Why do some people think that Science is the only source of knowledge?

[tonyrey]

*I’d have thought love is highly irrational.

                             Love is not irrational by God's standards but only by self-righteous human beings.                                     No response....

And it’s highly unreasonable of God to love us but He does all the same.

It’s highly unreasonable to think it’s highly unreasonable of God to love us considering we are His children for whom He died. It amounts to believing He was unreasonable to create us in the first place knowing some of us would reject Him.

To think God is unreasonable in any respect is a further reflection of Luther’s irrationalism. God’s kingdom is a kingdom of truth not Unreason. No response… I’m not interested in off-topic posts.

To think love is unrelated to whether science is the only source of knowledge is yet another reflection of Luther’s irrationalism considering that you referred to the parable of the good Samaritan and asserted that it’s highly unreasonable of God to **love **us…

 

[john_doran]

Math is axiomatic, the theorems must be based on unprovable propositions. For centuries it was thought that Euclidean geometry was the only true geometry until discovering evidence that even space itself is non-Euclidean.

sure, but so what if math is based on “unprovable” axioms? knowledge concerning the entailments of those axioms is still knowledge, and it still proceeds independently of experience.

the idea that the geometry of space could be non-Euclidian is definitely an empirical proposition, but to the extent that such a proposition is demonstrable, it’s not math, but physics.

the features of the geometry proposed by riemann/bolyai/lobachevsky are purely mathematical, and, again, are determined purely by reason.

but look, the discovery of relations between necessarily true propositions is itself a necessarily non-empirical activity, since sensory experience can only tell you about the way the world happens to be, not how it must be.

 

[inocente]

sure, but so what if math is based on “unprovable” axioms? knowledge concerning the entailments of those axioms is still knowledge, and it still proceeds independently of experience.

But there are substantive differences between math and philosophy. Math is either pure, meaning entirely abstract with no claim to be about anything concrete, or applied to science and engineering, where the math provides falsifiable models of the world. Whereas philosophers claim their work tells truths about the world (so long as we ignore all the philosophers with different conclusions).

the idea that the geometry of space could be non-Euclidian is definitely an empirical proposition, but to the extent that such a proposition is demonstrable, it’s not math, but physics.

Yes (my point was that empirical evidence is required to determine whether the math tells us anything about the real world).

the features of the geometry proposed by riemann/bolyai/lobachevsky are purely mathematical, and, again, are determined purely by reason.

But starting from their axioms, all good mathematician will agree the theorems, whereas in philosophy all good philosophers tend to disagree about everything, leaving no way to know whether any of it is true.

but look, the discovery of relations between necessarily true propositions is itself a necessarily non-empirical activity, since sensory experience can only tell you about the way the world happens to be, not how it must be.

Not sure why you believe the world must be anything. The world is what it is, and we can’t determine what it is by logic alone.

But your argument is circular here, you are assuming the thing you want to prove, that we have a priori knowledge of logic which exists on some eternal Platoean perfect plane.

 

[john_doran]

But there are substantive differences between math and philosophy. Math is either pure, meaning entirely abstract with no claim to be about anything concrete, or applied to science and engineering, where the math provides falsifiable models of the world. Whereas philosophers claim their work tells truths about the world (so long as we ignore all the philosophers with different conclusions).

sure, but pure math still yields knowledge of the world, where the “world” is something like the set of all true propositions, and non-empirical knowledge, at that, which is what you seem to be denying when you say things like “all knowledge is experiential”.

and philosophy is also about the world and also yields non-empirical knowledge, the ineliminable controversy of its conclusions notwithstanding.

inocente:

But starting from their axioms, all good mathematician will agree the theorems, whereas in philosophy all good philosophers tend to disagree about everything, leaving no way to know whether any of it is true.

disagreement about philosophical conclusions in no way vitiates the possibility of having knowledge concerning them, any more than unanimity with regard to belief in a proposition entails its truth (or, a fortiori, that anyone knows it.)

inocente:

Not sure why you believe the world must be anything. The world is what it is, and we can’t determine what it is by logic alone.

But your argument is circular here, you are assuming the thing you want to prove, that we have a priori knowledge of logic which exists on some eternal Platoean perfect plane.

the “world” as defined above is necessarily many ways (i.e. contains true propositions that are also true in every possible world), and there is no other way to know those truths save and except via non-empirical means (since every empirical truth is contingent.)

and i beg no questions: mathematical truths are necessarily true and known by (mathematical) logic alone: i can see that by experience.

 

[Tunare]

But your argument is circular here, you are assuming the thing you want to prove, that we have a priori knowledge of logic which exists on some eternal Platoean perfect plane.

Oh yes. The famous, or infamous “abstract objects” will probably be the next step.

I suggest that the realm of “objective reality” and the realm of “abstractions” be separated, because there are two different epistemological methods to deal with them.

When we deal with the objective external reality, we start with observation, hypothesis forming, making predictions and verifying those predictions (theories) against the external reality - which is the inductive method of gaining knowledge about the objective reality.

When we deal with abstract systems, we define some axioms (which can be totally arbitrary), some “grammatical” rules of transformation and verify that our theorems (not to be confused with the theories) can be reached from the axioms - which is the deductive method.

The concept that propositions pertaining to the external reality are only worth to consider if they can be verified against the external reality is an epistemological one, it is not about the external reality, so it cannot be expected to be empirically verifiable. Also the concept that propositions about the axiomatic systems are only true if they can be reached from the axioms is also an **epistemological ** concept, and one cannot demand that it should be reached from some axioms.

So how can we ascertain that the two epistemological methods are correct? When it comes to the inductive systems, we actually verify the method by its results. It is not an abstract verification method, it is the down-to-earth, pragmatic empirical one. When it comes to the deductive systems, as long as our deductive chain does not lead to a contradiction, the epistemological method works. And this is the fundamental principle: “the proof of the pudding is that it is edible”. No need for some esoteric philosophical mumbo-jumbo. If the method works in practice, it is a good method.

 

[john_doran]

So how can we ascertain that the two epistemological methods are correct? When it comes to the inductive systems, we actually verify the method by its results. It is not an abstract verification method, it is the down-to-earth, pragmatic empirical one. When it comes to the deductive systems, as long as our deductive chain does not lead to a contradiction, the epistemological method works. And this is the fundamental principle: “the proof of the pudding is that it is edible”. No need for some esoteric philosophical mumbo-jumbo. If the method works in practice, it is a good method.

don’t look now, but you just used esoteric philosophical mumbo-jumbo to demonstrate that esoteric philosophical mumbo-jumbo isn’t needed

that said, “if the method works in practice, it is a good method” is compatible with instrumentalism, which isn’t aimed at determining truth, but only predictive success. so i would add the proviso that a method “works” when it results in true propositions.

 

[Tunare]

don’t look now, but you just used esoteric philosophical mumbo-jumbo to demonstrate that esoteric philosophical mumbo-jumbo isn’t needed

Do you really mean that the concept of “if a method works, then it is a good method” is a philosophical statement? I would simply call it common sense - almost tautological. Maybe we differ in our opinion to categorize what is a “philosophical statement”. I feel (and please correct me if I am mistaken) that in your choice of words every proposition is philosophical.

that said, “if the method works in practice, it is a good method” is compatible with instrumentalism, which isn’t aimed at determining truth, but only predictive success. so i would add the proviso that a method “works” when it results in true propositions.

I agree that if one can make successful predictions then it leads to true propositions. Now comes the 100 dollar question: “how do we decide if a proposition (about the external, objective reality) is true, unless we compare the proposition to the external reality - which is direct (and dirty ) empiricism?”.

 

[inocente]

sure, but pure math still yields knowledge of the world, where the “world” is something like the set of all true propositions, and non-empirical knowledge, at that, which is what you seem to be denying when you say things like “all knowledge is experiential”.

In pure math there are lots of worlds, each with its own rules. What follows in one world doesn’t in another because the rules are different. In Boolean algebra 1 + 1 = 1, which works fine in computing but not in accounting.

And how do we know which math world applies to a real world problem? By experience.

and philosophy is also about the world and also yields non-empirical knowledge, the ineliminable controversy of its conclusions notwithstanding.

Philosophy is founded on the notion that we are rational computers. Turns out we’re not, we don’t have a logic unit and arithmetic unit in our head. All our reasoning has to be learned, which means the way your parse “if a and b then a” is down to your unique set of experiences. This means that since we don’t reason uniformly, we must have some way of testing our reasoning.

In math the reasoning rules are tightly defined and mathematicians don’t disagree whether a statement is a theorem. That’s a good test.

Whereas in philosophy the rules are so loose that philosophers rarely agree and it’s just a matter of opinion.

disagreement about philosophical conclusions in no way vitiates the possibility of having knowledge concerning them, any more than unanimity with regard to belief in a proposition entails its truth (or, a fortiori, that anyone knows it.)

This sounds like special pleading: there’s a mystic Truth™ out there but it’s unknowable. But if it’s unknowable, it’s neither use nor ornament.

*the “world” as defined above is necessarily many ways (i.e. contains true propositions that are also true in every possible world), and there is no other way to know those truths save and except via non-empirical means (since every empirical truth is contingent.)

and i beg no questions: mathematical truths are necessarily true and known by (mathematical) logic alone: i can see that* by experience.

“if a and b then a” is only true in worlds where the physics keeps a in existence long enough to parse the statement (and where it keeps us in existence long enough). We have to test it and the test, as Tunare points out, is the proof of the pudding is in the eating.

 

[john_doran]

Do you really mean that the concept of “if a method works, then it is a good method” is a philosophical statement? I would simply call it common sense - almost tautological. Maybe we differ in our opinion to categorize what is a “philosophical statement”. I feel (and please correct me if I am mistaken) that in your choice of words every proposition is philosophical.

well, i was referring to your whole post, where you make distinctions between different aspects of “reality” (i.e. objective vs. abstractions), and between deduction and induction and when each is useful: that is pure philosophy.

Tunare:

I agree that if one can make successful predictions then it leads to true propositions. Now comes the 100 dollar question: “how do we decide if a proposition (about the external, objective reality) is true, unless we compare the proposition to the external reality - which is direct (and dirty ) empiricism?”.

predictive success is just one of the features of any given theory that is indicative of truth, a certain number of which features are at least jointly sufficient for (reasonable belief in) the truth of that theory, even if none are individually necessary.

other properties include coherence with other accepted theories, the number of ad hoc revisions to the theory required to achieve that coherence and/or to accommodate recalcitrant data, simplicity, beauty/elegance, explanatory power, etc.

how do we tell when a theory has achieved the critical mass of these properties (in both quantity and quality) to be reasonably sure that it’s true? no idea. which is why all of my scientific beliefs are provisional at best.

 

[john_doran]

In pure math there are lots of worlds, each with its own rules. What follows in one world doesn’t in another because the rules are different. In Boolean algebra 1 + 1 = 1, which works fine in computing but not in accounting.

you’re not using “world” in the way i was using it, but no matter: my point is simply that it is possible to have real knowledge of mathematical “worlds” (in your sense) independently of experience.

which means that experience is not the only source of knowledge.

(indeed, as i pointed out before, the proposition “only empirical experience can yield knowledge” is itself incapable of empirical demonstration, and is so far forth self-refuting.)

inocente:

And how do we know which math world applies to a real world problem? By experience.

well that’s certainly true, and tautologically so: “the only way to know if theorem X applies to the empirical world is to examine the empirical world empirically”

my point has only been that there is more to the world than its material (read: empirical) aspect, and thus sources of knowledge other than empirical experience.

inocente:

Philosophy is founded on the notion that we are rational computers. Turns out we’re not, we don’t have a logic unit and arithmetic unit in our head. All our reasoning has to be learned, which means the way your parse “if a and b then a” is down to your unique set of experiences. This means that since we don’t reason uniformly, we must have some way of testing our reasoning.

In math the reasoning rules are tightly defined and mathematicians don’t disagree whether a statement is a theorem. That’s a good test.

Whereas in philosophy the rules are so loose that philosophers rarely agree and it’s just a matter of opinion.

this - what you’re doing right here - is philosophy. and you yourself think that it yields knowledge (i.e. you think your reasoning here is valid and sound and therefore that its conclusions are true and that you know them.)

and i’m afraid it’s self-refuting: let P be the proposition “disagreement about A entails that there is no truth of the matter concerning A” (i.e. any belief about A is simply and irreducibly “opinion”). then the fact that you and i disagree about the truth of P entails that P is not true (or false).

inocente:

This sounds like special pleading: there’s a mystic Truth™ out there but it’s unknowable. But if it’s unknowable, it’s neither use nor ornament.

nope, it’s perfectly knowable.

“if a and b then a” is only true in worlds where the physics keeps a in existence long enough to parse the statement (and where it keeps us in existence long enough). We have to test it and the test, as Tunare points out, is the proof of the pudding is in the eating.

you don’t have to test “if a and be, then a”. it is deductively true, and cannot fail to be true. if you did need to test it, then you’d never be able to know it was true. the same goes for the pythagorean theorem, and cantorian set theory and transfinite math and…

i mean, there’s a reason that you can’t prove goldbach’s conjecture, for example, simply by going through every even number and seeing if it is the sum of two primes.

of course, if what you mean (again) is just that there is no necessary link between math and the world (that we know of), then sure, but so what? i’m not disagreeing that experiment is required to determine fit between math and the empirical world: i’m simply saying that empirical experiment is (demonstrably) not the only source of knowledge.

 

[Tunare]

well, i was referring to your whole post, where you make distinctions between different aspects of “reality” (i.e. objective vs. abstractions), and between deduction and induction and when each is useful: that is pure philosophy.

Yes, it is… but it is trivial. Though I do not agree that “abstractions” belong to the external reality, they are either images of that reality, or purely fictional ideas.

As we probably agree, philosophy consists of three branches: “metaphysics, epistemology and ethics” (though some would say that aesthetics is a fourth branch). Of these branches the epistemology is the important part, which tells us “how to gain knowledge” - but again, it is simply trivial.

The other part, metaphysics is the one which I (and probably inocente, too) consider problematic. As long as it is empty musing, it has no use. If it is a new hypothesis about the nature of reality, it can lead to real knowledge. But that requires a proper epistemology. And so far I have only encountered those two epistemological methods which yield proper results (inductive, observation based and deductive, axiomatically established). I need to add: “authority based method” can only be an epistemological shortcut, not a legitimate method of its own right. Also propositions about the past have no legitimate epistemological methods, but that is not important, since the past does not exist as an ontological entity.

predictive success is just one of the features of any given theory that is indicative of truth, a certain number of which features are at least jointly sufficient for (reasonable belief in) the truth of that theory, even if none are individually necessary.

other properties include coherence with other accepted theories, the number of ad hoc revisions to the theory required to achieve that coherence and/or to accommodate recalcitrant data, simplicity, beauty/elegance, explanatory power, etc.

I don’t think these are necessary criteria. The proof of the four-color problem is neither simple, nor beautiful, and it has absolutely no explanatory power. But it is true that any map on a flat surface can be colored by 4 colors.

how do we tell when a theory has achieved the critical mass of these properties (in both quantity and quality) to be reasonably sure that it’s true? no idea. which is why all of my scientific beliefs are provisional at best.

It is true that knowledge about the objective, external reality is always provisional. It is also true that axiomatically established knowledge is always “true” within that axiomatic system. Of course one can create a different set of axioms, with different sets of propositions.

One can make propositions about fictional entities, for example one may assert that a poem is “beautiful”. But these propositions are subjective assessments, and as such are irrelevant.

 

[inocente]

you’re not using “world” in the way i was using it, but no matter: my point is simply that it is possible to have real knowledge of mathematical “worlds” (in your sense) independently of experience.

which means that experience is not the only source of knowledge.

(indeed, as i pointed out before, the proposition “only empirical experience can yield knowledge” is itself incapable of empirical demonstration, and is so far forth self-refuting.)

You’re using your observations to conclude that observations are not the only source knowledge.

well that’s certainly true, and tautologically so: “the only way to know if theorem X applies to the empirical world is to examine the empirical world empirically”

my point has only been that there is more to the world than its material (read: empirical) aspect, and thus sources of knowledge other than empirical experience.

But if it can’t be experienced, how would we know?

this - what you’re doing right here - is philosophy. and you yourself think that it yields knowledge (i.e. you think your reasoning here is valid and sound and therefore that its conclusions are true and that you know them.)

Nope. I’m aware that any utterance can and will be claimed as philosophy, philosophers apparently being defensively imperialist these days, but my hypothesis can be tested against empirical evidence, so no dice.

and i’m afraid it’s self-refuting: let P be the proposition “disagreement about A entails that there is no truth of the matter concerning A” (i.e. any belief about A is simply and irreducibly “opinion”). then the fact that you and i disagree about the truth of P entails that P is not true (or false).

That’s neither here nor there. If there’s no way of determining whether substance dualism, property dualism, predicate dualism, occasionalism, behaviorism, functionalism, emergentism, idealism, neutral monism, supervenience physcialism, reductive physicalism, epiphenomenalism, … is correct, then they’re not knowledge about anything except themselves.

nope, it’s perfectly knowable.

By all means say how.

you don’t have to test “if a and be, then a”. it is deductively true, and cannot fail to be true. if you did need to test it, then you’d never be able to know it was true. the same goes for the pythagorean theorem, and cantorian set theory and transfinite math and…

“if a and be, then a” is true since if you label two switches and connect them in series, the light only goes on when both are closed. The Pythagorean theorem is true by definition (just use vectors), but only in Euclidean geometry. We need experience to know when and where a branch of math applies.

*i mean, there’s a reason that you can’t prove goldbach’s conjecture, for example, simply by going through every even number and seeing if it is the sum of two primes.

of course, if what you mean (again) is just that there is no necessary link between math and the world (that we know of), then sure, but so what? i’m not disagreeing that experiment is required to determine fit between math and the empirical world: i’m simply saying that empirical experiment is (demonstrably) not the only source of knowledge.*

Granted but since the OP asks “Why is belief in God allegedly incompatible with Science?”, I think he’s talking about knowledge which applies directly to our world, not knowledge which may apply in some other possible world, or else any belief in bigfoot or fairies or whatever would count as knowledge, since we can’t prove they don’t exist in any possible world.

 

[john_doran]

Yes, it is… but it is trivial. Though I do not agree that “abstractions” belong to the external reality, they are either images of that reality, or purely fictional ideas.

As we probably agree, philosophy consists of three branches: “metaphysics, epistemology and ethics” (though some would say that aesthetics is a fourth branch). Of these branches the epistemology is the important part, which tells us “how to gain knowledge” - but again, it is simply trivial.

A) epistemology doesn’t tell us how to gain knowledge: it tells us when we have knowledge; what ***counts ***as knowledge.

B) epistemology as “the study of knowledge” is as trivial as physics as “the study of nature”. which is to say, not at all.

Tunare:

The other part, metaphysics is the one which I (and probably inocente, too) consider problematic. As long as it is empty musing, it has no use. If it is a new hypothesis about the nature of reality, it can lead to real knowledge. But that requires a proper epistemology. And so far I have only encountered those two epistemological methods which yield proper results (inductive, observation based and deductive, axiomatically established). I need to add: “authority based method” can only be an epistemological shortcut, not a legitimate method of its own right. Also propositions about the past have no legitimate epistemological methods, but that is not important, since the past does not exist as an ontological entity.

any musing that is empty by definition has no use, so i would agree with you there. but if your claim is that metaphysics is inherently empty musing then i would disagree.

that said, everything you’ve said here is a (non-trivial) synthesis of metaphysics and epistemology: it is impossible to make a claim about any area of philosophy without thereby making a (non-trivial) philosophical claim.

Tunare:

I don’t think these are necessary criteria. The proof of the four-color problem is neither simple, nor beautiful, and it has absolutely no explanatory power. But it is true that any map on a flat surface can be colored by 4 colors.

i agree, and said exactly that, myself.

but scientists and mathematicians in fact do judge their theories by these standards: QM and GR and M theory are all regularly evaluated by these criteria in the peer-reviewed literature.

 

[john_doran]

You’re using your observations to conclude that observations are not the only source knowledge.

no, i’m not. at all.

but if you disagree, define “observation” and please demonstrate to me that i am.

inocente:

But if it can’t be experienced, how would we know?

the same way that you know that any right-angled triangle will have a hypotenuse the square of the length of which will equal the sum of the squares of the other two sides, even without doing the measurements yourself.

the same way that you can know that 65^5 is 1,160,290,625 despite never having counted that many objects in your life.

the same way that you can know for any P and any Q, P → Q; P; therefore Q

inocente:

Nope. I’m aware that any utterance can and will be claimed as philosophy, philosophers apparently being defensively imperialist these days, but my hypothesis can be tested against empirical evidence, so no dice.

look, your hypothesis is “only sensory data can yield knowledge”, and sensory data simply and straightforwardly cannot demonstrate the truth of such a proposition.

this is rock-bottom reasoning here, and if you cannot see that or accept it, then that honestly leaves us nowhere to go from here.

inocente:

That’s neither here nor there. If there’s no way of determining whether substance dualism, property dualism, predicate dualism, occasionalism, behaviorism, functionalism, emergentism, idealism, neutral monism, supervenience physcialism, reductive physicalism, epiphenomenalism, … is correct, then they’re not knowledge about anything except themselves.

what you mean is something like “if there’s no way to convince all (or very nearly most?) people of the truth of some theory, then that theory isn’t true”.

why on earth would anyone believe something like that?

and i’ll say it again: by that light, that very statement itself is falsified, since neither all nor most people are convinced of its truth.

 

[Tunare]

I remember the best definition of the different branches of philosophy:

1. Metaphysics - what exists?
2. Epistemology - how do we know it?
3. Ethics - so what now?

A) epistemology doesn’t tell us how to gain knowledge: it tells us when we have knowledge; what ***counts ***as knowledge.

Yes, that, too. But primarily it is about the ways and means of acquiring knowledge.

B) epistemology as “the study of knowledge” is as trivial as physics as “the study of nature”. which is to say, not at all.

Maybe you could tell me what is complicated about epistemology? Because it seems perfectly trivial to me. But, of course I may be mistaken, and there is something complicated there, which I do not know about. Physics, chemistry, biology, the branches of studying nature are not simple, because nature is not simple. But epistemology?

any musing that is empty by definition has no use, so i would agree with you there. but if your claim is that metaphysics is inherently empty musing then i would disagree.

Yes, of course. But I never said that. Metaphysics, as a starting point of “what exists?” is very important, as long as its assertions can be “mapped” upon what it asserts “exists”. People made a metaphysical claim that the Earth is flat. When observation was applied, it turned out that this claim was incorrect. It would be possible to claim that the Moon is made of cheese, but again, this claim would be refuted by observation. One might make a metaphysical claim that there is no such thing as gravity, but some magical, invisible genie keeps pushing the objects “down”, as if there were a gravity. This claim cannot be validated or refuted - as such it is an empty metaphysical claim.

Without a proper method to decide whether a metaphysical claim is true or false, the claim is irrelevant, in other words: “without epistemology, metaphysics is an empty musing”.

that said, everything you’ve said here is a (non-trivial) synthesis of metaphysics and epistemology: it is impossible to make a claim about any area of philosophy without thereby making a (non-trivial) philosophical claim.

What is trivial and what is not cannot be objectively measured. The same claim is complicated for someone, while it can be trivial to someone else.

 

[john_doran]

Granted but since the OP asks “Why is belief in God allegedly incompatible with Science?”, I think he’s talking about knowledge which applies directly to our world, not knowledge which may apply in some other possible world, or else any belief in bigfoot or fairies or whatever would count as knowledge, since we can’t prove they don’t exist in any possible world.

assuming the truth of your epistemological principle (there is no knowledge that is not empirical), in what way does it disqualify belief in god? i assume that’s the point you’ve been trying to make all along?

i mean, do we have empirical knowledge of quarks and leptons, for example? we certainly don’t have any direct observations of them, unless you consider scatterings on the screens of cloud chambers to constitute “direct” observational evidence.

it would seem to me that your principle either proves too little or too much: too little if it allows knowledge of entities based on their putative effects (like cloud chambers and particle accelerators, the cosmological argument for god’s existence is based on his effects); too much if it requires the entities in question to impinge directly on our sensory apparatus (nothing impinges directly on our senses: it’s all the exchange of photons and transmission of electrical pulses along neural pathways.)

but i am no doubt missing your point.

 

[john_doran]

Yes, that, too. But primarily it is about the ways and means of acquiring knowledge.

not really, but i’ not sure that anything in this discussion hinges on the point.

Tunare:

Maybe you could tell me what is complicated about epistemology? Because it seems perfectly trivial to me. But, of course I may be mistaken, and there is something complicated there, which I do not know about. Physics, chemistry, biology, the branches of studying nature are not simple, because nature is not simple. But epistemology?

well, some of the brightest minds in human history have struggled over it for thousands of years without any universal assent: that, to me, is the very definition of complicated and difficult field of study.

i’m not sure how much epistemology you’ve studied, but the various theories are dense and widely divergent from one another.

but perhaps you’re using the terms “complicated” and “trivial” in a way that i am misunderstanding.

Tunare:

Yes, of course. But I never said that. Metaphysics, as a starting point of “what exists?” is very important, as long as its assertions can be “mapped” upon what it asserts “exists”. People made a metaphysical claim that the Earth is flat. When observation was applied, it turned out that this claim was incorrect. It would be possible to claim that the Moon is made of cheese, but again, this claim would be refuted by observation. One might make a metaphysical claim that there is no such thing as gravity, but some magical, invisible genie keeps pushing the objects “down”, as if there were a gravity. This claim cannot be validated or refuted - as such it is an empty metaphysical claim.

Without a proper method to decide whether a metaphysical claim is true or false, the claim is irrelevant, in other words: “without epistemology, metaphysics is an empty musing”.

those claims are physical claims, not metaphysical claims.

that said, the manner of answering metaphysical questions (e.g. those concerning universals, properties, the mental, modality, etc.) is simply that of deductive logic; it’s just that the arguments can be difficult and convoluted (but no more so than the arguments made by specialists in physics or chemistry or biology, etc.), and can be made using unexpressed premises or made in such a way that their defects are difficult to perceive (again, no different from mathematical or logical proofs).

Tunare:

What is trivial and what is not cannot be objectively measured. The same claim is complicated for someone, while it can be trivial to someone else.

agreed.

 

[Tunare]

assuming the truth of your epistemological principle (there is no knowledge that is not empirical)

Please forgive me for “butting in”, but to my best knowledge, NO one says that. After all the (deductive) axiomatic systems do not need empirical verification. Of course if they are applied to the objective reality, that is a different issue, then the predictions must be verified.

On the other hand it is true that all knowledge started with empirical observation - and this process started at the dawn of history, when the cavemen were anything but “philosophers”. The phrase “Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu” might be commonplace, but it is still true. Even the most abstract concept of “numbers” started with observing that “two apples are more than one apple”. Many simple people were unable to step beyond this, and for them the only numbers are: “one, two and many”.

 

[Tunare]

well, some of the brightest minds in human history have struggled over it for thousands of years without any universal assent: that, to me, is the very definition of complicated and difficult field of study.

i’m not sure how much epistemology you’ve studied, but the various theories are dense and widely divergent from one another.

but perhaps you’re using the terms “complicated” and “trivial” in a way that i am misunderstanding.

As I said, if a claim is about the objectively existing reality, then the epistemological method is to compare the predictions to the reality. If the claim is part of an axiomatic system, then the epistemological method is to use the axioms and the rules of transformation and see if the proposition can be reached from the axioms. It is very true that the actual transformations can be very complicated, but the “method” itself is extremely simple - to the point of triviality. Just like the actual claims about the objective reality can be decided by performing very complicated experiments and measurements, but the “process itself” is trivially simple.

those claims are physical claims, not metaphysical claims.

Interesting. I don’t see that there is a lot of difference there. Is the claim that “only humans have an immortal soul” a physical claim or a metaphysical one?

that said, the manner of answering metaphysical questions (e.g. those concerning universals, properties, the mental, modality, etc.) is simply that of deductive logic; it’s just that the arguments can be difficult and convoluted (but no more so than the arguments made by specialists in physics or chemistry or biology, etc.), and can be made using unexpressed premises or made in such a way that their defects are difficult to perceive (again, no different from mathematical or logical proofs).

Oh, I certainly agree that the particulars can be very complicated (personally I have no idea how Fermat’s last theorem was proven), but the epistemological process (take the axioms and apply the rules of transformation) is simplicity itself.

 

[Gricken]

Science is limited to the study of the material world. We’re only able to study what we are allowed to study, nothing more. Why do people insist that science is the be all end all of knowledge and information? Why is belief in God allegedly incompatible with Science?

It isn’t. Don’t let anyone try and tell you otherwise.