Where does Aristotle go wrong?

[JP2Admirer]

You know, I wasn’t aware that Aristotle didn’t distinguish the two very much. Although … didn’t he distinguish them a little bit? Didn’t he say they could be distinguished but not separated? Or am I totally off?.

It’s a good question to which I do not know the answer. I studied with a number of people who told me this was the case. I was taught that Aristotle’s great contribution was the act/potency distinction, and Aquinas’ was essence/existence. I have yet to read the whole of the metaphysics cover to cover, so I am going to have to state that I “trusted, but didn’t verify.” (The people I studied with knew it was a mortal sin to lie, so I didn’t really have any issue with accepting what they told me.) Also, Coppleston makes the same claim in his History of Philosophy. I’ll study more into it and maybe get back to you at some point.

Are you aware of Aquinas’ defense of the categories?

Where does he do so? I guess, not entirely. I’ve read a number of his metaphysical treatises – SCG I, some of the De Trinitate, some of his commentary on the Metaphysics, and of course, De Ente et Essentia, but I am unaware of where he makes an explicit defense of them? (I would love to go study it, though, if you have a reference.)

Are you aware of the three different kinds of relation (real relation, logical relation, and divine relation)? Technically, only “real relation” is an accident (and hence the only one that refers to the “category of relation”) … the rest are nonetheless called “relations” by analogy. You might already know this. Do you know what I’m talking about?

Yes, except I haven’t studied much on the “divine relation.” I am assuming that is what Ratzinger was referring to when he made the astounding claim that it ought to be elevated (indeed, he says something to the effect that because the fundamental reality of God is a relation, it means that being should reflect that in some way; he also says that this makes the possibility of a being that is pure act possible.) I would have to go back to my books to really ‘refresh’ my memory. I know that John of St. Thomas is an excellent resource on the topic, though. A professor I once had has done some translating work on him. The way I was taught the distinctions, however, were between “ens reale,” and "ens rationis.’ Some modern semioticians have a whole difficult technical language they use to describe the differences between logical relations, real relations, and logical/real relations (they use “subject/object” language much differently than we do in common language, which makes the whole subject quite difficult to get into.)

 

[Syntax]

Are you also attacking the principle of sufficient reason? Or do you accept it and are merely attacking the abuse of the principle? I’m not sure what you’re saying here.

I am aware that some people reject logical principles. But what is your larger point? Are you saying that since some people dismiss them … that therefore logic is unknowable and/or not objective. I honestly have no idea what your point is.

Not all scientists assume the same things about science, either. In fact, there isn’t any one thing that everyone agrees on. That’s no reason to condemn all reality as unknowable.

Oh, don’t worry … I already know that there is a diversity of opinion about metaphysics. If you could, stop playing devil’s advocate and actually start talking about what you actually believe. I don’t find it productive responding to things you obviously don’t believe.

Well, it’s a good question. You must have a reason to hold the empirical standard. So what is it? It’s a perfectly fair question. In fact, how do you know that the empirical standard is correct? Because, obviously, not everyone accepts it … hence, empiricism isn’t objective. Right? I’m using your logic … unless that was your Devil’s advocate logic and you didn’t mean any of it. Frankly, I have no idea what you believe.

If you could give a clear answer to these questions:

Do you think metaphysics is a dead-end pursuit merely because there are different beliefs about it? (because, I hope you know, that’s a very poor argument)

Also:

Do you still accept your distinction between physical existence and conceptual existence? (because if you do, then why are you throwing out metaphysics? … because that’s a metaphysical distinction)

Nicely said. Just challenging everything on the table without offering any constructive solution is way too easy to do. A 4-year-old child can do this if you allow him to ask “why” enough times. Going about the world living as if most of these logical/metaphysical principles were true, and then criticizing all of them in these posts as if you didn’t believe any of them, is just a cute way of being a jack-a**.

 

[JP2Admirer]

Besides the usual, “metaphysics is a dead science” blather, is there anyone who can show where Aristotle’s physics could lead to corruptions in his metaphysics?

I say this as someone who wonders, not merely as an antagonist.

Thanks.

 

[Oreoracle]

Sorry, I didn’t see this post earlier.

How are you defining “soul”? Aristotle defined it as “the form of a living thing.” Do you take objection to this?

What’s a “form” in this context?

It’s positive because it adds something to animals that plants do not have. If it was negative, then it would subtract from animals “something” that plants would have.

Hmm…I’m not very impressed by this. We could easily manipulate this system with clever wordplay. Hypothetically, suppose that we could cure a person of blindness. Now most people, such as yourself, would consider that a positive act, because we’ve “given” the person an ability: sight. However, we could also say that we’ve “taken away” a disability: blindness. If taking away qualities is what characterizes a condition as negative, then sight is negative in this sense. Likewise, making someone blind would be giving them the quality of lacking sight. Again, it’s a matter of perspective.

Obviously, I could probably devise better examples given the time, but I think you see the weakness here. “Positivity” and “negativity” are not so much conditions of reality as they are types of phrasing.

Sensory perception is good in various ways. Perhaps one of the more obvious ways is that it enables an animal to see food, which aids in actually getting the food. Food is good for animals because it maintains their existence.

Why is existence good? If I proposed that it was evil, how would you prove me wrong? Please don’t try to say that “good” is positive and “evil” is negative, therefore good must be something existent. Epicureanism is an example of a philosophy that held evil to be a thing (suffering) and good to be a not-thing (“not-suffering”).

Now, more abstractly, Aristotle would say that good is synonymous with being. Hence, the more being a thing has, the better the thing is. Sensory perception is a being (because it exists) and hence it is better for a thing to have it than to not.

Okay, so because a malignant tumor is a being, it is better to have it than to not have it. Gotcha.

Methinks abstractions aren’t effective mechanisms for presenting ethics, eh?

 

[DomusAurea]

Besides the usual, “metaphysics is a dead science” blather, is there anyone who can show where Aristotle’s physics could lead to corruptions in his metaphysics?

I say this as someone who wonders, not merely as an antagonist.

Thanks.

Yes Please!

 

[Betterave]

Why is existence good? If I proposed that it was evil, how would you prove me wrong? Please don’t try to say that “good” is positive and “evil” is negative, therefore good must be something existent. Epicureanism is an example of a philosophy that held evil to be a thing (suffering) and good to be a not-thing (“not-suffering”).

Wow, Oreo, your erudition keeps expanding! Now you have informed opinions about Aristotle and Epicureanism! Next I suppose you’ll tell us that Stoics taught that all feelings are bad? Seriously though, I’m curious: what’s your source for this alleged doctrine of Epicureanism? Did someone tell you that? What if I told you you shouldn’t believe everything people tell you? Could you prove me wrong?

 

[Syntax]

Why is existence good? If I proposed that it was evil, how would you prove me wrong? Please don’t try to say that “good” is positive and “evil” is negative, therefore good must be something existent. Epicureanism is an example of a philosophy that held evil to be a thing (suffering) and good to be a not-thing (“not-suffering”).

Epicurus did not hold the view that you are attributing to him. The path to happiness consisted of the extinction and removal of disturbing thoughts and influences, but Epircurus didn’t qualify eudaimonia itself as non-existent. Maybe it would help if you actually took the time to understand a person’s philosophy before you mentioned it in a pejorative context?

 

[itinerant1]

The differences between a plant and an animal have nothing to do with souls or types of existence. It boils down to physical and chemical properties.

I think you have boiled off the essence and then claimed that what is left is all that matters, that is, just the matter. Rather too reductionist to fully account for what a thing is.

Physical and chemical properties by themselves do not define what a thing is, any more than the brick, lumber and nails that are used to make a house by themselves explain the kind of structures. Bricks, lumber, and nails are the material components only of the house. It is the plan of structure, which has organized the material elements into a house that are a part of its definition of what a thing is.

The idea or plan of structure is the formal element instantiated in the material. The plan for a house is different than a plan for a fence or windmill. By way of analogy, these different organizing plans or ideas are what corresponds to the different formal constituents or souls of plant and animals. A plant or animal is not defined by its material elements only.

How do you conclude that sensory perception is positive? Do you mean that it’s good? What is it good for?

It’s good for the being that possesses it. The sense of touch is most fundamental and animals cannot survive without it. Sight is the most noble and useful of the sense, giving the animal more knowledge of its environment than the other sense.

Yes, and this is assuming that the capacity for knowledge is the arbiter of quality. Of course, humans think of rationality as a worthy trait because we have rationality. If we were as the animals living outside of civilization, we might think that having huge claws makes one superior, because that would be something we could use to survive.

Claws can be most useful for a creature in a particular environment, but mere survival is not the noblest kind of existence. To be able to know is a better way to exist than to merely survive. There are those, like yourself perhaps, who do not think it is objectively better to be a rational human being than to be a cockroach or a tomato. The absurdity of the position speaks for itself.

I think it’s dangerous to project your idea of “positive” or “good” onto the world of objects as though it were objective. It clearly isn’t once we consider other perspectives (thus revealing that “positivity” is a matter of perspective). I don’t think such labels have a place in metaphysics.

The “good” has very much a place in both metaphysics and ethics.

What is objectively good for a particular being is determined by its nature. Animals know what things are good or harmful by instinct and limited learning.

Humans have certain needs, such as for shelter and food. These things are good, and desired as such by nature.

I don’t feel that there’s a need to go further with this. We both agree that any idea of “good,” “positive,” or any quality referring to a thing’s worth or usefulness assumes a goal of some short, i.e., a cheetah’s stature is “better” than a human’s if speed is the goal. There is no objective good because there is no objective goal.

The objective goal is determined by how a creature is constituted by nature. A cheetah’s behavior is goal oriented by instinct. Man’s behavior is goal oriented by rational choice. He can choose what is objectively good for his nature and the actualization of his potential, or he can choose what is only apparently good and does not contribute to, or may be positively harmful to his well-being.

Regarding metaphysics specifically? I don’t think any philosopher from any era has helped us out there. All of the old metaphysical questions still remain unanswered, or, if they have been answered, there is no consensus as to what the answers might be.

Consensus never determines truth in metaphysics, nor any other discipline. Truth is not a matter of majority vote.

There remains a consistent tradition of truth attained in genuine philosophy. We call it the philosophia perennis, regardless of what the skeptics might think.

Metaphysics is a dead-end because it begins with no rules, axioms, bare facts, etc. Everything can be questioned. I know that sounds so great and liberating to everyone, but such liberality also comes with a steep price: we have no rationale for rejecting anyone’s claims. For example, a person can even deny the inconsistency of contradictions, posit multiple universes, etc., and still not break any of metaphysics’s rules, because metaphysics has no rules.

A person may verbally deny “the inconsistency of contradictions” but the very fact that we can recognize and speak of those who deny “the inconsistency of contradictions” is evidence for an objective standard, and of what makes true metaphysics possible.

 

[Areopagite]

What’s a “form” in this context?

See Itinerant1’s previous post. It might answer your question.

Hmm…I’m not very impressed by this. We could easily manipulate this system with clever wordplay. Hypothetically, suppose that we could cure a person of blindness. Now most people, such as yourself, would consider that a positive act, because we’ve “given” the person an ability: sight. However, we could also say that we’ve “taken away” a disability: blindness. If taking away qualities is what characterizes a condition as negative, then sight is negative in this sense. Likewise, making someone blind would be giving them the quality of lacking sight. Again, it’s a matter of perspective.

When you say that you’ve “taken away a disability” … a “disability” is also a word that symbolizes a negation of being, as it symbolizes a lack of something. Hence “taken away a disability” (in this case, blindness), results in something positive. This is, of course, because a double negative equals a positive.

Likewise, when you say “giving them the quality of lacking sight” … “lacking sight” obviously refers to a lack of something … and hence this is negative. Blindness is negation of being, whereas sight is a positive being.

Hence, “positivity” and “negativity” (in the ways I was talking about) is not merely a matter of phrasing but correspond objectively to the nature of being.

Obviously, I could probably devise better examples given the time, but I think you see the weakness here.

I don’t. Come up with better examples.

Why is existence good? If I proposed that it was evil, how would you prove me wrong?

I can’t. Not that I am aware of. The truth that existence is better than non-existence cannot be proven. It’s sort of one of those essential truths that must be accepted … otherwise nothing makes sense.

Just out of curiosity, do you have some kind of proof that existence and non-existence are both neutral?

Please don’t try to say that “good” is positive and “evil” is negative, therefore good must be something existent.

Do you have a reason for forbidding me from saying this?

Epicureanism is an example of a philosophy that held evil to be a thing (suffering) and good to be a not-thing (“not-suffering”).

Well, if the Epicureans said it, it must be true.

First of all, I’m not aware that the Epicureans considered suffering “a thing” insofar as it was a positive being. Aristotelians considered suffering being the result of some kind of deficiency in the nature of a sensate being … and hence suffering relates to a negation of being. If a sensate thing was perfected in its nature, it would not be suffering, since suffering implies there is something wrong with it.

But did Epicureans say that suffering was something “positive” … I don’t know. I’d like to see the passage that says so. Chances are: they didn’t think that deep.

It is true that the Epicureans thought happiness equaled pleasure, and that pleasure (very strangely) simply equaled not-suffering. A very interesting definition of pleasure, one that no one else agree with except them.

It does seem to be the case that Lucretius (also an Epicurean) in his De Rerum Natura seems to say that the most ideal place a person can be is … non-existence. This is when he is trying to console people about the prospect of death, saying that when one is dead (and hence doesn’t exist … as he was a materialist) then one never has the potential for pain again … unlike when one is alive. Hence, it seems that the true Epicurean would simply kill himself … and thus enter into the only true sanctuary against unhappiness. Epicurean heaven was non-existence.

Epicureanism is sometimes a tempting philosophy … until I realize that they define “pleasure” as simply “not suffering.” That’s not my idea of happiness … and not even my idea of pleasure.

Anyone disagree?

Okay, so because a malignant tumor is a being, it is better to have it than to not have it. Gotcha.

Good question.

A tumor is bad for the being that has it because it threatens the existence of the being and/or detracts from the fulfillment of the being’s nature. This is unlike sensory perception, which not only benefits the being who has it but also is a natural part of being’s nature … unlike a tumor.

You could say, though, that it is better for the tumor to exist than not exist. Because when you consider “what is better for the tumor?” you are asking what is better for the existence of the tumor. However, once again, the tumor is bad for the being that has it because it harms the existence of that being.

I could go into this more if you want.

Methinks abstractions aren’t effective mechanisms for presenting ethics, eh?

What? We’re not allowed to think abstractly when talking about ethics? That’s hard to do. Maybe you can manage it. I can’t.

 

[Betterave]

Well, if the Epicureans said it, it must be true.

First of all, I’m not aware that the Epicureans considered suffering “a thing” insofar as it was a positive being. Aristotelians considered suffering being the result of some kind of deficiency in the nature of a sensate being … and hence suffering relates to a negation of being. If a sensate thing was perfected in its nature, it would not be suffering, since suffering implies there is something wrong with it.

But did Epicureans say that suffering was something “positive” … I don’t know. I’d like to see the passage that says so. Chances are: they didn’t think that deep.

It is true that the Epicureans thought happiness equaled pleasure, and that pleasure (very strangely) simply equaled not-suffering. A very interesting definition of pleasure, one that no one else agree with except them.

It does seem to be the case that Lucretius (also an Epicurean) in his De Rerum Natura seems to say that the most ideal place a person can be is … non-existence. This is when he is trying to console people about the prospect of death, saying that when one is dead (and hence doesn’t exist … as he was a materialist) then one never has the potential for pain again … unlike when one is alive. Hence, it seems that the true Epicurean would simply kill himself … and thus enter into the only true sanctuary against unhappiness. Epicurean heaven was non-existence.

Epicureanism is sometimes a tempting philosophy … until I realize that they define “pleasure” as simply “not suffering.” That’s not my idea of happiness … and not even my idea of pleasure.

Anyone disagree?

Okay, forget Aristotle - where did Epicureanism go wrong?

I don’t think an Epicurean would say death was good (or ‘ideal’), any more than a modern death-is-the-final-word materialist would, but rather that it is nothing, so it is not to be feared. I think Epicureans were concerned with virtue just like anyone else, and they crafted their metaphysics to avoid ethical distractions, like fear of death. They sought a positive good, but the best good for them was just the one that was least vulnerable to the whims of fortune (a not un-Aristotelian idea).

 

[RobbyS]

You might have heard me bash him for dabbling in modal logic, and I do so for all philosophers because I don’t think modal logic is useful for anything other than organizing our thoughts.

Using modal terms, the only description of the observable world we can give is that events which have occurred are possible. That’s really all we know. We can’t prove that any event is “necessary” or demonstrate that any event which hasn’t yet occurred is possible. I don’t even know how we’d go about collecting evidence to suggest such things.

Also, when Aristotelians quibble over different types of “being” I have to roll my eyes. “To be X” simply means “to exist as X,” and no non-circular definition of “existence” has been offered thus far. This is because the purpose of a definition is to distinguish between the defined item, X, and those that are not X. Quite simply, “existence” applies to all items; there is no “not X” to distinguish X from. Rather than philosophers asking for definitions of “existence,” I would have them ask themselves whether a definition is really required.

Aristotle’s ethics were based almost entirely on the traditions of the time, so he didn’t offer anything new morality-wise. And as you know, he’s made laughable claims about physics (though I concede that he might have rejected a different kind of atom than we imagine today).

Generally, I consider him an irresponsible fellow. He knew that he was influential, but he never went very far out of his way to substantiate his claims. Because of him, we have people who are still trying to understand the world as he did, but we’ve obviously made progress since then. Excuse me for saying so, but the world doesn’t need scientific, astronomical, or metaphysical advice from an ancient Greek.

You do know that we have very little directly from the hands of the Philosopher. Most of what we have are the copybooks of his disciples. His dialogues were mostly lost.

 

[Oreoracle]

I think you have boiled off the essence and then claimed that what is left is all that matters, that is, just the matter. Rather too reductionist to fully account for what a thing is.

I haven’t boiled off “essence,” I just don’t see it.

Physical and chemical properties by themselves do not define what a thing is, any more than the brick, lumber and nails that are used to make a house by themselves explain the kind of structures. Bricks, lumber, and nails are the material components only of the house. It is the plan of structure, which has organized the material elements into a house that are a part of its definition of what a thing is.

The plan of the structure? Are you referring to its purpose? I should have known; you’re assuming creationism.

The idea or plan of structure is the formal element instantiated in the material. The plan for a house is different than a plan for a fence or windmill. By way of analogy, these different organizing plans or ideas are what corresponds to the different formal constituents or souls of plant and animals. A plant or animal is not defined by its material elements only.

Why should we believe that there is a plan, purpose, or goal behind the formation of plants and animals? They may just be the consequences of physical and chemical laws.

It’s good for the being that possesses it. The sense of touch is most fundamental and animals cannot survive without it. Sight is the most noble and useful of the sense, giving the animal more knowledge of its environment than the other sense.

Noble? That sounds like a word that signifies a value judgment on your part.

Claws can be most useful for a creature in a particular environment, but mere survival is not the noblest kind of existence…

…in your opinion.

To be able to know is a better way to exist than to merely survive…

…in your opinion.

There are those, like yourself perhaps, who do not think it is objectively better to be a rational human being than to be a cockroach or a tomato. The absurdity of the position speaks for itself.

Actually, the fact that you don’t have any true rebuttal other than “Look at how silly that guy is being!” says a lot about your position. You have no evidence or rationale for support, or at least none that you’ve provided.

What is objectively good for a particular being is determined by its nature. Animals know what things are good or harmful by instinct and limited learning.

Well yes, you’re using “good” in the Aristotelian sense. But Aristotle’s “good” just means “efficient”; it has nothing to do with ethics. For example, you could say that a healthy body is good for survival, but this doesn’t tell us that we should survive. All that’s being said is that fitness is an efficient means of achieving survival, it doesn’t tell us that survival ought to be achieved.

Humans have certain needs, such as for shelter and food. These things are good, and desired as such by nature.

And now you’re personifying nature. This smacks of creationism.

The objective goal is determined by how a creature is constituted by nature. A cheetah’s behavior is goal oriented by instinct. Man’s behavior is goal oriented by rational choice. He can choose what is objectively good for his nature and the actualization of his potential, or he can choose what is only apparently good and does not contribute to, or may be positively harmful to his well-being.

Again, “good” just means “efficient for” in your usage. It has nothing to do with what should or should not be, which is the subject matter of ethics.

A person may verbally deny “the inconsistency of contradictions” but the very fact that we can recognize and speak of those who deny “the inconsistency of contradictions” is evidence for an objective standard, and of what makes true metaphysics possible.

“True metaphysics,” eh? Have you ever heard of the No True Scotsman fallacy?

 

[Oreoracle]

See Itinerant1’s previous post. It might answer your question.

Err…it didn’t address anything we were discussing, really. It did give me a chance to point out that Aristotle’s usage of “good” dealt with efficiency rather than ethics, however, so I guess it wasn’t a complete waste of time.

This is, of course, because a double negative equals a positive.

I don’t deny that. I was just pointing out that clever wording easily complicates this system. I don’t see why the concepts of “negativity” and “positivity” need to be introduced. We know what’s being said without these terms.

I can’t. Not that I am aware of. The truth that existence is better than non-existence cannot be proven. It’s sort of one of those essential truths that must be accepted … otherwise nothing makes sense.

Those “essential truths” are called “axioms.” It’s a much more humble word, especially when you’re presenting the axioms to those who may not agree.

Just out of curiosity, do you have some kind of proof that existence and non-existence are both neutral?

What do you mean?

Do you have a reason for forbidding me from saying this?

It would just be another axiomatic statement on your part. I don’t want axioms, I want evidence, or at least a rationale.

Well, if the Epicureans said it, it must be true.

I didn’t say that. I was pointing out that your axioms are not universally agreed upon. And as your comments about Epicureanism demonstrate, you cannot prove them wrong.

But did Epicureans say that suffering was something “positive” … I don’t know. I’d like to see the passage that says so. Chances are: they didn’t think that deep.

As far as I know, there aren’t any surviving philosophical works by Epicurus himself. You may be able to read about him from other philosophers of the time, but his message would likely be filtered through their own philosophical biases.

Good question.

It wasn’t a question, actually. There was no question mark.

A tumor is bad for the being that has it because it threatens the existence of the being and/or detracts from the fulfillment of the being’s nature.

I’m not so sure. Unless you’re of the opinion that a being is more than the sum of its parts, no materials are lost even if the tumor kills the being. Everything that existed before the death will exist after the death, except for abilities, such as rationality. I wouldn’t say that abilities “exist,” technically, because abilities are only possible actions that a being may produce given its structure.

In fact, if the laws of conservation are true, then no materials in our universe are ever lost, they are only converted to different forms. I don’t know how an Aristotelian would deal with this, because not a single ounce of “being” is ever lost if conservation laws hold true, unless you’re counting abilities as existent items. And even then, how would we determine which abilities are “better” than others?

And by the way: “Fulfillment of the being’s nature?” Pshh. Why should I believe I have a purpose?

You could say, though, that it is better for the tumor to exist than not exist. Because when you consider “what is better for the tumor?” you are asking what is better for the existence of the tumor. However, once again, the tumor is bad for the being that has it because it harms the existence of that being.

I have a few very simple questions for you: How would an Aristotelian come to conclude that one “being” is better than another “being?” Is it the one that has more abilities or “powers,” as Aristotle might say? Is it the one with better abilities? How do you determine what’s better?

As it stands, I don’t know how you could use this reasoning to conclude that, between the existence of a person and the existence of a tumor, one is better than the other.

 

[Syntax]

I haven’t boiled off “essence,” I just don’t see it…

The new “essence” today is what biologists call “kinds.” And you just boiled off the notion of “kinds” with which current biologists still make extensive use in their taxonomies of different genus and species. Though the schematics of genus and species are *reduced *to microstructural properties, nevertheless, different groups of microstructural arrangements are still considered types of particular arrangments of matter from which other macro-properties emerge in terms of genotype and phenotype. So Aristotle was correct to think in terms of genus and species.

They may just be the consequences of physical and chemical laws.

That’s correct, these other macro-structural properties are supervenient on their micro-structural properties. But these very microstructural properties give rise to macro-properties distinct from other kinds of properties. For instance, the macro-differences found between the mammalian and the reptilian brains.

 

[Oreoracle]

The new “essence” today is what biologists call “kinds.” And you just boiled off the notion of “kinds” with which current biologists still make extensive use in their taxonomies of different genus and species.

How did I boil off that notion?

 

[Syntax]

…You did because you rejected Aristotle’s “souls” as if they were different than essences. You probably didn’t intend this; but maybe if you tried to understand Aristotle’s view before you criticized it, this wouldn’t happen. “Soul” means “life principle” for Aristotle. Your misunderstanding springs from your confusion that what Aristotle meant by “soul” was some purely immaterial substance like we think of it now. He didn’t. The “soul” that gave rise to the distinctive kinds and variety of plants and animals was the very *formal blueprint *contained within the matter which it is a part. But it is not identical to the mere matter (the impression that you gave) which it informs, but is instantiated in that matter as **composition **and structure–exactly what biologists think today. DNA=specie “souls.”

 

[Syntax]

How did I boil off that notion?

…because you rejected Aristotle’s “souls” as if they were different than essences. You probably didn’t intend to do this; but maybe if you tried to understand Aristotle’s view before you criticized it, this wouldn’t happen so often as it does. “Soul” means “life principle” for Aristotle. You have this false impression that what Aristotle means by “soul” is some purely immaterial substance existing independently of matter like we think of it now. He didn’t. The soul is bound to its matter, but it is not identical to it. The “soul” that gives rise to the distinctive kinds and varieties of plants and animals is the very *formal blueprint * or *organizing principle *contained within the matter of which it is a part. But this principle or blueprint is not identical to its mere matter (the impression that you gave) which it organizes and to which it gives life, but is instantiated in that matter as **composition **and structure–very similar to what biologists think today. There is no doubt that if Aristotle were alive today he would think:

DNA=specie “souls.”

 

[Oreoracle]

…because you rejected Aristotle’s “souls” as if they were different than essences.

Actually, I rejected both with equal rigor, I believe. I believe in materials, not essences or souls.

You have this false impression that what Aristotle means by “soul” is some purely immaterial substance existing independently of matter like we think of it now. He didn’t. The soul is bound to its matter, but it is not identical to it.

Okay, so you’re saying that a soul isn’t purely immaterial but is partially immaterial. Gee, that makes it better.

The “soul” that gives rise to the distinctive kinds and varieties of plants and animals is the very *formal blueprint * or *organizing principle *contained within the matter of which it is a part.

You compare this to DNA and the notions do sound very similar. So I have a simple question: DNA is composed entirely of matter, so if a soul is not identical to matter, as you said above, how can DNA act as a soul? Actually, I feel obliged to point out that DNA is not “bound to its matter” in animals, but is a part of the animal itself. The role it plays in the formation of animals is due solely to its physical relationship with those animals; there’s nothing immaterial about it.

But this principle or blueprint is not identical to its mere matter (the impression that you gave) which it organizes and to which it gives life, but is instantiated in that matter as **composition **and structure–very similar to what biologists think today.

I was unaware that biologists now posit something other than matter in their explanations of structure in life forms!

 

[Syntax]

You compare this to DNA and the notions do sound very similar. So I have a simple question: DNA is composed entirely of matter, so if a soul is not identical to matter, as you said above, how can DNA act as a soul? Actually, I feel obliged to point out that DNA is not “bound to its matter” in animals, but is a part of the animal itself. The role it plays in the formation of animals is due solely to its physical relationship with that animal; there’s nothing immaterial about it.

I was unaware that biologists now posit something other than matter in their explanations of structure in life forms!

The key word here is “relationship.” You should know that Genetic Sequencing which determines phenotype depends entirely upon the order and structure of the code, and not merely the particular proteins which make up that code. Structural and functional features are relationships between physical parts, not the parts themselves. Nor are the biological laws determining the behavior of physical things the physical things themselves.

 

[Betterave]

And by the way: “Fulfillment of the being’s nature?” Pshh. Why should I believe I have a purpose?

In other words, why should I be rational? Why is understanding better than misunderstanding? If I don’t want to understand, can you prove that I should, that understanding is intrinsically better than and to be preferred to misunderstanding? If I want to present myself as arrogant and ignorant and unable to learn, can you prove that it would be ‘better’ for me to do otherwise (N.B.: I dismiss all value judgments as objectively groundless)?

The answer to the last question is, yes; however, if you’re the sort of person who asks that sort of question, you probably won’t understand the proof.

Are you familiar with Meno’s paradox of inquiry? It’s an argument for the impossibility of learning: if you already know what you’re inquiring after, you have no need to inquire; if you don’t know, you won’t know how to look for it and you won’t be able to recognize it even if you happen to come across it. Most people find a way out of the paradox; but if you don’t want to find a way out, no one can force you to. That’s where you seem to be at and you seem to pride yourself on it. There’s not much point in trying to explain anything to such a determinedly ‘useless wight’ (see Nic.Ethics Bk1.4).