J
JuanFlorencio
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In a previous post I discussed this point. I am taking the liberty to reproduce it again:I think Hume says we can’t get through even one day without the principle of causation, but we can never prove it. We observe a billiard ball striking another (event A), and then see the second ball moving (event B), but we cannot logically prove that A causes B.
While we might casually say A causes B, Hume says if instead we’re careful, the best we can do is to state that whenever A, we customarily see B. This leads to the notion of a universal law, as a statement that if certain conditions apply (A) then a particular phenomenon (B) is always observed to occur. And this is exactly how we now define a physical law. I think Hume’s skepticism, the careful refusal to go with intuition alone, then becomes the foundation for knowledge in the physical sciences.
One issue with it is that it doesn’t work for one-off events. Historians can’t use it to construct a law of Napolean to explain his motivation, since there’s only one of him and he only fought each battle once, etc. So it can’t be a foundation for all knowledge. And of course the initial singularity is a one-off.
I don’t think Hume’s position serves as a foundation for science. If his position is correct, science is an illusion.Hume said that since we can conceive “cause and effect” relations which are different to those that we actually know, without incurring in contradiction, those relations are not necessary; they might very well be different from what they are. Those who entertain thinking on “possible” worlds which obey other “rules” might think that Hume’s doctrines provide a great support to them. However, what Hume thought was that there is no way to prove that there is any rule at all in this very world: the behaviors that we have observed this minute might be completely different the next moment. According to him we have no basis to think that from similar “causes” or conditions we can expect similar “effects”. Here you have his own words:
“It is certain that the most ignorant and stupid peasants- nay infants, nay even brute beasts- improve by experience, and learn the qualities of natural objects, by observing the effects which result from them. When a child has felt the sensation of pain from touching the flame of a candle, he will be careful not to put his hand near any candle; but will expect a similar effect from a cause which is similar in its sensible qualities and appearance. If you assert, therefore, that the understanding of the child is led into this conclusion by any process of argument or ratiocination, I may justly require you to produce that argument; nor have you any pretense to refuse so equitable a demand. You cannot say that the argument is abstruse, and may possibly escape your enquiry; since you confess that it is obvious to the capacity of a mere infant. If you hesitate, therefore, a moment, or if, after reflection, you produce any intricate or profound argument, you, in a manner, give up the question, and confess that it is not reasoning which engages us to suppose the past resembling the future, and to expect similar effects from causes which are, to appearance, similar. This is the proposition which I intended to enforce in the present section. If I be right, I pretend not to have made any mighty discovery. And if I be wrong, I must acknowledge myself to be indeed a very backward scholar; since I cannot now discover an argument which, it seems, was perfectly familiar to me long before I was out of my cradle.”
Let’s suppose it is a fact that you are one of those guys who can’t provide a satisfactory argument to Hume. How could you avoid thinking that physical sciences are just illusions? In particular, how would you respond to someone who, based on Hume’s words, said that the mathematical expressions with which we pretend to represent certain regularities that we conceive in the world are fantasies? They would represent how physicists think in a given moment, but not how the world is or might be. And, of course, this would include all cosmological models. Besides, verifiability/ falseability would be entirely useless “methods” to show that a hypothesis is scientific; and, finally, to say that a statement is scientific would add no value to it.
However, even if it were the case that similar conditions were followed by different effects, Hume’s severe doubt would not affect the principle of causality; it would be a severe doubt concerning determinism, but not causality.