Why should a person prefer hylomorphic dualism to competing positions in the philosophy of mind?

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Hylemorphism is the doctrine that material substances are composed of form and matter. The substantial form and primary matter are the substantial principles which constitute the substance of some material thing. Material substances are also composed of accidents which are forms and which comprise the remaining nine categories of Aristotle’s ten categories of being. Substance is the first category and the substantial form and matter which are the principles of the substance are included in this category. Matter is the material cause of a material substance; the formal cause is the substantial form which is immaterial as all forms are including the accidents. If one takes physical to mean simply matter, then yes, hylemorphism requires a non-material principle which is called form. That material substances are composed of form and matter applies to all material substances whether animate or inanimate, living or non-living things.

Decartes posited that God created two kinds of substances, namely, spiritual or mind or intellect and material. For him, human beings are the only creatures in the material world that are composed of the spiritual and material, the rest of things are simply material substances. Descartes did not hold the view of hylemorphism, that is, that the substantial principles of material substances are composed of substantial form and matter. He did away with substantial forms so that non-human substances whether animate or inanimate is simply matter in different sizes, shapes, and motions. He identified quantity or extension, which is an accident of substance in Aristotlelian philosophy, with matter so that matter is extension, extension is the essence of matter. Quantity or extension for Aristotle, which is the first accident of material substances, is a form, it is not matter. Matter in itself is pure potentiality lacking all form. Qualities such as color, smell, taste which for Aristotle are accidents that inhere in a substance, Descartes thought to be purely subjective. For example, color is only in our mind and not in the things themselves.
Yes, that’s my understanding (although I disagree with both). Hopefully balto will say what he means by “non-physical faculty”.
Hylemorphism is certainly (A) a claim about objective reality. For material substances are composed of form and matter, these principles constitute the very being of a thing, comprise it, are in it. The substantial form and matter constitute the substance of some thing and all material substances have accidents which are the accidental forms of the nine categories of accidents.

Our knowledge of the external world around us is also subjective in the sense that knowledge is in our intellects, in us. However, we gather our knowledge about the external world from the external things themselves. Our intellect does not invent knowledge but discovers it and it is able to reason about the knowledge it discovers. We receive the images or forms of things through our senses, sense knowledge is concerned with individual particular things. Through a process of abstraction, our intellects discover the substance and universal nature of things by abstracting the substantial forms of things in the phantasm which we receive through our senses which is an image or likeness of the external thing. So that the substantial form that is a part of the thing outside our minds and which makes some thing to be the kind of thing it is, is now in our intellect according to its likeness received through the senses but abstracted by the intellect from individuating material conditions and which points to the external object. Accordingly, our knowledge of the universal nature of things is derived from the external objects themselves through a process of abstraction by the intellect, that is, the intellect goes right to the substantial forms of things which form is a substantial part and principle of the thing itself. This is Aristotle’s theory of how we obtain knowledge which is founded in objective reality. He, along with Plato, thought that scientific and universal knowledge about the world around us must be grounded in objective reality.
I’m no expert but my understanding is that Aristotle believes we cannot go beyond our experience in making sense of the world, and so we cannot make sense of Plato’s separate world of forms. Therefore I think objective is a little subtle for Aristotle, as we cannot escape into some imagined objective world of pure form, since such a world does not exist.

Seems to me there are also various interpretations of Aristotle going on. For instance, the link below is to a talk by a Dominican priest who is also a microbiologist. Unlike what I think some on this thread have argued, he’s quite happy speaking of hylomorphism in the context of science, and has no problem explaining things in terms of molecules and atoms without getting hung up about reductionism. Basically he seems to use hylomorphism as another way to think of his science and issues such as identity. Seems a little clumsy to me, but I think maybe he wouldn’t find any conflict between neuroscience and hylomorphism.

Systems Hylomorphism: A Post-Genomic Theory of Nature, Rev. Nicanor Austriaco - youtube.com/watch?v=Ujvu-Jrd8EA
 
It seems that the delicate creatures who started the protests at Yale hail from its Silliman College.
*"Silliman is the largest college at Yale in terms of area, occupying most of a city block.

Benjamin Silliman, Yale Class of 1796, (1779-1864) was one of America’s pioneers in science." - silliman.yalecollege.yale.edu/

“I hope you will continue to use your voices and essays to advance your causes. I was especially impressed with the March of Resilience asking for a more inclusive Yale. …] P.P.S. We are heartbroken by the terrorist attacks in Paris, a city we love, and send positive thoughts across the Atlantic towards France, and towards any in Silliman who are affected by these events (please contact us).” - Master and Associate Master of Silliman - silliman.yalecollege.yale.edu/news/idea-positive-intent*

I think protests against discrimination and injustice are always a good thing. There’s nothing wrong with the young generation. At the weekend a young man who had been shot in the Paris attacks walked out of hospital because he felt they needed the bed for those worse injured than him. There’s nothing wrong with the young generation.

But that’s not the subject of this thread.
 
I don’t recall Christ saying the highest good is loafing around contemplating Aristotle’s navel.

Then he will say to those on his left, ‘Depart from me, you who are cursed, into the eternal fire prepared for the devil and his angels. For I was hungry and you gave me nothing to eat, I was thirsty and you gave me nothing to drink, I was a stranger and you did not invite me in, I needed clothes and you did not clothe me, I was sick and in prison and you did not look after me.’

They also will answer, ‘Lord, when did we see you hungry or thirsty or a stranger or needing clothes or sick or in prison, and did not help you?’

He will reply, ‘Truly I tell you, whatever you did not do for one of the least of these, you did not do for me.’
Christ also said, “Man does not live by bread alone, but by every Word that comes from the mouth of God.”

What do you suppose that means?

Now, it might just be possible that Jesus recognized that meeting the physical needs of people was good, as far as that went, but just perhaps he meant “hungry and thirsty” metaphorically, as in feeding those “hungry” for the “food that lasts,” which, as it turns out is his Body and Blood, which he called REAL food and REAL drink.

Regarding clothing, recall that after Adam and Eve sinned they felt naked and looked to hide themselves and their nakedness behind fig leaves. It was God who clothed them with the furs of animals. You don’t suppose “clothing” could also be metaphorical in terms of protection from the fallout of sin and guilt, rather than to be taken in strictly “physical” terms?

What Aristotle’s navel has to do with anything is beyond me since Aristotle didn’t suggest contemplating his navel was at all that fulfilling, but he, along with Aquinas later on, suggested that contemplative life - the contemplation of God for Aquinas - was the highest good for any human being. This actually does accord well with Jesus’ words about what kind of food we should seek - i.e., the food that will last to eternal life.

Now you could, to your peril, I suppose, be dismissive of all of this, but recall that Jesus’ commission to the Apostles was to spread the Gospel to the world and that Gospel principally has to do with feeding his lambs and sheep with WHAT do you suppose? Keep in mind that Jesus was quite clear that “The Spirit gives life; the flesh counts for nothing. The words I have spoken to you – they are full of the Spirit and life. (John 6:63)”

Yes, you might reconsider your strictly physical rendering of “For I was hungry and you gave me nothing to eat, I was thirsty and you gave me nothing to drink,…” regarding which bread and which drink constitute REAL food and REAL drink if the flesh “counts for nothing” in the end.
 
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Nope, I joined the thread to discuss the OP, not the silly arguments of that ID fanatic.
Well. Actually, his “silly arguments” are quite in line with Jesus’ thoughts that the “flesh,” I.e., a strictly or reductively materialistic view of the world ends up “profiting nothing” because it reduces truth to insignificance. You do recall that truth is important to Jesus and not to be dismissed by the trite reductionist tendencies humans have to see everything in terms of what is good for the flesh.

Also recall that Jesus said “I am the Truth,” so if you want to dismiss a defense of the truth against reductionist materialism, and call it ‘silly,’ the take away is that you are in favour of starving human beings of REAL food by claiming (contra Jesus) that the ONLY real food is the meat and potatoes on the plate in front of you because the only reality is reductionist and material.

I expect another dismissive reply that calls my thinking convoluted pie-in-the-sky. Don’t disappoint.
 
*"Silliman is the largest college at Yale in terms of area, occupying most of a city block.

Benjamin Silliman, Yale Class of 1796, (1779-1864) was one of America’s pioneers in science." - silliman.yalecollege.yale.edu/*

“I hope you will continue to use your voices and essays to advance your causes. I was especially impressed with the March of Resilience asking for a more inclusive Yale. …] P.P.S. We are heartbroken by the terrorist attacks in Paris, a city we love, and send positive thoughts across the Atlantic towards France, and towards any in Silliman who are affected by these events (please contact us).” - Master and Associate Master of Silliman - silliman.yalecollege.yale.edu/news/idea-positive-intent

I think protests against discrimination and injustice are always a good thing. There’s nothing wrong with the young generation. At the weekend a young man who had been shot in the Paris attacks walked out of hospital because he felt they needed the bed for those worse injured than him. There’s nothing wrong with the young generation.

But that’s not the subject of this thread.
Protests are ALWAYS a good thing?

It is interesting that the second quote you provided above comes from the two individuals – the Master and Associate Master at Silliman – one of whom wrote an email and one who, in person, tried to bring sanity to the wildly irrational position of protesters regarding their “feeling” unsafe about Halloween costumes, of alll things.

You do need to watch this (and watch it to the end) to get a sense of when protests may not ALWAYS be “a good thing.”

youtu.be/Tsgc0k594Js

The man suffering the abuse of “protesters” in the video is Nicholas Christakis, whose wife Erika wrote the email that triggered this particular protest in the first place – both of whom composed the letter of apologia from which you lifted the second quote.

I am not clear what you intended by posting that reply, but the point remains that truth must exist in order to make sense of anything. Otherwise, things devolve into senselessness (silliness) such as witnessed in the above video at Silliman.

Your diatribe against the Douglas Groothius article is an example of an unwillingness to consider truth on its own terms because it happens to conflict with your deeply held reductionist sentiments about the material world and its all-encompassing importance. Calling Groothius an “ID fanatic” based upon something written by someone else about him in order to excuse you from considering his argument is hardly being even-handed or fair-minded.
 
Re “there should be some common neural feature”, I’d like to see experimental confirmation rather than just assume. A computer program would be designed to parse a string and recognize a plus sign as meaning addition if there are digits on either side, but we don’t design our mind, the paths are learned, so perhaps 2+2 and 5+7 take different paths. For instance, if you’re an American carpenter, 5+7 might make you think 1 foot rather than 12 inches.
Okay, but we were considering the claim that mental processes really just are neural processes. If 2+2 and 5+7 take completely separate paths and there is no commonality between them, then wouldn’t that mean that we are not doing the same thing? But we are doing the same thing, we are adding two integers. I think we would need to have some kind of idea of what kind of evidence would either support or refute the above claim. The claim would seem to require a common element, as performing addition is the same operation regardless of the (name removed by moderator)uts, and if neural activity can completely explain addition then there would have to be an addition pathway that appears in both instances of addition. If we don’t observe a feature, or there can’t be such a feature, then we would have reason to doubt the claim. Before I could develop this idea any further I was just wondering if I could have a clarification on something you said in your last post to me.
Now I take it we agree there is a link between mind and brain - the question is whether there’s an additional link, to your non-physical faculty.
This is a bit confusing to me, because the claim that we were considering was the hypothesis that mental activity can be completely reduced to neural activity. In other words, there is no mental activity; it is really just neural activity. When you say that we agree that there is a link between mind and brain, it sounds like you are supposing that mind is something separate from the brain, otherwise you wouldn’t have said that there is a link between the two if they are really identical. Forgive me if this is not what you mean, but that’s how it is coming across, so I was wondering if you could clarify.
What you may want for H[sub]1[/sub] sounds similar to the proposal for dark matter, in the sense that it too states there are phenomena which can’t be explained by known, observable matter, and it too predicts the presence of some unknown factor, which it labels dark matter. H[sub]0[/sub], as always, denies any link, so H[sub]1[/sub] stands or falls on the detection of dark matter, for which there are various candidates.



But let’s go back a step. Does hylomorphism require a non-physical faculty? (How then could you distinguish it from Cartesian dualism?)
I guess now it is my turn to clarify :o. Maybe my usage of the term “non-physical faculty” was sloppy, because it gives the impression that there is an extra object that is part of the system. That would be Cartesian dualism. What I mean to suggest is something along the lines of what Richca suggested. If you go back to Pattern 1, 2, and 3 from an earlier post of mine, the physical facts can’t tell you which pattern specifically is the one i am implementing, so we need to appeal to some extra-physical principle that would determine which pattern is indeed being implemented. This principle is intentionality; it is always necessary to appeal to my intention; I need to have an intention to implement one and not the other, the intention is what determines the pattern, and the brain is only the medium through which this intention is represented. On this view, the relationship between brain and mind is analogous to the relationship between the physical words in a book and the meaning of said book. The meaning of the book is not reducible to the ink marks on the pages, but the ink marks on the pages are the means by which the meaning is represented.
 
Christ also said, “Man does not live by bread alone, but by every Word that comes from the mouth of God.”

What do you suppose that means?
Unless you’re arguing that Jesus is a disciple of Aristotle, it doesn’t have anything to do with your claim that the highest good is loafing around contemplating Aristotle’s navel. You could always start a thread as it’s off-topic here.
Well. Actually, his “silly arguments” are quite in line with Jesus’ thoughts that the “flesh,” I.e., a strictly or reductively materialistic view of the world ends up “profiting nothing” because it reduces truth to insignificance.
You could always start a thread as it’s off-topic here.
inocente;13440751:
I think protests against discrimination and injustice are always a good thing.
Protests are ALWAYS a good thing?
Your capacity to read only what you want to read while ignoring the rest is wondrous to behold. Earlier in the thread you argued that racism might be rational, now you appear to be upset about demos against racism. I think there cannot be enough demos against racism, there should be a whole lot more, we should all dance on injustice[sup]*[/sup].

** Open up the doors and let the music play / Let the streets resound with singing / Songs that bring your hope / Songs that bring your joy / Dancers who dance upon injustice - Did You Feel The Mountains Tremble, Delirious+Hillsong - youtube.com/watch?v=aIR5zFSkWUY*

Christianity is about action. You could always start a thread as it’s off-topic here. I’d join in.
 
Okay, but we were considering the claim that mental processes really just are neural processes. If 2+2 and 5+7 take completely separate paths and there is no commonality between them, then wouldn’t that mean that we are not doing the same thing? But we are doing the same thing, we are adding two integers. I think we would need to have some kind of idea of what kind of evidence would either support or refute the above claim. The claim would seem to require a common element, as performing addition is the same operation regardless of the (name removed by moderator)uts, and if neural activity can completely explain addition then there would have to be an addition pathway that appears in both instances of addition. If we don’t observe a feature, or there can’t be such a feature, then we would have reason to doubt the claim. Before I could develop this idea any further I was just wondering if I could have a clarification on something you said in your last post to me.
You may well be right, but it involves assumptions. We’re not computers, we have to learn to count, and it’s quite a laborious process, partly because ten was not a good choice for a number base, but mainly because we don’t have a computer’s AU (arithmetic unit) between our ears. So there’s no a priori reason to think we are doing the same thing in every case. It’s an interesting research topic: does everyone who is taught according to a standard Western syllabus do the same thing? (I’d predict no.) How about someone with learning difficulties? Someone who is unschooled but helped her dad on his market stall from an early age and so is ace at mental arithmetic? I think the claim is something which needs to be tested rather than assumed.
This is a bit confusing to me, because the claim that we were considering was the hypothesis that mental activity can be completely reduced to neural activity. In other words, there is no mental activity; it is really just neural activity. When you say that we agree that there is a link between mind and brain, it sounds like you are supposing that mind is something separate from the brain, otherwise you wouldn’t have said that there is a link between the two if they are really identical. Forgive me if this is not what you mean, but that’s how it is coming across, so I was wondering if you could clarify.
Sorry about that, I think of it more as a series of levels of explanation. For instance, no one would try to explain an elephant in terms of quarks and electrons. There are several layers of explanation in-between, some in the subject area we call physics, several more in what we call chemistry, a whole lot more in biology, and excursions into other areas as well.

So, to me neurons are clumsily analogous to the quarks, and mind to the elephant. Brain is looking bottom-up, mind top-down, with several layers of explanation needed to get from one to the other, but they are the same thing.
I guess now it is my turn to clarify :o. Maybe my usage of the term “non-physical faculty” was sloppy, because it gives the impression that there is an extra object that is part of the system. That would be Cartesian dualism. What I mean to suggest is something along the lines of what Richca suggested. If you go back to Pattern 1, 2, and 3 from an earlier post of mine, the physical facts can’t tell you which pattern specifically is the one i am implementing, so we need to appeal to some extra-physical principle that would determine which pattern is indeed being implemented. This principle is intentionality; it is always necessary to appeal to my intention; I need to have an intention to implement one and not the other, the intention is what determines the pattern, and the brain is only the medium through which this intention is represented. On this view, the relationship between brain and mind is analogous to the relationship between the physical words in a book and the meaning of said book. The meaning of the book is not reducible to the ink marks on the pages, but the ink marks on the pages are the means by which the meaning is represented.
Intentionality is a disputed subject in philosophy of mind, and I think it can’t be assumed a priori. Not sure if it exists, but if it does it might be an artifact of pattern seeking, which would be an elegant explanation :).

Either way, I think you have not escaped from substance dualism, since surely in hylomorphism, intentionality must necessarily be part of form (of the matter), or else it must be some other, non-material, substance?
 
Why should a person prefer hylomorphic dualism to competing positions in the philosophy of mind? I am interested in answers with respect to (what I take to be) its three principal competitors - materialism, idealism and substance dualism - although arguments why it is preferable to other less common positions (e.g. epiphenomenalism or property dualism or neutral monism) will also be welcome.

To clarify: presenting arguments against one specific competing view (e.g. arguments against materialism) does not in itself answer my request, since if (for example) materialism was disproven, that would not by itself prove hylomorphic dualism, since doing so would not exclude the possibility that another competing view (e.g. substance dualism) was true instead. However, if you could successfully knock off each of the major competing views (i.e. argue against materialism and idealism and subjective dualism, even if by separate arguments against each one), that would constitute a strong argument for hylomorphic dualism.

Finally, I am primarily looking for arguments based on natural reason, not those based on divine revelation (Scripture or Tradition).

Simon
Seeing as the nature of “form” and even of “matter” are constantly being re-explored, a concept such as “hylomorphic dualism” must be highly allusive if not un-pin-down-ably elusive.

It’s a bit like looking at the moon and trying to choose between a bus to Paris, a bus to Brussels and a bus to South Croydon.

To get to the moon, they had to carry on living their lives day to day.

A lasagne needs all its layers, otherwise it’s not on the way to being a lasagne.

Neurology is symbol-based.

That it is symbol-based doesn’t conclusively prove the existence of spirit (it might hint at it by implication) and doesn’t conclusively prove the non-existence of spirit.

The number of “isms” needed to even begin describing reality needs to be expanded to infinity!

We need to do much more to build up a colossal volume of hints and implications without having too many preconceptions about which fashionable brand names they may be “taken” to point towards or away from.
 
Unless you’re arguing that Jesus is a disciple of Aristotle, it doesn’t have anything to do with your claim that the highest good is loafing around contemplating Aristotle’s navel. You could always start a thread as it’s off-topic here.

You could always start a thread as it’s off-topic here.

Your capacity to read only what you want to read while ignoring the rest is wondrous to behold. Earlier in the thread you argued that racism might be rational, now you appear to be upset about demos against racism. I think there cannot be enough demos against racism, there should be a whole lot more, we should all dance on injustice[sup]*[/sup].

Christianity is about action. You could always start a thread as it’s off-topic here. I’d join in.
Except that…
  1. The particular protest at Yale wasn’t about racism except by thin association.
  2. Your depiction of Aristotle and contemplation is remarkably thick and about as wearisome to read as listening to those Yale protestors screaming their childish incapacity to see past their offended feelings. Which takes us to the absolute necessity for individuals to set right the proper internal priority of sound reason over sentiment - which is essentially what the life of contemplation is about.
    Despite your superficial claims about objectivity, you seem to have an affinity for the kind of fluff in the navel-gazing that is the stuff of the protests that you want to defend. I’ll take Aristotle over that nonsense every time. You are free to “join in” with them, since you obviously have some sympathy for what they are doing.
  3. I am not interested in another thread where you would “join in” and engage in the kind of predictable rhetorical deflection and wordplay that is your standard. 👋
 
This principle is intentionality; it is always necessary to appeal to my intention; I need to have an intention to implement one and not the other, the intention is what determines the pattern, and the brain is only the medium through which this intention is represented. On this view, the relationship between brain and mind is analogous to the relationship between the physical words in a book and the meaning of said book. The meaning of the book is not reducible to the ink marks on the pages, but the ink marks on the pages are the means by which the meaning is represented.
I would suspect that if intentionality were clearly understood your point would be a fairly obvious one, no a priori assumptions required.

The word “intend” would seem to be a shortened form of “inner tendency,” which would seem to be a feature of every entity in existence and which – bringing Aristotle back into the picture – would seem to be the reason he developed the idea of final causes.

Everything has a kind of in-built tendency towards some end or other. Rocks have an inner tendency towards staying put; trees towards growth by developing branches, leaves and roots; and the Sun towards producing heat and light.

An acorn has the in-built or “inner tendency” towards becoming, as its end “goal,” an oak tree. It “inwardly tends” or “intends” to become an oak tree. That end or goal is not foreseeable to the acorn, nor is the acorn “aware” in any sense of its “intending” to become an oak, but it is constructed so to achieve that end.

This kind of unconscious or unwilled “intent” inheres in the nature of the acorn because it depends entirely upon causal antecedents to bring about or activate the potential inherent within the acorn. The acorn doesn’t “choose” in any sense of the word its end goal, it simply moves towards it as a result of the relationship between its internal structure, “information” in the cells that make it up and the environment around it. The inner-tendency is obviously there because acorns don’t become pianos, aardvarks or large erratic rocks.

Now either the “inbuilt tendencies” or “intentions” of a human being are simply more of the same or substantially different. The inbuilt tendencies of higher order animals are typically quite predictable by human beings. Apes do ape things, porpoises do porpoise things. They carry on pretty much as they have always done with not much differentiation in behaviour – except perhaps when they model novel human behaviour.

Humans, are distinctively different from all animal species, especially in terms of the nature of our intentionality. We don’t simply “tend towards” a certain repertoire of ends. Our “inner tendency” or what we “intend” is not limited by causal mechanisms. In a very real sense, our capacity to be aware of and understand in a way that transcends the natural causal or “inbuilt” order of things permits us to look into the future, look at the past and study the present in order to interject novel causal sequences.

We can “intend” that which does not exist, that which isn’t a part of any “internal tendency” of our own because our intentions seem to far exceed the inbuilt tendencies of the material order from which we rose up. What we do and build is nowhere found in the natural order. That has to be explained.

The natural order can produce things far more complex and integrated than the things we create – cells, brains, ecosystems, etc. – but we intend and make things found nowhere else in the natural order – computing and communication devices, books, musical instruments, vehicles, engines, image and motion capture devices, etc.

These could not have been part of the natural or “inbuilt” tendency of matter, yet if they depend for their coming into existence entirely on human intellect and will, then, in some sense, human intellect and will were “intended” by the causal mechanisms inbuilt in the physical world. Where are those inbuilt tendencies found?

The possibility of human intellect and will to “intend” that which is beyond or transcends possibility for the material causal order would have been “inbuilt” into and, therefore, an “inner tendency” or “intended by” the causal order, itself. How could this be so?

That it just happened as a “natural” consequence of the inhering nature of the causal order seems to imply that causality isn’t as determined or determinable as it is made out to be. Or, just maybe, the existence of human will and intelligence is an indicator or clue of the “something more” that is behind the material order.

Given that we don’t really understand the nature of the material order, it would seem to be premature to speak of “reducing” mind to brain as if we truly understand what “matter” or “brain” really are. What we are bringing into our attempts to understand or “explain away” the mind are the legacies of a mechanistic view of matter from the eighteenth century because treating the “material” universe like a mechanical device was helpful at the time. Thus the distinction between mind and the machine it “inhabits” was thought to be a useful paradigm for explaining human beings in Cartesian terms.

Since, then it has become clear that the “machine” – as exemplified in brains, cells, living organisms, etc. – is far more complicated than was assumed, and that fact alone, it is wrongly assumed, makes mind unnecessary.

Getting away from a mechanistic view of nature and armed with a greater understanding of how the universe and the things in it are inherently “informed,” there has been a more recent return to an Aristotelian view of “informed substance” and a clear need to get away from the artificial separation of mind/information from mechanism, which is why hylomorphism is being reconsidered by new essentialist philosophers and physicists.
 
I would suspect that if intentionality were clearly understood your point would be a fairly obvious one, no a priori assumptions required.

The word “intend” would seem to be a shortened form of “inner tendency,” which would seem to be a feature of every entity in existence and which – bringing Aristotle back into the picture – would seem to be the reason he developed the idea of final causes.

Everything has a kind of in-built tendency towards some end or other. Rocks have an inner tendency towards staying put; trees towards growth by developing branches, leaves and roots; and the Sun towards producing heat and light.
Intentionality doesn’t refer to intentions, it refers to a mental state that is about something, as opposed to one which is not.

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philsophy

For reasons soon to be explained, in its philosophical usage, the meaning of the word ‘intentionality’ should not be confused with the ordinary meaning of the word ‘intention.’ - plato.stanford.edu/entries/intentionality/

Philosophy of Science: An Encyclopedia

Some things are about, or are directed on, or represent, other things. For example, the sentence ‘Cats are animals’ is about cats (and about animals), this article is about intentionality, Emanuel Leutze’s most famous painting is about Washington’s crossing of the Delaware, lanterns hung in Boston’s North Church were about the British, and a map of Boston is about Boston. In contrast, ‘#a$b’, a blank slate, and the city of Boston are not about anything. Many mental states and events also have “aboutness”: the belief that cats are animals is about cats, as is the fear of cats, the desire to have many cats, and seeing that the cats are on the mat. Arguably some mental states and events are not about anything: sensations, like pains and itches, are often held to be examples. Actions can also be about other things: hunting for the cat is about the cat, although tripping over the cat is not. This – rather vaguely characterized – phenomenon of “aboutness” is called intentionality. Something that is about (directed on, represents) something else is said to “have intentionality”, or (in the case of mental states) is said to be an “intentional mental state”. - web.mit.edu/abyrne/www/intentionality.html

Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Many mental states exhibit intentionality. If I believe that the weather is rainy today, this belief of mine is about today’s weather—that it is rainy. Desires are similarly directed at, or about things: if I desire a mosquito to buzz off, my desire is directed at the mosquito, and the possibility that it depart. Imaginings seem to be directed at particular imaginary scenarios, while regrets are directed at events or objects in the past, as are memories. And perceptions seem to be, similarly, directed at or about the objects we perceptually encounter in our environment. We call mental states that are directed at things in this way ‘intentional states’. - iep.utm.edu/intentio/
 
Intentionality doesn’t refer to intentions, it refers to a mental state that is about something, as opposed to one which is not.
It is very informative of you to point out this distinction, but the use of “intention,” the one about which Balto was speaking - especially the bolded part - would seem to include, or at least not exclude the “common” one that I addressed.
This principle is intentionality; it is always necessary to appeal to my intention; I need to have an intention to implement one and not the other, the intention is what determines the pattern, and the brain is only the medium through which this intention is represented…
Are you denying that we can have “intentions” in the common sense view or proposing that these are completely unrelated to the philosophical sense in which we might have them?
 
It is very informative of you to point out this distinction, but the use of “intention,” the one about which Balto was speaking - especially the bolded part - would seem to include, or at least not exclude the “common” one that I addressed.

Are you denying that we can have “intentions” in the common sense view or proposing that these are completely unrelated to the philosophical sense in which we might have them?
It will be for balto to say what he meant.

I thought it was worth saying that intentional is a term associated with Scholasticism, yet I’m the one who had to point that out.

:rotfl:

“Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object…” Franz Brentano quoted in plato.stanford.edu/entries/intentionality/

“Obviously the term “intentional,” too, goes back to the Scholastics. To my knowledge its first occurrence has not yet been traced, yet it is already used by Thomas Aquinas.” - books.google.es/books?id=XVVFBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA13&lpg=P13
 
It will be for balto to say what he meant.

I thought it was worth saying that intentional is a term associated with Scholasticism, yet I’m the one who had to point that out.

:rotfl:
My… how absolutely thrilling for you! :dancing:

Let’s celebrate, shall we? :choocho:

What was your point, again? :hmmm:
 
My… how absolutely thrilling for you! :dancing:

Let’s celebrate, shall we? :choocho:

What was your point, again? :hmmm:
In the context of people telling me earlier how little I know and understand, it was good to put a pin in that particular bubble.

It doesn’t even appear to be an obscure topic for Fesserians (or is it Fesserites? Fesseroons?). Just googled, and he’s blogged about intentionality more than once and devoted a 40 page chapter to it in his Philosophy of Mind (A Beginner’s Guide).
 
In the context of people telling me earlier how little I know and understand, it was good to put a pin in that particular bubble.

It doesn’t even appear to be an obscure topic for Fesserians (or is it Fesserites? Fesseroons?). Just googled, and he’s blogged about intentionality more than once and devoted a 40 page chapter to it in his Philosophy of Mind (A Beginner’s Guide).
It isn’t about what you know or understand, it is about what it is that you are proposing to be the established truth.

It’s Feser, by the way.

And when did anyone claim the topic was “obscure?”

Rather than just Google Feser, you might try reading what he actually has to say so that you have something substantial to add.

Never mind. We won’t “put a pin in that particular bubble.”

I should have stuck to my intention [disambiguation required apparently] of not responding to posts where you engage in frivolous word play.

I’m now going to say a prayer towards overcoming that particular flaw in my character.
 
And when did anyone claim the topic was “obscure?”
No idea how you got to that in responding to me saying “In the context of people telling me earlier how little I know and understand”. Which they did in post #27, “Clearly, you have been charmed and beguiled by scientism rather than by a robust understanding of what the real aim of any science ought to be”. And in post #37 “I am afraid you are being “dogmatic” AND inconsistent”. And in post #69 “This is your either/or mindset coming into play. It is a fundamentalism, of sorts, that keeps pushing you to reduce and simplify everything to “black or white” - for example, science or philosophy - in order to comprehend reality on your terms”.

I could go on. Then the chickens came home to roost, when that person wrote 870 words on a mistaken understanding of intentionality. Perhaps the moral is that if that person had stuck to the subject instead of making all those personal comments, he wouldn’t have dug himself into that particular hole.
I’m now going to say a prayer towards overcoming that particular flaw in my character.
Good to hear bro. 🙂

Back to the subject, in balto’s example I think it’s not possible to appeal to intentionality, in either the philosophical sense or in the ordinary sense of directing. Knowing the definition of patterns A, B and C is not the same as having the patterns burnt into the mind as programs. We may know an algorithm for calculating Pi to one billion decimal places, we may know everything about it and have studied it intensively for ten years, but that doesn’t mean we can mentally run the algorithm in our mind to compute one billion dp.
 
You may well be right, but it involves assumptions. We’re not computers, we have to learn to count, and it’s quite a laborious process, partly because ten was not a good choice for a number base, but mainly because we don’t have a computer’s AU (arithmetic unit) between our ears. So there’s no a priori reason to think we are doing the same thing in every case. It’s an interesting research topic: does everyone who is taught according to a standard Western syllabus do the same thing? (I’d predict no.) How about someone with learning difficulties? Someone who is unschooled but helped her dad on his market stall from an early age and so is ace at mental arithmetic? I think the claim is something which needs to be tested rather than assumed.
I think that would be an interesting question to ask, but it is not necessary to know if other people do the same thing every time they claim to be performing addition in order to understand the point that I am trying to make. The only thing necessary to understand is that when you, inocente, calculate 3+5 are you, inocente, really doing the same thing as when you calculate 5+6? I would think the answer would have to be yes otherwise you could not claim to be doing addition in both cases. If you are not really doing the same thing each time, then why do you think that you are?
Sorry about that, I think of it more as a series of levels of explanation. For instance, no one would try to explain an elephant in terms of quarks and electrons. There are several layers of explanation in-between, some in the subject area we call physics, several more in what we call chemistry, a whole lot more in biology, and excursions into other areas as well.

So, to me neurons are clumsily analogous to the quarks, and mind to the elephant. Brain is looking bottom-up, mind top-down, with several layers of explanation needed to get from one to the other, but they are the same thing.
Interesting, I think we are actually closer in our views than we think. The only possible point of disagreement in your analysis that I can see is whether we agree on what I am calling “reductionism.” For instance, can the biological level be completely explained without remainder in terms of physics? Many people say yes, but would say that biology is still a meaningful science because it is useful shorthand, because it would be far too complicated for anyone’s understanding to represent a biological system in terms of physical entities alone. So it is only an “in practice” limit and not an “in theory” limit. I would disagree with that claim and say that biology gives you real knowledge that could never be had at the physical level alone, even though it cannot exist without the physical elements. That is the view I am trying to apply to the mind/brain distinction.
Intentionality is a disputed subject in philosophy of mind, and I think it can’t be assumed a priori. Not sure if it exists, but if it does it might be an artifact of pattern seeking, which would be an elegant explanation :).
I think it can be assumed a priori because reality seems to be “top-down” rather than “bottom-up”, to use your previous analogy. The reason I say this is that any attempt to explain reality seems to presuppose that we have the intention to explain reality by our verbal utterances and physical actions. Otherwise it is not really an “explanation” of reality.

BTW, I am taking “intentionality” to mean what you described in your quote from MIT’s Philosophy of Science: An Encyclopedia, which I thought was what Peter meant by “inner tendencies.”
Either way, I think you have not escaped from substance dualism, since surely in hylomorphism, intentionality must necessarily be part of form (of the matter), or else it must be some other, non-material, substance?
I think I have but have maybe done a poor job of explaining the point again :o. Yes, intentionality is part of the form because it is part of what is actual in the rational agent. How are you understanding form here?
 
I would suspect that if intentionality were clearly understood your point would be a fairly obvious one, no a priori assumptions required.



That it just happened as a “natural” consequence of the inhering nature of the causal order seems to imply that causality isn’t as determined or determinable as it is made out to be. Or, just maybe, the existence of human will and intelligence is an indicator or clue of the “something more” that is behind the material order.
Yes, I agree with what you have written here.
Given that we don’t really understand the nature of the material order, it would seem to be premature to speak of “reducing” mind to brain as if we truly understand what “matter” or “brain” really are. What we are bringing into our attempts to understand or “explain away” the mind are the legacies of a mechanistic view of matter from the eighteenth century because treating the “material” universe like a mechanical device was helpful at the time. Thus the distinction between mind and the machine it “inhabits” was thought to be a useful paradigm for explaining human beings in Cartesian terms.

Since, then it has become clear that the “machine” – as exemplified in brains, cells, living organisms, etc. – is far more complicated than was assumed, and that fact alone, it is wrongly assumed, makes mind unnecessary.

Getting away from a mechanistic view of nature and armed with a greater understanding of how the universe and the things in it are inherently “informed,” there has been a more recent return to an Aristotelian view of “informed substance” and a clear need to get away from the artificial separation of mind/information from mechanism, which is why hylomorphism is being reconsidered by new essentialist philosophers and physicists.
This is the crux of the matter I think. The problem is that people seem to be hesitant to dismiss mechanism because they believe that by dismissing mechanism we are saying that some aspects of reality really can’t be explained after all, since they assume that explanation means showing that higher-level things are really just a complicated system of smaller parts. But our view is just attempting to point out the fact that the higher-level is more fundamental than this system, because this system can only be explained in reference to the whole, higher reality, and then we attempt to draw out all the consequences of this view. People can probably come to accept the hylomorphic view but are wary of the old terminology because they think that the old terminology contradicts modern science, which is why I have been trying to avoid using those terms as often as possible.
 
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