What's wrong with this argument against the existence of God?

[danserr]

There is no logical reason to believe that the Creator of The Universe is an all-loving entity. Therefore it is easy to demolish using the tiny bits of logic the perfesser mustered.

Consider the possibility that God does not “love” us, did not create our barely-conscious component, may not even know of the species we call “homo sapiens,” and created the universe not for our piddling benefit, but to serve His own agenda, one with respect to which, humans are 99.99999% irrelevant.

I think that it is very hard to account for the Incarnation and the Crucifixion if God does not love man. Better answers to the problem will probably question premise 2 and premise 3, as has been done previously on this thread.

 

[Perplexity]

But again, the point is not mere belief. The point is for people to be able to make morally significant decisions and engage in soul-making. The example of Paul only shows that God can clearly reveal himself to some people without hindering this; It does not follow that he can reveal himself this clearly to everyone without hindering their ability to engage in soul-making.

But given the strong and explicit circumstances of Paul, (i.e., he was an adult, the experience was directly contrary to firmly held convictions of his, etc.) I think we’re justified in inferring that God could reveal himself in much weaker circumstances to everyone capable of relating thusly to God.

1). It is not clear that a world in which God made his existence more obvious to everyone as a child and then stopped this when people got older (because you seem to acknowledge that at that point it could result in pervasive coercion) would lead to more people entering into a loving relationship with him. You actually don’t have any way of showing that this is the case and since you don’t, your claim that a loving God would do so is without warrant.

In bayesian terms, it certainly is the case that the probability of S entering into a loving relationship with S’ is greater given that S believes S’ exists, than that S doesn’t. This is because unless S believes S’ exists, it’s not possible for S to relate to S’ lovingly.

1. Children might dismiss such experiences as they grew older (I though I saw Santa Claus too etc.) and acquired new beliefs. As they reach the age of reason (whenever that is) perhaps they would acquire new beliefs that might lead them to rationally dismiss their religious experience as children. As a child I believed in Santa, I even experienced his existence (at malls, school parties). I grew older, however, and acquired new beliefs that caused me to rationally dismiss my belief in santa. Children might do the same about God when they got older and their revelations stopped. [you see the difficulty of pinning down what those revelations must be like, how long they must continue, and when they must stop]. It is actually far from obvious then, that God revealing himself to children in this way would result in more people saved, but if not, then you can’t say that God is unloving for not doing it.

The experience would need to be so obvious that the only way to forget it is to culpably suppress it or deliberately misconstrue it. Given the experience, there’s no way the subject could then acquire beliefs which permit her to rationally disbelieve. Perhaps that’s too much coercion, but that’s what we’re discussing.

It’s not about saving people, either. We can deduce from Divine Love that God would desire to lovingly relate to everyone capable of such a relationship, at all times they are. This is the nature of love itself. God would desire this relationship for its own sake, and the innumerable benefits it’d cause for our well-being. A side affect of this relationship which God would initiate is belief in God.

1. Next, since the argument requires that no rational atheists exist. God would have to reveal himself so clearly that those children could not be rational atheists when they grow up, no matter what other beliefs they acquired. Even if I granted your argument (and intuitively, it seems off somehow) that this would not prevent soul-making in children, God would have to reveal himself in such an obvious way that it would override competing beliefs acquired as adults to the point of rational indubitably. Hence, it seems more than plausible that this could lead to the same pervasive coercion that we have been discussing, where God becomes the moral equivalent of a policeman on every street corner.

Hmm, but you don’t seem to be demonstrating that this is in fact too much coercion. You just note some implications I’ve acknowledged and state it’s too much. Why? I’ve given a number of examples in which something relevantly similar occurs but which we don’t ordinarily think involve pervasive coercion. (Personally, I don’t think this matters. Even if it did involve pervasive coercion, I think God would do it anyways. But, I’m trying to be faithful to Schellenberg’s argument to see if it can stand.)

1. As to hell. Even if children would not think of hell or understand it fully, they would still recognize hell as the necessary corollary of rejection of God when they grew up. Hence my point still works. The strength of the threat is measure by multiple factors including: 1. the strength of the threat (whether I am threatened with death or only a small fine) and 2. the immediacy of the threat (epistemic imminance). God cannot decrease the penalty, so if he is to protect free will and avoid pervasive coercion, then it seems all he can do is make his existence less obvious; and perhaps he does this.

That’s true, I’ll concede. I don’t think this coercion is pervasive though, at least no more than I think any of the average punishments parents give their children are pervasively coercive. I think your argument here would effectively undermine most parenting. In fact, it seems to do away with our general usage of punishment. Of course punishment is coercive, in many circumstances that’s seen as a good thing though.

(It’s worth mentioning here the idea of imperfect contrition prominent in Catholicism. Since when did a priest not accept a confession in which the penitent acknowledged she was confessing due to imperfect contrition, because the threat of hell was pervasively coercive?)

 

[Summa_Wrestler]

It is my view that God is not trying to purposely stay hidden from us. If God’s existence is not obvious to us, it is because God is what He is and we are what we are, and there is a wide difference between the two natures. Examples can be made where infallible knowledge of God’s existence does not preclude free will (e.g. the fallen angels).

I disagree that there is such a thing as reasonable non-belief. That is not to say that one’s conclusions don’t logically proceed from the premises, or that non-belief doesn’t exist as Schellenburg defines it. Rather, one can arrive at virtually any conclusion given the right premises and one can be married (perhaps unconsciously) to a premise that is in actuality a false premise. Given that there are rational arguments for belief, can both belief and non-belief be rational at the same time? If so, is there anything even God could do to intervene in such non-belief?

To the latter question, Schellenburg suggests that a loving God would reveal Himself to each individual in such a way so as any non-believer would be culpable for their non-belief. How do we propose God go about this? Keep in mind that God cannot be seen for what He truly is (a non-physical, eternal, transcendent being). Any kind of religious experience would be but an “avatar” of sorts. The Catholic Encyclopedia identifies three ways in which apparitions may work: either the eye is being manipulated, the brain is being manipulated, or a physical object appears which the eye is able to see. All these things can be considered not God, but part of the physical realm. If one cannot see God behind such mundane things as the Sun rising in the morning, I fail to see how such an occurrence would be any more persuasive.

 

[greylorn]

I think that it is very hard to account for the Incarnation and the Crucifixion if God does not love man. Better answers to the problem will probably question premise 2 and premise 3, as has been done previously on this thread.

It is not the least bit difficult for someone who does not accept the belief that Jesus Christ is/was a “god,” whatever that means. The Jews do not accept it. The bible historian Hugh Schonfield did a fine job of accounting for the incarnation, crucifixion, and resurrection of Christ in his book, The Passover Plot. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Passover_Plot

 

[Pieman333272]

It is not the least bit difficult for someone who does not accept the belief that Jesus Christ is/was a “god,” whatever that means. The Jews do not accept it. The bible historian Hugh Schonfield did a fine job of accounting for the incarnation, crucifixion, and resurrection of Christ in his book, The Passover Plot. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Passover_Plot

Hi Greylorn, not to distract from the thread too much, but two questions on the book:

1. What exactly is the naturalistic explanation for Jesus’ alleged or actual resurrection from the dead in the book?
2. How does this refute the idea that Jesus is God (meaning he is the same as the God who revealed himself in the Old Testament to the Jews)?

 

[greylorn]

Hi Greylorn, not to distract from the thread too much, but two questions on the book:

1. What exactly is the naturalistic explanation for Jesus’ alleged or actual resurrection from the dead in the book?
2. How does this refute the idea that Jesus is God (meaning he is the same as the God who revealed himself in the Old Testament to the Jews)?

Pieman,
Your query seems a relevant sort of distraction.

Schonfield’s book was published in the sixties, and it was then that I read it. I could probably reproduce his theory, but it would be a long and complex explanation, which, 50 years after my reading, would be so frought with errors that it would surely dishonor Schonfield’s well-considered thesis.

Passover Plot is an interesting, well written book— an easy read. I assure you that it is credible and thoughtful, based upon more bible research than you or I will ever perform.

Re: Your second question: I do not recall Schonfield as ever attempting to refute the idea that Christ is an incarnation of the Creator of the Universe. He simply made an excellent case for the obvious alternative.

The wiseish man comes to realize that it is impossible to refute dogma, whether religious or pseudo-scientific. (Refutation requires logic, and dogma is entirely a function of illogical belief.) The best approach is to offer a credible alternative for the curious mind to explore. That is pretty much what I attempt to do in my own book, less effectively than Schonfield.

I read his book from the perspective of a curious mind, and invite others with a similar mindset, yourself included, to do the same.

 

[maryh10000]

It is my view that God is not trying to purposely stay hidden from us. If God’s existence is not obvious to us, it is because God is what He is and we are what we are, and there is a wide difference between the two natures. Examples can be made where infallible knowledge of God’s existence does not preclude free will (e.g. the fallen angels).

I disagree that there is such a thing as reasonable non-belief. That is not to say that one’s conclusions don’t logically proceed from the premises, or that non-belief doesn’t exist as Schellenburg defines it. Rather, one can arrive at virtually any conclusion given the right premises and one can be married (perhaps unconsciously) to a premise that is in actuality a false premise. Given that there are rational arguments for belief, can both belief and non-belief be rational at the same time? If so, is there anything even God could do to intervene in such non-belief?

To the latter question, Schellenburg suggests that a loving God would reveal Himself to each individual in such a way so as any non-believer would be culpable for their non-belief. How do we propose God go about this? Keep in mind that God cannot be seen for what He truly is (a non-physical, eternal, transcendent being). Any kind of religious experience would be but an “avatar” of sorts. The Catholic Encyclopedia identifies three ways in which apparitions may work: either the eye is being manipulated, the brain is being manipulated, or a physical object appears which the eye is able to see. All these things can be considered not God, but part of the physical realm. If one cannot see God behind such mundane things as the Sun rising in the morning, I fail to see how such an occurrence would be any more persuasive.

This is the best answer I’ve seen so far. What the discussions about rational non-belief and hiddenness have primarily done is to make obvious exactly how much evidence and how “not hidden” God is.

Even the argument about Paul’s conversion has the opposite effect. Instead of showing that God can sometimes make his presence known unambiguously, it just makes me think of how easy it would be for someone to explain the phenomenon away. As Summa Wrestler points out, we can only directly perceive things that are in the physical realm, and our perceptions can be wrong.

People who have decided ahead of time (not saying this is our rational non-believer) that God does not exist can always come up with an alternate explanation of phenomenon that might by attributed to God. In fact, it’s a perfectly reasonable answer to say of a phenomenon that we just don’t know why it happened – our knowledge is not perfect.

It becomes harder and harder to imagine a way that God could make himself any more apparent than he already has and is.

 

[Perplexity]

It is my view that God is not trying to purposely stay hidden from us. If God’s existence is not obvious to us, it is because God is what He is and we are what we are, and there is a wide difference between the two natures. Examples can be made where infallible knowledge of God’s existence does not preclude free will (e.g. the fallen angels).

I don’t think our natures adequately explains God’s hiddenness. You believe God can reveal himself explicitly to everyone: you believe in the general judgement, and 2nd coming etc. You believe we’ll all have an explicit knowledge of God. So, our nature’s can’t be what’s causing the hiddenness, since these natures won’t be an impediment to God’s non-hiddnness.

I disagree that there is such a thing as reasonable non-belief. That is not to say that one’s conclusions don’t logically proceed from the premises, or that non-belief doesn’t exist as Schellenburg defines it. Rather, one can arrive at virtually any conclusion given the right premises and one can be married (perhaps unconsciously) to a premise that is in actuality a false premise. Given that there are rational arguments for belief, can both belief and non-belief be rational at the same time? If so, is there anything even God could do to intervene in such non-belief?

Well, if you concede that Schellenberg’s understanding can happen I can’t see this as an objection to it then. Perhaps it wasn’t intended to be though.

To the latter question, Schellenburg suggests that a loving God would reveal Himself to each individual in such a way so as any non-believer would be culpable for their non-belief. How do we propose God go about this? Keep in mind that God cannot be seen for what He truly is (a non-physical, eternal, transcendent being). Any kind of religious experience would be but an “avatar” of sorts. The Catholic Encyclopedia identifies three ways in which apparitions may work: either the eye is being manipulated, the brain is being manipulated, or a physical object appears which the eye is able to see. All these things can be considered not God, but part of the physical realm. If one cannot see God behind such mundane things as the Sun rising in the morning, I fail to see how such an occurrence would be any more persuasive.

Schellenberg develops a scenario in which God could accomplish this. He spends a fair amount of time showing that the scenario is possible. Highly recommend the book

 

[danserr]

It is not the least bit difficult for someone who does not accept the belief that Jesus Christ is/was a “god,” whatever that means. The Jews do not accept it. The bible historian Hugh Schonfield did a fine job of accounting for the incarnation, crucifixion, and resurrection of Christ in his book, The Passover Plot. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Passover_Plot

This is one of the worst arguments ever for alternate theories and is rejected by all critical scholarship (even atheistic scholarship) today.

Here is what the entry you gave me says:

His reading of that Gospel convinced him that John’s account, though probably filtered through an assistant and transcription in John’s old age, suggests that Jesus had planned everything. Among other things, so that he would not be on the cross for more than a few hours before the Sabbath arrived when it was required by law that Jews be taken down, so that one of his supporters, who was on hand, would give him water (to quench his thirst) that was actually laced with a drug to make him unconscious, and so that Joseph of Arimathea, a well-connected supporter, would collect him off the cross while still alive (but appearing dead) so that he could be secretly nursed back to health.

So the author believes that Jesus faked his own death, was not really killed on the cross by the romans and revived in the tomb where he emerged to convince people that he had risen from the dead and defeated death. You must be joking:

As NT Wright says:
Roman soldiers knew how to kill people. (they were very good at it, having had a lot of practice), to suggest that they somehow failed to kill Jesus is incredibly ad hoc. Second, if by some wierd stretch of the imagination, they did not fail to kill Jesus, his injuries were surely so bad from being beaten and crucified that he would have died after having been in the tomb. Finally, a drugged, beaten Jesus could never have emerged from the tomb three days later and convinced everyone that he had defeated death and risen from the dead.

If you try to claim that Jesus was never in the tomb at all, you contradict an awful lot of evidence, even from his enemies who admit that he was in the tomb. Your theory thus becomes incredibly ad hoc and even more absurd as your are forced to supposed the existence of secret plots, drugs, not not really dead Jesus, etc, and many other things not implied by present evidence.

 

[danserr]

But given the strong and explicit circumstances of Paul, (i.e., he was an adult, the experience was directly contrary to firmly held convictions of his, etc.) I think we’re justified in inferring that God could reveal himself in much weaker circumstances to everyone capable of relating thusly to God.

But the “weaker” those conditions, the less you can plausibly claim that God does not do this. No, I don’t think that fact that Paul is an adult and his experience contrary to his previous knowledge warrant you in thinking that God could do something comparable, even on a lower level, for everyone else. The circumstances of God’s explicit revelations to Paul, Mosses, were highly contingent and not necessarily translatable to everyone else.

In bayesian terms, it certainly is the case that the probability of S entering into a loving relationship with S’ is greater given that S believes S’ exists, than that S doesn’t. This is because unless S believes S’ exists, it’s not possible for S to relate to S’ lovingly.

Put it otherwise. In one world God does precisely what you claim, that is, reveals himself clearly to everyone to the point of rational indubitability. The other world is the present world. I do not think that you can claim warrant for thinking that the first world would result in more people entering a saving relationship with him. Perhaps a world where people gradually enter such a relationship is more effective. Perhaps God providentially orders the world so that anyone who would respond to his revelation does in fact receive that revelation and those who do not receive it would not have responded even if they did receive it. Given the possibility of either of these cases, I don’t think you can say God is unloving for not revealing himself more clearly to everyone.

The experience would need to be so obvious that the only way to forget it is to culpably suppress it or deliberately misconstrue it

Ok, thanks for the clarification. So God would have to reveal himself so clearly to a child that it would overwhlem all competing information that child might acquire as an adult (at least to the point of rational indubitability. That seems to me like too much coercion, but more on that below.
p.s. being “saved” is not a “side effect” it seems to me to be the main point.

Why? I’ve given a number of examples in which something relevantly similar occurs but which we don’t ordinarily think involve pervasive coercion. (Personally, I don’t think this matters. Even if it did involve pervasive coercion, I think God would do it anyways. But, I’m trying to be faithful to Schellenberg’s argument to see if it can stand.)

Actually, the only real example you have given is the claim that parents coercing their children is comparable to what you want God to do for us. Since this forms the main part of your claim, and you seem to rest most of your argument on it at this point, I will spend most time on that. Specifically, I want to show that parents raising their children is not comparable to the coercive pressure that would be placed on someone by having God reveal himself as clearly as you want him to.

First, though, your claim that God should reveal himself even if it resulted in pervasive coercion. This seems a very bold claim that even Schellenberg and I think most atheists would reject. It is hard to imagine how people could enter into a loving relationship with God if they were coerced into it. In the same way, a woman does not enter into a loving relationship with a man if she only marries him because he will kill her if she does not. It is not clear we could enter into a loving relationship with God if that were precede by say, a full guided tour of hell.

 

[danserr]

More to the point, since this is the real question. How much coercion is too much? Now, you want to put the burden on me to clearly show that it is too much, but since this is your argument, all I have to do is suggest that such clear revelation could plausibly result in too much coercion. So we have seen there are ways in which God making himself too obvious could indeed result in this coercion.

I response, you have moved to suggesting that God should reveal himself clearly to children, so clearly that it would override any competing beliefs formed as adults to the point of rational indubitility. You suggest that parents regularly influence children in the same way.

I think we can show however, that parents influencing children is not a good analogy to the coercion that would result in God revealing himself clearly to children.

Coercive pressure is a result of several factors:

1. the strength of the threat
2. the probabilistic imminence of the threat (how likely it is the threat will be carried out)
3. temporal imminence of the threat (how quickly threat carried out)
4. epistemic iminence of the threat (felt awareness of the threat)
5. threat indifference.

You claim that the threat of hell is no more coercive than any threat parents carry out. But given the above, I think we can clearly show this is mistaken.

1. Strength of the threat: the strength of the threat of rejecting God is hell (you agree that this follows even from a revelation to a child). This is a far far stronger threat than the worst punishment of a parent, and especially the standard punishment of a parent (no new toy, go to your room etc.).
2. Probabilistic imminence of the threat: Again, God’s threat will be carried out, it is unavoidable. A parent’s threat. however, could easily not be carried out. The child might, lie, or hide the offense from the parent. The parent might relent etc.

-the other three are not as immediately relevant.

Given then, the harshness of the penalty of rejecting God, which you agree would naturally result from his clear revelation of himself, and the inescapability of that threat being carried out. This all seems to contrast dramatically with the coercive pressure a parent exerts on a child. Furthermore, you ignore that the child can grow up and learn competing beliefs and that no parent can prevent this. You are demanding, however, that God reveal himself so clearly as to prevent this (at least to the point of rational indubitability).

It seems clear then that your comparison of God coercing a child (and later adult) to a parent coercing a child is not comparable.

I can go further, given the strength of the threat of rejecting God, hell, and the certainty the threat will be carried out, I think we can say that this would certainly result to pervasive coercion unless God lessens the epistemic imminence of the threat.

Surely, this would be at least as coercive as a mugger sticking a gun in my back, where the threat is also harsh (but less than hell) and lacks the same certainty it would be carried out. I think then, that it is plausible that God revealing himself as clearly as you wish would result in sufficient pervasive coercion to prevent soul-making (making morally significant decisions that would lead us to formation of our moral characters.

 

[Perplexity]

But the “weaker” those conditions, the less you can plausibly claim that God does not do this. No, I don’t think that fact that Paul is an adult and his experience contrary to his previous knowledge warrant you in thinking that God could do something comparable, even on a lower level, for everyone else. The circumstances of God’s explicit revelations to Paul, Mosses, were highly contingent and not necessarily translatable to everyone else.

hmm, ok. I’ll concede this point.

Put it otherwise. In one world God does precisely what you claim, that is, reveals himself clearly to everyone to the point of rational indubitability. The other world is the present world. I do not think that you can claim warrant for thinking that the first world would result in more people entering a saving relationship with him. Perhaps a world where people gradually enter such a relationship is more effective. Perhaps God providentially orders the world so that anyone who would respond to his revelation does in fact receive that revelation and those who do not receive it would not have responded even if they did receive it. Given the possibility of either of these cases, I don’t think you can say God is unloving for not revealing himself more clearly to everyone.

hmm, you keep mentioning a saving relationship. But, I’m talking about the bare-theistic God. I’m not so sure he’s interested in soteriology. So, perhaps I can grant that such a revelation of himself wouldn’t be fitting for soteriological ends. But, Schellenberg (and I) have only claimed that God would want to enter into a loving relationship; because, (inter alia) he’d desire that relationship for its own sake, and for how incredible it’d amplify our well-being.

First, though, your claim that God should reveal himself even if it resulted in pervasive coercion. This seems a very bold claim that even Schellenberg and I think most atheists would reject. It is hard to imagine how people could enter into a loving relationship with God if they were coerced into it. In the same way, a woman does not enter into a loving relationship with a man if she only marries him because he will kill her if she does not. It is not clear we could enter into a loving relationship with God if that were precede by say, a full guided tour of hell.

Sorry for the ambiguity, I had more of a compatibilist understanding of the scenario in mind. In this, everyone could be causally determined to enter into a loving relationship with God and yet they “freely” do so. You may reject compatibilism, but I hope you see what I proposed wasn’t that bold: comaptibilists currently dominate the free-will debate.

 

[Perplexity]

I response, you have moved to suggesting that God should reveal himself clearly to children, so clearly that it would override any competing beliefs formed as adults to the point of rational indubitility. You suggest that parents regularly influence children in the same way.

To be fair, Schellenberg’s claim has always been that this revelation would be to yung’ns. His original article in which he made such a claim was '93 iirc. This might sound like a trivial point but I just want to note that I haven’t shifted claims here (some might consider that reason to doubt the argument), just clarified Schellenberg’s position.

1. Strength of the threat: the strength of the threat of rejecting God is hell (you agree that this follows even from a revelation to a child). This is a far far stronger threat than the worst punishment of a parent, and especially the standard punishment of a parent (no new toy, go to your room etc.).

I agree the threat is far, far stronger. But, how might a child of this young age understand such a threat? I highly doubt it’d understand it with the kind of significance you need it to. It would just think “ouch for long time” which is roughly equivalent to the child’s interpretation of other punishments it might encounter.

1. Probabilistic imminence of the threat: Again, God’s threat will be carried out, it is unavoidable. A parent’s threat. however, could easily not be carried out. The child might, lie, or hide the offense from the parent. The parent might relent etc.

Again, I agree. But, would a child of this age really understand that difference with the significance you need it to? That just seems very implausible to me.

Furthermore, you ignore that the child can grow up and learn competing beliefs and that no parent can prevent this. You are demanding, however, that God reveal himself so clearly as to prevent this (at least to the point of rational indubitability).

That’s a good point. .

I can go further, given the strength of the threat of rejecting God, hell, and the certainty the threat will be carried out, I think we can say that this would certainly result to pervasive coercion unless God lessens the epistemic imminence of the threat.

Given the child’s cognitive limitations, I don’t think God needs to lessen the epistemic imminence.

Surely, this would be at least as coercive as a mugger sticking a gun in my back, where the threat is also harsh (but less than hell) and lacks the same certainty it would be carried out. I think then, that it is plausible that God revealing himself as clearly as you wish would result in sufficient pervasive coercion to prevent soul-making (making morally significant decisions that would lead us to formation of our moral characters.

For the reasons I’ve cited above, this implied threat seems far more analgous to things the child will encounter anyways which we don’t take to be destructive to its soul-formation. Imagine a child climbing into its parent’s vehicle and putting the thing in neutral. Suppose the child gets out fine, but the vehicle rolls into the house and causes a lot of damage. It seems quite natural to imagine the parents reacting very strongly, perhaps crying and asking the child if its ok and emotionally scolding it to never scare them like that again etc. etc. I find examples like these (and I can think of many) to be the right kind of analogy.

 

[Summa_Wrestler]

I don’t think our natures adequately explains God’s hiddenness. You believe God can reveal himself explicitly to everyone: you believe in the general judgement, and 2nd coming etc. You believe we’ll all have an explicit knowledge of God. So, our nature’s can’t be what’s causing the hiddenness, since these natures won’t be an impediment to God’s non-hiddnness.

That only applies to one branch of theism where I thought the argument was directed against theism in general. In any event, it apparently takes the dissolution of the entire universe for the general judgement, etc. to come to pass. When it comes to the current state of things, however, it seems clear to me that God cannot be any more obvious than He already is.

Well, if you concede that Schellenberg’s understanding can happen I can’t see this as an objection to it then. Perhaps it wasn’t intended to be though.

I concede that non-belief exists; I question if it is rational. One can have the notion that anything that is pink exists and therefore pink unicorns exist. The problem here isn’t in the logic but that the premise is false. I found the relevant passage from Schellenberg online (unfortunately it was just this chapter though) and he would probably say such a position is irrational (as it doesn’t meet correct standards of justification), but inculpably so as he doesn’t recognize it at the time. But what can anyone do for you if you just can’t see it any other way?

I see a parallel to the most common atheist position: By default nothing is to be believed until sufficient empirical evidence is presented. Note that this is neither belief or disbelief but simply non-belief. Empirical evidence for God is impossible in principle, however, so the atheist is forever in a state of non-belief. There is absolutely nothing even God could do to prove Himself to their satisfaction.

Schellenberg develops a scenario in which God could accomplish this. He spends a fair amount of time showing that the scenario is possible. Highly recommend the book

As I’m seeing it, that scenario should be impossible in principle. The closest to having a vision of God would be to see an angel, and even as a believer I would be skeptical of the experience. One might say it provides an irrational reason for belief, as there remains a justifiable level of doubt.

 

[Perplexity]

That only applies to one branch of theism where I thought the argument was directed against theism in general. In any event, it apparently takes the dissolution of the entire universe for the general judgement, etc. to come to pass. When it comes to the current state of things, however, it seems clear to me that God cannot be any more obvious than He already is.

Schellenberg’s argument is that a loving God would reveal himself in a way that isn’t actual. What we observe around us is rather surprising, given what we expect of divine love. So, I could agree that in the actual world, God couldn’t reveal himself in the obvious way Schellenberg says God would, and still maintain that if God existed, he wouldn’t be hidden.

I concede that non-belief exists; I question if it is rational. One can have the notion that anything that is pink exists and therefore pink unicorns exist. The problem here isn’t in the logic but that the premise is false. I found the relevant passage from Schellenberg online (unfortunately it was just this chapter though) and he would probably say such a position is irrational (as it doesn’t meet correct standards of justification), but inculpably so as he doesn’t recognize it at the time. But what can anyone do for you if you just can’t see it any other way?

He spends a fair amount of time developing what ‘rational’ and ‘inculpable’ mean. I’ve found it especially convincing because I’ve met the criteria before.

I see a parallel to the most common atheist position: By default nothing is to be believed until sufficient empirical evidence is presented. Note that this is neither belief or disbelief but simply non-belief. Empirical evidence for God is impossible in principle, however, so the atheist is forever in a state of non-belief. There is absolutely nothing even God could do to prove Himself to their satisfaction.

hmm, Schellenberg’s claim is miles away from what you describe as ‘the most common atheist position’ (which I don’t recognize as very common, at least among atheist philosophers).

As I’m seeing it, that scenario should be impossible in principle. The closest to having a vision of God would be to see an angel, and even as a believer I would be skeptical of the experience. One might say it provides an irrational reason for belief, as there remains a justifiable level of doubt.

Are you familiar with the scenario I’m referring to?

 

[tonyrey]

This is one of the worst arguments ever for alternate theories and is rejected by all critical scholarship (even atheistic scholarship) today.

Here is what the entry you gave me says:

So the author believes that Jesus faked his own death, was not really killed on the cross by the romans and revived in the tomb where he emerged to convince people that he had risen from the dead and defeated death. You must be joking:

As NT Wright says:
Roman soldiers knew how to kill people. (they were very good at it, having had a lot of practice), to suggest that they somehow failed to kill Jesus is incredibly ad hoc. Second, if by some wierd stretch of the imagination, they did not fail to kill Jesus, his injuries were surely so bad from being beaten and crucified that he would have died after having been in the tomb. Finally, a drugged, beaten Jesus could never have emerged from the tomb three days later and convinced everyone that he had defeated death and risen from the dead.

If you try to claim that Jesus was never in the tomb at all, you contradict an awful lot of evidence, even from his enemies who admit that he was in the tomb. Your theory thus becomes incredibly ad hoc and even more absurd as your are forced to supposed the existence of secret plots, drugs, not not really dead Jesus, etc, and many other things not implied by present evidence.

One more conspiracy theory to add to the list of futile attempts to establish a preconceived conclusion!

 

[maryh10000]

I don’t think our natures adequately explains God’s hiddenness. You believe God can reveal himself explicitly to everyone: you believe in the general judgement, and 2nd coming etc. You believe we’ll all have an explicit knowledge of God. So, our nature’s can’t be what’s causing the hiddenness, since these natures won’t be an impediment to God’s non-hiddnness.

Actually, we believe that our natures will be perfected in heaven. So I don’t see where we have to believe that God ever has revealed himself through something other than what Summa Wrestler called an “avatar” or manipulation of the physical world. Since any revelation, however explicit, still must occur to us through the physical world, at least while we’re alive, any revelation will always be counterable by saying our perceptions of the physical world can be wrong.

Did God explictly reveal himself to Paul? Well, he sure revealed himself dramatically, but he still had to reveal himself in this world. Paul could have disbelieved the evidence of his eyes and of his feelings.

And as long as you’re talking about what we believe, did Jesus reveal himself explicitly? Well, in one sense it’s hard to imagine how much more explicit he could have been, and yet Judas doesn’t appear to have believed he was God. And the apostles all appear, from the accounts, to have lost faith in Jesus’ divinity when he was crucified, despite the fact that (according to the Gospels) three of them had seen the Transfiguration.

But the fact is, that despite all this evidence, they still decided Jesus wasn’t God during the crucifixion. Which was still possible because all these “explicit revelations” occurred in the physical world.

Now of course you don’t have to believe in the Bible accounts, but since you were specifically referencing what we believe, I think they are relevant in this case.

So I think the point still stands. It is reasonable to assume that the nature of living human beings are sufficiently different from God that God can only reveal himself to them through the physical world. Christians believe that God has actually done this numerous times, to numerous people, in a wide variety of ways, most markedly through the life, miracles, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ.

However, our nature is also such that we can choose to disbelieve any physical evidence whatsoever. Even rationally. People will argue for mass hallucinations rather than believe something that they believe is, a priori, impossible.

I have followed and agreed with Danser’s arguments about coercion, but as I have said before, it’s harder and harder for me to imagine how, totally apart from the problem of coercion (which remains a significant argument to me) God could *indubitably * reveal himself to ANYONE, let alone to everyone.

Schellenberg develops a scenario in which God could accomplish this. He spends a fair amount of time showing that the scenario is possible. Highly recommend the book

Well, I can’t answer an argument that isn’t presented and I’m pretty sure I’m not going to be getting the book in the near future. Since the arguments you’ve presented from Schellenberg haven’t convinced me so far, I’m not going to assume this one would either.

 

[greylorn]

This is one of the worst arguments ever for alternate theories and is rejected by all critical scholarship (even atheistic scholarship) today.

Here is what the entry you gave me says:

So the author believes that Jesus faked his own death, was not really killed on the cross by the romans and revived in the tomb where he emerged to convince people that he had risen from the dead and defeated death. You must be joking:

As NT Wright says:
Roman soldiers knew how to kill people. (they were very good at it, having had a lot of practice), to suggest that they somehow failed to kill Jesus is incredibly ad hoc. Second, if by some wierd stretch of the imagination, they did not fail to kill Jesus, his injuries were surely so bad from being beaten and crucified that he would have died after having been in the tomb. Finally, a drugged, beaten Jesus could never have emerged from the tomb three days later and convinced everyone that he had defeated death and risen from the dead.

If you try to claim that Jesus was never in the tomb at all, you contradict an awful lot of evidence, even from his enemies who admit that he was in the tomb. Your theory thus becomes incredibly ad hoc and even more absurd as your are forced to supposed the existence of secret plots, drugs, not not really dead Jesus, etc, and many other things not implied by present evidence.

I recommended reading the entire book, but perhaps your attention span is too short for such a project. Any halfwit can excerpt a few paragraphs from any book or Wiki article and make up information about it, as you’ve demonstrated.

Schonfield went on to propose (in the book you’ve not read) that Romans had considerable experience at killing people, hence the spear thrust into Christ’s side— an event unanticipated by Jesus in his advance planning. Upon being removed from the cross, he was thoroughly dead.

Kindly do not refer to Schonfield’s theory as if it were mine. I mentioned it by way of reply to someone who proposed that there were no such explanations available.

I really do not care what atheists think about Schonfield’s theory or anything else, since they all base their limited thinking upon incompetently derived premises which they are too lazy, stupid, or whatever to take the trouble of correcting. IMO it would be a mistake to raise an atheist’s opinion about anything, including those subjects about which they are generally regarded as authoritative (cosmology, philosophy, evolution, etc.) to any higher level than Joe Blow’s opinions about what’s the best car or who’d make a good President.

 

[tonyrey]

Actually, we believe that our natures will be perfected in heaven. So I don’t see where we have to believe that God ever has revealed himself through something other than what Summa Wrestler called an “avatar” or manipulation of the physical world. Since any revelation, however explicit, still must occur to us through the physical world, at least while we’re alive, any revelation will always be counterable by saying our perceptions of the physical world can be wrong.

Did God explictly reveal himself to Paul? Well, he sure revealed himself dramatically, but he still had to reveal himself in this world. Paul could have disbelieved the evidence of his eyes and of his feelings.

And as long as you’re talking about what we believe, did Jesus reveal himself explicitly? Well, in one sense it’s hard to imagine how much more explicit he could have been, and yet Judas doesn’t appear to have believed he was God. And the apostles all appear, from the accounts, to have lost faith in Jesus’ divinity when he was crucified, despite the fact that (according to the Gospels) three of them had seen the Transfiguration.

But the fact is, that despite all this evidence, they still decided Jesus wasn’t God during the crucifixion. Which was still possible because all these “explicit revelations” occurred in the physical world.

Now of course you don’t have to believe in the Bible accounts, but since you were specifically referencing what we believe, I think they are relevant in this case.

So I think the point still stands. It is reasonable to assume that the nature of living human beings are sufficiently different from God that God can only reveal himself to them through the physical world. Christians believe that God has actually done this numerous times, to numerous people, in a wide variety of ways, most markedly through the life, miracles, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ.

However, our nature is also such that we can choose to disbelieve any physical evidence whatsoever. Even rationally. People will argue for mass hallucinations rather than believe something that they believe is, a priori, impossible.

I have followed and agreed with Danser’s arguments about coercion, but as I have said before, it’s harder and harder for me to imagine how, totally apart from the problem of coercion (which remains a significant argument to me) God could *indubitably * reveal himself to ANYONE, let alone to everyone.

Well, I can’t answer an argument that isn’t presented and I’m pretty sure I’m not going to be getting the book in the near future. Since the arguments you’ve presented from Schellenberg haven’t convinced me so far, I’m not going to assume this one would either.

An excellent post, Mary! You’re going to be a real asset to this forum…

 

[Pieman333272]

Schonfield went on to propose (in the book you’ve not read) that Romans had considerable experience at killing people, hence the spear thrust into Christ’s side— an event unanticipated by Jesus in his advance planning. Upon being removed from the cross, he was thoroughly dead.

But wait, if Schonfield proposes that he actually died, doesn’t that mean he affirms the actual, bodily resurrection of Jesus (at least from the synopsis I read)? And if so, doesn’t that make it backfire on your argument that Jesus was not the Son of God? Unless Schonfield (or you) has reconciled the resurrection with Jesus being just a man, at least.