What's wrong with this argument against the existence of God?

[Perplexity]

Actually, we believe that our natures will be perfected in heaven. So I don’t see where we have to believe that God ever has revealed himself through something other than what Summa Wrestler called an “avatar” or manipulation of the physical world. Since any revelation, however explicit, still must occur to us through the physical world, at least while we’re alive, any revelation will always be counterable by saying our perceptions of the physical world can be wrong.

I wasn’t disagreeing with this part of Summa’s post.

And as long as you’re talking about what we believe, did Jesus reveal himself explicitly? Well, in one sense it’s hard to imagine how much more explicit he could have been, and yet Judas doesn’t appear to have believed he was God. And the apostles all appear, from the accounts, to have lost faith in Jesus’ divinity when he was crucified, despite the fact that (according to the Gospels) three of them had seen the Transfiguration.

Sure, but how does that effect your outlook on Schellenberg’s argument? The apostles were grown men with all kinds of goodies in their background knowledge etc. whereas Schellenberg’s argument is concerned with children.

So I think the point still stands. It is reasonable to assume that the nature of living human beings are sufficiently different from God that God can only reveal himself to them through the physical world. Christians believe that God has actually done this numerous times, to numerous people, in a wide variety of ways, most markedly through the life, miracles, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ.

I wasn’t disagreeing with that. I was saying out natures cannot adequately explain why God is hidden, not why he can only reveal himself through the physical world.

However, our nature is also such that we can choose to disbelieve any physical evidence whatsoever. Even rationally. People will argue for mass hallucinations rather than believe something that they believe is, a priori, impossible.

Sure, it’s possible. But, ever heard the saying ‘seeing is believing’? I think when we encounter something in a physical way, it’s much, much harder to disbelieve. But, in any case, all Schellenberg and I are interested in showing is that this experience would be such that any following disbelief would be culpable, not that there wouldn’t be disbelief.

I have followed and agreed with Danser’s arguments about coercion, but as I have said before, it’s harder and harder for me to imagine how, totally apart from the problem of coercion (which remains a significant argument to me) God could *indubitably * reveal himself to ANYONE, let alone to everyone.

hmm, this is surprising to me, but to each his own.

Well, I can’t answer an argument that isn’t presented and I’m pretty sure I’m not going to be getting the book in the near future. Since the arguments you’ve presented from Schellenberg haven’t convinced me so far, I’m not going to assume this one would either.

Thanks for giving it a go anyways! I guess I haven’t seen any reason to doubt it yet.

 

[danserr]

To be fair, Schellenberg’s claim has always been that this revelation would be to yung’ns. His original article in which he made such a claim was '93 iirc. This might sound like a trivial point but I just want to note that I haven’t shifted claims here (some might consider that reason to doubt the argument), just clarified Schellenberg’s position.

Ok. I am going to argue that this does not actually help you, since even if God’s revealing himself clearly to a child might not be coercive, that revelation would be coercive when the child grew up. This is not comparable to a parent’s interaction with their child for reasons I will try to lay out.

Furthermore, you ignore that the child can grow up and learn competing beliefs and that no parent can prevent this. You are demanding, however, that God reveal himself so clearly as to prevent this (at least to the point of rational indubitability).

That’s a good point. .

Since this is our closest point of agreement, I’ll start here.

I am suggesting that God revealing himself too clearly would risk leading to pervasive coercion and limit man’s ability to make morally significant decisions. In short, that it would interfere with human free will.

You have suggested in reply that God should reveal himself to children since this would only be comparable to a parents relationship with their children and their own coercive measure to raise their child. I want to suggest some reasons why this doesn’t help you.

My first point centers around your statement that God must reveal himself with sufficient clarity to a child that they child, when he becomes an adult, will not be able to be a rational atheist. Hence God’s revelation would have to be so clear as to over-ride to the point of rational indubitability any competing beliefs or other information that this child would acquire as an adult.

The problem, though, is that on becoming an adult, everything I said before would still follow. This person would know that the punishment of rejecting God is very great, and that it is inevitable. Hence there would still be a very strong coercive pressure on this person. This is comparable to a mugger sticking a gun in my back, only the threat of rejecting God is even harsher and more certain to be carried out. But if we agree that in this case the mugger is coercing me to hand over my wallet (to the point where it is not a free choice), then surely we must agree that God’s action would be similarly coercive unless he decreased the epistemic imminence of the threat, or its felt awareness, which is precisely what he does.

Making that revelation very clear to a child would prevent God from diminishing the epistemic imminence of the threat and thus result in pervasive coercion, not perhaps when the person was a child, but certainly when they grew older.

Now, why is this not comparable to a parent coercing their child to behave, since we agree that a parent’s coercion on their child (to a certain level) does not interfere with their child’s free will when they are older.

1. As I mention above, a child could grow up and acquire competing beliefs from what their parent’s told them, but your argument requires that God’s revelation be so clear as to prevent this (at least to the point of rational indubitability).
2. As the child grew older and into an adult, he would come to better understand that the consequence of rejecting God is hell and understand how bad that is. Hence the threat would grow harsher as the child grows older and the coercive pressure greater.

• On the other hand when parents raise children and child grows up. Typically any coercive pressure the parents exercise on the children, however, is diminished when children grow older.

1. The likelihood of the threat being carried out (hell) would similarly increase as the child became an adult. The again contrasts with the fact that the likelihood of a parent’s threatened punishment to children typically diminishes with age.

So this leaves us right where we started. An adult knows to the point of rational indubitability that the punishment for rejecting God is 1. Very harsh and 2. Certain to be carried out. This would certainly interfere with his free will (exert sufficient coercive pressure to prevent soul-making), unless God decreases the epistemic imminence (felt awareness) of the threat. By making his existence less obvious, he does precisely this. But, he could not do this, if he revealed himself to a child as clearly as you want.

Consider again the analogy of the mugger with a gun in my back. The threat (death) is harsh, the likelihood is be carried out is not certain, (and might even be rationally doubted), but given these two things and the felt awareness of the threat, it is obviously strongly coercive. God revealing himself too clearly (and I think I have shown why what you demand would be too clearly) would do the same, hence his need to make his existence less obvious to most people.

Ps, I wrote some of this last night and some this morning, sorry for being repetitive in places.

 

[danserr]

I recommended reading the entire book, but perhaps your attention span is too short for such a project. Any halfwit can excerpt a few paragraphs from any book or Wiki article and make up information about it, as you’ve demonstrated.
.

You provided the link as being informative on the book, so you can hardly complain if I take the link that you provide seriously. I note, however, your inability to provide any serious answer beyond petty insults. How very, errr… scientific, of you.

Since we are suggesting books, possibly I could suggest to you a book of the New Testament scholar NT Wright, The Resurrection of the Son of God I’m sure if a half-wit like myself can get through its arguments that take up a mere 700 pages, you can do so as well.

Kindly do not refer to Schonfield’s theory as if it were mine. I mentioned it by way of reply to someone who proposed that there were no such explanations available.

If it bothers you, I won’t. I thought it a reasonable inference since you appeared to be presenting it as a theory that you accepted. If you do not accept it and think it is problematic, why? If you do accept it, why does it offend you when I call it “yours” meaning by this, not “yours” by way of having originated the theory, but “your” in the sense of being a theory that you adhere to.

Schonfield went on to propose (in the book you’ve not read) that Romans had considerable experience at killing people, hence the spear thrust into Christ’s side— an event unanticipated by Jesus in his advance planning. Upon being removed from the cross, he was thoroughly dead.

I see. So Jesus was totally dead, with a brutal spear thrust in his side. And then he was given a magic drug that made him come alive in spite of all these injuries (brutal beating, crucifixion, spear thrust etc.)?

Or are you claiming (excuse me, or is S. claiming) that Jesus really did die, but that the historical facts of the empty tomb, appearances of the risen Christ, and origin of Christian belief can be accounted for in some other way? Do tell.

Anyway, how could Jesus’ not have taken the spear thrust into account? It was standard procedure to either break a victims legs or else to spear thrust them to make sure they were dead. Furthermore, S’s plot turns Jesus into a deceptive conniver, which contradicts all present evidence.

 

[Perplexity]

The problem, though, is that on becoming an adult, everything I said before would still follow. This person would know that the punishment of rejecting God is very great, and that it is inevitable. Hence there would still be a very strong coercive pressure on this person. This is comparable to a mugger sticking a gun in my back, only the threat of rejecting God is even harsher and more certain to be carried out. But if we agree that in this case the mugger is coercing me to hand over my wallet (to the point where it is not a free choice), then surely we must agree that God’s action would be similarly coercive unless he decreased the epistemic imminence of the threat, or its felt awareness, which is precisely what he does.

The relationship people would have with God would be developmental. So, by the time these children are adults, if they haven’t rejected God, they’d be in a very deep loving relationship with God. I think they’d suffer from perfect contrition far sooner than they’d ever suffer from imperfect contrition. Can you imagine having that kind of explicit loving relationship with God (unlike what nearly anyone on earth has) and still being worried about hell? I suggest that if the person does culpably reject God it must be at a point at which he’s not very deep in a loving relationship with God such that he’s extremely young in age (wouldn’t really understand hell), and thus wouldn’t be coerced as much as you say.

Now, why is this not comparable to a parent coercing their child to behave, since we agree that a parent’s coercion on their child (to a certain level) does not interfere with their child’s free will when they are older.

1. As I mention above, a child could grow up and acquire competing beliefs from what their parent’s told them, but your argument requires that God’s revelation be so clear as to prevent this (at least to the point of rational indubitability).
2. As the child grew older and into an adult, he would come to better understand that the consequence of rejecting God is hell and understand how bad that is. Hence the threat would grow harsher as the child grows older and the coercive pressure greater.

• On the other hand when parents raise children and child grows up. Typically any coercive pressure the parents exercise on the children, however, is diminished when children grow older.

1. The likelihood of the threat being carried out (hell) would similarly increase as the child became an adult. The again contrasts with the fact that the likelihood of a parent’s threatened punishment to children typically diminishes with age.

It seems you’ve changed from saying the experience would be far too coercive for God to carry out, to saying the experience’s distant implications are too coercive for God to initiate the experience.

Now you’re comparing the coercion of punishments imposed by parents upon their children with the coercion this experience would imply later in the child’s life. But, I don’t think these coercive events are analogous. I only made the claim that the coercion elicited in the experience itself and that of parenting-punishments are analogous. So, I may very well concede that these are not analogous but still maintain that the experience isn’t too coercive. In fact, perhaps you’ve conceded this point?

In any case, as I’ve just argued I don’t think it’s very plausible to say that the child would be in a position to worry about hell as you suggest when they’re older. When they’re adults, they’ll either be in a very deep relationship with God, or would’ve long since culpably buried God. Either way, it doesn’t seem plausible that they’d feel a gun to their back, or anything close to that as far as coercion goes when they’re adults.

I apologize for the late reply, just been chewing on your points.

 

[danserr]

I apologize for the late reply, just been chewing on your points.

It’s ok, I’ve been doing the same.

o,

I may very well concede that these are not analogous but still maintain that the experience isn’t too coercive. In fact, perhaps you’ve conceded this point?

Not entirely: I abandoned it for the moment because I though I saw an easier line of attack, but I see that my previous attempt may need to be supplemented. I think one problem though with claiming that the experience would not be coercive is the issue of how strong the experience is, more anon. Perhaps this will go back to what you mentioned earlier about competing intuitions about how much coercion is too much.

You seem willing to agree that God revealing himself to adults in this way could plausibly be coercive, and you seem willing to agree that if the distant implications of God revealing himself to children resulted in coercion in adults, that would would not be obliged to do it.

You suggest however, that God should still reveal himself to children, since this would not be coercive to children and by the time the child reached the age (undefined) where this could result in coercion, then the child would either be so deep in relationship with God, or else long culpability buried. I want to try to suggest why this does not square with how we normally see child development and that it has a couple implausible consequences.

1. You are assuming that it is not possible to coerce a child too much. But we normally agree in practical terms that it is indeed possible to coerce a child too much and that this is not desirable. We don’t approve of parents who “hover” too much over their children. We actually see this as interfering with this child’s development. Your view thus contradicts the widely held assumption that it is good for the child to do some things themselves without parental supervision. For example, a parent may tell a child to clean his room and deliberately not oversee the cleaning because they will want the child to clean his room without being forced. This leads to the next point.
2. You are assuming that by the time a child reaches the age where coercion would ensue, they would be so deep in a relationship with God that coercive pressure would not matter, or else they would be culpably lost. This is actually seems like a bold statement. One problem is picking the age at which this would occur. I would say by age 12 a child could understand the consequences of rejecting God enough to be coerced if not already in as deep a relationship as you mention. Certainly by age 14.

• For your solution to work, it must be necessarily true that God revealing himself this way would inevitably result in a deep relationship or final culpable rejection. Children, however, are not always in a solid relationship with their parents by this age. Children will rebel against very good parents who work hard and well to initiate loving relationships.
• How could God prevent this? Well, perhaps by being even more continually present to those children than their parents, but then see my point 1. If he does this, then your parent/child analogy breaks down since God would be going beyond what those parents would be doing, and indeed God by being continually present when the child would otherwise try to do something wrong (as children do) would violate our commonly held assumption that parents should let children do some things for themselves and make some significant decisions (on a smaller scale).

3). What you are suggesting would deny a child the ability to repent after the age of 12-14 or so. They would have rejected God but at this point coercive pressure would prevent them from entering into a loving relationship with God. This contradicts present experience that a rebellious child or teenager may grow up, repent, and still enter a loving relationship with his parents. Your view would deny a person this opportunity. Does that seems fair?

• This means, that one your view, the most significant decision a person would make in their whole lives, would be made as children. But this contradicts how we normally see childhood as preparation to make the important decisions of adulthood. Parental coercion does not prevent this, but God’s revealing himself would, as you seem willing to concede.

 

[Perplexity]

1. You are assuming that it is not possible to coerce a child too much. But we normally agree in practical terms that it is indeed possible to coerce a child too much and that this is not desirable. We don’t approve of parents who “hover” too much over their children. We actually see this as interfering with this child’s development. Your view thus contradicts the widely held assumption that it is good for the child to do some things themselves without parental supervision. For example, a parent may tell a child to clean his room and deliberately not oversee the cleaning because they will want the child to clean his room without being forced.

I guess it’s not clear to me how I’ve made this assumption. I agree that a child can be coerced too much, and that it is a good for the child to do somethings free from parental supervision.

At the same time, the coercion we ordinarily (and without second thought) exert over children couldn’t be exerted on an adult without serious violence to his or her soul-formation. I’m thinking of dozens of examples of punishments and rewards (quite analogous to bribes) which we use all the time with children; but, in no way could be used on adults without serious repercussions.

So, I think it would require far more coercion to significantly interfere with a child’s soul-formation than it would to significantly interfere with an adult’s soul-formation.

Think of the degree of coercion which would be enough to harm a child’s soul-formation as a ‘mile’ in reality, and the amount which would be enough to harm an adult’s soul-formation as the, let’s say, 3 inch line on a map intended to proportionally represent a mile.

• How could God prevent this? Well, perhaps by being even more continually present to those children than their parents, but then see my point 1. If he does this, then your parent/child analogy breaks down since God would be going beyond what those parents would be doing, and indeed God by being continually present when the child would otherwise try to do something wrong (as children do) would violate our commonly held assumption that parents should let children do some things for themselves and make some significant decisions (on a smaller scale).

God could behave in any number of roles so as to best foster a relationship with the child. If he believed that behaving as a parent would encourage rebellion, I think we can safely say God wouldn’t so behave. No, I think it’s probable that God would come to children as a friend. You might say a parent can equally try to befriend the child; but, then it’s unclear whether the child would rebel. (assuming the parent’s attempt was successful)

If God could only do what a parent would do, then I’m not sure we’d be dealing with an analogy.

3). What you are suggesting would deny a child the ability to repent after the age of 12-14 or so. They would have rejected God but at this point coercive pressure would prevent them from entering into a loving relationship with God. This contradicts present experience that a rebellious child or teenager may grow up, repent, and still enter a loving relationship with his parents. Your view would deny a person this opportunity. Does that seems fair?

• This means, that one your view, the most significant decision a person would make in their whole lives, would be made as children. But this contradicts how we normally see childhood as preparation to make the important decisions of adulthood. Parental coercion does not prevent this, but God’s revealing himself would, as you seem willing to concede.

I’ve just realized something that might have saved us a lot of time, perhaps.

Would there be a punishment for rejecting God on bare-theism? I don’t think that’s clear at all. Sure, you could argue there would be one on Christian Theism.

So, my response should be two-fold.

On the one hand, I don’t think anything we’ve been discussing thus far about coercion applies to a discussion about this argument in relation to bare-theism. I wonder, if you concede this point, would you see more strength in the Divine Hiddenness argument apropos bare-theism?

As far as your above points about coercion with regards to Christian-Theism:

Remember that Schellenberg assumes Libertarian Free-Will in his argument. So, the most important decision of people’s lives wouldn’t be made, perhaps, until the very moment of death.

Think of all those who actually detest God, and vehemently oppose theism. Surely, you wouldn’t say such people are beyond the grasp of God’s merciful love? Neither would we say these individuals are.

All I’ve suggested is that by the time they reach an age at which the punishment for rejecting God would exert significant coercion, they wouldn’t be in a state of discernment in which such coercion would play a pivotal role in their soul-formation.

This could be because their being in a relationship with God would mean they had to abstain from certain actions they desire, or perform certain actions they dislike. It seems totally natural to me, that a young child would far sooner do things they want, and not do things they don’t want to than that they’d submit. Think of the ol’ cliche ‘terrible 2’s’. And that’s just 2!

Lawrence Kohlberg’s stages of moral development would place these children at the tail end of the preconventional moral reasoning period. This means, they’re moral reasoning is self-interest driven. There are other psychological models reinforcing this as well.

 

[greylorn]

But wait, if Schonfield proposes that he actually died, doesn’t that mean he affirms the actual, bodily resurrection of Jesus (at least from the synopsis I read)? And if so, doesn’t that make it backfire on your argument that Jesus was not the Son of God? Unless Schonfield (or you) has reconciled the resurrection with Jesus being just a man, at least.

Schonfield does not believe in the resurrection of Christ. His case was, as I recall, based upon the testaments themselves, which do not record that Christ was seen by anyone other than his mother and Magdalene, and by his apostles. I forget who was around for the ascension, but do not recall any mention of the good old multitudes. For me, that is a convincing case.

Well before reading Schonfield I wondered why Christ did not show himself to the same multitudes before which he had previously spoken? It would have been really cool had he shown up knocking on Pilate’s door, or stopped by the barracks to forgive the soldiers who had crucified him. Such convincing proofs of his resurrection would have clinched the validity of his teachings. Yet, they are missing.

And of course I have no doubt that apologists can come up with any number of explanations as to why Christ kept to himself after his resurrection, when they are not moonlighting by writing soap opera plots.

If I felt a great need to believe in the godhood of Christ, I could propose that his resurrected form was not a real human body, but something more like the forms manifested by ghosts and spirits who want to return to either reassure a loved one or haunt an enemy. Such a form would be consistent with the rare and brief appearances noted in the Bible.

Kindly do not mistake these remarks for any failure to appreciate Christ, as a great and powerful teacher. I find too many inconsistencies in his teachings (as recorded in the Bible) to accept them as the genuine teachings of a God. A good case can be made for the opinion of some scholars that many of the contradictions are the result of after-market additions, but that is another subject.

 

[danserr]

I’ve just realized something that might have saved us a lot of time, perhaps.

Would there be a punishment for rejecting God on bare-theism? I don’t think that’s clear at all. Sure, you could argue there would be one on Christian Theism.

So, my response should be two-fold.

On the one hand, I don’t think anything we’ve been discussing thus far about coercion applies to a discussion about this argument in relation to bare-theism. I wonder, if you concede this point, would you see more strength in the Divine Hiddenness argument apropos bare-theism?

I think Divine Hiddennes is like the problem of evil in that it is irrelevant on deism. A simply deist would deny the first premise, that God is all loving, (as you may have noticed that greylorn did). It is only on Christian theism, which claims that God is all-loving that this becomes an issue. So I agree, a bare theist would not believe in punishment for rejecting God, because a bare theist would probably not claim that God is all-loving. (assuming by “God”, you just mean a powerful creator of the universe.) So yes, I am defending divine hiddenness assuming a Christian concept of God.

As to the rest of your reply, I may need to ask for further clarification of some points, because I don’t think some of what you are saying fully addresses my latest suggestions, so clarify if you think I missed something.

I argued:

1. What matters is not believing in God’s existence, but entering into a saving relationship with Him.
2. God revealing himself in an obvious (rationally indubitable) manner could plausibly result in pervasive coercion that would make freely entering this loving relationship difficult and prevent man’s ability to make morally significant decisions and engage in soul-making.

• You replied that

perhaps God could only reveal himself to children, since the coercion exerted in this way would be no more than is exerted in the normal parent-child relationship.

I replied:
3. The distant implications of this are such that it would result in coercion on the children after the reached a fuller understanding of God and what rejecting him would entail.

-you replied:

by the point this children would be so deep in a loving relationship with God or else culpably buried, that coercion would no longer an issue

My latest reply:
4.
A. You argument wrongly assumes that it is not possible to coerce children too much, but we agree this is possible and undesirable
B.your assumption that a child would be so deep in a relationship with God that coercion would not matter contrasts with what we know of child development. (hence your parent/child analogy is flawed)
C. You would deny adults the ability to repent (because of my point 3.) and this would mean the most sig. decision people make in their lives would be made as children.

Now I (ftsoa- though it requires clarification) agree with you when you say that the level of coercion required to coerce child is greater than an adult, but the problem is where to draw the line. You suggested the God’s coercion would be similar to that exerted by a parent. In response I made point 4 (esp. B and C). I pointed that even if God did coerce in the way a parent coerces a child this would not be enough to guarantee that a child would either be so deep in a loving relationship with God that coercion would not matter or else culpably buried. This is especially, where I think I need further clarification to your answer.

You say, for instance, in reply that God would not behave this way if it would result in coercion (which is precisely my point- he doesn’t because it could!), but then suggest God would come as a friend (which is where it seems like you abandon the parent/child analogy). But remember, you need to be able to guarantee that this would inevitably result in children entering so deep a relationship with God that they would not feel coerced by the time they reached young adulthood. This just seems pretty implausible to me. But if not then (from my point 2 and 3) God is not required to reveal himself in this way because of this distant coercive implications.

Think of all those who actually detest God, and vehemently oppose theism. Surely, you wouldn’t say such people are beyond the grasp of God’s merciful love? Neither would we say these individuals are.

But remember, in the present world, since God does not reveal himself so obviously, such people would not be prevented from repenting and entering a loving relationship with God because of pervasive coercion; if God revealed himself the way you want him to, they would.

All I’ve suggested is that by the time they reach an age at which the punishment for rejecting God would exert significant coercion, they wouldn’t be in a state of discernment in which such coercion would play a pivotal role in their soul-formation.

But you can’t show that people would be that deep in a relationship with God and I’ve given reasons to doubt it.
Next, what about people who reject God at that point? Because of my point 1 and 2, such people, young adults and older, who reject God at this point, would be unable to enter a loving relationship with him because then pervasive coercion would ensue.
This means that 1. people who do not enter such a relationship with God by young adulthood would be unable to, and 2. that the most important decision of people’s lives would be made as children. Neither of these seem fair to me.

• Sorry, if this is a little scattered.
• ps. from the other thread. agreed, Dean Zimmerman is pretty cool

 

[JDaniel]

Schonfield does not believe in the resurrection of Christ. His case was, as I recall, based upon the testaments themselves, which do not record that Christ was seen by anyone other than his mother and Magdalene, and by his apostles. I forget who was around for the ascension, but do not recall any mention of the good old multitudes. For me, that is a convincing case.

Greylorn:

I know that you don’t put much trust in John’s Gospel, but, it seems to me you were OK with Luke’s. Read chapter 24 of Luke’s Gospel. Luke mentions the eleven, Mary (mother of James), Joanna, and Mary Magdalene, “and the others,” who were around the morning the women went to the tomb to find Jesus gone. There, they encountered two angels. Also, there were two women on their way to Emmaus, that Jesus appeared to and spoke with. “Multitude,” in those days, might not have the same meaning as it does today. But, it looks as though there were more people involved on Christ’s Resurrection day than only the few that were, strictly speaking, intimates.

Also, it seems to me, but I can’t remember where I saw it, that the Risen Christ was seen in Galilee, in various places. Most likely He was not recognized - as, even at first, the Apostles didn’t recognize Him - and more efficaciously made His presence known to those that would recognize Him.

Just some thoughts; however, I’ll try not to be an apologist.

Well before reading Schonfield I wondered why Christ did not show himself to the same multitudes before which he had previously spoken? It would have been really cool had he shown up knocking on Pilate’s door, or stopped by the barracks to forgive the soldiers who had crucified him. Such convincing proofs of his resurrection would have clinched the validity of his teachings. Yet, they are missing.

Yes; no doubt that would have been “cool!” But, He didn’t do it that way- for whatever reasons.

And of course I have no doubt that apologists can come up with any number of explanations as to why Christ kept to himself after his resurrection, when they are not moonlighting by writing soap opera plots.

I wish you weren’t so covert in announcing your disdain for Christian apologists. It took me forever to glean that from the paragraph above!

If I felt a great need to believe in the godhood of Christ, I could propose that his resurrected form was not a real human body, but something more like the forms manifested by ghosts and spirits who want to return to either reassure a loved one or haunt an enemy. Such a form would be consistent with the rare and brief appearances noted in the Bible.

Yes it would.

Kindly do not mistake these remarks for any failure to appreciate Christ, as a great and powerful teacher. I find too many inconsistencies in his teachings (as recorded in the Bible) to accept them as the genuine teachings of a God.

Can you give one or two examples? (Of course you know this: Islamists think so, too.)

A good case can be made for the opinion of some scholars that many of the contradictions are the result of after-market additions, but that is another subject.

But of course: conspiracy! I think you may be right.

The book. Is it still on track for this month?

God bless,
jd

 

[greylorn]

Greylorn:

I know that you don’t put much trust in John’s Gospel, but, it seems to me you were OK with Luke’s. Read chapter 24 of Luke’s Gospel. Luke mentions the eleven, Mary (mother of James), Joanna, and Mary Magdalene, “and the others,” who were around the morning the women went to the tomb to find Jesus gone. There, they encountered two angels. Also, there were two women on their way to Emmaus, that Jesus appeared to and spoke with. “Multitude,” in those days, might not have the same meaning as it does today. But, it looks as though there were more people involved on Christ’s Resurrection day than only the few that were, strictly speaking, intimates.

Also, it seems to me, but I can’t remember where I saw it, that the Risen Christ was seen in Galilee, in various places. Most likely He was not recognized - as, even at first, the Apostles didn’t recognize Him - and more efficaciously made His presence known to those that would recognize Him.

Reply 1 of 2

Thank you for taking to trouble to recall my proclivities, the more so for doing it correctly. I’m kind of neutral on Luke, found nothing in his gospel to justify blowing it off, but not much different from Matthew (my favorite) or Mark. Luke is not someone I ever quote, and it’s been decades since I’ve studied it. Nonetheless,…

Sloppy scholarship is a lousy excuse for ignorance, and you’ve nailed me dead to rights. Thank you for doing so with more class than I usually show.

Can I make my case otherwise? I don’t know. It is an inferential sort of case, and its importance to me should be considered in the light of my overall attitude towards religion.

My biggest complaint with religions in general is the dogmatic attitude of their followers, their insistence that their particular belief system is absolutely right. Same problem with atheists. Yet I realize that the problem is a function of human nature, not of any particular religious belief system.

It could be that I am posting on a Catholic site as an accident of having been born and raised Catholic, but I do not regard that birth as an accident (Yes, I accept the concept of reincarnation, in general, but not according to the Hindu/Buddhist styles.)

It has long been my opinion (Galileo felt the same way) that if there is one religion capable of admitting its mistakes and correcting them by pursuing the goal of an integrated science and theology, it is the Catholic Church, at the core of which lies a vast repository of thought and scholarship. Unfortunately, much of this seems to be forgotten.

Just some thoughts; however, I’ll try not to be an apologist.

You’ve done a fine job of not being one throughout this post.

Yes; no doubt that would have been “cool!” But, He didn’t do it that way- for whatever reasons.

Yes. And because I do not like stories with incompetent plots, or incomplete plots, the “whatever reasons” are important to me.

I wish you weren’t so covert in announcing your disdain for Christian apologists. It took me forever to glean that from the paragraph above!

Then you clearly needed the mental exercise. Normally you are quicker on the uptake. Better that you express gratitude at having been forced to think an extra five seconds. I’ll try to be even more subtle in the future, to keep you on your toes.

Yes it would.

You are in a remarkably agreeable frame of mind, this post. Are there any attitude-adjustment pills you’d recommend for me?

Can you give one or two examples? (Of course you know this: Islamists think so, too.)

Actually I neither know nor care what Islamists think about Christian Biblical matters. I am more concerned with the evils inherent within their own teachings, particularly their intent to create a Muslim world by using murder, coercion, intimidation and fear, Whatever religious twaddle they might use to justify running a bus tire over a child-thief’s forearm, or stoning raped women, does not greatly interest me.

To answer your question I would need to do some research. I know the contradictions which have greatly troubled me, but have never tracked them by chapter and verse. I’ve not contemplated trying to write a book designed to show the faults in Christianity, because Christianity is not a great threat to the furtherance of human thought. Christians who find their beliefs an impediment to thought are now allowed to leave their church without death promises.

I get the sense that you have already examined a few such contradictions for yourself, and come to accept them. If so, can I beg off doing the research? (I hate research!)

If you won’t let me off that particular hook (which I admit to having installed), can you tell me how a good reply on my part would make a life or thought-changing difference to you?

Continued…

 

[greylorn]

But of course: conspiracy! I think you may be right.

Actually, I’d not propose conspiracy. There is a natural tendency of people to “be right,” which often leads them to invent facts. During my science-support career, I encountered two scientists who had clearly invented data.

People are always making stuff up to support their opinions. You’ve caught me, a pillar of integrity, making-up the absence of information in an earlier post.

During the early years of the Church, quite a number of thoughtful individuals were trying to fill in the metaphysical blanks left by Christ’s teachings. (E.g. the Gnostics).

The tendency of a Christian translator to promote his particular take on certain ideas might easily lead him to torque a few words, even add a few phrases. That one would deliberately conspire with others to do so implies a deliberate suspension of integrity. Collusion, perhaps— just like Darwinists all agree with one another on the validity of their imbecilic evolution theories. Conspiracy is not out of the question, but I prefer to believe in the good (but human) intentions of Biblical scribes.

The book. Is it still on track for this month?

God bless,
jd

Regrettably, no. I made a serious error. I used an old DOS text editor to write it, with added HTML for my website. Could have used “Word,” but I detest Bill Gates and have twenty-plus years of practice with my DOS editor, so can write more naturally with it. I figured that what with modern software technology, it would be easy to translate HTML into the PDF that my book-printer requires. This is not the case. After two months I’ve been unable to find a translator program that actually works, and am still dealing with this simple technical problem that has turned surprisingly ugly.

 

[Pfaffenhoffen]

I just recently learned about this argument for atheism on another thread. It is by a current professor of Oxford, J.L. Schellenberg, and he presents the argument in his book entitled: Divine Hiddennes and Human Reason.

1. If God exists, then God is all loving.
2. If an all loving God exists, reasonable non-belief does not occur.
3. Reasonable non-belief occurs.
4. Therefore, an all loving God doesn’t exist.
5. Therefore, God doesn’t exist.

Do you think this is a good argument? Does it prove logically that God does not exist? It does not look like a good argument to me.

If the car has a brake, it brakes.
My car has a brake.
So, when I accionate the brake, it brakes.

Well, God is not a machine.

If an all loving God exists, reasonable non-belief does not occur.

If this was so, there was no freedom, God would had created robots.
But God did not want to create robots.
God wanted to create man free.
So, if a person is free, you never know what is his choice.

 

[lnslucky]

Thats probably one of the dumbest arguments ive ever heard. First who is to say God is all loving? All the destruction you see in the world is mostly created by humans, NOT God.

Of course, ignore the mother nature part like hurricanes and tornadoes.

God might be all loving, but he also might be a God of freedom. Giving us the chance to do what we want, and this is what we have.

 

[Perplexity]

I think Divine Hiddennes is like the problem of evil in that it is irrelevant on deism. A simply deist would deny the first premise, that God is all loving, (as you may have noticed that greylorn did). It is only on Christian theism, which claims that God is all-loving that this becomes an issue. So I agree, a bare theist would not believe in punishment for rejecting God, because a bare theist would probably not claim that God is all-loving. (assuming by “God”, you just mean a powerful creator of the universe.) So yes, I am defending divine hiddenness assuming a Christian concept of God.

Ah, I suppose I understand bare-theism to be distinct from deism. I think the God Schellenberg (and most problems of evil) are concerned with is well described by Swinburne in his celebrated The Existence of God, p. 7:

“I take the proposition ‘God exists’ (and the equivalent proposition ‘There is a God’) to be logically equivalent to 'there exists necessarily a person without a body (i.e. spirit) who necessarily is eternal, perfectly free, omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good, and the creator of all things.”

The only addendum added here is that this being is perfectly loving (which many feel just means omnibenevolent), which Swinburne deduces from omniscience and perfect goodness iirc.

As to your response, I think I’ll concede that this experience would probably involve coercion of an unjustifiable kind and amount such that the Christian God would probably not initiate such an experience.