Where is the efficient cause in Aristotle's natural motion?

[Blue_Horizon]

Could you explain how the “laws of inertia and compression” enter in here?

In a horizontal chain of contiguous instrumental agents this necessitates temporal delays ensuring that simultaneity (in the colloquial sense of that word) of locomotion between the first cause and the final effect in the chain cannot take place.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

No I think the trouble is interpreting him correctly. It seems that you say this a lot, but I don’t remember any specific examples given.

In this context “life” and “animation” and “soul” have different and discontinuous (though related) definitions for Aristotle wrt sub-lunary and super-lunary spheres (ie perishable substances versus imperishable substances).

To say that X has a soul and to say that X is a living thing are both equivalent statements. I don’t think we have too much of a difficulty understanding living vs. non-living things. The only point of contention is borderline cases, eg. viruses, but that’s not because we don’t have a good understanding of life but because we can’t figure out whether viruses exemplify it or not. It’s tangential to the issue at hand however.

The small point I make is that for Aristotle in DA “life” is a common sense starting observation and his equivalent definition of “soul” (if one can call it that) is his final conclusion based on a large number of arguments.

I am clearly suggesting there are inconsistencies in these arguments (as proven by Newtonian Physics) whereby he reaches that conclusion/definition - which make for gaps.
Therefore, by re-applying his acceptable arguments and reasonings to the new findings of modern Physics we may come up with revised Aristotelian conclusions on some points of his system.

The other point you may not have averted to, as hinted above, is that Aristotle has two definitions of soul depending on whether we are speaking of perishable or imperishable substances as he makes clear at the start of DA.

Hence he regards planets and stars as being alive and having souls - though a very different sort of soul from those of plants, animals and humans. Do you disagree?

I am hypothesising that inconsistencies in his Physics wrt natural motion of what you call “inanimate substances” may be explained by allowing that principles he applies to super-lunary substances (composed of the 5th element aether) could be validly applied to the other 4 elements (what I call “minerals”) here on earth.

The distinction I gave you was the relevant one. Here’s a good article on the matter for a more detailed explanation: Stop It, You’re Killing Me.

I read this. This is really irrelevant to the point I am making as I am positing that both apply to celestial bodies (as they have souls) … so why not minerals in like fashion.

Everything has a telos though. If it exists, it has something it tends towards. Non-living things have teloses as much as living things do. That’s not the relevant distinction between life and non-life.

The natural motion of celestial bodies is indeed a telos and a perfection of that 5th element. Indeed it was a point of contention between Aristotle and Plato who denied this.

If this same sort of soul can be predicated of the sub-lunary elements then they do have life and telos and perfection as I posit even though it is not “life” as found in perishable bodies.

I think you know what I meant about mineral growth.

I really don’t know what you mean. Growth is not a necessary quality of soul - the celestial bodies do not grow do they - nor do iron canon-balls.

Electrons are always repelling each other and attracting protons. Do they have souls too, since they have natural powers and motion?

Why not, if Aristotle realised that the fundamental particles were pretty much eternal and without decay like the celestial bodies he would surely have seen the congruity of them having similar souls and life and “perfect” circular natural motion as these heavenly bodies.

The spatio-temporal location of a quantity of air is an accidental quality and would not contribute to its perfection.

I believe you will find yourself mistaken if you study Aristotle more deeply on this point.
It is prob not the static location that perfects air but its natural, unrestrained rising motion which is a perfecting act - as opposed to being restrained (a privation?) or violent motion imposed in another direction.

This is the modern view, which seems to only end in absurdities. Aristotle is saying that the elements have certain actions that flow from their nature. We know some things exhibit electrical properties, so we propose the electron as a unit of charge. It would be silly to ask what causes electrons to have charge.

Motion is change (change of position) and so cannot be a property or accident (place is an accident) as Aristotle explicitly states.
That is why natural motion is problematic - even Aristotle says it is extremely difficult to determine whether it is self-caused (demanding that we call such a form “soul”) or caused by another. He tentatively holds it is caused by another but the arguments he uses are weak and I think he knows that. Newton has proven they are indeed flawed.

Because soul does not denote something that has natural actions, but rather something that is self-perfective.

I do not believe this is the essence of “soul” for Aristotle. But it seems clear to me that his sine qua non is that anything that moves itself must be predicated as having a “soul” and “life” - which he defines in two different and discontinuous ways. Likewise “animation” may be simply local motion - as is the case with the celestial bodies in their natural motions.

Natural motion =/= self perfection.

Can you find a clear quote from Aristotle on this point.
I do not think one is to be found as he certainly asserts the opposite wrt the celestial bodies.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

I think this idea of simultaneity is captured very well in Fr. Barron’s depiction of God in this talk.

wordonfire.org/resources/blog/watch-free-lesson-from-bishop-elect-barrons-the-mystery-of-god-study-program/4843/?utm_source=Mystery+of+God±+Sample+Video+%2B+PDF&utm_campaign=MoG+Pre-sales&utm_medium=email

Think about it. The God of the burning bush and of the Incarnation simultaneously creates and becomes what he creates without being a “cause” in the sense of preceding or coming before either.

In this same sense, God “creates” the universe without preceding it because God is not constrained by time nor is he in time. Time is an aspect of or internal to the creation, but not an aspect of nor internal to God.

Lets just stick to the simple scope - horizontal chains of efficient caused local motion.
Provide an example perhaps.

 

[Peter_Plato]

Lets just stick to the simple scope - horizontal chains of efficient caused local motion.
Provide an example perhaps.

The balance of forces which, for example, keep a bridge or building standing. The forces – gravity acting on dead and live masses resisted by the compression and tensile properties of the materials within the structure – are held in balance precisely because they are simultaneous with respect to each other.

Feser gives the example of a rock thrown through a window pane. The rock going through the pane is simultaneous with the glass breaking. One does not, in reality, precede the other, they occur at the same time. In fact, they are, in a sense, the same event viewed from different perspectives – one as ‘cause,’ the other as ‘effect.’

As CS Lewis noted, a bulge in the border of Wales is an indent in the border of England. The bulge makes the indent – one is simultaneous to the other. If you were to slowly remove the cause (the bulge), the effect (the indent) would be remedied at the same time to the same extent – simultaneously because there would be no time lag between the cause occurring and the effect resulting, since they are integral to each other.

Granted, the entire event (as motion) requires time, but the cause does not PRECEDE the effect. Now suppose a series of simultaneous cause-effects were stacked vertically. That would explain “why” things occur in a manner that is sufficient because the reason for each effect would be contained in and necessitated by the very nature of the relationships between the causes and effects.

These are 'per se" series since the causes and effects are integral to each other because they happen concurrently.

Accidental series do not depend on the concurrency of causes and effects. Effects could happen as distinct from (in time and space) their causes.

 

[Peter_Plato]

In a sense, accidental series are not explanatory. They are the associations human observers ‘see’ between events in the world which are loosely tied to each other as “causes and effects,” but which are merely inductive – they “happen” consistently as part of the ordered universe, but we don’t really get at the underlying why. Why do chickens come from eggs?

Per se events are undeniable and with some attention to the details have the potential to be sufficiently explanatory because the effects are inherent in the causes. The underlying causes in per se series are always present and simultaneous with the effects.

This is where observable reality and the underlying metaphysics come together to explain each other. the metaphysics explains the observable world and the observable world reinforces the metaphysics. There is a “two way” relationship between them such that explanation can be had, rather than the stochastic, “shot in the dark” possible relationship that some tend to rely upon by association.

 

[Richca]

The problem with that is that there is no need to get vertical if it is explained by an infinite past of horzontal

Your not getting it. As I explained or thought I did, the second way is not concerned with the past nor about the eternity or non-eternity of the world. It is about the present, the here and now.

 

[thinkandmull]

In this context “life” and “animation” and “soul” have different and discontinuous (though related) definitions for Aristotle wrt sub-lunary and super-lunary spheres (ie perishable substances versus imperishable substances).

The small point I make is that for Aristotle in DA “life” is a common sense starting observation and his equivalent definition of “soul” (if one can call it that) is his final conclusion based on a large number of arguments.

I am clearly suggesting there are inconsistencies in these arguments (as proven by Newtonian Physics) whereby he reaches that conclusion/definition - which make for gaps.
Therefore, by re-applying his acceptable arguments and reasonings to the new findings of modern Physics we may come up with revised Aristotelian conclusions on some points of his system.

The other point you may not have averted to, as hinted above, is that Aristotle has two definitions of soul depending on whether we are speaking of perishable or imperishable substances as he makes clear at the start of DA.

Hence he regards planets and stars as being alive and having souls - though a very different sort of soul from those of plants, animals and humans. Do you disagree?

I am hypothesising that inconsistencies in his Physics wrt natural motion of what you call “inanimate substances” may be explained by allowing that principles he applies to super-lunary substances (composed of the 5th element aether) could be validly applied to the other 4 elements (what I call “minerals”) here on earth.

I read this. This is really irrelevant to the point I am making as I am positing that both apply to celestial bodies (as they have souls) … so why not minerals in like fashion.

The natural motion of celestial bodies is indeed a telos and a perfection of that 5th element. Indeed it was a point of contention between Aristotle and Plato who denied this.

If this same sort of soul can be predicated of the sub-lunary elements then they do have life and telos and perfection as I posit even though it is not “life” as found in perishable bodies.

I really don’t know what you mean. Growth is not a necessary quality of soul - the celestial bodies do not grow do they - nor do iron canon-balls.

Why not, if Aristotle realised that the fundamental particles were pretty much eternal and without decay like the celestial bodies he would surely have seen the congruity of them having similar souls and life and “perfect” circular natural motion as these heavenly bodies.

I believe you will find yourself mistaken if you study Aristotle more deeply on this point.
It is prob not the static location that perfects air but its natural, unrestrained rising motion which is a perfecting act - as opposed to being restrained (a privation?) or violent motion imposed in another direction.

Motion is change (change of position) and so cannot be a property or accident (place is an accident) as Aristotle explicitly states.
That is why natural motion is problematic - even Aristotle says it is extremely difficult to determine whether it is self-caused (demanding that we call such a form “soul”) or caused by another. He tentatively holds it is caused by another but the arguments he uses are weak and I think he knows that. Newton has proven they are indeed flawed.

I do not believe this is the essence of “soul” for Aristotle. But it seems clear to me that his sine qua non is that anything that moves itself must be predicated as having a “soul” and “life” - which he defines in two different and discontinuous ways. Likewise “animation” may be simply local motion - as is the case with the celestial bodies in their natural motions.

Can you find a clear quote from Aristotle on this point.
I do not think one is to be found as he certainly asserts the opposite wrt the celestial bodies.

People so often say “Plato said so and so” but they hardly EVER quote him. Where does he say motion does not perfect the quintessence of the stars? Interesting.

As for inertia, your position now seems to be that Newton’s physics shows there must be a Mover outside the chain of natural causes, instead of refuting Aristotle’s take on that as you said earlier. Maybe you can clarify

 

[thinkandmull]

Your not getting it. As I explained or thought I did, the second way is not concerned with the past nor about the eternity or non-eternity of the world. It is about the present, the here and now.

Then how it is different from the Third Way (argument from contingency)?

 

[thinkandmull]

In a sense, accidental series are not explanatory. They are the associations human observers ‘see’ between events in the world which are loosely tied to each other as “causes and effects,” but which are merely inductive – they “happen” consistently as part of the ordered universe, but we don’t really get at the underlying why. Why do chickens come from eggs?

Per se events are undeniable and with some attention to the details have the potential to be sufficiently explanatory because the effects are inherent in the causes. The underlying causes in per se series are always present and simultaneous with the effects.

This is where observable reality and the underlying metaphysics come together to explain each other. the metaphysics explains the observable world and the observable world reinforces the metaphysics. There is a “two way” relationship between them such that explanation can be had, rather than the stochastic, “shot in the dark” possible relationship that some tend to rely upon by association.

A father, for example, ceasing to be the efficient cause of the son after a single moment is really not relevant as to the arguments. This is frequently brought up but no argument is fleshed out from it.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

The balance of forces which, for example, keep a bridge or building standing…

I don’t think so.
There is no local motion (this is why the bridge “stands”) so there is no change, so there are no chains of horizontal efficient causality. So there is no motion to explain in this example.

This is nothing like hand moving stick moving puck.

Remember we are talking local motion (which is a perfectly valid form of generic “motion”) in this thread and of efficient causality.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

In a sense, accidental series are not explanatory. They are the associations human observers ‘see’ between events in the world which are loosely tied to each other as “causes and effects,” but which are merely inductive – they “happen” consistently as part of the ordered universe, but we don’t really get at the underlying why. Why do chickens come from eggs?

Per se events are undeniable and with some attention to the details have the potential to be sufficiently explanatory because the effects are inherent in the causes. The underlying causes in per se series are always present and simultaneous with the effects.

This is where observable reality and the underlying metaphysics come together to explain each other. the metaphysics explains the observable world and the observable world reinforces the metaphysics. There is a “two way” relationship between them such that explanation can be had, rather than the stochastic, “shot in the dark” possible relationship that some tend to rely upon by association.

Can you give some context to what you are responding too.

This thread now has multiple discussions going on and you have not quoted what you are referring to. Thanks.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

People so often say “Plato said so and so” but they hardly EVER quote him. Where does he say motion does not perfect the quintessence of the stars? Interesting.

Sorry life is short! This Plato point is indeed interesting (I came across it in one of many online textbooks) but really a bit of a tangent to my thread question. It was asserted glibly enough as to suggest its a known controversy so if you do some research it should come to light fairly easily.

As for inertia, your position now seems to be that Newton’s physics shows there must be a Mover outside the chain of natural causes, instead of refuting Aristotle’s take on that as you said earlier. Maybe you can clarify

I think my basic observation is:
(1) Aristotle holds that the natural motion of the sub-lunary elements (I call them minerals, others call them “inanimate matter” which is an unhelpful description in this discussion as to whether or not they are “animate” (ie can have a type of soul like the celestial bodies)) is caused by an-other.
(2) This is only a tentative conclusion by Aristotle because
(i) he himself acknowledges the discovery of the source of this motion (whether an-other or self) is exceedingly difficult to determine (Physics 8,4)
(ii) his actual reasoning in favour of an-other is exceedingly weak (the so called “generative cause”) and his example has at least two difficulties
(3) The weakness of this argument is now solidly proven by Newton. Aristotle is half-right that the efficient cause of “natural motion” in sub-lunar elements is from an-other (but also involves self). However his proffered argument here is shown not only to be weak but in fact mistaken.

As a further intellectual exercise I am wondering how Aristotle’s system of reasoning (which may still work) can be improved/tweaked to incorporate the empirical discoveries of Newtonian physics … rather than outright rejecting Aristotelian Physics as a whole in this area.

I believe it could be done by
(i) asserting that natural motion is caused from within
(ii) Aristotle already asserts this of the 5th element (in the super-lunary realm) ie the celestial bodies.
(iii) why can these principles not be applied to all 5 elements as a group - if possible a greater continuity and systemic harmony would result.
(iv) of course it would mean we must accept that there are two discontinuous forms of “soul” (and therefore of “animation”) both found in the sub-lunary realm.

Actually it would prob be a step towards seeing a single continuous continuous hierarchy of increasingly complex “life” from mineral to angel.

I believe Aquinas himself hints at this, somewhere in SCG saying that even minerals are “alive” in a certain analogical sense simply by being “formed”. I better find the ref for that lest I be accused of not backing up my assertions .

 

[Peter_Plato]

I don’t think so.
There is no local motion (this is why the bridge “stands”) so there is no change, so there are no chains of horizontal efficient causality. So there is no motion to explain in this example.

This is nothing like hand moving stick moving puck.

Well, actually, it IS like hand moving stick moving puck where the status quo is maintained even though no local motion is observed. It explains why the bridge remains standing much like Newton’s law of motion/inertia includes both an object in motion AND an object at rest.

Why things tend to remain unchanged requires explanation as much as why they tend towards motion.

Otherwise, you are arbitrarily placing import on one and not on the other.

Why a bridge or building collapses can be explained only BECAUSE and when it is clearly understood why it stood to begin with. You are showing prejudice in your dismissal of some kinds of motion in order to show a preference for more obvious kinds.

Recall that for Aquinas and Aristotle ‘motion’ was change of any sort and “change” was actualizing any potential. That means a potential to stand or fall makes a bridge or building potentially susceptible to ‘motion’ both ways - in being built and in collapsing - AND it is that ‘motion’ that requires explanation.

 

[Peter_Plato]

I don’t think so.
There is no local motion (this is why the bridge “stands”) so there is no change, so there are no chains of horizontal efficient causality. So there is no motion to explain in this example.

This is nothing like hand moving stick moving puck.

Remember we are talking local motion (which is a perfectly valid form of generic “motion”) in this thread and of efficient causality.

Let me try a different approach to this.

Suppose instead of hand move stick moves puck, we have hands move rope moves hands on other end - i.e., a tug of war.

If one side has big, burly, Olympic class women shot putters and the other side Don Knotts or Bill Nye sized pea shooters (forgive the sexist stereotypes) it is pretty obvious which side will “move” the other. Now suppose the two sides were perfectly - and I do mean PERFECTLY - matched. Instead of one side moving the other, equivalent forces will amount to or actualize a “steady state.” No observable movement. Does that mean the forces that previously explained hand move stick move puck no longer explain hand move rope move other hand, merely because the hand on the other end of the rope balances or “holds steady” the first hand?

It isn’t as if all motion just stopped. Opposite motions (actualized potentials) are in effect and balance each other, which explains the apparent inertia.

If you talk to an engineer, this is precisely what happens to a bridge or building. Countering forces are balanced such that the bridge or building is able to stand. The forces are still there, however, AND are acting on the members of the building or bridge all of the time. Remove or change a crucial element that holds everything in balance and the structure will collapse.

Gravity doesn’t suddenly kick in when an apple falls off a tree. Gravity is always acting on the apple; it is just that, at some point, the apple gets to a size that the tensile strength of the spur holding the apple to the branch can no longer counter the force of gravity and the apple falls.

 

[thinkandmull]

I am not sure what you two are discussing.

Anyway, I thought about it last night, and I can see how the first three ways are each slightly different, although they are almost essentially the same if it is assume there can be an eternity of motion. The assertion however that there cannot be an infinity of past motions **within time **leading to the present in an instant simultaneous motion is seen as core to a Thomistic argument somehow, but I don’t see how it is really relevant to the question though

 

[Blue_Horizon]

Well, actually, it IS like hand moving stick moving puck where the status quo is maintained even though no local motion is observed. It explains why the bridge remains standing much like Newton’s law of motion/inertia includes both an object in motion AND an object at rest.

Why things tend to remain unchanged requires explanation as much as why they tend towards motion.

Otherwise, you are arbitrarily to placing import on one and not on the other.

Why a bridge or building collapses can be explained only BECAUSE and when it is clearly understood why it stood to begin with. You are showing prejudice in your dismissal of some kinds of motion in order to show a preference for more obvious kinds.

Recall that for Aquinas and Aristotle ‘motion’ was change of any sort and “change” was actualizing any potential. That means a potential to stand or fall makes a bridge or building potentially susceptible to ‘motion’ both ways - in being built and in collapsing - AND it is that ‘motion’ that requires explanation.

PP you are welcome to raise your own thread to pursue your concerns.
As for me, my questions and observations have always been up front and limited to local motion. And have yet to be refuted from what I can see.

If I was you I would be intrigued that the principles of motion you assert do not seem to hold for local motion. Even Aristotle seems to hold that local motion is not only a valid example of motion - but the primary one.

Aristotle’s system of causality was created to explain change not stasis. Objects that don’t move don’t require an efficent causal explanation in this system.

We could talk about uniform rectilinear motion as a disputed point in this regard. . For Aristotle that requires an efficient cause, but strangely not for Newton it seems.

 

[thinkandmull]

PP you are welcome to raise your own thread to pursue your concerns.
As for me, my questions and observations have always been up front and limited to local motion. And have yet to be refuted from what I can see.

If I was you I would be intrigued that the principles of motion you assert do not seem to hold for local motion. Even Aristotle seems to hold that local motion is not only a valid example of motion - but the primary one.

Aristotle’s system of causality was created to explain change not stasis. Objects that don’t move don’t require an efficent causal explanation in this system.

We could talk about uniform rectilinear motion as a disputed point in this regard. . For Aristotle that requires an efficient cause, but strangely not for Newton it seems.

By efficient cause you mean a personal God? Can you site were Newton speaks of rectilinear motion? thanks thanks

 

[Blue_Horizon]

By efficient cause you mean a personal God? Can you site were Newton speaks of rectilinear motion? thanks thanks

*Corpus omne perseverare in statu suo quiescendi vel movendi uniformiter in directum, nisi quatenus a viribus impressis cogitur statum illum mutare. *
(Principia 1,19)

 

[Blue_Horizon]

…If one side has big, burly, Olympic class women shot putters and the other side Don Knotts or Bill Nye sized pea shooters (forgive the sexist stereotypes) it is pretty obvious which side will “move” the other. Now suppose the two sides were perfectly - and I do mean PERFECTLY - matched.

Instead of one side moving the other, equivalent forces will amount to or actualize a “steady state.”

Watch the ambiguous language here (actualise) - there is of course no “act” in terms of efficient causality of any local motion here other than the initial (and completed) act of bringing the rope to rest.

No observable movement. Does that mean the forces that previously explained hand move stick move puck no longer explain hand move rope move other hand merely because the hand on the other end of the rope balances or “holds steady” the first hand.

Correct. Initially there was a net force imbalance acting in direction causing the rope to accelerate. As the opposing team heave-ho-ed the force imbalance arrested the initial acceleration causing a deceleration. At zero rope velocity forces were adjusted such to result in a net zero force in the rope - hence no further net force and no further rope motion. No further instrumental chains of local motion and its causation need to be explained because there is no more motion.

I am not really sure what’s new here that you are trying to demonstrate?

It isn’t as if all motion just stopped.

Well it looks that way to me. You yourself said “no observable movement”.
You keep forgetting I am talking chains of efficient causality wrt local motion.

Opposite motions (actualized potentials) are in effect and balance each other, which explains the apparent inertia.

I think you mean opposing forces (not local motion). “Inertia” does not seem involved at all here to me - do you just mean “no observable movement”

Sure the participants expend a lot of energy keeping the tension in the rope.
But how is that relevant and what exactly is it you want me to see re horizontal chains of efficient causality wrt local motion ?

If you talk to an engineer, this is precisely what happens to a bridge or building. Countering forces are balanced such that the bridge or building is able to stand. The forces are still there, however, AND are acting on the members of the building or bridge all of the time. Remove or change a crucial element that holds everything in balance and the structure will collapse.

I am an engineer thanks.
Forces in balance are no longer “acting” (ie efficient causes of local motion). Only when a force manages to displace a mass can it be said to be acting as in the sense of “working”. All such “acting” requires energy. Hence E=Fd, and the mass is obviously moved in the process. To move a mass it must go from zero velocity to some other velocity. Hence an acceleration is involved. As Newton showed this acceleration is directly related to the amount of force and the mass: a=F/m.

Gravity is always acting on the apple; it is just that, at some point, the apple gets to a size that the tensile strength of the spur holding the apple to the branch can no longer counter the force of gravity and the apple falls.

You keep using the word “acting” in equivocal ways that cause you confusion.
The force we call gravity is in fact not acting (ie working) if an object is still. The spur is of course “feeling” the force and opposes it equally.
Yes as the apple gets bigger it stretches the spur further (which is a form of minute movement of course). In so far as the spur stretches, yes gravity is “acting.”

 

[Peter_Plato]

Forces in balance are no longer “acting” (ie efficient causes of local motion). Only when a force manages to displace a mass can it be said to be acting as in the sense of “working”. All such “acting” requires energy.

Well, this just seems odd to me.

If one tug-of-war team, say the hypothetical brawny women, pull the Don Knotts team into the mud, clearly, the efficient cause of the motion into the mud was the pull exerted on the rope by the brawny women. They “acted” on the rope and the opposing team. This is “work” for you according to your definition because displacement of a mass occurs AND that requires energy, obviously.

Now take the two perfectly matched teams. They are “acting” on each end of the rope and require the exertion of energy to pull on each end. The fact that the rope is not in motion does not make the actions on each end “no longer ‘acting.’”

Clearly, energy is being exerted at each end and the two teams are “acting” on the rope. The fact that no motion is observed does not nullify their actions nor does it reduce energy exertion to zero merely because no movement is observed.

It might even be said that the action of keeping the rope taut over the mud hole is enabled (actualized) by the balance of two equal but opposing efficient causes.

Displacement of masses, in this case, is not required for the two teams to be “working” against each other. Clearly they are both working very hard, exerting energy and as a result are maintaining the tension because they are acting as efficient causes in balance at each end of the rope.