Where does Aristotle go wrong?

[Syntax]

Okay, but I’m still not sure how you answer my question: Are you saying that we really **can’t talk **about Arthur, or that we are **mistaken **when we take ourselves to be talking about Arthur?

Ok. Forgive me for the length here. Remember, I am coming at this with a univocal meaning of existence, unlike you. And your questions below indicate that you may not be making a distinction (that I am making) between the meanings (descriptions associated with) names and the referents (the objects) of those names which those names point to. I also make a distinction between the meanings (descriptions associated with) properties and the referents (properties) of those descriptions which those descriptions point to. Also, there exists a distinction between the meanings (propositions) of statements and the referents (the true, the false) those statements point to. I will avoid the latter two distinctions, and just focus on referents of names for now…

If Arthur exists, then

(1) “Arthur” is a name, and it is a name that refers to Arthur.
(2) we can talk about Arthur,
(3) If we think we refer to an existent object when we use the name “Arthur,” then we are not mistaken.

If Arthur does not exist, then

(1) “Arthur” is a purported name, but a purported name that refers to nothing–it is empty.
(2) we cannot talk about Arthur since Arthur does not exist.
(3) If we *think *we refer to an existent object when we use the name “Arthur,” then we are mistaken.

Suppose there is no such entity that is designated by the name “Arthur.” The problem that seems to be quite naturally bothering you is how to account for Bob’s utterance of what seems like a perfectly true statement such as “Arthur is the King of Denmark,” and Bill’s utterance of what seems like a perfectly false statement such as “Arthur is not the King of Denmark.” Both of these statement are perfectly meaningful, but both of them lack denotation, that is, no really existent person satsifies either statement to make either one or the other true or false. So with respect to the lack of an actually existent person, both statements are truth-valueless.

However, if you want these statement to be truth-valuable, then I am claiming you are going to have to provide a referent for each of these statements to make one them true and the other false. The only natural candidate for a truth-maker that I can think of is the concept of Arthur and the concept of the King of Denmark retranslating both of them to be saying respectively,

“The concept of Arthur contains, as partial meaning, the concept of King-of-Denmark.”
“The concept of Arthur does not contain, as partial meaning, the concept of King-of-Denmark.”

The first is true, the latter is false.

You claim: “But if Arthur does not exist, then ‘Arthur’ is not about Arthur.”

That’s right. If nothing is designated by the name “Arthur,” then “Arthur” does not refer to any existent entity. And…

Okay, so what is ‘Arthur’ about then? You seem forced to say: NOTHING. And that, I submit, is simply false…

“Arthur” is not about anything. But if you want to know what the statement “Arthur is the King of Denmark” is about, it is about the relations between the concept of Arthur and concept of the King of Denmark.

Does this help at all?

I’m not sure about definitions. I would evaluate the truth-value of such statements by inquiring what was meant in each case and deciding whether I thought that the meaning given was true. Both statements could be true and both could be false - but truth and falsity must be evaluated in context…

I thought you would say something like that. Though I think the meanings of names like “John,” proper pronouns like “I, you,” and definite descriptions like “the President of the United States” will be determined by context and speaker-intention, I do *not *think the meaning of “to exist” changes whatsoever. I am confident there is one and only one unalterable meaning across all changes in contexts and speaker-intentions. Let me just point out that this is clearly where our disagreement is coming from.

It means effective/standing-out-into-being in each case, but there are obviously different ways of being effective/standing-out-into-being. It again depends on the context of the claim, the meaning that is intended…

Would you be willing to concede that there may be different “ways of being effective/standing-out-into-being” but only one “way” of existing?

 

[Syntax]

Yes, it’s Heidegger. At least it was. And Kant and Hegel - they fascinate me too. “The real is the rational; and the rational is the real.” They ruined me perhaps. I even think Nietzsche has interesting things to say…

Yeah, I like reading Heidegger now and then, but I can’t subscribe to his terminology because it starts to confuse me the more I think about it. But Kant is great! The Critique is my favorite historical piece of philosophy of all time. However, I can’t stand Hegel. Have you read his Science of Logic? yuk! Try reading Quine’s Word and Object by comparison–that knocks Hegel’s socks off in logical rigor.

I admit, I like some of Nietzsche’s thoughts too. He’s a powerfully insightful but dangerous writer if you don’t know how to properly engage with him, right? Nietzsche even knew that…His use of logic stinks though, and he obviously speaks in too many faulty generalizations about the human predicament. I used to be such a fan that at 18 I got “Will to Power” tattooed an my arm (dumb…). I even used to be one of these misinformed atheists that we always encounter on this forum, until I woke up…

Do you enjoy Kierkegaard much?

I find that analytic philosophers are often - not always - very analytical, but shallow and not very rigorous. That’s just been my experience. Continentals have plenty of problems too, of course.

Analytic philosophers are “not very rigorous”? Who do you have in mind here? Of course this remark is going chap me a little. I happen to think that “being rigorous” is the very virtue of the analytic discipline. The reason why I abandoned much of the continental way of approaching subjects (my last serious frustration years ago involved Husserl) was because I thought (and still do think) that it lacks the precision and clarity so desperately needed in areas like meaning, linguistics, and logic. After all, the analytic discipline comes from the styles of Russel, Carnap, Hempel, Wittgenstein, Frege, and others. The analytic method is incredibly effective at exposing the error and implicit assumptions in ideological world-views like Rorty-style pragmatism, post-modernism, Marxism, and Nietzschean perspectivism. Much of our work involves “taking out the trash” really, but this is the beauty of it. I may not know for certain what is true, but I definitely know what is false.

 

[Betterave]

Ok. Forgive me for the length here. Remember, I am coming at this with a univocal meaning of existence, unlike you.

I find I’m rather mystified about the meaning of this claim about the ‘univocity of existence.’ Is this an just axiom for a particular model of logical world-building that you find to be superior to any other you have come across, in some sense of ‘superior’?

And your questions below indicate that you may not be making a distinction (that I am making) between the meanings (descriptions associated with) names and the referents (the objects) of those names which those names point to. I also make a distinction between the meanings (descriptions associated with) properties and the referents (properties) of those descriptions which those descriptions point to. Also, there exists a distinction between the meanings (propositions) of statements and the referents (the true, the false) those statements point to. I will avoid the latter two distinctions, and just focus on referents of names for now…

If Arthur exists, then

(1) “Arthur” is a name, and it is a name that refers to Arthur.
(2) we can talk about Arthur,
(3) If we think we refer to an existent object when we use the name “Arthur,” then we are not mistaken.

If Arthur does not exist, then

(1) “Arthur” is a purported name, but a purported name that refers to nothing–it is empty. nothing; ‘Arthur’ does not.]
(2) we cannot talk about Arthur since Arthur does not exist.
(3) If we *think *we refer to an existent object when we use the name “Arthur,” then we are mistaken.
*[Not (1), (2), and (3); therefore (modus tollens) Arthur does exist.]

Suppose there is no such entity that is designated by the name “Arthur.” The problem that seems to be quite naturally bothering you is how to account for Bob’s utterance of what seems like a perfectly true statement such as “Arthur is the King of Denmark,” and Bill’s utterance of what seems like a perfectly false statement such as “Arthur is not the King of Denmark.” Both of these statement are perfectly meaningful, but both of them lack denotation, that is, no really existent person satsifies either statement to make either one or the other true or false. [In an obvious sense which we can all understand, this is true. In another obvious sense, which we can also all understand, it is only part of the truth, and so is in some sense false.] So with respect to the lack of an actually existent person, both statements are truth-valueless. ****

However, if you want these statement to be truth-valuable, then I am claiming you are going to have to provide a referent for each of these statements to make one them true and the other false. The only natural candidate for a truth-maker that I can think of is the concept of Arthur and the concept of the King of Denmark retranslating both of them to be saying respectively,

“The concept of Arthur contains, as partial meaning, the concept of King-of-Denmark.”
“The concept of Arthur does not contain, as partial meaning, the concept of King-of-Denmark.”

The first is true, the latter is false.**

The intentionality of the concept ‘Arthur’ is not the same as the intentionality of the concept ‘the concept of Arthur’ - I maintain that as self-evidently true. I also maintain that concepts are the only truth-bearers and that concepts are just as real as can be. Obama has a different mode of existence from the concept Obama, but both are entirely real. Socrates and Hamlet have the same mode of existence, but both, again, are entirely real, though it is true that neither is a living flesh-and-blood person, and Hamlet never was.

That’s right. If nothing is designated by the name “Arthur,” then “Arthur” does not refer to any existent entity. And…
“Arthur” is not about anything. But if you want to know what the statement “Arthur is the King of Denmark” is about, it is about the relations between the concept of Arthur and concept of the King of Denmark.

Does this help at all?

I want to say that ‘Obama is the president of the USA’ is a statement and as such is no less a relation between concepts than ‘Hamlet is a great Dane.’ The kind of truth-making reality that pertains to each is different; that’s all.

Would you be willing to concede that there may be different “ways of being effective/standing-out-into-being” but only one “way” of existing?

I take this as the suggestion of a normative stipulation regarding our use of the word ‘exist’ and I would need to be convinced that such a stipulation made sense or was even possible. On the other hand, I would want to say that ‘existing’ is always ‘standing out into being’ and that the only way to understand ‘existence’ univocally would be by identifying the common ground of all existence (similar, perhaps, to Kant’s “common, but unknown root” of knowledge). And since we are not God… let’s just say we need to be cautious about taking on that project (do you still have that ‘will-to-power’ tattoo? (that’s hilarious btw)).

 

[Syntax]

I find I’m rather mystified about the meaning of this claim about the ‘univocity of existence.’ Is this an just axiom for a particular model of logical world-building that you find to be superior to any other you have come across, in some sense of ‘superior’?

Simply put, yes.

The intentionality of the concept ‘Arthur’ is not the same as the intentionality of the concept ‘the concept of Arthur’ - I maintain that as self-evidently true.

I would be inclined to agree. But an intentional act doesn’t guarantee an actually existent object of that act whenever any such purported name is used. (Wouldn’t even someone like Husserl even agree? Didn’t he distinguish the “object” of an intentional act and an actual “thing,” or some such notion? Maybe not–this was probably the source of my own frustration with him.)

I can invent a name “grocktue,” but this doesn’t entail any entity is designated by that name. Similarly, propositional attitudes such as “belief that” or “hope that” or “fear that” don’t necessarily indicate any actually existent object. I can fear that an angry tiger is at my door, but my fearing doesn’t entail there is an actually existent angry tiger at my door.

I also maintain that concepts are the only truth-bearers.

Basic first-order logic says this is outright false. Only propositions can be truth bearers. Concepts, objects, or properties standing alone cannot be truth bearers. We need a subject and a predicate in order to make a truth-valuable sentence.

Suppose I say “red.” Can the concept (or property) alone I designate by my utterance “red” be true or false? No. This doesn’t even make sense to say “Red is true.” It is not even truth-valuable. It needs an object, such as a firetruck, in order to contruct a truth-valuable proposition such as

“The firetruck is red.”

This sentence would have this form,

Red (firetruck).

and is captured in the schema,

R(x)

But to bind the variable we need a quantifier to know the domain of x. So we say for instance that “there exists an entity such that, that entity is red”, and this statement is truth-valuable as indicated by,

(Ex) R(x)

But for this existentially quantified statement to be true, at least one object has to satisfy the variable (x).

Call that object “c.” Then,

“R(c)” is true.

and that concepts are just as real as can be.

I agree fully. Concepts really exist. I’m a full platonic realist.

Obama has a -]different mode of existence /-]from the concept Obama, but both are entirely real.

I agree that they both really exist and that they are different kinds of entities, but I disagree that they exist in different “ways.”

Socrates and Hamlet have -]the same mode of existence/-],

I think this is false. Hamlet does not exist. Socrates does exist. Socrates just doesn’t exist now. The past is just as real as the present and future, and there’s nothing wrong with putting a time-constraint on propositions made about Socrates. That’s why we talk about Socrates in past tense, not present tense.

but both, again, -]are entirely real/-], though it is true that neither is a living flesh-and-blood person, and Hamlet never was.

Hamlet doesn’t exist and Hamlet was never flesh and blood. Socrates exists and was once flesh and blood.

I want to say that ‘Obama is the president of the USA’ is a statement and as such is no less a relation between concepts than ‘Hamlet is a great Dane.’

Assuming I understand what you are saying, I would agree. Obama is the president of the USA is synthetic truth, so there are no analytic entailments between the concepts “Obama” and “president of the USA.” On the other hand, “Hamlet is a great Dane” is analytically false with respect to the meanings of the concepts, and is truth-valueless with respect to anything satisfying the name “Hamlet.” Further, “Hamlet is the king of Denmark” is analytically true with respect to conceptual relations since the concept designated by “king of Denmark” is *fully contained *in the concept of “Hamlet.”…as Kant might say…

The kind of truth-making reality that pertains to each is different; that’s all.

Right!

I take this as the suggestion of a normative stipulation regarding our use of the word ‘exist’ and I would need to be convinced that such a stipulation made sense or was even possible. On the other hand, I would want to say that ‘existing’ is always ‘standing out into being’ and that the only way to understand ‘existence’ univocally would be by identifying the common ground of all existence (similar, perhaps, to Kant’s “common, but unknown root” of knowledge).

I’m glad you mentioned Kant because I think, just like he does, that existence is not a predicate and doesn’t denote any properties, relations, persons, or anything! The term “existence” seems to pose exactly similar problems as the notion of “truth” does. But I am much more open to various interpretations of “truth” than I am “existence.”

And since we are not God… let’s just say we need to be cautious about taking on that project (do you still have that ‘will-to-power’ tattoo? (that’s hilarious btw)).

I know. Yeah, you can see it in my photos on here. Let’s just say if I ever became a practicing monk, the tattoo would make for a lot of boisterous laughter.

 

[davidv]

{snip]Hamlet doesn’t exist and Hamlet was never flesh and blood. Socrates exists and was once flesh and blood.
{snip}

Please help a rank novice when it comes to the language of philosophy.
If Hamlet doesn’t exist, what is “Hamlet”? Since we talk about “Hamlet”, it appears that “Hamlet” is something rather than nothing. What is this “something” called.

 

[Syntax]

Please help a rank novice when it comes to the language of philosophy.
If Hamlet doesn’t exist, what is “Hamlet”? Since we talk about “Hamlet”, it appears that “Hamlet” is something rather than nothing. What is this “something” called.

That’s what exactly what Betterave is asking. If you focus on the dialogue between Betterave and I beginning with post #78, you will know what I think.

“Existence” and “non-existence” have one and only one meaning…a kind of 1 or 0 notion. And all those entities that exist, exist. Just about all practicing analytic philosophers agree too. So I am not saying anything novel, and I stand on the shoulders of others who developed these notions in logic and linguistics.

 

[davidv]

That’s what exactly what Betterave is asking. If you focus on the dialogue between Betterave and I beginning with post #78, you will know what I think.

“Existence” and “non-existence” have one and only one meaning…a kind of 1 or 0 notion. And all those entities that exist, exist. Just about all practicing analytic philosophers agree too. So I am not saying anything novel, and I stand on the shoulders of others who developed these notions in logic and linguistics.

I have been following along. I asked the question because I could not extract an answer from the exchange on my own.

 

[Syntax]

**Necessity, possibility, and contingency **are nothing but different MODES of truth. They function as operators on propositions, and are strictly independent from notions like causation or ontological dependency

More Wiki on Modal truth. And the article stand right in line with what I have been saying all along:

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Modal_logic#Alethic_modalities

In classical modal logic, a proposition is said to be

possible if and only if it is not necessarily false (regardless of whether it is actually true or actually false);
necessary if and only if it is not possibly false; and
contingent if and only if it is not necessarily false and not necessarily true (ie. possible but not necessarily true).

In classical modal logic, therefore, either the notion of possibility or necessity may be taken to be basic, where these other notions are defined in terms of it **[like contigency]**in the manner of De Morgan duality.

For those with difficulty with the concept of something being possible but not true, the meaning of these terms may be made more comprehensible by thinking of multiple “possible worlds” (in the sense of Leibniz) or “alternate universes”; something “necessary” is true in all possible worlds, something “possible” is true in at least one possible world. These “possible world semantics” are formalized with Kripke semantics.

The truth-makers, or ontology, of necessary, possible, and contingent truths:

In the most common interpretation of modal logic, one considers “logically possible worlds”. If a statement is true in all possible worlds, then it is a necessary truth. If a statement happens to be true in our world, but is not true in all possible worlds, then it is a contingent truth. A statement that is true in some possible world (not necessarily our own) is called a possible truth.

Whether this “possible worlds idiom” is the best way to interpret modal logic, and how literally this idiom can be taken, is a live issue for metaphysicians. The possible worlds idiom would translate the claim about Bigfoot as “There is some possible world in which Bigfoot exists”. To maintain that Bigfoot’s existence is possible, but not actual, one could say, “There is some possible world in which Bigfoot exists; but in the actual world, Bigfoot does not exist”. But it is unclear what it is that making this claim commits us to. Are we really alleging the existence of possible worlds, every bit as real as our actual world, just not actual? **Saul Kripke **believes that this is a misnomer – that the term ‘possible world’ is just a useful way of visualizing the concept of possibility.[5] For him, the sentences “you could have rolled a 4 instead of a 6” and “there is a possible world where you rolled a 4, but you rolled a 6 in the actual world” are not significantly different statements.[6] David Lewis, on the other hand, made himself notorious by biting the bullet, asserting that all merely possible worlds are as real as our own, and that what distinguishes our world as actual is simply that it is indeed our world – this world (see Indexicality).

 

[Syntax]

I have been following along. I asked the question because I could not extract an answer from the exchange on my own.

…then I guess you are not understanding. What else can I do?

Please help a rank novice when it comes to the language of philosophy.
If Hamlet doesn’t exist, what is “Hamlet”? Since we talk about “Hamlet”, it appears that “Hamlet” is something rather than nothing. What is this “something” called.

“Hamlet” does not refer to Hamlet, because there is no such entity. If you want “Hamlet” to refer to anything, then the best candidate is that “Hamlet” refers to the concept-Hamlet.

Read post #98 about this:

And read post #79 for my motivations for thinking the way I do. It’s crucial that you understand why. Saying that “Hamlet exists,” messes up logic, it makes philosophical discourse unintelligible, and above all, it just confuses matters. We all know Hamlet does not exist. So why say that he does exist, or *“kind of” *exists? That doesn’t make any sense. Either Hamlet exists or Hamlet does not exist. There’s no “in-between.” This should be a pretty straight-forward notion. Do you think fairies, goblins, Santa Claus, and the Easter-Bunny exist? I seriously doubt it.

 

[Areopagite]

Does it? I thought “essence” was a term strictly applicable only to the substance’s property or to the substance’s possession of a property, not to the bare existence of that substance itself, such that, when the property ceases to exist for the substance, the substance is no longer the same *kind *of substance (or no substance at all).

I may be wrong, but you seem to indicate that properties are the things that define essences. However, I believe, Aristotle would say the opposite, specifically properties flow from a thing’s essence. Things have certain properties based on what their essences are. Right?

So is “essence” really a way of existing, or simply the way that John has that property, namely, **de re **necessarily, that is, having that property in all worlds in which John exists?

I’m quite sure “essence” is simply the way something exists. I’m not quite sure what else you are saying here … I admit you might be talking over my head.

Is not “actual existence” redundant? Doesn’t “existent” just mean actual?

Aristotle and Aquinas would very much disagree. It is true that when one says “existence” they usually specifically are referring to “actual existence” … but not always.

Tell me, do you think potential existence is a kind of existence? This is, of course, one the key doctrines of Aristotle’s metaphysics … but if you are equating “existence” with “actual existence” it would seem you deny that doctrine. Am I representing your view correctly? Do you deny potential existence is a kind of existence at all?

Does “existence” have two meanings here? Does Hamlet kind of exist, and kind of not exist?

Absolutely. Once again “existence” is an ambiguous term, though people usually are referring to actual existence specifically. Hamlet does not exist in actuality, but he does exist conceptually (or ideally).

I must say I didn’t want to interfere much because I thought you were doing a fine job:thumbsup:

Thank you very much.

FYI, I have no problem with metaphsyics whatsoever. You might call me a neo-platonist, actually. But I will say that though most of our ideas are the same, I construe them differently and this difference effects our different ontologies.

I have much respect for Plato. He changed my life. I believe that one day the basic ideas of Aristotle and Plato shall be reconciled (apparently Boethius did just that … in one of his lost works). But I think there is something to this “potential existence” of Aristotle’s. But before I proceed, I want to make sure you that officially reject the idea of “potential existence.”

 

[Magnanimity]

Syntax,

Let me jump in here, if I may. You stated earlier that you are approaching things from a univocal understanding of existence. Probably a few of your interlocutors (esp Areopagite) are approaching these questions raised in these recent posts with an analogical understanding of being (a classically Thomistic approach). I’ve been sympathetic with the latter for some time, mostly because my profs in grad school were heavily inclined in that thomistic direction, I imagine.

But, I’m not sure that I ever heard a fair presentation of this univocity of existence approach, so I want to see if you can flesh it out a little more. I don’t see how it really encapsulates what we’re all doing here in these exchanges. It seems like an analogical approach more fully encompasses the mutual understanding you have with Areo and Betterave.

You stated in a prior post above:

“I agree fully. Concepts really exist. I’m a full platonic realist.
…
I agree that they both really exist and that they are different kinds of entities, but I disagree that they exist in different ‘ways.’”

I’m trying to understand how you can affirm that concepts really exist and yet hold to this univocity of existence approach. In your second line above, you and Betterave can agree so far that they both exist. You further agree that they are different kinds of entities. But, you cannot agree that they exist in different ways? For two things to exist, and to exist as different entities, is not to exist in different ways? That seems like a distinction without a difference. Iow, it looks as if you’re tacitly assuming an analogical approach to existence as you try to deny it.

If concepts really exist, and Hamlet is a concept (or a “being of reason,” as Thomists like to put it), then Hamlet exists. Only, Hamlet exists inasmuch as he is a ‘Hamlet-concept,’ as you said earlier. Is this not an example of a different way of existing? To exist as a thing in re extra is not to exist in the same way in your mind, correct? And this does not entail an analogical understanding (rather than univocal) because…?

(I know I’m not being very precise about the terms here. Some of the distinctions between being, essence, existence, etc were drawn out earlier in some posts above. But, if you think I’m unfairly equivocating on the terms anywhere, please let me know. I’m really not trying to stack the deck in my favor. I’ve just never understood this ‘univocity’ in these discussions.)

 

[Syntax]

Syntax,

You stated in a prior post above:

“I agree fully. Concepts really exist. I’m a full platonic realist.
…
I agree that they both really exist and that they are different kinds of entities, but I disagree that they exist in different ‘ways.’”

I’m trying to understand how you can affirm that concepts really exist and yet hold to this univocity of existence approach. In your second line above, you and Betterave can agree so far that they both exist. You further agree that they are different kinds of entities. But, you cannot agree that they exist in different ways? For two things to exist, and to exist as different entities, is not to exist in different ways? That seems like a distinction without a difference. Iow, it looks as if you’re tacitly assuming an analogical approach to existence as you try to deny it.

Hi Magnanimity,
There are various ways this could be described, but it is such a very simple notion, actually. The analogical approach that seems to you I am “implicitly admitting” is simply due to the difficulties created by the grammar of natural languages, not with my view. And I am not saying anything new here at all. Kant said a very similar thing. Frege, Russel, and most other 20th century guys would agree too. I am proposing, like Kant, to stop treating the term “to exist” as if it were a **predicate **at all. Quine said this: “to be” is merely to be a value of a variable in existentially quantified statements. So “x” in “Ex” merely acts as a place-holder for all objects that exist. There are only two ways we can give this idea expression: (Ex) or ~(Ex). But the quantifier and its negation are not verbs at all that are saying “to exist” or “not to-exist.” This is precisely why people get confused by talking about “different ways of being.” That just doesn’t make any sense to me. I suppose physical objects have a different way of “enduring” than abstract conceptual entities such that one set of entities have spatial-temporal location, while the others do not, or some such thing–but I don’t think whatsoever that concepts and physical objects have “different ways of being, or existing.”

(1) There are different kinds of entities, but there is only one domain: the domain of all things that exist. And the empty domain, is simply the empty set.
(2) Many people will have different ontologies, so they will have different ideas as to what exists, and what does not exist. But this will not affect the univocal meaning of (Ex).
Someone will just be committed to the existence of some set of entities in order for his theories to be true, and the person who disagrees about what exists, would just perceive the other’s theory to be truth-valueless or false if he thinks those entities to which the other person’s theory purportedly refers do not exist.
(3) The univocal meaning of “to exist” that I am proposing we accept does NOT make any judgments about what does exist, and what does not exist, but only tells us what we mean to *say *when we say when we say this or that thing exists.

If concepts really exist, and Hamlet is a concept (or a “being of reason,” as Thomists like to put it), then Hamlet exists. Only, Hamlet exists inasmuch as he is a ‘Hamlet-concept,’ as you said earlier.

…yes, if you think Hamlet=concept-Hamlet, and concepts exist, like I do.

Is this not an example of a different way of existing? To exist as a thing in re extra is not to exist in the same way in your mind, correct? And this does not entail an analogical understanding (rather than univocal) because…?

No. Objects existing conceptually, physically, spiritually, mathematically, logically, linguistically–all objects “exist the same way.” To think otherwise, as it seems to me, begins to confuse matters rather quickly once we try to makes sense of truth and falsity. For instance, proposing the the univocal meaning of “to exist” to a post-modernist is probably the quickest way to get rid of his silly **relativist **notions like “it exists for you, but not for me,” or “it is true for you, but not for me”–and other such nonsense. Specifying “existential univocity” actually begins to clear up intelligible discourse rather quickly. So my reasons for adopting it, are primarily Logical, Mathematical, and Linguistic. And just for the record, the “univocity of existence” doesn’t affect one’s religion, one’s faith, or any other philosophical view for that matter. I just think some existentialist/phenomenologist, and perhaps some Aristotelian/Thomistic, ways of talking are just sloppy ways of talking. Better sense can be made of all these views (perhaps).

Let me just say this: It is perfectly possible that I would change my view later down the line, but from all my philosophical readings up to this point in my career, I don’t see that happening anytime soon since there has been so much philosophical rubbish proposed by post-modernism, Rorty-style pragmatism, and other such irrational ideologies.

 

[davidv]

…then I guess you are not understanding.

That is why i asked the question.

What else can I do?

You did quite well with your response below. This improved my understanding because it specifically addressed my question. It also highlights the difficultly with the high level of abiguity with many english words. I will examine those posts with this info in mind.

Thank you.

“Hamlet” does not refer to Hamlet, because there is no such entity. If you want “Hamlet” to refer to anything, then the best candidate is that “Hamlet” refers to the concept-Hamlet.

Read post #98 about this:

And read post #79 for my motivations for thinking the way I do. It’s crucial that you understand why. Saying that “Hamlet exists,” messes up logic, it makes philosophical discourse unintelligible, and above all, it just confuses matters. We all know Hamlet does not exist. So why say that he does exist, or *“kind of” *exists? That doesn’t make any sense. Either Hamlet exists or Hamlet does not exist. There’s no “in-between.” This should be a pretty straight-forward notion. Do you think fairies, goblins, Santa Claus, and the Easter-Bunny exist? I seriously doubt it.

 

[Syntax]

I may be wrong, but you seem to indicate that properties are the things that define essences. However, I believe, Aristotle would say the opposite, specifically properties flow from a thing’s essence. Things have certain properties based on what their essences are. Right? I’m quite sure “essence” is simply the way something exists. I’m not quite sure what else you are saying here … I admit you might be talking over my head.

Sorry…Ok, bare essentials here…

Why can’t we just say that the object’s essence is simply what an existent object is, as opposed to the “way” in which an object exists? The latter way of talking is claiming that “to be human,” for instance, means “existing-humanly” as if that is what one object does to be distinguished from “existing-artifactually” as if that is what another object does such as a table, and that “existing” is what they both do differently. So this supposes there are two kinds of existence itself. Though this may sound intuitively correct to you, to me it seems plainly false. Here’s why:

The vast difference between me and the* table *does not consist in our having vastly different sorts of being–the Heideggerian Dasein, or “that it is”–but consists rather in our having vastly different sorts of nature–Wesen, was sein, or “what it is.” So existence is what both the table and I have in common, and with respect to existence, we **do not **differ at all–we differ only in our natures, not in our existing. If different objects had different “ways of existing” then the table and I would be differing with respect to existence itself. But this is plainly false because that we both exist is true for the both of us, while the kinds of things that we are is where we differ. So “that we exist” should be univocal, while “distinguishedly human, or distinguishedly artifactual” should be the only characteristics that make us different in kind.

I’ve noticed that undergraduates and continental philosophers alike will fall effortlessly into this older way of talking, and it is very difficult to convince anyone who subscribes to it that it is false–or even that it is not obviously true. But it is false. Here is at least another reason for thinking it is false. Gilbert Ryle in The Concept of Mind (1949) was one of the most outspoken advocate for the univocity of existence. He says:

It is perfectly proper to speak in one logical tone of voice and that there exists minds, and in another logical tone of voice that there exists bodies. But these expressions *do not *indicate two different species of existence . . . They only indicate two different senses of “exist,” somewhat as “rising” has different senses in “the tide is rising,” “hopes are rising,” and “the average age of death is rising.” A man would be thought to be making a poor joke who said that three things are now rising, namely the tide, hopes and the average age of death. It would be just as good or bad a joke to say that there exist prime numbers and Wednesdays and public opinions and navies; or that there exists both minds and bodies.

Aristotle and Aquinas would very much disagree. It is true that when one says “existence” they usually specifically are referring to “actual existence” … but not always.

I don’t know how to make sense of that. And I am being perfectly honest

Tell me, do you think potential existence is a kind of existence? This is, of course, one the key doctrines of Aristotle’s metaphysics … but if you are equating “existence” with “actual existence” it would seem you deny that doctrine. Am I representing your view correctly? Do you deny potential existence is a kind of existence at all?

Yes, I do deny it. There are not different “species” of existing, as if “potentially existing” meant “not quite existing.” I find that a completely absurd way of talking, and to be respectfully honest to you, I think if you thought about this more, there’s a really good chance you would change your mind. I’m not trying to be presumptuous–I’m just thoroughly convinced of my view…lol! (whoa, that might have been inconsistent)

Here’s what I would say: There are really existent dispostions, or powers to do this or that, and that these latent powers are simply lacking the conditions which makes them manifest in the world around them. It is not as if they potentially exist and then become actually existent. That doesn’t make sense. Rather, they’ve always existed, there’s just no outside efficient cause that has made them kinetically interactive with the world around them.

Absolutely. Once again “existence” is an ambiguous term, though people usually are referring to actual existence specifically. Hamlet does not exist in actuality, but he does exist conceptually (or ideally).

You are making a distinction on the level of existence. I’m positive that if you want Hamlet to exist, then it is much more appropriate to make the distinction on the *kind *of thing Hamlet purportedly is, not with respect to *THAT *he exists. Do you see the difference?

I have much respect for Plato. He changed my life. I believe that one day the basic ideas of Aristotle and Plato shall be reconciled (apparently Boethius did just that … in one of his lost works). But I think there is something to this “potential existence” of Aristotle’s. But before I proceed, I want to make sure you that officially reject the idea of "potential existence."

That’s cool. Plato changed my life too. I underwent that classic Augustinian switch from Neo-Platonism and Manicheaism to Catholicism.

I do reject “potential existence.” Again, it doesn’t make any sense to me. Moreover, I’m pretty sure that if Aristotle was alive today he would have revised this way of talking too. For instance, why can’t we just talk about potential and active powers, instead of potential and actual existence? What’s wrong with that?

 

[Syntax]

That is why i asked the question.

You did quite well with your response below. This improved my understanding because it specifically addressed my question. It also highlights the difficultly with the high level of abiguity with many english words. I will examine those posts with this info in mind.

Thank you.

No worries.

I think if you read my last post to Aero- you will find more motivations for thinking about “existence” this way.

This older way of talking is common among alot of people, especially undergraduates in philosophy, and everyone slips into it quite effortlessly. So am I confident that distinctions have to be made to pull ourselves out of the sloppy mess some philosophers of old created.

 

[davidv]

No worries.

I think if you read my last post to Aero- you will find more motivations for thinking about “existence” this way.

This older way of talking is common among alot of people, **especially undergraduates in philosophy, **and everyone slips into it quite effortlessly. So am I confident that distinctions have to be made to pull ourselves out of the sloppy mess some philosophers of old created.

The post to Aero does help as well.

Re: bold above. I don’t even have that excuse. I had one Philosophy course (Modern) 35 years ago.

 

[Magnanimity]

There are various ways this could be described, but it is such a very simple notion, actually. The analogical approach that seems to you I am “implicitly admitting” is simply due to the difficulties created by the grammar of natural languages, not with my view. And I am not saying anything new here at all. Kant said a very similar thing. Frege, Russel, and most other 20th century guys would agree too. I am proposing, like Kant, to stop treating the term “to exist” as if it were a predicate at all. Quine said this: “to be” is merely to be a value of a variable in existentially quantified statements. So “x” in “Ex” merely acts as a place-holder for all objects that exist. There are only two ways we can give this idea expression: (Ex) or ~(Ex). But the quantifier and its negation are not verbs at all that are saying “to exist” or “not to-exist.” This is precisely why people get confused by talking about “different ways of being.” That just doesn’t make any sense to me. I suppose physical objects have a different way of “enduring” than abstract conceptual entities such that one set of entities have spatial-temporal location, while the others do not, or some such thing–but I don’t think whatsoever that concepts and physical objects have “different ways of being, or existing.”

Syntax,

OK, I think I got what you’re saying, and I don’t think most folks’ views are too divergent from what your’re claiming here. Yes, I remember the Kantian objection very well, although I’m pretty sure he’s objecting mostly to the Modernist philosophers who preceeded him (esp those inclined towards the ontological argument for the existence of God). In making his point, I don’t really see how Kant could be arguing against Aquinas or Scotus (or Aristotle, even).

For the scholastics, the verb “to be” is used in two ways, which I can only assume you would find non-controversial. First, there is the use of “is” as in the pure copula. “Jane is.” iow, “Jane exists.” The second use of “is” occurs in predication. “Jane is intelligent.” “Jane is tall.”

However, I’d have to hold off on conceding what may be an overly reductive view of Quine here. Let’s take the dodo bird as an example. We can agree with Kant that whether or not the dodo bird actually exists does not make any difference to the conceptual value of it. We mean the exact same thing when we refer to the dodo bird today, as they did in 1600 when dodos were still around.

However, what is often inquired of, with respect to either things or states of affairs is whether they exist (or obtain). That is what we’re often interested in, at least as much as we want to discuss the concepts involved. So, with respect to the dodo bird it is not the case that all we’re ever really interested in is the concept itself (or the “essence”) of this particular bird. We very often are interested in the actuality of things. Does x exist? Does a certain state of affairs obtain? These are often our modes of inquiry, and it must therefore be meaningfully distinct to state, “No, the dodo bird no longer exists,” as opposed to “The dodo bird is extant.” I agree with Aquinas that we affirm through judgments the actuality (existence) of things, but I’m wondering whether there’s more going on here.

 

[Syntax]

OK, I think I got what you’re saying, and I don’t think most folks’ views are too divergent from what your’re claiming here. Yes, I remember the Kantian objection very well, although I’m pretty sure he’s objecting mostly to the Modernist philosophers who preceeded him (esp those inclined towards the ontological argument for the existence of God). In making his point, I don’t really see how Kant could be arguing against Aquinas or Scotus (or Aristotle, even).

Yes, Kant did do that. But notice his motivation for doing so: the existence of something can never be deduced in a logical argument without already assuming that that thing exists. But other properties of things **can **be demonstrated. This is exactly why existence cannot be predicated of an object!

For the scholastics, the verb “to be” is used in two ways, which I can only assume you would find non-controversial. First, there is the use of “is” as in the pure copula. “Jane is.” iow, “Jane exists.” The second use of “is” occurs in predication. “Jane is intelligent.” “Jane is tall.”

Exactly. Notice what is going on. The copula of “predication” serves to make proposition truth-valuable, because it indicates the possession of a property by relating a the subject to a predicate. The bare copula “is” on the other hand is not even properly a copula (not in logic anyway), and cannot do anything by itself when it is conjoined with an object. It can’t make an object “true.” That doesn’t even make any sense. How can an object be true? We require both a subject and predicate to be able to speak of anything being true; and from subjects and predicates, we construct statements, sentences, or propositions–and only propositions, sentences, and statements are the bearers of truth–not objects, not properties, not individuals (except Christ). lol.

It is only sentences and propositions that say things. Nouns don’t *say *things; they denote objects. Predicates don’t say things, they denote properties. But because existence can’t be one of these predicates, then what function does “is” have? In fact, it has the most bare meaning ever, if anything. It’s not a predicate, it’s not a property, it’s not a verb, it’s not thing, it’s not an entity–so what the heck is it? It’s a **place-holder **for an existent object. For instance,

“The firetruck is red.”

Red(firetruck)

R(x)

(Ex) Rx

Honestly, I don’t even know how to make sense of it otherwise. For instance, how would I quantify the statement “Obama exists”??? I can’t. In fact, if the name “Obama” denotes an actually existent object, then we are saying something redundant when we utter the sentence “Obama exists.” We are saying “The existent entity denoted by the name ‘Obama’ exists,” so “an existent entity exists.” But this isn’t saying anything about Obama that is unique or peculiar or informative at all–so it is not even truth-valuable! In fact, we are not saying anything about Obama! We are merely denoting an object, if that object exists, whenever we utter the name “Obama.” So we need to predicate something to him such as “president of the usa” in order to say, mean, or assert anything informative at all about Obama.

However, I’d have to hold off on conceding what may be an overly reductive view of Quine here. Let’s take the dodo bird as an example. We can agree with Kant that whether or not the dodo bird actually exists does not make any difference to the conceptual value of it. We mean the exact same thing when we refer to the dodo bird today, as they did in 1600 when dodos were still around.

Though Quine was probably the one who first clearly articulated this thought–it started in Kant. So there’s nothing peculiarly Quinean about it.

I have no immedate qualms about your Dodo bird example. What exactly is the objection?
Of course we mean the same thing now and then. I’ve said and implied this numerous times in the thread: Existence is not a necessary condition for meaning. Sense and reference are different notions, just like Frege, Russell, and Kant noticed–and many others.

However, what is often inquired of, with respect to either things or states of affairs is whether they exist (or obtain). That is what we’re often interested in, at least as much as we want to discuss the concepts involved. So, with respect to the dodo bird it is not the case that all we’re ever really interested in is the concept itself (or the “essence”) of this particular bird. We very often are interested in the actuality of things. Does x exist? Does a certain state of affairs obtain? These are often our modes of inquiry, and it must therefore be meaningfully distinct to state, “No, the dodo bird no longer exists,” as opposed to “The dodo bird is extant.” I agree with Aquinas that we affirm through judgments the actuality (existence) of things, but I’m wondering whether there’s more going on here.

I don’t find anything problematic here. What’s the difference between the two statements with respect to the *existence *of the Dodo Bird? I can see how they may have different meanings with respect to its lost place in its ecological environment, or to whom or what its importance was with respect to other things when it once existed–so they will be different propositions, of course. But I don’t see how this difference in conceptual meanings of the statements entails that there are different species of (Ex).

Please read #110 for further motivations of mine for this view. It should help articulate alot more.

 

[Syntax]

OK, I think I got what you’re saying, and I don’t think most folks’ views are too divergent from what your’re claiming here. Yes, I remember the Kantian objection very well, although I’m pretty sure he’s objecting mostly to the Modernist philosophers who preceeded him (esp those inclined towards the ontological argument for the existence of God). In making his point, I don’t really see how Kant could be arguing against Aquinas or Scotus (or Aristotle, even).

Yes, Kant did do that. But notice his motivation for doing so: the existence of something can never be deduced in a logical argument without already assuming that that thing exists. But other properties of things **can **be demonstrated. This is exactly why existence cannot be predicated of an object!

For the scholastics, the verb “to be” is used in two ways, which I can only assume you would find non-controversial. First, there is the use of “is” as in the pure copula. “Jane is.” iow, “Jane exists.” The second use of “is” occurs in predication. “Jane is intelligent.” “Jane is tall.”

Exactly. Notice what is going on. The copula of “predication” serves to make proposition truth-valuable, because it indicates the possession of a property by relating a the subject to a predicate. The bare copula “is” on the other hand is not even properly a copula (not in logic anyway), and cannot do anything by itself when it is conjoined with an object. It can’t make an object “true.” That doesn’t even make any sense. How can an object be true? We require both a subject and predicate to be able to speak of anything being true; and from subjects and predicates, we construct statements, sentences, or propositions–and only propositions, sentences, and statements are the bearers of truth–not objects, not properties, not individuals (except Christ). lol.

It is only sentences and propositions that say things. Nouns don’t *say *things; they denote objects. Predicates don’t say things, they denote properties. But because existence can’t be one of these predicates, then what function does “is” have? In fact, it has the most bare meaning ever, if anything. It’s not a predicate, it’s not a property, it’s not a verb, it’s not thing, it’s not an entity–so what the heck is it? It’s a **place-holder **for an existent object. For instance,

“The firetruck is red.”

Red(firetruck)

R(x)

(Ex) Rx

Honestly, I don’t even know how to make sense of it otherwise. For instance, how would I quantify the statement “Obama exists”??? I can’t. In fact, if the name “Obama” denotes an actually existent object, then we are saying something redundant when we utter the sentence “Obama exists.” We are saying “The existent entity denoted by the name ‘Obama’ exists,” so “an existent entity exists.” But this isn’t saying anything about Obama that is unique or peculiar or informative at all–so it is not even truth-valuable! In fact, we are not saying anything about Obama! We are merely denoting an object, if that object exists, whenever we utter the name “Obama.” So we need to predicate something to him such as “president of the usa” in order to say, mean, or assert anything informative at all about Obama.

However, I’d have to hold off on conceding what may be an overly reductive view of Quine here. Let’s take the dodo bird as an example. We can agree with Kant that whether or not the dodo bird actually exists does not make any difference to the conceptual value of it. We mean the exact same thing when we refer to the dodo bird today, as they did in 1600 when dodos were still around.

Though Quine was probably the one who first clearly articulated this thought–it started in Kant. So there’s nothing peculiarly Quinean about it.

I have no immedate qualms about your Dodo bird example. What exactly is the objection?
Of course we mean the same thing now and then. I’ve said and implied this numerous times in the thread: Existence is not a necessary condition for meaning. Sense and reference are different notions, just like Frege, Russell, and Kant noticed–and many others.

However, what is often inquired of, with respect to either things or states of affairs is whether they exist (or obtain). That is what we’re often interested in, at least as much as we want to discuss the concepts involved. So, with respect to the dodo bird it is not the case that all we’re ever really interested in is the concept itself (or the “essence”) of this particular bird. We very often are interested in the actuality of things. Does x exist? Does a certain state of affairs obtain? These are often our modes of inquiry, and it must therefore be meaningfully distinct to state, “No, the dodo bird no longer exists,” as opposed to “The dodo bird is extant.” I agree with Aquinas that we affirm through judgments the actuality (existence) of things, but I’m wondering whether there’s more going on here.

I don’t find anything problematic here. What’s the difference between the two statements with respect to the *existence *of the Dodo Bird? I can see how they may have different meanings with respect to its lost place in its ecological environment, or to whom or what its importance was with respect to other things when it once existed–so they will be different propositions, of course. But I don’t see how this difference in conceptual meanings of the statements entails that there are different species of (Ex).

Please read #110 for further motivations of mine for this view. It should help articulate alot more.

 

[Betterave]

…how would I quantify the statement “Obama exists”??? I can’t. In fact, if the name “Obama” denotes an actually existent object, then we are saying something redundant when we utter the sentence “Obama exists.” We are saying “The existent entity denoted by the name ‘Obama’ exists,” so “an existent entity exists.” But this isn’t saying anything about Obama that is unique or peculiar or informative at all–so it is not even truth-valuable! In fact, we are not saying anything about Obama! We are merely denoting an object, if that object exists, whenever we utter the name “Obama.” So we need to predicate something to him such as “president of the usa” in order to say, mean, or assert anything informative at all about Obama.

I disagree. We are saying something about the world: namely, Obama is part of it. This is a truth-valuable statement. It is true! Contrast: “Blobama exists.” (False, I presume.) Note also the contrast between “Hamlet exists” and “Blamlet exists.”

You misquote Kant, as almost everyone seems to do. You wrote: “I am proposing, like Kant, to stop treating the term “to exist” as if it were a predicate at all.” But Kant only denied that ‘exists’ was a ‘real’ predicate, that is, a predicate that contributed to specifying the ‘what’ of a thing. He did not claim that it was not a truth-functional predicate at all. Kant distinguished blosser Position einer Gegenstand (the ‘mere’ positing of an object) from its absoluter Position (positing it ‘absolutely’). In Kantian terms, then, the question before us regards our disagreement about the sufficient conditions for counting something as having been posited ‘absolutely.’