holy Spirit. So I think one can plausibly hold that God does give sufficient reason to believe to everyone (at least before death) and that those who deny God do not do so reasonably.

• I think I follow your point about doubt, I agree that this should be distinguished from unbelief in the sense that the argument here intends.

1. God making his evidence sufficiently obvious that rational unbelief could not occur would lead to pervasive coercion and prevent morally significant free will.

I don’t think that your argument is sufficient to defeat this consideration. I think you reply’s strength and weakness both rest on the same thing, the potential ambiguity of the word “minimal” in your statement that God would have to provide people “minimal confidence in his existence.” This makes your argument sound very modest, which in practice, I don’t think it is. You mean that God would have to make his existence sufficiently obvious that no rational person could deny him (again, assuming there are such people). How could he do this? By appearing to everyone? But some might dismiss that as a hallucination. Perhaps they would even do so reasonably based on their background information. Perhaps God would have to appear to many people multiple times. But then we are right back to the problem of pervasive coercion and interference with free will.

 

[danserr]

1. God may have morally sufficient reasons for not making his existence more obvious and we are not well placed to make the nonseum inferencethat he does not have such reasons.

I have heard several objections to skeptical theism before, yours doesn’t strike me as one of the more plausible. It seems to me to be vulnerable to Michael Rea and Michael Bergaman’s paper showing that skeptical theism does not entail moral skepticism.

My first consideration is an analogy. One good comparison of skeptical theism is to chaos theory. Modern scientific chaos theory says (for example) that a butterfly flapping its wings in Africa can set forces into motion that could leads to a hurricane over the Atlantic. In the same way, God may have morally sufficient reasons for allowing the existence of evil (or rational unbelief since this is really just a more specific version of the problem of evil). We don’t see why he does, but there might be some justifying reason known to him alone.

Yet in spite of my knowledge of modern scientific chaos theory, I do not fear to close my car door too hard or soft for fear I might cause a tsunami in Asia and kill millions. In the same way, I do not think that skeptical theist entails that I must be paralyzed because of the belief that God has morally sufficient reasons for allowing evil or rational unbelief.

The example is easier to give than the explanation why, but I think the explanation is as follows. The the case of chaos theory, even I know it to be true that me closing my car door too hard could lead to a disaster, I still close the car door without worrying about this. This is because my background knowledge of the laws of nature, sense data etc. provide “all-things-considered” reasons to act.

Similarly, my background knowledge about history, the laws of nature, God’s commands, and God’s revelation provide me with “all-things-considered” reasons to act.

The non-seum inference of the atheist is unjustified because he is claiming solely on the basis of cognitive considerations that God cannot have a morally sufficient reason for allowing rational unbelief. But his inference on the basis of cognitive considerations is unjustified. That Christian, however, is not acting solely on the basis on cognitive considerations, but includes his whole background knowledge, including God’s commands, revelation etc, which provide him all-things-considered reasons to act or in this case, to believe that Columbus died.

 

[danserr]

danserr

**I think the Christian can plausibly hold that God provides enough evidence to people who are open to seeking him, but not enough to compel those whose hearts are closed. **

You share in the genius of Blaise Pascal!

“It would not have been right, therefore, for Him [God] to appear in a way that was plainly divine and absolutely bound to convince all mankind; but it was not right either that he should come in a manner so hidden that He could not be recognized by those who sought Him sincerely. He chose to make Himself perfectly knowable to them; and thus, wishing to appear openly to those who sought Him with all their heart, and hidden from those who flee Him with all their heart, He tempered the knowledge of Himself, with the result that He had given signs of Himself which are visible to those who seek Him, and not to those who do not seek Him.” Pensees

Cool, thanks for the reference. I knew I was paraphrasing someone, but I couldn’t for the life of me remember who.

As former atheist Peter Hitchens points out in The Rage against God, it isn’t that the atheist can objectively prove there is no God. It’s that he doesn’t want there to be a God. He then cobbles together arguments that fit his want, rather than arguments that fit the wants of logic and truth.

Which goes against premise 3 of the argument, that rational belief does occur, which is certainly debatable.