I guess Leibniz would have said to himself: “Which can be the conditions that are not the same from one experiment to the other besides those that I am trying hard to keep under control? There must be at least one. I need to look for it”. On your side, you definitely conclude: “I know absolutely all the variables which are relevant for this experiment and I am keeping all of them under absolute precise control: therefore, the PSR does not work”. This is too audacious.
Your “insight” here is exactly what prompted Einstein’s famous “God does not play dice” quote. The problem is that now a generation of scientists have investigated this very issue from all sorts of angles. For example, the
Bell Theorem says that it is impossible to find certain kinds of variables and still get the (successful) predictions of quantum mechanics. In other words, the theorem rules out a whole class of possible conditions. In fact there has even been
experimental evidence that comes down in favor of the . Now it is certainly possible that the missing variables belong to some a class not covered by the Bell Theorem. But it turns out that most of those other classes have
equally troubling implications or involve violations of other well known and successful ideas (like having information move faster than the speed of light.)
Well JK, I did not ask you what
knowledge is, but what is “
to know”, and it is this question what I would like you to answer. Nevertheless, it seems that your spectrum of beliefs and justifications contains these beliefs:
- We don’t have access to the truth about the world we live in (I guess this includes you, JK, even in the case that you are a man who does science).
- The best we can do is to carefully keep track of our reasonings and evidence and assign our various beliefs and justifications probabilities of being correct.
- As we don’t have access to the truth about the world, “empirical evidence” is just a fantasy that we need to discard from our thoughts.
- It is not possible to defeat pure skepticism using only reason (but we, skeptics included, don’t have any more except reason).
- Still, we infallibly know light is an electromagnetic wave without having to use our reason.
- Things that contradict reason get a lower probability of being correct. I.e. they have a weaker justification.
- Quantum mechanics contradicts reason, but it gets a higher probability of being correct, because there is “empirical evidence” that supports it.
- Scientists use their reason to figure out how best to collect “empirical data”.
- Even though reason is the only thing we all have to know, scientists and philosophers use different epistemic methods.
And this makes me think that you need to work hard to straighten your thoughts and make them correct.
I think your “to know” vs “knowledge” is a distinction without a difference. Or alternatively you’re conflating different conceptions of knowledge.
Not quite. Points 1-4 misunderstand my position on skepticism. I am not advocating that pure skepticism is correct , just that you can’t “beat” it in an a-priori sense. I tend to agree with the sentiment “it may be possible to be a complete skeptic, you just can’t be anything else, not even a defender of skepticism.” I think that Descartes’ Cogito Ergo Sum is *probably *correct, but not some the kind of
guaranteed fact he was looking for. Consequently, I think that we simply have to acknowledge that
all our pronouncements about the world are necessarily colored with the faint tinges of doubt.
That is why #1 is wrong. I am not asserting-as-true the proposition “We don’t have access to the truth about the world we live in.” We may very well have that access. What I am saying is that we can’t know for sure whether or not we have the access. Hence my reasoning is more pragmatic. Given that we’re not sure about our ability to sense things accurately or reason about things accurately, what can we possibly do? Well we might as well start somewhere, so we assume that our senses and reason are at least somewhat reliable. If it turns out that we don’t have access to the truth about the world we live in, then this is no worse a method than any other available to us.
This approach means that at no point are there any sacred cows. If there is some evidence that contradicts our reason, we have to consider both the possibility that our reasoning was wrong, as well as the possibility that our evidence was wrong. The strongest claims, and the ones that I would colloquially refer to us as “knowing” are the ones that have solid support from both reason and empirical evidence.
The “light is an electromagnetic wave” claim is sort of true-by-definition. We’ve defined both the concepts of light and electromagnetic waves, and it turns out they both refer to the same thing.