Where does Aristotle go wrong?

[Syntax]

Yep.

 

[Oreoracle]

In other words, why should I be rational? Why is understanding better than misunderstanding? If I don’t want to understand, can you prove that I should, that understanding is intrinsically better than and to be preferred to misunderstanding? If I want to present myself as arrogant and ignorant and unable to learn, can you prove that it would be ‘better’ for me to do otherwise (N.B.: I dismiss all value judgments as objectively groundless)?

Those are all excellent questions, are they not? Do you figure that anyone who asks such questions is too stupid to be expected to follow another’s explanation? It seems far more likely that you simply have no explanation.

I can’t tell over the internet, of course, but you write as if you’re positively fuming! It only reinforces my belief that ethics are ultimately based on emotions.

The answer to the last question is, yes; however, if you’re the sort of person who asks that sort of question, you probably won’t understand the proof.

Or I won’t feel as you do about the “proof,” so I’ll remain unconvinced of the proof that relies on my feelings. You guys have done two things in this thread, whether the topic be ethical or otherwise: 1) invent terms to label your own abstractions in order to confuse me (which didn’t work, I might add) and 2) flippantly dismiss me as an ignorant Aristotle-basher who wouldn’t understand your rationale even if you presented it or had something to present, which is doubtful. I’m not impressed.

There’s not much point in trying to explain anything to such a determinedly ‘useless wight’ (see Nic.Ethics Bk1.4).

In order for me to be a “useless wight” in Aristotle’s usage, I would have to fail to “lay to heart another’s wisdom.” That would require you to have wisdom, I’m afraid.

Anyway, I suppose this discussion is coming to a close. If Areo wants to continue, that’s fine, but I guess that it will be pointless to continue responding to your snide remarks or to Syntax, who’s decided to be your cheerleader. (I hate posts that consist of one word and a smiley.)

 

[Syntax]

Or I won’t feel as you do about the “proof,” so I’ll remain unconvinced of the proof that relies on my feelings. You guys have done two things in this thread, whether the topic be ethical or otherwise: 1) invent terms to label your own abstractions in order to confuse me (which didn’t work, I might add) and 2) flippantly dismiss me as an ignorant Aristotle-basher who wouldn’t understand your rationale even if you presented it or had something to present, which is doubtful. I’m not impressed.

In order for me to be a “useless wight” in Aristotle’s usage, I would have to fail to “lay to heart another’s wisdom.” That would require you to have wisdom, I’m afraid.

Anyway, I suppose this discussion is coming to a close. If Areo wants to continue, that’s fine, but I guess that it will be pointless to continue responding to your snide remarks or to Syntax, who’s decided to be your cheerleader. (I hate posts that consist of one word and a smiley.)

No one is asking you to accept Aristotle’s arguments as true; I, myself, am not a huge fan. But at least I am charitable to Aristotle’s views even if I don’t always understand or agree with them. For intellectual inquiry to have any substantive value, constructive criticism goes much further in understanding someone as great as Aristotle than adopting a default position of skepticism as soon as you hear something you don’t like. You haven’t even understood his views correctly, or even made the attempt. It doesn’t take a genius to criticize an Ancient Philosopher who lacked the available technological apparatus to test or express his view in modern terminology. Try problem-solving instead. You will learn alot more and be surprised, for instance, how similar Aristotle’s take on biology is to the taxonomic difficulties biologists are recently facing today. You are right, the discussion has been pointless because you made it that way.

 

[Oreoracle]

It doesn’t take a genius to criticize. Try problem-solving instead. You are right, the discussion has been pointless.

I don’t assume that my ability to criticize makes me superior to whoever posed the initial argument. However, if the one who posed the initial argument considers himself to be a philosopher and a contemplative man in general, as Aristotle did, it would be dishonest for him to regard his argument as being above criticism. It’s just as bad when his followers claim that his position is above criticism.

Whether you reckon yourself an Aristotelian or not, know this: Criticizing is a lot like having sex. It’s easy, it’s common, it’s largely considered to be vulgar, but yet it’s essential to our survival and improvement as a species. Asking someone to stop criticizing is like asking everyone to refrain from reproducing. No philosophy would go far without criticism. So I couldn’t care less how silly or pointless you think my questioning is. The questioning is necessary.

 

[Syntax]

I don’t assume that my ability to criticize makes me superior to whoever posed the initial argument. However, if the one who posed the initial argument considers himself to be a philosopher and a contemplative man in general, as Aristotle did, it would be dishonest for him to regard his argument as being above criticism. It’s just as bad when his followers claim that his position is above criticism.

No one, as far as I know, presupposed Aristotle’s arguments are immune from criticism.

Whether you reckon yourself an Aristotelian or not, know this: Criticizing is a lot like having sex. It’s easy, it’s common, it’s largely considered to be vulgar, but yet it’s essential to our survival and improvement as a species. Asking someone to stop criticizing is like asking everyone to refrain from reproducing. No philosophy would go far without criticism. So I couldn’t care less how silly or pointless you think my questioning is. The questioning is necessary…

Of course! lol…whoever said questioning was “bad”? But if you have already decided to dismiss everything Aristotle said from the start without trying to understand it, then what’s the point? I don’t agree with him on everything either. But at least I am charitable. Criticizing the Ancient is easy from a modern point of view, but they gave us much that we still use today. Aristotle’s own study of logic, for instance, was used for two-thousand years. So he wasn’t some superstitious moron.

It’s unfortunate that someone has to make this obvious point to you.

 

[Oreoracle]

But if you have already decided to dismiss everything Aristotle said from the start without trying to understand it, then what’s the point? I don’t agree with him on everything either. But at least I am charitable. Criticizing the Ancient is easy from a modern point of view, but they gave us much that we still use today. Aristotle’s own study of logic, for instance, was used for two-thousand years. So he wasn’t some superstitious moron.

I haven’t dismissed everything that Aristotle proposed. Recently, we’ve just been discussing “souls.” I questioned the notion, and you two freaked on me.

 

[Areopagite]

I don’t deny that. I was just pointing out that clever wording easily complicates this system.

Does clever wording disprove the system? Obviously any clever wording can complicate any system. But the issue being discussed (correct me if I’m wrong) is whether Aristotle’s system can be disproved. You haven’t disproved it yet.

I don’t see why the concepts of “negativity” and “positivity” need to be introduced. We know what’s being said without these terms.

Oh, we do? Oh good.

Those “essential truths” are called “axioms.”

That’s fine.

It’s a much more humble word, especially when you’re presenting the axioms to those who may not agree.

… okay. I’m not sure what the point is that you’re making. You still seem to suggest that this is only a problem with metaphysics … but it’s also a problem with mathematics too. If you don’t accept mathematical axioms … well, then you don’t have math, do you? Likewise, if you don’t accept essential truths (…oh, I mean “axioms”) of metaphysics … well you don’t have metaphysics.

Now, the best we can do to cure a person from rejecting essential truths is to find something he DOES believe and use that to show that he must also believe in the axioms in question (something along the lines of reduction to the absurd). That is what I hope to do with you … and, heck, I’ll keep trying. (although, I must admit, I’ve already done that a couple times now)

What do you mean?

I asked, “do you have some kind of proof that existence and non-existence are both neutral?” … because, that’s what you believe, right? Or no? What do you believe regarding the goodness or badness or neaturalness with regard to existence and non-existence? And can you prove your position? Just wondering.

It would just be another axiomatic statement on your part. I don’t want axioms, I want evidence, or at least a rationale.

First of all, do you agree that the acceptance of evidence and rationale is all founded on axioms?

As far as I know, there aren’t any surviving philosophical works by Epicurus himself. You may be able to read about him from other philosophers of the time, but his message would likely be filtered through their own philosophical biases.

I was talking about “Epicurus” only but Epicurean literature in general, like Lucretius. From what I’ve read, they never seemed to clearly lay out if “suffering” was positive being or negation of being. But perhaps someone could enlighten me on this.

It wasn’t a question, actually. There was no question mark.

Good heavens! You’re right!

I’m not so sure. Unless you’re of the opinion that a being is more than the sum of its parts, no materials are lost even if the tumor kills the being.

Define “being” here, as well as “parts” and “materials” and even “sum.” Are “parts” here the same as “materials”?

Everything that existed before the death will exist after the death, except for abilities, such as rationality.

So, when a deer gets thrown into a wood-chipper … everything will still exist except for its abilities … wait, what about the deer? Would the deer still exist? And would its different body parts (like its head, antlers, etc.) would they still exist … even if they are reduced to a fine powder?

I wouldn’t say that abilities “exist,” technically, because abilities are only possible actions that a being may produce given its structure.

Interesting … so abilities don’t exist …

So, abilities aren’t “things” then, right? Because you said previously that only “things” exist. Or do they exist conceptually? In which case, according to you, they would be things. What about “actions” … do “actions” even exist, according to you?

You claims here need sorting out. If you could clear this up, I would enjoy it very much.

Just FYI, the kind of claims you’re making … they’re metaphysical claims … so does that mean you really don’t believe what you’re saying, or is it that you DO believe in metaphysics?

In fact, if the laws of conservation are true, then no materials in our universe are ever lost, they are only converted to different forms. I don’t know how an Aristotelian would deal with this, because not a single ounce of “being” is ever lost if conservation laws hold true, unless you’re counting abilities as existent items.

Aristotle deals with this very well and says the primary matter that makes up all material things is never destroyed. However, the things that matter can compose can definitely be destroyed.

So, when you say that not a single ounce of “being” is ever lost … what on earth are you talking about? Surely, things go out of existence … like deers, right? Deers are mortal, are they not?

And by the way: “Fulfillment of the being’s nature?” Pshh. Why should I believe I have a purpose?

You don’t have to call it “purpose” if you don’t want to. I’ve run into atheists who believe that “natures can be fulfilled” … but that simply those “natures” happened randomly.

Do you believe things even have “natures”? I’ll let you answer that before I go on.

 

[Areopagite]

I have a few very simple questions for you: How would an Aristotelian come to conclude that one “being” is better than another “being?” Is it the one that has more abilities or “powers,” as Aristotle might say? Is it the one with better abilities? How do you determine what’s better?

Good questions. This will probably require a very painfully long answer to answer this thoroughly. But, for now, I will be brief (and then elaborate on the parts that you try to tear apart):

In general, it can be said that … a being is greater the more being it has. Another way to say this is a thing is greater the more things it has. Here are some ways a being can possess being in varying degrees:

• Knowledge: knowledge exists and thus it is a being. The more knowledge a thing has the more being it has … and hence the greater the being is. A thing that does not have the capacity for knowledge is hence intrinsically less in being than a thing that does have such a capacity.
• Power: This is the capacity for doing something (usually, to cause a change in something). Powers also fall under being (because they exist) and hence the more power a thing has the greater that thing is (because it would have more being).
• Action: This is operation of actually doing something (not just the capacity for it). Since actions exist and are thus beings, and since the actions of a thing are a part of that thing … then the more actions a thing performs the more being that thing has … and thus the greater it is. Also, a thing is greater the more things it affects, since its actions (which a part of the thing) grow greater in existence with greater number of recipients.
• Existence: Obviously (as said before) a being is greater the more it exists. An actually existing being is greater than a potentially existing being. Also, the more a thing exists throughout space and time, the greater it is, for the greater points in space and time the thing occupies, the more it can be said to exist.

These are some of the big ones that come to mind. I think I can possibly anticipate some of your objections/questions … but I’ll let you make them first.

Also, before I take a stab at explaining how some powers are better than others … let’s get down the aforementioned topics first.

As it stands, I don’t know how you could use this reasoning to conclude that, between the existence of a person and the existence of a tumor, one is better than the other.

A person has the capacity for knowledge, whereas the tumor does not. I doubt that satisfies you … but I’ll try that out for now.

 

[Syntax]

I haven’t dismissed everything that Aristotle proposed. Recently, we’ve just been discussing “souls.” I questioned the notion, and you two freaked on me.

I didn’t freak. I attempted to draw modern notions into Aristotle’s understanding of “souls,” since most modern Aristotelian scholars and current biologists will interpret him this way, which I find incredibly accurate to his own views on the matter from the littel that I know.

I think the problem is that everyone has the strong impression that you are Aristotle-bashing, so we are skeptical of your intent. I can’t defend everything Aristotle said because it is not my area of expertise in philosophy. But I do recommend constructive criticism over downright skepticism and misrepresentation of Aristotle.

 

[Areopagite]

Anyway, I suppose this discussion is coming to a close. If Areo wants to continue, that’s fine …

I’m still here … I have no intention of stopping.

It may help the discussion if you clarified the following things, though (b/c I think it’s creating a lot of confusion about where you’re coming from):

Do you think metaphysics is a dead-end pursuit merely because there are different beliefs about it? (because … wouldn’t everything be a dead-end pursuit?)

Do you still accept your distinction between physical existence and conceptual existence … as well as your recent remarks about how “abilities” don’t technically exist and whatnot? (because if you do, then why are you throwing out metaphysics? … because those are metaphysical distinctions)

 

[Betterave]

Those are all excellent questions, are they not? Do you figure that anyone who asks such questions is too stupid to be expected to follow another’s explanation? It seems far more likely that you simply have no explanation.

I can’t tell over the internet, of course, but you write as if you’re positively fuming! It only reinforces my belief that ethics are ultimately based on emotions.

Fuming with laughter, maybe. My statements consist of words with logical content, I suggest that you try to read them with that in mind and that you set aside your wild speculations about my emotions. They are irrelevant. (Same goes for your claim that others have ‘freaked’ on you in this thread - I think you should consider the possibility that this is your own insecurity speaking, not a perception of what has actually happened in this thread.)

As for these ‘excellent’ questions, what makes them ‘excellent’? What makes a person who can’t understand something ‘stupid’? Are you inventing terms to label your own abstractions in order to confuse me here? Or do these terms mean something objectively? What if I don’t ‘feel good’ about the way you use these terms - can you convince me to feel good about them?

Or I won’t feel as you do about the “proof,” so I’ll remain unconvinced of the proof that relies on my feelings. You guys have done two things in this thread, whether the topic be ethical or otherwise: 1) invent terms to label your own abstractions in order to confuse me (which didn’t work, I might add) and 2) flippantly dismiss me as an ignorant Aristotle-basher who wouldn’t understand your rationale even if you presented it or had something to present, which is doubtful. I’m not impressed.

(Translation: I didn’t understand, or try to understand, respond to, or try to respond to, anything you wrote.)

In order for me to be a “useless wight” in Aristotle’s usage, I would have to fail to “lay to heart another’s wisdom.” That would require you to have wisdom, I’m afraid.

That’s what the inventors-of-abstract-terms-that-confuse-you call a non sequitur.

Anyway, I suppose this discussion is coming to a close. If Areo wants to continue, that’s fine, but I guess that it will be pointless to continue responding to your snide remarks or to Syntax, who’s decided to be your cheerleader. (I hate posts that consist of one word and a smiley.)

Pointless as long as you refuse to engage with the content of what I have written.

 

[Oreoracle]

You seem to consider these questions to be the priorities, so I’ll answer them first.

Do you think metaphysics is a dead-end pursuit merely because there are different beliefs about it? (because … wouldn’t everything be a dead-end pursuit?)

Of course not. As I said before, I think it’s a dead-end pursuit because there are no official axioms used from the start, and so we have no means of deriving or refuting ideas. One person begins their metaphysics with the assumption that their senses are reliable, while another may begin with great skepticism about their senses, and therefore become skeptical about the existence of the natural world. Both are considered metaphysical theories, so presumably no metaphysical axioms have been violated (if any were violated, the theory wouldn’t be considered metaphysical). You can say that one theory resembles “true metaphysics” while the other is only vain metaphysics, but this is begging the question–how do you know one is true while the other is not?

At the start of things, we just have to assume axioms and go from there. I begin with trust in my senses and what I deem to be the sane man’s standard of empirical evidence. No nonsense about intuition or immaterial entities for me.

Do you still accept your distinction between physical existence and conceptual existence … as well as your recent remarks about how “abilities” don’t technically exist and whatnot? (because if you do, then why are you throwing out metaphysics? … because those are metaphysical distinctions)

As I said, I begin with those assumptions because, to me, they adequately explain my experiences (I assume that I am having experiences, too ).

As for abilities, I still hold that an ability is just a label we give to the possibility of an event occurring that involves the entity in question. For example, if I say that I have the ability to run, I mean that my body structure is such that running is a possible activity that my body could undergo. Postulating an immaterial entity to explain this isn’t necessary, so I don’t.

I’ll post again later, though it might be tomorrow…

 

[Oreoracle]

… okay. I’m not sure what the point is that you’re making. You still seem to suggest that this is only a problem with metaphysics … but it’s also a problem with mathematics too. If you don’t accept mathematical axioms … well, then you don’t have math, do you? Likewise, if you don’t accept essential truths (…oh, I mean “axioms”) of metaphysics … well you don’t have metaphysics.

Actually, the problem is much different. You presented the existence of the physical world as being axiomatic in metaphysics, but we still recognize theories that reject the physical world as metaphysical theories. In reference to your bolded statement above, this seems to imply that those theories that are recognized as metaphysical have not transgressed any axioms, correct? So if a theory like solipsism is considered metaphysical, it must not have violated any axioms essential to metaphysics. Since solipsism rejects the existence of the physical world, we can infer that the existence of the physical world is not axiomatic in the “study” of metaphysics. So you were wrong about metaphysics’ axioms on at least one count. The existence of the physical world may be axiomatic in one kind of metaphysic, but it mustn’t be to the field in general.

I asked, “do you have some kind of proof that existence and non-existence are both neutral?” … because, that’s what you believe, right? Or no? What do you believe regarding the goodness or badness or neaturalness with regard to existence and non-existence? And can you prove your position? Just wondering.

I consider certain existent items to be good and others to be bad, as most people seem to do. I can’t really label non-existence with any qualities due to its distinctive lack of qualities. If the suspense of not knowing exactly what I believe is killing you, I’ll let you know that I’m a utilitarian. I concur mostly with preference utilitarianism, to be specific.

First of all, do you agree that the acceptance of evidence and rationale is all founded on axioms?

Yes.

Define “being” here, as well as “parts” and “materials” and even “sum.” Are “parts” here the same as “materials”?

I used the phrase with the intention of simplifying matters. Explaining what I meant would only complicate things unnecessarily, so we’ll move on.

So, when a deer gets thrown into a wood-chipper … everything will still exist except for its abilities … wait, what about the deer? Would the deer still exist? And would its different body parts (like its head, antlers, etc.) would they still exist … even if they are reduced to a fine powder?

By “things” I meant matter and energy. All of the composite materials of the deer will still exist; as you’ve pointed out, we can’t say the same about the deer, the antlers, etc.

But what are deers and antlers? Aren’t they just objects that conform to definitions we propose? If so, then losing a deer merely amounts to losing the label “deer.” The materials that constituted the deer will still exist.

Think of it like a math problem. We can start out with an equation such as “4=4.” We can also change it to a different form: 4=2+2. Now did we truly “lose” a four in this process? In a sense, yes, but we haven’t subtracted four, we’ve only lossed the label “four” and replaced it with smaller parts that are equivalent to the original.

Because you said previously that only “things” exist.

Okay, so an ability is a thing. You got me there. But I mean that abilities exist conceptually as references to possibilities. We can’t look at an object and say, “Oh, there’s an ability!” We can watch an occurring event and say that something is able to undergo a process (the process we just saw), but we can’t point at an ability.

Your claims here need sorting out. If you could clear this up, I would enjoy it very much.

I hope I’ve done so.

So, when you say that not a single ounce of “being” is ever lost … what on earth are you talking about?

Matter and energy are conserved during conversions.

Surely, things go out of existence … like deers, right? Deers are mortal, are they not?

The label “deer” may become inapplicable to a particular object, but that doesn’t mean the materials constituting the deer have been done away with. Nothing’s been lost, except a label.

Do you believe things even have “natures”? I’ll let you answer that before I go on.

What do you mean by “nature?”

 

[Oreoracle]

Areo, I appreciate this outline you’ve given me. (The one containing your elaborations about power, knowledge, and such.) When I read it, though, I don’t think you’ve given me exactly what I asked for. If you recall, I wanted to know how you would determine which beings are better than other beings. You expounded on the concept of “greatness,” but I didn’t ask for an explanation of how to determine whether one being is “greater” than another; I only wanted to know which is better. In other words, I’m talking about value, not greatness.

Now maybe you consider value and greatness to be the same. If so, I strongly disagree. I don’t believe that greatness is the factor that determines whether something ought to exist. To conflate greatness and value is to commit ethical suicide. When you talk about power and knowledge, for example, Hitler has most humans beaten, so we may say that Hitler is greater than most. If this means that Hitler is more valuable, it would also mean that, ethically speaking, Hitler’s existence is preferable to the average person’s existence. Considering the consequences of having Hitler-like people in the world, I must say, “Yikes!”

(Admittedly, the deaths resulting from his existence may counterbalance his greatness in your view. I don’t know. But to think that Hitler’s barbaric acts made him valuable in the first place is insane.)

That being said, I hope you conceive of value and greatness differently. I’ll get back to your last post later…

 

[Syntax]

Actually, the problem is much different. You presented the existence of the physical world as being axiomatic in metaphysics, but we still recognize theories that reject the physical world as metaphysical theories. In reference to your bolded statement above, this seems to imply that those theories that are recognized as metaphysical have not transgressed any axioms, correct? So if a theory like solipsism is considered metaphysical, it must not have violated any axioms essential to metaphysics. Since solipsism rejects the existence of the physical world, we can infer that the existence of the physical world is not axiomatic in the “study” of metaphysics. So you were wrong about metaphysics’ axioms on at least one count. The existence of the physical world may be axiomatic in one kind of metaphysic, but it mustn’t be to the field in general.

You confuse terms again. Solipsism is not a metaphysical position which rejects the existence of the physical world; rather, it is an epistemological position which says that all I know are my own ideas of things for which I am immediately acquainted. Idealism, on the other hand, is a metaphysical position which says the only thing that exists are ideas. And physical realism, which asserts the existence of the physical world, is a metaphysical position as well.

Physical realism is a metaphysical position adopted by science, for which no scientific evidence can be provided. So it behaves as a metaphysical axiom in scientific discourse. But the position may have to be arrived at by further arguments in the domain of metaphysical discourse. So it is not always **treated **as an axiom in metaphysics.

You continue to confuse metaphysical axioms which are typically universally accepted by everyone (such as the Law of numerical Identity, the Principle of Causation, the Identity of Indiscernibles, the Principle of Subsistence and Inherence, etc.) with metaphysical theories which are constructed from these metaphysical axioms (physical realism, idealism, etc).

Would you please specify, if any, which metaphysical axioms you actually accept? ** It would make much more clear what exactly your objection to metaphysics is.**

And what exactly is your ontology, namely, what things do you think exist and why?

 

[Areopagite]

As I said before, I think it’s a dead-end pursuit because there are no official axioms used from the start, and so we have no means of deriving or refuting ideas.

I’m a little confused, perhaps, about what you mean by “dead-end” here. Does this mean that you think metaphysics is worthless … or should not be discussed … or what? I don’t think you would agree … because you keep making metaphysical distinctions to back up many of your views. So what does “dead-end” mean here?

Perhaps I’m also confused about what you mean by “official axioms” … does “official” mean that an x-number of people agrees about them? If I found enough people to agree on a certain number of axioms would they become official? Does there have to be a majority? And hence if a majority happened to be reached … can certain axioms be “officialized”? What is this word “official”?

One person begins their metaphysics with the assumption that their senses are reliable, while another may begin with great skepticism about their senses, and therefore become skeptical about the existence of the natural world. Both are considered metaphysical theories, so presumably no metaphysical axioms have been violated (if any were violated, the theory wouldn’t be considered metaphysical).

No, I think there can be “metaphysical views” that nonetheless contradict the necessary metaphysical first principles. The definition of metaphysics (or more precisely “metaphysical view”) does not necessarily including its proper axioms. A view becomes a metaphysical view if the view simply comments on “being” or “existence” or “reality” etc.

Similarly for the term “mathematics.” While it is true that mathematics has certain axioms, we can nevertheless talk about “mathematical errors”, even though such errors ultimately contradict mathematical axioms and yet are still called “mathematical.” This is because the errors pertain to number, quantity, space etc. … the same thing mathematics pertains to (just like metaphysics pertains to “being” and hence any statements about “being” can be deemed “metaphysical” even if they deny the proper and necessary metaphysical first principles)

Does that make sense?

You can say that one theory resembles “true metaphysics” while the other is only vain metaphysics, but this is begging the question–how do you know one is true while the other is not?

Ultimately, if you accept no axioms, you can’t prove anything … not even which metaphysical theory is true (but of course, in that case, you can’t prove which mathematical theories are true either).

However, what you can do is this (in my opinion):

People, no matter how hard they try, implicitly hold on to certain axioms about reality that are shared by all human beings … and they actually subconsciously assume them in their thinking even when they try to hold a philosophy contrary to those axioms. Hence, one’s job is to bring to the surface those instances where such people are utilizing those axioms so that those people can either choose to accept the axioms consciously or choose to discontinue holding any kind of philosophy or thinking altogether (because that is really the only time where someone can consistently hold no axioms).

So, you can show inconsistencies in certain metaphysical systems and/or show how normal human thinking conflicts with it. Obviously, so I say, a true metaphysical system will not be self-contradictory nor will it betray common sense.

That’s the best we can do.

At the start of things, we just have to assume axioms and go from there. I begin with trust in my senses and what I deem to be the sane man’s standard of empirical evidence.

Do you, personally, accept these as well: (I’m not talking about other people … but you)

• The principle of non-contradiction
• The validity of logic (and hence all the rules of logic)
• The mind’s ability to grasp truth
• The existence of the physical world
• The principle of sufficient reason (even though, as you say, some theologians “abuse” it … do you still think that, in itself, it’s a valid principle?)

No nonsense about intuition or immaterial entities for me.

I’m not sure what you mean by these two. “Intuition” can simply mean “immediate knowledge” as opposed to “reasoned-out knowledge.” However, reasoned-out ultimately requires truths with which reason … and hence ultimately reason requires intuited truths. You, as you seem to indicate, seem to intuit the trustworthiness of your senses … hence, you seem to accept some level of intuition. In fact, all axioms must be gained by intuition. Hence, if you reject intuition, you reject all axioms.

I’m a little unsure what you mean by “immaterial entities” too. Can “entity” simply mean “thing”? In which case, it would seem that you would have to reject all conceptual things. I assume you mean something else by this … but what exactly?

 

[Areopagite]

As I said, I begin with those assumptions because, to me, they adequately explain my experiences (I assume that I am having experiences, too ).

Of course this previously assumes some criteria for “adequate explanation” does it not? What makes one thing “an adequate explanation” compared to another?

I consider certain existent items to be good and others to be bad, as most people seem to do. I can’t really label non-existence with any qualities due to its distinctive lack of qualities. If the suspense of not knowing exactly what I believe is killing you, I’ll let you know that I’m a utilitarian. I concur mostly with preference utilitarianism, to be specific.

That’s a bit more helpful thanks.

By “things” I meant matter and energy. All of the composite materials of the deer will still exist; as you’ve pointed out, we can’t say the same about the deer, the antlers, etc.

You would agree though that matter and energy aren’t the only “things”, right? The deer is a thing too and yet it can cease to exist … right?

But what are deers and antlers? Aren’t they just objects that conform to definitions we propose?

What do you mean by “object”? Would that be … any conglomeration of matter/energy?

If so, then losing a deer merely amounts to losing the label “deer.”

So … what are “labels”? Are labels “things”? Are they physical things or conceptual things? It would seem to be, according to you, conceptual things, right? Hence, no deers physically exist, right? They are all in our head. Or no?

Also, can’t we have a concept of a deer? Or is “deer” simply a label without any meaning? Sure we can change the label of “deer” … but doesn’t the concept stay the same? Or is the concept, as well, merely the label/word “deer”? Also, does that concept also correspond to reality … physical reality? Your thoughts.

Think of it like a math problem. We can start out with an equation such as “4=4.” We can also change it to a different form: 4=2+2. Now did we truly “lose” a four in this process? In a sense, yes, but we haven’t subtracted four, we’ve only lossed the label “four” and replaced it with smaller parts that are equivalent to the original.

Once again, are “four” and “two” only labels or do they correspond to things (conceptual things, in this case)? Also, this is very different when comparing this to a physical deer … with mathematical operations, none of the things are actually affected (and hence, none are being destroyed or created). But when you tear apart a deer … that deer’s gone. Or at the very least … the matter/energy IS affected … unlike numbers … no?

Okay, so an ability is a thing. You got me there. But I mean that abilities exist conceptually as references to possibilities. We can’t look at an object and say, “Oh, there’s an ability!” We can watch an occurring event and say that something is able to undergo a process (the process we just saw), but we can’t point at an ability.

So … abilities aren’t physical things (but conceptual things). However, isn’t it true that a physical thing’s ability is rooted in the physical reality of the thing … and not merely what we conceptually think of it?

Also, what about actions? Can we say “Oh, there’s an action!” even though technically an action isn’t a “physical object” … unless you disagree.

The label “deer” may become inapplicable to a particular object, but that doesn’t mean the materials constituting the deer have been done away with. Nothing’s been lost, except a label.

Aristotle would agree that matter isn’t lost during the annihilation of a deer.

However, when you say that only the label is lost … you nonetheless say that the label “deer” may become inapplicable to a particular object … what on earth does that mean? Why would an object be disqualified from possessing a certain label? Is this because something happens to the label in this physical event, or does something happen to the “physical object”? And if something happens to the “physical object” then what exactly happens to it?

What do you mean by “nature?”

Answering the questions I just asked above may lead to answering this one.

 

[Syntax]

By “things” I meant matter and energy. All of the composite materials of the deer will still exist; as you’ve pointed out, we can’t say the same about the deer, the antlers, etc.

But what are deers and antlers? Aren’t they just objects that conform to definitions we propose? If so, then losing a deer merely amounts to losing the label “deer.” The materials that constituted the deer will still exist.

Of course the matter and energy still remain, and Aristotle would have thought this too. But the rest of this isn’t correct whatsoever! So are deer objects (things) or *defintions *(concepts) or labels (words)? Surely the definitions (concepts) of deer and antler and the words “deer” and “antler” still remain when the deer dies. So if the deer is nothing but its matter and energy, then the deer still exists when the deer dies? That doesn’t make any sense at all.

Or if the deer is just its concept and label, does something magically happen to the concept or the label when the deer dies? It seems to me the concept and the label still exist and never change in this instance; it’s just that the thing to which they originally applied ceased to exist.

 

[Areopagite]

Areo, I appreciate this outline you’ve given me. (The one containing your elaborations about power, knowledge, and such.)

Thank you.

When I read it, though, I don’t think you’ve given me exactly what I asked for. If you recall, I wanted to know how you would determine which beings are better than other beings. You expounded on the concept of “greatness,” but I didn’t ask for an explanation of how to determine whether one being is “greater” than another; I only wanted to know which is better. In other words, I’m talking about value, not greatness.

Now maybe you consider value and greatness to be the same. If so, I strongly disagree. I don’t believe that greatness is the factor that determines whether something ought to exist. To conflate greatness and value is to commit ethical suicide. When you talk about power and knowledge, for example, Hitler has most humans beaten, so we may say that Hitler is greater than most. If this means that Hitler is more valuable, it would also mean that, ethically speaking, Hitler’s existence is preferable to the average person’s existence. Considering the consequences of having Hitler-like people in the world, I must say, “Yikes!”

(Admittedly, the deaths resulting from his existence may counterbalance his greatness in your view. I don’t know. But to think that Hitler’s barbaric acts made him valuable in the first place is insane.)

Good comments.

When I was referring to “greatness” I was referring to “ontological goodness” (a concept, I am aware, that you might not agree with at the moment). The more being a thing has, the more ontological goodness it has, and hence the greater the thing is. This is because being is synonymous with goodness (i.e. ontological goodness). This is admittedly different from moral goodness, and so even though Hitler could be said to possess certain kinds of “ontological goodness,” he was nonetheless monstrously deficient in “moral goodness.” Nonetheless, even though ontological and moral goodness are different, moral goodness is largely determined by a certain consideration of ontological goodness.

Now before I attempt to demonstrate that I would ask … if you could explain your own ethical theory (of “value” and whatnot), so that I may figure out where to begin explaining Aristotle’s ethics to you in light of what we have said and what you believe. You said you were utilitarian … but I fear I may have a simplistic view of what that means … or particularly what you think that means. So, if you could, explain (briefly) what your view is on determining the moral goodness of an action.

 

[Syntax]

Good questions. This will probably require a very painfully long answer to answer this thoroughly. But, for now, I will be brief (and then elaborate on the parts that you try to tear apart):

In general, it can be said that … a being is greater the more being it has. Another way to say this is a thing is greater the more things it has. Here are some ways a being can possess being in varying degrees:

• Knowledge: knowledge exists and thus it is a being. The more knowledge a thing has the more being it has … and hence the greater the being is. A thing that does not have the capacity for knowledge is hence intrinsically less in being than a thing that does have such a capacity.
• Power: This is the capacity for doing something (usually, to cause a change in something). Powers also fall under being (because they exist) and hence the more power a thing has the greater that thing is (because it would have more being).
• Action: This is operation of actually doing something (not just the capacity for it). Since actions exist and are thus beings, and since the actions of a thing are a part of that thing … then the more actions a thing performs the more being that thing has … and thus the greater it is. Also, a thing is greater the more things it affects, since its actions (which a part of the thing) grow greater in existence with greater number of recipients.
• Existence: Obviously (as said before) a being is greater the more it exists. An actually existing being is greater than a potentially existing being. Also, the more a thing exists throughout space and time, the greater it is, for the greater points in space and time the thing occupies, the more it can be said to exist.

These are some of the big ones that come to mind. I think I can possibly anticipate some of your objections/questions … but I’ll let you make them first.

Also, before I take a stab at explaining how some powers are better than others … let’s get down the aforementioned topics first.

A person has the capacity for knowledge, whereas the tumor does not. I doubt that satisfies you … but I’ll try that out for now.

Though I have a deep respect for Aristotle, this way of talking about “being” above has always disturbed me greatly since I take “being” to mean nothing but “existence.” For this reason I disagree that there are “degrees” or even “kinds” of being. Existence and being I take to be a 1 or 0 kind of notion. So I have a question: do you take the meaning of “being” as completely overlapping the meaning of “existence” as I do, or are their meanings partly non-overlapping?

In direct disagreement with existentialism and some Greek philosopy, I simply can’t understand the meanings of “different ways of being” or having “more rather than less being” at all. If one object takes up a greater spatial extent than another object, it doesn’t exist more than the other. It simply occupies a greater number of spatial points; the object doesn’t have more existence than the other object. If I have more knowledge than my friend, my knowledge doesn’t exist any more than my friend’s knowledge exists. I may have more knowledge than my friend, but the knowledge that I do have does not exist “more” than the existence of the knowledge that my friend has. Likewise, a locomotive train may have more power than a baseball in trajectory, but the power that the train does have does not exist more than the the existence of the power of the baseball. A greater power “exists” no more than a lesser power, even though both powers are of different degrees.

Similarly, I take the behavior of running to be different way of locomotion than walking, not a different way of being. And tables, and concepts, and words don’t “exist in different ways” from eachother. They all exist, period. A table, a concept, a word are different kinds of entities, so they may have a different way of enduring, I suppose, spatio-temporally and non-spatio-temporally. But they don’t have different ways of “existing.” They either exist or don’t exist.

Similarly, I think Hamlet does not exist. So he has no being at all. He doesn’t “subsist,” in some Meinongian fashion as an abstract idea, simply because Hamlet is not an idea. He is purportedly a person. And ideas are not persons.

Alot of this older way of talking seems to confuse matter rather quickly and has many unpalatable consequences for one’s ontology and for quantificational logic. For instance, it introduces variety of different meanings of “Ex” in existentially quantified statements, so that saying “Hamlet exists” is just as plausible as saying “Obama exists.” So we quickly get into alot of trouble if we don’t have a **univocal **meaning of “to exist.”