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Peter_Plato
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The question asked by your professor covertly undermines a proper answer by a false dichotomy between doing âwrongâ acts as opposed to doing ârightâ acts.Hi everyone! This discussion relates to the discussion we had in world philosophy today, so I wanted to join in. I have some questions and I do want genuine answers, I in no way ask these questions in defiance or in an argumentative way.I also realize that not everyone on the forum may not have theology or philosophy degrees (nor do I) so everyone may have a different answer.
Anyways, my philosophy professor was listing the theistic arguments for the existence of evil, basically the âHow can an all-knowing, all good God permit evil?â question. She asked us to list the answers people gave us in our lives to the existence of evil and then she argued against each one, also with the intention of demonstrating how each theistic argument leads to the next during atheistic vs. theistic debate.
**Her question was basically (paraphrasing here) âWhy is it that when I do something it is wrong, but if God does it itâs OK?â She used Exodus 12 and Godâs smiting of the Egyptian children as an example. **
I personally love God and I am trying to trust in his decisions no matter what. I would like your thoughts/arguments especially from a Jewish perspective. Thank you!
Here is what I mean. We could consistently hold that killing another human being is prima facie a âwrongâ act. However, even with that admission we can conceive of circumstances where killing another human being would be permissible, for example for self-defense or protection of an innocent third party. Clearly, there are circumstances under which doing a âwrongâ act is permissible for someone but that need not make the act of killing permissible for everyone under every circumstance.
In the case of God, there are features (omniscience, omnipotence, ability to create new human beings at will, knowing the inner motives of all beings, etc.) that make the circumstances under which God acts substantially different from the circumstances under which normal human beings lacking complete knowledge would choose to act.
Given that Godâs purview is knowing with absolute certainty the outcomes of all events through all time, his ability to make judgements taking into account a veritable mountain of âcircumstantialâ considerations not available to us, would make his moral determinations substantively different than ours.
In other words, we cannot have access to the relevant information God has access to so we cannot assume a privileged position of judging the actions of God precisely because we do not know all of the circumstantial details that function to make Godâs judgement the right one in each case.
It is our limitations in terms of knowledge and power that substantively limit our ability to make fully adequate moral judgements. It is that same inability that should make us pause when âjudgingâ the rightness or wrongness of Godâs actions.