What's wrong with this argument against the existence of God?

[inocente]

As former atheist Peter Hitchens points out in The Rage against God, it isn’t that the atheist can objectively prove there is no God. It’s that he doesn’t want there to be a God. He then cobbles together arguments that fit his want, rather than arguments that fit the wants of logic and truth.

Schellenberg might have made a better cobbler? I reckon his argument can be restated in a humanist form, where it shows a profound lack of faith in people. See what you think. Start by imagining Jesus as the most loving person (real or fictional) possible.

1. If Jesus existed, then Jesus was all loving.
2. If an all loving Jesus existed, reasonable non-belief in an all loving person does not occur.
3. Reasonable non-belief occurs.
4. Therefore, an all loving Jesus never existed.
5. Therefore, an all loving person can’t exist.

 

[Perplexity]

But I think my explanation shows why this is not true. Those rational unbelievers (if there be any) would not have accepted God even if he did reveal himself sufficiently clearly to render their unbelief irrational. Since they would not have responded anyway, God’s loving nature is not called into question.

What I meant was a perfectly loving God couldn’t create a world containing individuals who would never freely embrace him. If there is any circumstance within which S would freely choose to embrace God, then a perfectly loving God would create S such that S would at some time encounter that circumstance.

But we do not know that God making his existence more obvious would lead to more people entering into a saving relationship with him.

This is a fair point, but I think it misunderstands Schellenberg’s argument. He seeks to demonstrate that a perfectly loving God would propose an explicit loving relationship with each person the instant they’re capable of entering into it. So, everyone would “meet” God, essentially. So, we can grant that God’s existence being more obvious wouldn’t necessarily lead folks into the relation he wants with them. But, because everyone would ‘meet’ God, everyone would have some confidence that God existed…at least, initially.

1. Rational unbelief does not occur.

Well, I generally don’t like to do this, but I’ve been in that camp before. I subjected theistic and atheistic belief as adequate as my means allowed, and concluded that I simply couldn’t figure out which was more probable. The universe was religiously ambiguous. So, perhaps this is why I find this premise indubitable. You can refrain from judgment on this, say I’m being dishonest etc. but I’m highly skeptical that you could sway my belief that I fit in this camp at one point.

You mean that God would have to make his existence sufficiently obvious that no rational person could deny him (again, assuming there are such people). How could he do this? By appearing to everyone? But some might dismiss that as a hallucination. Perhaps they would even do so reasonably based on their background information. Perhaps God would have to appear to many people multiple times. But then we are right back to the problem of pervasive coercion and interference with free will.

Remember that Schellenberg has it that all persons would ‘meet’ God through some kind of religious experience the very instant they’re capable of relating to God in the way he desires.Think of the angels when they were first created. They all had certitude that God existed and was good etc. Then, many fell through sin. While, you probably won’t say they now doubt God’s existence, it’s clear they warped God’s nature in their minds and deceived themselves. Schellenberg has in mind a similar scenario, except that God doesn’t elicit certitude through the experience, just enough confidence such that a denial of God would have to be culpable. But, everyone would either accept God, or culpably reject him. No one would inculpably doubt theism.

You’d be wont to say your belief about the angels, or even the immaculate conception causes problems for an all loving God and the freedom of the will, I suspect?

 

[maryh10000]

This is a fair point, but I think it misunderstands Schellenberg’s argument. He seeks to demonstrate that a perfectly loving God would propose an explicit loving relationship with each person the instant they’re capable of entering into it. So, everyone would “meet” God, essentially. So, we can grant that God’s existence being more obvious wouldn’t necessarily lead folks into the relation he wants with them. But, because everyone would ‘meet’ God, everyone would have some confidence that God existed…at least, initially.
…

Well, I generally don’t like to do this, but I’ve been in that camp before. I subjected theistic and atheistic belief as adequate as my means allowed, and concluded that I simply couldn’t figure out which was more probable. The universe was religiously ambiguous. So, perhaps this is why I find this premise indubitable. You can refrain from judgment on this, say I’m being dishonest etc. but I’m highly skeptical that you could sway my belief that I fit in this camp at one point.

Emphasis mine. I’ll start with the second point first.

**The first argument appears to be that a loving God would never allow reasonable unbelief at any time. **

That makes no sense to me. In my mind, all a loving God is required to do is to provide sufficient evidence to every person, of whatever kind is necessary, such that that person does not die in a state of reasonable non-belief.

In fact, as you’ve explained Schellenberg’s definition to me (thank you), non-belief looks to me like a state that would be inherently unstable and hard to maintain. All the evidence on both sides has to be perceived as exactly balancing. Any additional evidence about God at all would tend to throw one into belief or disbelief unless one purposely cut off from consideration any additional evidence. But in that case, we run into willful ignorance, which the definition excludes.

As for why I disagree that a loving God has to prevent reasonable unbelief from occurring at any time, I can think of three reasons off the top of my head:

1. Maybe it is necessary for some people, who start from irrational disbelief due to their upbringing, to approach the question of the existence of God logically. It seems likely that they would move first from irrational disbelief to “rational” disbelief, in that the first evidence they are likely to consider logically is likely to be evidence against the existence of God. Then as they consider more evidence, they would be likely to pass through a period of time when the evidence on both sides seemed equivalent.
2. Maybe God allows this so that the person who goes through this period becomes a better apologist to doubters or people of other faiths.
3. Maybe it happens because the sinfulness of others blocks or causes a person to misinterpret the evidence that God actually has provided to that person. God does not protect us from the effects of the sins of others - which is one reason why sins are so serious. We can actually do real damage to others. God will provide further opportunities and further evidence - as much as anyone needs - but since we live in time, it means there will be a time when someone may experience rational unbelief.

The fact that I can come up with three reasons implies that God, who if he exists we both admit is a bit smarter than me probably has a lot more to hand.

The second argument seems to be that God would propose an explicit loving relationship with each person the instant they’re capable of entering into it

1. This actually appears to happen for quite a few people. Many people seem to have a direct experience of the existence of God (I’m not saying that they ‘see’ him or that he appears to them - just that they are certain of his existence) practically from the beginning which never or rarely wavers.
2. Maybe God does in fact do this. Here I’m depending on the phrase “the instant they’re capable of entering into it”. How do you know that a person who is in a phase of rational unbelief is in fact capable of entering into an explicit loving relationship with God at that point? Perhaps it is precisely at this point when the only way God could make his presence known to that person would in fact be coercive and over-rule free will in that particular case with that particular person?

I’m sorry and I mean no disrespect of Schellenberg at all (having also had problems with logical arguments about God in the past) but this is starting to look more and more like “If God really existed, he’d have made his existence perfectly clear to me and done it right now!”

Or am I missing something? Is the argument truly that a perfectly loving God would NEVER allow any rational unbelief at ANY TIME WHATSOEVER?

 

[Charlemagne_II]

maryh
**
I’m sorry and I mean no disrespect of Schellenberg at all (having also had problems with logical arguments about God in the past) but this is starting to look more and more like “If God really existed, he’d have made his existence perfectly clear to me and done it right now!”

Or am I missing something? Is the argument truly that a perfectly loving God would NEVER allow any rational unbelief at ANY TIME WHATSOEVER? **

This would take away our free will. What good is belief if it is not freely given?

Only in places like the Soviet Union was atheistic faith in Papa Joe Stalin forced by law.

Or “Heil Hitler” forced by Nazi law, whether or not you believed in him.

 

[Perplexity]

Emphasis mine. I’ll start with the second point first.

**The first argument appears to be that a loving God would never allow reasonable unbelief at any time. **

That makes no sense to me. In my mind, all a loving God is required to do is to provide sufficient evidence to every person, of whatever kind is necessary, such that that person does not die in a state of reasonable non-belief.

“omeone may be inclined to object as follows: “Although there is no reason for God to refrain from relating personally to us at some time at which we are capable of such relationship, there is no reason for him not to do so, and he therefore very well might do so. More specifically, God need only do what he is obligated to do, and relating personally to human beings is not among his obligations.” It seems to me, however, that all talk of obligation is out of place here. Even if God may legitimately be said to have moral obligations (and some would deny this), the objector must still face the fact that it is not the nature of obligation-fulfillment but of love that we are exploring.” pp. 26-27

In fact, as you’ve explained Schellenberg’s definition to me (thank you), non-belief looks to me like a state that would be inherently unstable and hard to maintain. All the evidence on both sides has to be perceived as exactly balancing. Any additional evidence about God at all would tend to throw one into belief or disbelief unless one purposely cut off from consideration any additional evidence. But in that case, we run into willful ignorance, which the definition excludes.

Yup, I think agnosticism is one of the more radical positions a person can take.

As for why I disagree that a loving God has to prevent reasonable unbelief from occurring at any time, I can think of three reasons off the top of my head:

1. Maybe it is necessary for some people, who start from irrational disbelief due to their upbringing, to approach the question of the existence of God logically. It seems likely that they would move first from irrational disbelief to “rational” disbelief, in that the first evidence they are likely to consider logically is likely to be evidence against the existence of God. Then as they consider more evidence, they would be likely to pass through a period of time when the evidence on both sides seemed equivalent.

Here you say God may permit reasonable unbelief if such unbelief is necessary for those starting with irrational disbelief, that they may later approach God’s existence more logically. But, why would a perfectly loving God desire people to start with irrational disbelief? Much less, why would he permit irrational disbelief and reasonable non-belief just so that the person can approach God’s existence more logically? Surely, it’s a far greater good to just be in a relationship with God? I don’t see this possibility as plausible.

1. Maybe God allows this so that the person who goes through this period becomes a better apologist to doubters or people of other faiths.

Why would a perfectly loving God desire better apologetics more than a personal relationship? And there is a dichotomy here: you’re saying he’d sacrifice the intimate and immediate relationship Schellenberg argues for just so people could witness better. Surely greater witnessesing can be obtained by better means?

1. Maybe it happens because the sinfulness of others blocks or causes a person to misinterpret the evidence that God actually has provided to that person. God does not protect us from the effects of the sins of others- which is one reason why sins are so serious. We can actually do real damage to others. God will provide further opportunities and further evidence - as much as anyone needs - but since we live in time, it means there will be a time when someone may experience rational unbelief.

Here I think you assume theism in order to object to Schellenberg, but this just begs the question. Schellenberg has it that God appears the instant persons are capable, this means God is one the first things they’ll encounter.

The second argument seems to be that God would propose an explicit loving relationship with each person the instant they’re capable of entering into it

1. This actually appears to happen for quite a few people. Many people seem to have a direct experience of the existence of God (I’m not saying that they ‘see’ him or that he appears to them - just that they are certain of his existence) practically from the beginning which never or rarely wavers.

Granting that religious experiences occur, Schellenberg would say everyone would’ve had one when they were uber young if a perfectly loving God existed.

1. Maybe God does in fact do this. Here I’m depending on the phrase “the instant they’re capable of entering into it”. How do you know that a person who is in a phase of rational unbelief is in fact capable of entering into an explicit loving relationship with God at that point? Perhaps it is precisely at this point when the only way God could make his presence known to that person would in fact be coercive and over-rule free will in that particular case with that particular person?

Schellenberg has in mind very, very young children: the very instant they’re capable of loving.

Or am I missing something? Is the argument truly that a perfectly loving God would NEVER allow any rational unbelief at ANY TIME WHATSOEVER?

Yes, simply because if a perfectly loving God existed, he’d attempt to initiate a loving relationship with everyone such that every person would either accept him or culpably reject him. No one would be inculpably ignorant.

 

[danserr]

What I meant was a perfectly loving God couldn’t create a world containing individuals who would never freely embrace him. If there is any circumstance within which S would freely choose to embrace God, then a perfectly loving God would create S such that S would at some time encounter that circumstance.

I think your first and second sentence here both raise different points.

My suggestion was: It is possible that God providentially arranges the world so that anyone who would respond to his revelation does receive that revelation and that anyone who does not receive that revelation (if there are any such) are people who would not have responded even if they had received it. This explains how there can be rational atheists, since such people would not have responded to God even if he revealed himself, his loving nature is not lessened if he does not reveal himself.

The second part of your objection misses this point. I am supposing that God providentially arranges the world so anyone who does not freely embrace God is someone who would have rejected God even if God had revealed himself to that person.

The first part of your objection seems to be that God would not create a person he knew would reject him. By this, you are really abandoning the argument from divine hiddenness and trying to launch some sort of argument on how could a loving God send people to hell (or actualize a world in which some people choose hell. But why should the fact that some people will reject God and choose hell prevent the saved from accepting God and enjoying eternity with him? You seem to be demanding that hell veto heaven, by which sophistry, as CS Lewis remarked, you would make a dog in a manger the tyrant of the universe.

So, we can grant that God’s existence being more obvious wouldn’t necessarily lead folks into the relation he wants with them. But, because everyone would ‘meet’ God, everyone would have some confidence that God existed…at least, initially.

I think my initial objection still has force. It is not clear that a world where God’s existence is more obvious (and what you are suggesting would make God’s existence more obvious) would result in more people entering into a saving relationship with God. You can have no way of knowing this, but given this, your claim that a loving God would make his existence more obvious is without warrant.

As to my proposal that rational belief not occur. I don’t expect you to agree, I am sure most nonbelievers would consider themselves rational in their unbelief, but it does not follow that they are. Also, maybe you are rational in your unbelief. It does not follow that God is unloving for allowing you to be so. On the contrary, if you really are sincerely open-minded and seeking God, then I would say that you will receive sufficient evidence of his existence.

Remember that Schellenberg has it that all persons would ‘meet’ God through some kind of religious experience the very instant they’re capable of relating to God in the way he desires

Here is the problem. You keep trying to make your position even more modest. You retreat to “God only has to make people minimally aware of his existence.” Now minimally is a bit vague. But here here is the catch. The more you lower the requirements for God revealing himself to people, the harder it is for you to argue that God does not in fact reveal himself to people in this way. If you claim that God must make his existence obvious, then you are open to the objection that this would result in pervasive coercion; but on the other hand, the more modest you try to be (God must only make people minimally aware of his existence), the harder it is for you to argue that God does not do this.

Furthermore, for God to give people a rationally indubitable experience would plausibly risk negating free will. This is because on the basis of their background experience one might be able to rationally disbelieve even with direct revelation. One might require multiples such experiences or appearances, but now we are right back to pervasive coercion.

Sorry for the delayed and brief answer, the week is gettting busy.

 

[maryh10000]

“omeone may be inclined to object as follows: “Although there is no reason for God to refrain from relating personally to us at some time at which we are capable of such relationship, there is no reason for him not to do so, and he therefore very well might do so. More specifically, God need only do what he is obligated to do, and relating personally to human beings is not among his obligations.” It seems to me, however, that all talk of obligation is out of place here. Even if God may legitimately be said to have moral obligations (and some would deny this), the objector must still face the fact that it is not the nature of obligation-fulfillment but of love that we are exploring.” pp. 26-27

I think you misunderstood what I meant by “required to”. I didn’t mean that God was obligated to do something - I meant that a perfectly loving nature could be consistent with allowing someone to go through a period of rational unbelief.

Here you say God may permit reasonable unbelief if such unbelief is necessary for those starting with irrational disbelief, that they may later approach God’s existence more logically. But, why would a perfectly loving God desire people to start with irrational disbelief? Much less, why would he permit irrational disbelief and reasonable non-belief just so that the person can approach God’s existence more logically? Surely, it’s a far greater good to just be in a relationship with God? I don’t see this possibility as plausible.

Well no, I would imagine God doesn’t want people to start with irrational disbelief. God doesn’t permit irrational disbelief for the purpose of apologetics. He permits it because it is a necessary consequence of free will.

1. Assume person A has a religious experience that convinces him God exists. He freely rejects relationship with God. Afterwards, he deludes himself into thinking that God doesn’t exist because it would interfere with his “freedom” or his “amours” or what not. That’s irrational disbelief and it is the necessary consequence of free will.
2. Now person A has children. Assume every child, at the youngest age possible, has an experience that convinces him that God exists. For the sake of argument, let’s pick ten years old (you can pick a different one if you don’t like that).
3. A teaches his child that his religious experience is a delusion and doesn’t mean what he thinks it does. Thus, the child also grows up in a state of irrational disbelief.

Once that has happened, a loving God may allow that person to go through a path leading through rational unbelief.

Why would a perfectly loving God desire better apologetics more than a personal relationship? And there is a dichotomy here: you’re saying he’d sacrifice the intimate and immediate relationship Schellenberg argues for just so people could witness better. Surely greater witnessesing can be obtained by better means

Same answer as above.

Here I think you assume theism in order to object to Schellenberg, but this just begs the question. Schellenberg has it that God appears the instant persons are capable, this means God is one the first things they’ll encounter

Hmm, I did, didn’t I? Perhaps I should restate it this way:
Even if God did provide evidence to a person, maybe other people who have rejected God and deluded themselves that he does not exist cause that person to misinterpret the evidence.

Granting that religious experiences occur, Schellenberg would say everyone would’ve had one when they were uber young if a perfectly loving God existed.

Maybe they have and their parents or other people talked them out of it. Isn’t that what someone who doesn’t believe in God would do if their young child told them he was talking to God or knew God existed? Tell the child he was mistaken, in the same way Santa Claus doesn’t really exist?

Schellenberg has in mind very, very young children: the very instant they’re capable of loving.

That would seem to undermine Schellenberg’s own argument. Certainly, the initial beliefs of children are most easily molded and countered by parenting? I would think Schellenberg’s argument would require that the religious experience occur when the person was old enough and free enough to maintain confidence in his experience. Otherwise, what’s the point?

Yes, simply because if a perfectly loving God existed, he’d attempt to initiate a loving relationship with everyone such that every person would either accept him or culpably reject him. No one would be inculpably ignorant.

As far as we know, God does attempt to initiate a loving relationship with everyone. However, the “accept him or culpably reject him” isn’t a once and for all thing.

What I would expect for a perfectly loving God dealing with creatures who have free will and who exist in time is to continually need to initiate and re-initiate a loving relationship with each of his creatures.

 

[Perplexity]

The second part of your objection misses this point. I am supposing that God providentially arranges the world so anyone who does not freely embrace God is someone who would have rejected God even if God had revealed himself to that person.

Schellenberg addresses that scenario, I diverged from his book and began defending universalism. While I think it’s defensible, it’s not a part of Schellenberg’s argument, so I’ll just stick to the playbook so to speak:

“We have, then, reason to suppose that there is no time at which some human being is to some extent capable of personal relationship with God but at which God does not wish the potential represented by that capacity to be realized. God may create beings without such capacity, but if the beings he creates have it, then, at any time that they have it, to the extent that they do, we may expect that he will wish them to exercise it.” - p. 26

The first part of your objection seems to be that God would not create a person he knew would reject him. By this, you are really abandoning the argument from divine hiddenness and trying to launch some sort of argument on how could a loving God send people to hell (or actualize a world in which some people choose hell. But why should the fact that some people will reject God and choose hell prevent the saved from accepting God and enjoying eternity with him? You seem to be demanding that hell veto heaven, by which sophistry, as CS Lewis remarked, you would make a dog in a manger the tyrant of the universe.

For the moment I’ll bracket my universalism, it’s not a part of Schellenberg’s argument. Sorry for bringing it up

I think my initial objection still has force. It is not clear that a world where God’s existence is more obvious (and what you are suggesting would make God’s existence more obvious) would result in more people entering into a saving relationship with God. You can have no way of knowing this, but given this, your claim that a loving God would make his existence more obvious is without warrant.

We’re looking at the issue from opposite directions: it seems like you’re saying God wouldn’t necessarily try to convince people of his existence since this may not lead them to enter into a relationship with him. But, Schellenberg isn’t talking about God trying to persuade folks to believe in him. He’s saying, because God desires such a relationship, he’d initiate it, and consequently, belief in his existence would arise, unless and until culpable non-belief arises. So, it’s not about whether the evidence for God we actually have is enough.

As to my proposal that rational belief not occur. I don’t expect you to agree, I am sure most nonbelievers would consider themselves rational in their unbelief, but it does not follow that they are. Also, maybe you are rational in your unbelief. It does not follow that God is unloving for allowing you to be so. On the contrary, if you really are sincerely open-minded and seeking God, then I would say that you will receive sufficient evidence of his existence.

hmm, perhaps we’ve gone as far as we can with that point then.

Here is the problem. You keep trying to make your position even more modest. You retreat to “God only has to make people minimally aware of his existence.” Now minimally is a bit vague. But here here is the catch. The more you lower the requirements for God revealing himself to people, the harder it is for you to argue that God does not in fact reveal himself to people in this way. If you claim that God must make his existence obvious, then you are open to the objection that this would result in pervasive coercion; but on the other hand, the more modest you try to be (God must only make people minimally aware of his existence), the harder it is for you to argue that God does not do this.

The scenario Schellenberg envisages clearly isn’t actual. Unless you’d be willing to say all non-believers have surpressed their encounter with God such that the vast majority don’t even remember it? Sounds like X-Files to me (note, Calvinists do claim something very much like this and Schellenberg addresses these concerns on pp. 74-82)

Schellenberg lays out the relevant scenario in about a page. I could post it here if you like? I’ll type it out real quick just in case.

Furthermore, for God to give people a rationally indubitable experience would plausibly risk negating free will. This is because on the basis of their background experience one might be able to rationally disbelieve even with direct revelation. One might require multiples such experiences or appearances, but now we are right back to pervasive coercion.

The reason you say such an experience would plausibly negate free-will is because these persons would have a background knowledge which could allow them to rationally disbelieve. But, on Schellenberg’s argument, the experience occurs before any such background knowledge is acquired.

Sorry for the delayed and brief answer, the week is gettting busy.

No worries I know how it goes.

 

[danserr]

No worries I know how it goes.

Thanks

“We have, then, reason to suppose that there is no time at which some human being is to some extent capable of personal relationship with God but at which God does not wish the potential represented by that capacity to be realized. God may create beings without such capacity, but if the beings he creates have it, then, at any time that they have it, to the extent that they do, we may expect that he will wish them to exercise it.” - p. 26

What reason? It seems far from obvious. On the contrary, it seems perfectly possible that God providentially arranges history so that everyone who would respond to his revelation gets it, and those those who do not receive it (if there are any such people) are those who would not enter into a loving relationship with God even if they did receive such revelation.

This answer could agree happily that if such people are capable of entering into such a relationship that God would not and does not deny such a revelation to anyone, it simply maintains that such people denied that revelation are those who would not have responded anyway.

hmm, perhaps we’ve gone as far as we can with that point then.

agreed.

We’re looking at the issue from opposite directions: it seems like you’re saying God wouldn’t necessarily try to convince people of his existence since this may not lead them to enter into a relationship with him. But, Schellenberg isn’t talking about God trying to persuade folks to believe in him. He’s saying, because God desires such a relationship, he’d initiate it, and consequently, belief in his existence would arise, unless and until culpable non-belief arises. So, it’s not about whether the evidence for God we actually have is enough.

It seemed like earlier in this thread, when I said that God doesn’t want belief in him, but people to enter into a loving relationship with him, you replied that this might be true, but belief in him would be an important first step and so God would have to reveal himself to people. I think that point I make above can still work, though, if I simply rephrase it say read “revelation” instead of “belief.” So:

• It is not clear that a world in which God clearly reveals himself to people (making his existence more obvious) would result in more people entering into a loving relationship with him and being saved. But given this, we have no warrant for saying that God is unloving because he may not provide this revelation.

 

[danserr]

he reason you say such an experience would plausibly negate free-will is because these persons would have a background knowledge which could allow them to rationally disbelieve. But, on Schellenberg’s argument, the experience occurs before any such background knowledge is acquired.

Interesting; it sounds then, like this experience would have to happen at a very young age, no? Perhaps sufficiently young that a person’s free will might be interfered with? Or that one growing older might develop some background knowledge that would cause him to doubt that experience? Anyway, my main answer follows.

The scenario Schellenberg envisages clearly isn’t actual. Unless you’d be willing to say all non-believers have surpressed their encounter with God such that the vast majority don’t even remember it? Sounds like X-Files to me (note, Calvinists do claim something very much like this and Schellenberg addresses these concerns on pp. 74-82)

Schellenberg lays out the relevant scenario in about a page. I could post it here if you like? I’ll type it out real quick just in case.

Haha, yes, I agree we should deny the x-files scenario.

Here is still the problem as I see it. You are trying to be very modest and say that “God only has to make people minimally aware of himself,” but you also say that this minimal awareness must be sufficient that belief in God is rationally indubitable, (though one could still be open to self delusion). In this you seem to be responding to my claim that God making his existence obvious would negate free will (or soul-making), by saying that God doesn’t have to make his existence completely obvious, just sufficiently so to be rationally indubitable. In this way, by lowering the certainty of God’s revelation, you think free will is still protected.

• But this is not obvious. Maybe God making himself sufficiently obvious to each person as to be rationally indubitable, would require enough revelation to over-ride free will. Consider Swinburne’s response:
  " Knowing that there was a God, men would know their most secret thoughts and actions known to such a God… in such a world men would have little temptation to do wrong. Yet a man only has choices of good or evil destiny if he has reasons for pursuing good or evil action."

Possibly, here you could respond with S. (as you seem to be doing), that God doesn’t have to make his existence completely obvious, only rationally indubitable (though this might plausibly over-ride free will). But this leads to another problem: God could make his existence or revelation, less than totally certain, but this could still interfere with free will.

An example (from Michael Murray in Divine Hiddenness: New Essays:

• a man walks up to me late at night and puts a small cylindrical object in my back and demands my money. I do not know that it is a gun for certain; it could be a small stick; it could be a plastic gun. Perhaps the man has a strong aversion to shooting people, such that even if I refused to hand over my money, he would not shoot me. Perhaps he would miss if he did or the gun would not fire. There is a non-zero probability of all of these happening. So my death if I do not hand over my wallet is far from certain. Yet, even if there were only a 50% chance of my death, I would still be handing over my wallet under compulsion. In the same way, even if God does not make his existence completely obvious, He is still revealing himself to the point of rational indubitability, and it is still plausible that this could still result in coercion.

Let me even go a little further. Part of the strength of the coercion comes from the strength of the threat. The fact that I am threatened with being shot, for instance, is a very strong threat and will compel me even if odds it goes through are only moderate. Likewise, the threat of not accepting God is hell. This is a strong threat and cannot be diminished, so, if God is to protect free will, he must balance the strength of that threat by diminishing something else; the most obvious option is for him to diminish the epistemic imminence of the threat. Possibly this is what he does by not revealing himself to the point of rational indubitability.

 

[Perplexity]

• But this is not obvious. Maybe God making himself sufficiently obvious to each person as to be rationally indubitable, would require enough revelation to over-ride free will. Consider Swinburne’s response:
  " Knowing that there was a God, men would know their most secret thoughts and actions known to such a God… in such a world men would have little temptation to do wrong. Yet a man only has choices of good or evil destiny if he has reasons for pursuing good or evil action."

Schellenberg actually addresses this specific argument on pages 117-130 of his book.

In what way would God’s revelation override free-will? I can think of two senses which you could mean:

(i) We have the ability to choose to believe in God’s existence. If God revealed himself in the relevant manner, our choice would be so influenced as to no longer resemble a free-choice.

(ii) We don’t have the ability to choose to believe in God’s existence, but we do have the freedom to choose to encounter evidence for or against God’s existence. If God revealed himself in the relevant manner, our choice to encounter evidence for or against God’s existence would no longer resemble a free-choice.

Schellenberg assumes that we acquire beliefs involuntarily, and cites Swinburne as an authority on the issue, along with his argument for that position. If you’re proposing (i), I could post the argument in response. I’ll have to wait to see though.

If you mean the latter, I’d say theist’s generally don’t have any issues with God doing such. (ii) is actually an objection to the kinds of religious experiences used in arguments for God. It’d have devastating effects for the Resurrection argument. i.e., God wouldn’t be behind these post-mortem appearances because they override free-will. It causes real trouble for the proper basicality of theistic belief as well. Perhaps none of this matters though, I just thought I’d draw out some implications. I’ll wait to see though.

• a man walks up to me late at night and puts a small cylindrical object in my back and demands my money. I do not know that it is a gun for certain; it could be a small stick; it could be a plastic gun. Perhaps the man has a strong aversion to shooting people, such that even if I refused to hand over my money, he would not shoot me. Perhaps he would miss if he did or the gun would not fire. There is a non-zero probability of all of these happening. So my death if I do not hand over my wallet is far from certain. Yet, even if there were only a 50% chance of my death, I would still be handing over my wallet under compulsion. In the same way, even if God does not make his existence completely obvious, He is still revealing himself to the point of rational indubitability, and it is still plausible that this could still result in coercion.

But is this coercion enough to pose significant problems for free-will? I guess this might mean whether we’re talking about (i) or (ii).

Let me even go a little further. Part of the strength of the coercion comes from the strength of the threat. The fact that I am threatened with being shot, for instance, is a very strong threat and will compel me even if odds it goes through are only moderate. Likewise, the threat of not accepting God is hell. This is a strong threat and cannot be diminished, so, if God is to protect free will, he must balance the strength of that threat by diminishing something else; the most obvious option is for him to diminish the epistemic imminence of the threat. Possibly this is what he does by not revealing himself to the point of rational indubitability.

Well, hell is pretty controversial; but, supposing hell does exist (etc.), God wouldn’t mention it in the revelation: he’d only attempt to initiate a loving relation.

 

[tonyrey]

Correct me if I’m wrong, but you’re response is that (2) is still false because as long as reasonable non-belief doesn’t “dispose of your opportunity for a loving relationship with God”, then reasonable non-belief isn’t reason to think a loving God doesn’t exist?

 

[danserr]

Schellenberg actually addresses this specific argument on pages 117-130 of his book.
.

Yes, I know, hence why I followed up with Michael Murray’s response to S’s argument.

Now since, you seem to be going backward a bit and asking for some more clarification on what I mean by free will being interfered with, I’ll mention that and try to be more clear, and then assess where we stand on the argument.

My contention is that God revealing himself too clearly would result in pervasive coercion that would hinder human ability to make morally significant decisions that would form their moral characters and engage in what Murray and Schellenburg call “soul-making.”

By way of example, consider that a policeman on every street corner would result in pervasive coercion on every individual in terms of obeying the law. God revealing himself too clearly (or making his existence too obvious) could plausibly do the same.

Now you respond to this, by saying, that you and S. are taking a more modest position. You do not insist that God make his existence totally obvious, only that he reveal himself to each person enough that the person’s belief in God’s existence would be rationally indubitable (though still open to self-delusion).

In essence, you claim that because God’s existence would not be totally certain, only rationally indubitable, that this would not result in coercive pressure being placed on the human being and thus would not prevent his engaging in soul-making.

I reply, following Murray, that this is obviously flawed. Coercive pressure need not demand 100% certainty. By way of example I offer the following analogy:

a man walks up to me late at night and puts a small cylindrical object in my back and demands my money. I do not know that it is a gun for certain; it could be a small stick; it could be a plastic gun. Perhaps the man has a strong aversion to shooting people, such that even if I refused to hand over my money, he would not shoot me. Perhaps he would miss if he did or the gun would not fire. There is a non-zero probability of all of these happening. So my death if I do not hand over my wallet is far from certain. Yet, even if there were only a 50% chance of my death, I would still be handing over my wallet under compulsion. In the same way, even if God does not make his existence completely obvious, He is still revealing himself to the point of rational indubitability, and it is still plausible that this could still result in coercion.

Obviously, the man’s choice to hand over his money was severely coerced. In this way I claim to demonstrate that God revealing his existence to the point of rational indubitability could plausibly coerce human action and prevent human attempt to engage in soul-making (on which all eternal human happiness depends). God revealing himself in this way could (to repeat) lead to pervasive coercion that would hinder man’s ability to make morally significant decisions and develop his character.

I then strengthen this argument by pointing out that coercion is a result of several factors,. including the strength of the threat and the immediacy of the threat. Now the threat of not believing in God is hell. Even is God does not reveal this in a revelation, it is still very probably the consequence of rejection of God and failure to engage in soul-making. (for brevity sake, I ignore here universalism, since it is a small group). Now God cannot diminish the strength of this threat, so to protect free will, the only thing he can really make less obvious is his existence. It make be that he does this then.

Reply to other concerns:

1. What about God revealing himself to Saul or others after his revelation?

• at most it follows that God could reveal himself to some people without hindering their ability to engage in soul-making. It does not follow that he could do this to everyone.

1. What about the proper basicality of Christian belief?
   Well, you don’t believe in this, so I am assuming your viewpoint for the sake of argument. I am trying to convince you that your argument is flawed without bringing pb into the picture, just to make my job simpler. But since you ask, I do think that Christianity is properly basic, perhaps, so much so that there are no rational atheists (but we agreed to table that discussion).
   Alternately, Plantinga stresses that proper basicalilty does not make Christianity indubitable. You might simply accept it and claim that God does not make his existence so obvious by it as it over-ride human ability to engage in soul-making.

Finally, notice I did not accept either your I or II. Hopefully you now see why. I am not concerned with mere belief, but the ability of human persons to engage in soul making, which could plausibly be hindered if God made his existence too obvious.

 

[Perplexity]

My contention is that God revealing himself too clearly would result in pervasive coercion that would hinder human ability to make morally significant decisions that would form their moral characters and engage in what Murray and Schellenburg call “soul-making.”

I’d like to note how young people would be when God revealed himself. Do we really take children of this young an age to be making morally significant decisions? Generally, we regard this stage in their development as pivotal, but only in a passive sense. i.e., what happens to them, not what they choose to do.

We do not take ourselves to be doing anything wrong in giving children punishments or negative reinforcements. We might even find it odd that in influencing young children, we’re told we’re interfering with their soul-making.

Think of the ideal Catholic family. The children are baptized as soon as possible and are reared in the Catholic faith, developing through life amidst the sacraments: first holy communion, confession, confirmation etc. I’m sure you wouldn’t think the parents shouldn’t behave this way because they’re coercing their children, interfering with their soul-making, would you?

I reply, following Murray, that this is obviously flawed. Coercive pressure need not demand 100% certainty.

I think a problem we may face here is there doesn’t seem to be a principled way of discerning how much coercive pressure is too much. We can see it in examples, but drawing the right inferences from these examples is quite difficult: perhaps we’re in a battle of intuitions. As the examples I provided above illustrate (which are very close to the relevant scenario we’re debating over), we don’t take coercive pressure to be undesirable in many instances, we take it to be totally desirable.

It’s also worth mentioning that perhaps when the children get older they’d shrug the experience off as an imaginary friend.

I then strengthen this argument by pointing out that coercion is a result of several factors,. including the strength of the threat and the immediacy of the threat. Now the threat of not believing in God is hell. Even is God does not reveal this in a revelation, it is still very probably the consequence of rejection of God and failure to engage in soul-making. (for brevity sake, I ignore here universalism, since it is a small group). Now God cannot diminish the strength of this threat, so to protect free will, the only thing he can really make less obvious is his existence. It make be that he does this then.

I believe this forgets the age of the persons involved. Would a child really grasp hell? I doubt it. They’d probably regard it as a really bad punishment, very much like the one’s their parents might reveal to them That doesn’t stop trouble.

I very much doubt that rational indubitably is very significant to a young child.

Reply to other concerns:

1. What about God revealing himself to Saul or others after his revelation?

• at most it follows that God could reveal himself to some people without hindering their ability to engage in soul-making. It does not follow that he could do this to everyone.

The point of the Saul example was to show that you’re not actually opposed to God coercing folks into believing in him.

1. What about the proper basicality of Christian belief?
   Well, you don’t believe in this, so I am assuming your viewpoint for the sake of argument. I am trying to convince you that your argument is flawed without bringing pb into the picture, just to make my job simpler. But since you ask, I do think that Christianity is properly basic, perhaps, so much so that there are no rational atheists (but we agreed to table that discussion).
   Alternately, Plantinga stresses that proper basicalilty does not make Christianity indubitable. You might simply accept it and claim that God does not make his existence so obvious by it as it over-ride human ability to engage in soul-making.

Good points.

I think if we keep in mind the age of those involved, it becomes apparent that such a revelation would be no more coercive than actions we normally, and without second thought, perform ourselves. Young children are predisposed to believe things which adults find fantastical, so what is considered ‘rationally indubitable’ to children of this age is really nothing like what it is for adults. Adults could shrug their encounter off as an over active imagination without problem. It’s also doubtful children of this age are in a position to be making significant, soul-forming choices. I think these points (and others) form a cumulative case which shifts the burden to you: we should be inclined to believe God’s revelation to these children wouldn’t detriment their soul-formation in a significant manner.

 

[maryh10000]

Which brings us back to my argument that if the revelation of God’s experience occurs to a very young child, it would be very easy for an adult parent to convince the child that it wasn’t real. This isn’t the “X-factor” like “forgetting” of the revelation, per se. It’s just the adult reinterpreting what happened to her as a child.

So the younger the child is when the “revelation” occurs, the less ‘permanent’ it is likely to be.

 

[danserr]

The point of the Saul example was to show that you’re not actually opposed to God coercing folks into believing in him.

But again, the point is not mere belief. The point is for people to be able to make morally significant decisions and engage in soul-making. The example of Paul only shows that God can clearly reveal himself to some people without hindering this; It does not follow that he can reveal himself this clearly to everyone without hindering their ability to engage in soul-making.

Now, your most recent suggestion is that God should clearly reveal himself to a young child, sufficiently clearly so that this child could not remain a rational atheist when he/she grew older. This is because Schellenberg’s argument requires that a loving God not allow rational atheists. If this is how you intend for God to reveal himself to prevent this then, God’s revealing himself to a child must be sufficiently clear and obvious (and perhaps continuous- what would the cutoff age be?) as to prevent this child from developing into a rational atheist when he/she grew older. So I have a couple contentions:

1). It is not clear that a world in which God made his existence more obvious to everyone as a child and then stopped this when people got older (because you seem to acknowledge that at that point it could result in pervasive coercion) would lead to more people entering into a loving relationship with him. You actually don’t have any way of showing that this is the case and since you don’t, your claim that a loving God would do so is without warrant.

1. Children might dismiss such experiences as they grew older (I though I saw Santa Claus too etc.) and acquired new beliefs. As they reach the age of reason (whenever that is) perhaps they would acquire new beliefs that might lead them to rationally dismiss their religious experience as children. As a child I believed in Santa, I even experienced his existence (at malls, school parties). I grew older, however, and acquired new beliefs that caused me to rationally dismiss my belief in santa. Children might do the same about God when they got older and their revelations stopped. [you see the difficulty of pinning down what those revelations must be like, how long they must continue, and when they must stop]. It is actually far from obvious then, that God revealing himself to children in this way would result in more people saved, but if not, then you can’t say that God is unloving for not doing it.
2. Next, since the argument requires that no rational atheists exist. God would have to reveal himself so clearly that those children could not be rational atheists when they grow up, no matter what other beliefs they acquired. Even if I granted your argument (and intuitively, it seems off somehow) that this would not prevent soul-making in children, God would have to reveal himself in such an obvious way that it would override competing beliefs acquired as adults to the point of rational indubitably. Hence, it seems more than plausible that this could lead to the same pervasive coercion that we have been discussing, where God becomes the moral equivalent of a policeman on every street corner.
3. As to hell. Even if children would not think of hell or understand it fully, they would still recognize hell as the necessary corollary of rejection of God when they grew up. Hence my point still works. The strength of the threat is measure by multiple factors including: 1. the strength of the threat (whether I am threatened with death or only a small fine) and 2. the immediacy of the threat (epistemic imminance). God cannot decrease the penalty, so if he is to protect free will and avoid pervasive coercion, then it seems all he can do is make his existence less obvious; and perhaps he does this.

 

[fred_conty]

I just recently learned about this argument for atheism on another thread. It is by a current professor of Oxford, J.L. Schellenberg, and he presents the argument in his book entitled: Divine Hiddennes and Human Reason.

1. If God exists, then God is all loving.
2. If an all loving God exists, reasonable non-belief does not occur.
3. Reasonable non-belief occurs.
4. Therefore, an all loving God doesn’t exist.
5. Therefore, God doesn’t exist.

Do you think this is a good argument? Does it prove logically that God does not exist? It does not look like a good argument to me.

1. If God exists, then God is all loving.
   Many would disagree with this because of suffering. We are basing this on reason only since that is his direction. So many would conclude that he is not loving.
2. If an all loving God exists, reasonable non-belief does not occur.
   But God gives man freedom to believe or not to believe. We could only say that non-belief does not occur in God because he is belief so to speak. Man is distinct from God with freedom from God to do what he wishes, to believe or not.

 

[Curious_Seed]

1. If God exists, then God is all loving.
   Premise
2. If an all loving God exists, reasonable non-belief does not occur.
   True
3. Reasonable non-belief occurs.
   True
4. Therefore, an all loving God doesn’t exist.
   True
5. Therefore, God doesn’t exist.
   True

Is it surprising that there are many paths to reasonable doubt about the existence of God?

Did Jesus not tell us that revelation by the call of the Father is a prerequisite to knowledge of the Son?

Did He also not say that knowledge of Him is not by water nor by blood?

Again, reasonable conclusions can be drawn from any number of premises concerning God.

 

[greylorn]

I just recently learned about this argument for atheism on another thread. It is by a current professor of Oxford, J.L. Schellenberg, and he presents the argument in his book entitled: Divine Hiddennes and Human Reason.

1. If God exists, then God is all loving.
2. If an all loving God exists, reasonable non-belief does not occur.
3. Reasonable non-belief occurs.
4. Therefore, an all loving God doesn’t exist.
5. Therefore, God doesn’t exist.

Do you think this is a good argument? Does it prove logically that God does not exist? It does not look like a good argument to me.

This comment is offered w/o review of previous postings.

The argument is about what you would expect from an Oxford perfesser, or from a talking ox. The first statement (“If God exists, then God is all loving.”) is presented in the form of an axiom, designed to fool those who have a few neurons still twitching from the excitement of their high school geometry class, or who knew someone who took a geometry class, or actually went to high school , or maybe thought about it.

This is not an axiomatic statement. It is a disconnected if-then proposition which is logically stupid. What it really says is, “Suppose that an all-loving God exists.” The perf could have written, If God exists, then God is incapable of discriminating between good people and worthless louts. This would clarify the perf’s position and render his subsequent argument irrelevant. But perfessers of that sort are not honest enough to speak whatever passes in them for their mind.

The perfesser is simply preying upon some really silly beliefs which are commonly held by Christians because they fill emotional needs. People want to believe that they are loved by the omnipotent entity who created the universe, so they believe it, without justification. (They are the same folks who think that their cats and dogs love them; folks who are on the planet to try to become smarter than cats and dogs. Unlike the critters who graduate, they’ll be back.)

The perf’s argument proves that an all-loving God does not exist. (He built that notion into proposition 1.)

This is fine with me. Probably not so much with you. The perfesser is indirectly inviting you to get logical and take an honest look at the attributes which humans have assigned to God.

There is no logical reason to believe that the Creator of The Universe is an all-loving entity. Therefore it is easy to demolish using the tiny bits of logic the perfesser mustered.

Consider the possibility that God does not “love” us, did not create our barely-conscious component, may not even know of the species we call “homo sapiens,” and created the universe not for our piddling benefit, but to serve His own agenda, one with respect to which, humans are 99.99999% irrelevant.

 

[Nimeniton]

---

1. If God exists, then God is all loving.***

This is premise is only true if “all loving” is a definition of God. It is possible that a Creator God could be evil or indifferent. So, this premise is questionable but will be taken for granted by Christians

2. If an all loving God exists, reasonable non-belief does not occur.

Again this is a questionable premise. An all loving Creator may be lacking in Wisdom and not know how to communicate his existence. This premise stands only if it can be accepted that God is not only all loving but omnipotent and omniscient. Also you would have to agree what sort of actions a loving being can and cannot do.

3. Reasonable non-belief occurs.

I agree but not all Christians would accept this premise. And they could use St Paul to back the belief that atheists are in denial and therefore reasonable non belief does not occur.

…For the invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead; so that they are without excuse…: (Romans 1:18-21)

4. Therefore, an all loving God doesn’t exist.

It does not necessarily follow. Christians believe that God is all loving even when he brings into being persons he knows who will suffer in hell for all eternity. The definition of “loving” needs to be clarified. There are at least two possibilities. Certain actions/motives are signs of loving actions or anything God does is defined as loving even if the same action done by a human being would be considered evil.

5. Therefore, God doesn’t exist.

I agree but not on the basis of this argument. A lot of further argument would be needed to support these premises.