Why should a person prefer hylomorphic dualism to competing positions in the philosophy of mind?

[fisherman_carl]

I think the key to understanding why form/matter is not reductionist is realizing that form and matter do not denote separate things. This is what I was trying to allude to earlier on. It is not the case that there are these things called “forms” and this stuff called “matter” and when the two come together you have a perceivable thing. Form and matter are aspect of “thingness” itself.

For instance, by saying that a plant has a “vegetative soul” (i.e. it has the form of life), you are saying that it is fundamentally a different type of thing than non-living things. It therefore does not reduce to non-living things. The form specifies that it is part of a different class of things and therefore prevents reduction. Non-living things (i.e. the molecules) certainly enter into the plant’s nature, since that is the matter, the material cause of the plant. These material causes are not life itself, but the means by which life exists.

This is difficult to keep in mind at first, because the human intellect makes use of phantasms produced by the brain and imagination in order to do its reasoning. Whenever the imagination is given precedence, it will inevitably imagine two different things when thinking of form and matter, since whatever the imagination produces is by necessity a complete thing. So if you imagine form and matter, you have two separate things. The intellect has to continually be given precedence so that you keep in mind that form and matter are not things but aspects of thingness. Eventually this starts to happen more naturally on its own without having to consciously correct the imagination.

So its kind of like saying to a person you are a brown Ethiopian (versus a white Ethiopian)? By saying he is brown it distinguishes him from a white Ethiopian. Yet, it does not reduce him to his basic parts since brown is not a smaller or reduced component of him (He is not composed of “brownness”). Instead, brown is a distinguishing characteristic. He is this kind of Ethiopian versus that kind of Ethiopian. Similarly a tree has a distinct form from a bat. (In addition to a change in substance).

…

As I quoted before Feser says:

“As this indicates, hylemorphism is anything but a “reduction-istic” metaphysical position (that is, one claiming that some seemingly diverse or complex phenomena in reality consist of “nothing but” some more uniform or simpler set of elements). Certainly it is at odds with contemporary materialism; the suggestion that “matter is all that exists” becomes simply incoherent on a hylemorphic conception of matter, since matter by itself without anything else (including any form) would just be non-existent. Furthermore, while the hylemorphist holds that the substances of our ordinary experience are composites of form and matter, form and matter themselves in turn cannot be understood except in relation to the whole substances of which they are components. Hence the hylemorphic account is holistic and in no sense a “reduction” of substances even to their form and matter together.”

But, notice at the start he says “As this indicates”. What is “this” that he is talking about here? I didn’t include it before because it is hard to understand how it pertains to it, but do so now in case it aids our understanding. Keep in mind I can only include a small portion of it for brevity.

“To be sure, Aquinas tells us that “what is in potency to exist substantially is called prime matter” (DPN 1.2), or in other words that we can distinguish between matter having no form whatsoever (“prime matter”) and the various substantial forms that it has the potential to take on. But this distinction is for him a purely conceptual one. In reality, however matter may be transformed, it will always have some substantial form or other, and thus count as a substance of some kind or other; strictly speaking, “since all cognition and every definition are through form, it follows that prime matter can be known or defined, not of itself, but through the composite” (DPN 2.14). The notion of prime matter is just the notion of something in pure potentiality with respect to having any kind of form, and thus with respect to being any kind of thing at all. And as noted above, what is purely potential has no actuality at all, and thus does not exist at all.”

Can anyone explain to me how it follows from that paragraph that hylemporphism is not reductionistic?

 

[Wesrock]

So its kind of like saying to a person you are a brown Ethiopian (versus a white Ethiopian)? By saying he is brown it distinguishes him from a white Ethiopian. Yet, it does not reduce him to his basic parts since brown is not a smaller or reduced component of him (He is not composed of “brownness”). Instead, brown is a distinguishing characteristic. He is this kind of Ethiopian versus that kind of Ethiopian. Similarly a tree has a distinct form from a bat. (In addition to a change in substance).

…

As I quoted before Feser says:

“As this indicates, hylemorphism is anything but a “reduction-istic” metaphysical position (that is, one claiming that some seemingly diverse or complex phenomena in reality consist of “nothing but” some more uniform or simpler set of elements). Certainly it is at odds with contemporary materialism; the suggestion that “matter is all that exists” becomes simply incoherent on a hylemorphic conception of matter, since matter by itself without anything else (including any form) would just be non-existent. Furthermore, while the hylemorphist holds that the substances of our ordinary experience are composites of form and matter, form and matter themselves in turn cannot be understood except in relation to the whole substances of which they are components. Hence the hylemorphic account is holistic and in no sense a “reduction” of substances even to their form and matter together.”

But, notice at the start he says “As this indicates”. What is “this” that he is talking about here? I didn’t include it before because it is hard to understand how it pertains to it, but do so now in case it aids our understanding. Keep in mind I can only include a small portion of it for brevity.

“To be sure, Aquinas tells us that “what is in potency to exist substantially is called prime matter” (DPN 1.2), or in other words that we can distinguish between matter having no form whatsoever (“prime matter”) and the various substantial forms that it has the potential to take on. But this distinction is for him a purely conceptual one. In reality, however matter may be transformed, it will always have some substantial form or other, and thus count as a substance of some kind or other; strictly speaking, “since all cognition and every definition are through form, it follows that prime matter can be known or defined, not of itself, but through the composite” (DPN 2.14). The notion of prime matter is just the notion of something in pure potentiality with respect to having any kind of form, and thus with respect to being any kind of thing at all. And as noted above, what is purely potential has no actuality at all, and thus does not exist at all.”

Can anyone explain to me how it follows from that paragraph that hylemporphism is not reductionistic?

I believe Feser sums this up when he states: “Furthermore, while the hylemorphist holds that the substances of our ordinary experience are composites of form and matter, form and matter themselves in turn cannot be understood except in relation to the whole substances of which they are components.”

A reductionist can consider any atom in my body without considering me as a whole. He isn’t required to consider the whole in his study of the part. In hylemorphism you cannot consider form without matter or matter without form – in other words, in order to understand through this type of analysis you can only do so by studying it as a whole, as being ONE and undivided, cohering together. The substance isn’t being reduced down to parts for consideration, because form and matter are not parts in the sense of a machine being a collection of well-organized parts which can be disassembled.

Prime matter is purely conceptual. You can’t have matter without form in actuality. I can’t strip matter of its form. I can only consider it as a whole substance of form and matter.

 

[fisherman_carl]

I believe Feser sums this up when he states: “Furthermore, while the hylemorphist holds that the substances of our ordinary experience are composites of form and matter, form and matter themselves in turn cannot be understood except in relation to the whole substances of which they are components.”

A reductionist can consider any atom in my body without considering me as a whole. He isn’t required to consider the whole in his study of the part. In hylemorphism you cannot consider form without matter or matter without form – in other words, in order to understand through this type of analysis you can only do so by studying it as a whole, as being ONE and undivided, cohering together. The substance isn’t being reduced down to parts for consideration, because form and matter are not parts in the sense of a machine being a collection of well-organized parts which can be disassembled.

Prime matter is purely conceptual. You can’t have matter without form in actuality. I can’t strip matter of its form. I can only consider it as a whole substance of form and matter.

I agree.

Feser said : “form and matter themselves in turn cannot be understood except in relation to the whole substances of which they are components.”

In other words I think he is saying form and matter do not stand on their own. They are part of a composite. You can’t reduce a thing to one or the other. Any more than you can reduce an orchestra playing Bethoven’s 5th symphony to notes on a page.

Feser said “since all cognition and every definition are through form, it follows that prime matter can be known or defined, not of itself, but through the composite”

I think this statement is the clue that leads us to the next paragraph. The composite of what? Since Prime matter is something in pure potentiality to having any form it stands to reason that prime matter does not actually exist. But serves to conceptually demonstrate that matter can not exist without form. And thus this composite (form and matter) is needed for matter to be known by us. Or in other words Prime matter isn’t known by us. In order for it to be known it would have to take on form. But if it did that it would no longer be prime matter, but a composite.

 

[fisherman_carl]

I should add that Feser talks about form existing apart from matter. He gives examples as angels and human souls. However matter can not exist apart from form. As prime matter shows us.

 

[Wesrock]

I should add that Feser talks about form existing apart from matter. He gives examples as angels and human souls. However matter can not exist apart from form. As prime matter shows us.

Yes. Material beings can exist in categories. That is, there can be multiple beings with the same essence. (There are more than one hydrogen atom. There are more than one cat.) But if that is so, then these beings must have principles of similarity and difference. Form is how they are similar. Note, the difference then can’t also be in the form, because then we encounter a contradiction, because if the form between two beings is not the same, it’s no longer the similarity, and these two substances no longer fall into the same category. So the principle of difference must be some factor that further limits the way the form presents itself. This is matter. The being is made up of distinct matter unique to it at a point in spacetime.

The existence of immaterial beings is not ruled out, though. This isn’t a proof in and of itself, but an immaterial being would, by definition, have no matter. It would be a being of form only, (and not bound to a specific time or place).

But how could you tell one immaterial being from another? How could this being not be that being? Differences in form. Unlike material beings, each immaterial being would require a unique form. Angels, then, wouldn’t be a category in the way humans, cats, or hydrogen atoms are. It would essentially be a broader term referring to all immaterial beings whose essence is not the same as its existence.

This also leads to why there could only be one God (should such a being exist, which is conceptually possible but I haven’t shown in this post), because it follows that if every immaterial being has to have a unique form or essence, then there could only be one whose essence is the same as his existence, that is, there could only be one being with no limiting factors put on its existence.

There’s more to be said on being itself, and both the oneness and many of beings in our experience (why can’t all beings be the same? or why can’t all beings be completely unique with no principles of similarity? or why must each being be one, cohering together as something whole, in its own right, and not simply reducible to the sum of its parts?), and it’s an argument thay should come before what was said above, but I need to brush up on my notes on that.

If there’s anyone more versed on these arguments than me, and I know there are, please, please hop in and correct me if I’ve misstated anything. I am arguing from W. Norris Clarke, at the moment, not Feser.

 

[fisherman_carl]

…

Yes, I think some of what you wrote I remember reading in Feser’s book. For instance the part about how two things of the same form or essence are distinguished by their particular matter. Feser talks about a thing’s essence or what it is. The essence of a triangle is for instance having 3 sides. A blue triangle’s essence is not the color blue. For its color does not speak of what a triangle is, only that particular instance of it. It could be red or green, but its essence or form is the same. Each instance of the triangle is differentiated by their particular implementation of it. While, it’s essence or form for each remains the same.

To quote Feser:

"With respect to material things, “the term ‘essence’ signifies the composite of matter and form” (DEE 2), and not just the form alone; “otherwise,” Aquinas says, “there would be no difference between definitions in physics and in mathematics” (DEE 2). What he means is that when we understand what a material thing is, what we understand is different from the sort of thing we understand when studying geometry and the like, in that it is not a pure abstraction but something concrete. You can ignore the material structure of a particular circle, square, or triangle when learning a geometrical theorem, but you cannot ignore the material structure of particular rocks, trees, or animals when studying geology or biology. Hence matter is part of the essence of objects of the latter sort. At the same time, matter is for Aquinas the “principle of individuation” between members of a species of material things, that which makes them distinct things of the same type (DEE 2). So how can matter be part of the essence of trees (for example) – and thus common to all trees – and at the same time be that which distinguishes one tree from another? The answer is that we must make a distinction between matter in general, and this or that particular parcel of matter. It is the former, or “common matter,” that is part of the essence of trees, and the latter, or “designated matter,” that individuates one tree from another. All trees are material, but what makes this tree different from that one despite the fact that they have the same essence is that this one is composed of this particular hunk of matter, and that one is composed of that distinct particular hunk of matter.

With what Aquinas calls “separated substances” – that is to say, immaterial realities like the soul, angels, and God – things are not so straightforward. The soul, as we will see in chapter 4, must on Aquinas’s view be conjoined to matter at some point in its existence, even if it can exist beyond the death of the body. There is accordingly no difficulty in principle in explaining how one soul can be individuated from another, even if this requires a qualification to the thesis that matter is the principle of individuation. God, as shall see below, is necessarily unique in any case, so that the question of individuation cannot arise. But what about angels, which are supposed to be both distinct from one another and yet completely immaterial? An angel, says Aquinas, is a form without matter, and thus its essence corresponds to its form alone (DEE 4). But precisely because there is no matter to distinguish one angel in a species from another, “among these substances there cannot be many individuals of the same species. Rather, there are as many species as there are individuals” (DEE 4).

Does this mean that an angel, as a pure form, is also pure actuality, devoid of potency? By no means. Even an angel has to be created, and thus pass from potency to act. But since angels are immaterial, this cannot involve matter taking on a certain form. What it does involve is the form or essence being conjoined to what Aquinas calls an actus essendi or “act of existing.” Matter is “in potency” or only potential relative to form, which is what actualizes matter. But relative to the act of existing, both pure form (as in an angel) and a composite of form and matter (as in a material object) are themselves in potency or only potential. Hence even angels, like material things, are composites of act and potency insofar as they are composites of an essence with an act of existing (DEE 4).

Here we come at last to Aquinas’s famous doctrine of the distinction between essence and existence…"

 

[fisherman_carl]

Feser continued…

"To return again to our example of humanity, “it is … evident that the nature of man considered absolutely abstracts from every act of existing, but in such a way, however, that no act of existing is excluded by way of precision” (DEE 3). That is to say, there is nothing in our grasp of the essence humanity as such that could tell us whether or not any human beings actually exist, if we didn’t already know they did. In general, “every essence or quiddity can be understood without its act of existing being understood. I can understand what a man or phoenix is, and yet not know whether or not it exists in the nature of things” (DEE 4). The phoenix example is perhaps more instructive than the humanity one: someone unaware that the phoenix is entirely mythical might know that its “essence” is to be a bird that burns itself into ashes out of which a new phoenix arises, without knowing whether there really is such a creature. But in that case, “it is evident that the act of existing is other than essence or quiddity” for “whatever is extraneous to the concept of an essence or quiddity is adventitious, and forms a composition with the essence” (DEE 4). Or in other words, if it is possible to understand the essence of a thing without knowing whether it exists, its act of existing (if it has one) must be distinct from its essence, as a metaphysically separate component of the thing.

The significance of the distinction between essence and existence is indicated by another argument Aquinas gives for it. If essence and existence were not distinct, they would be identical; and they could be identical only in “something whose quiddity is its very act of existing … such that it would be subsistent existence itself” (DEE 4). That is to say, something whose essence is its existence would depend on nothing else (e.g. matter) for its existence, since it would just be existence or being. But there could only possibly be one such thing, for there would be no way in principle to distinguish more than one. We could not coherently appeal to some unique form one such thing has to distinguish it from others of its kind, “because then it would not be simply an act of existing, but an act of existing plus this certain form”; nor could we associate it with some particular parcel of matter, “because then it would not be subsistent existence, but material existence,” that is, dependent on matter for its being (DEE 4). In fact there is, in Aquinas’s view, a being in whom essence and existence are identical, namely God; and the identity of his essence and his existence entails (among other things) that God is a necessary being, one that cannot possibly not exist. But all of this shows that in everything other than God, essence and existence must be distinct. For in the case of material objects (for example) there is more than one member of each kind, and none of them exists in a necessary way but only contingently; and this would not be so if essence and existence were in these things identical."

 

[inocente]

It is interesting how you use words like “probably” to conclude “obviously wrong.”

Are you claiming that Feser or the string theorist believes “…that only form exists, that matter itself is nothing but form?” Your sentence isn’t very clear on that.

String theory claims that elementary particles are vibrations within additional spacetime dimensions which are curled very tightly on themselves. All is form.

I think Feser’s problem isn’t so much that he has the problem, but that his critics don’t bother to read much of what he says and then think they have sufficient knowledge to launch a critique. And I might add that his defenders frequently lack sufficient knowledge to sustain a credible defense precisely because his work is quite brilliant – much like Aquinas and Aristotle were. Which is why they all should be read much more carefully and completely.

I don’t know whether you’re right that Fesser is misunderstood by both his fans and critics, but brilliance is measured by ability to shed light, not ability to obfuscate.

I thought this thread was about hylomorphism, not about Feser’s fan club.

*Have you read any of Feser’s books, inocente? If not, and yet you still insist that you have the ability and credibility to carry out such “meaningful” attacks on him, it is clear who is doing the “howling” here.

And whether we agree or not on what Feser says simply means that what he says isn’t a simple matter to be fully comprehended from, or depicted in, a paragraph or two. Nor that what he says can be dismissed as tritely as you suppose.

Feser ought to employ muscle-bound henchmen to “coerce” those who begin reading his work to continue reading it until they get the complete picture – rather than some mistaken cursory “understanding” of it – before they go about critiquing it. Mostly to disabuse his critics of the notion that they do, in fact, “understand” what he is saying when they don’t have a clue.*

You may be his greatest fan, but imagining heavy-built henchmen doing violence to people to force them to read him is outrageous.

Yes, seems is the keyword (along with “perhaps,”) meaning that you are still far from demonstrating anything whatsoever.

Not that it was ever clear what it was that you were trying to demonstrate in the first place – other than a kind of low-level, noise-ridden skepticism with regard to everything you happen not to understand or agree with.

Argue it out with the writer of the article, hlorenz@princeton.edu

Why should a person prefer hylomorphic dualism? To avoid getting repeated personal insults and threats of muscle-bound henchmen. I’m going to ignore all further posts from you on this thread, please calm down. I’m just glad you don’t know my home address.

 

[inocente]

I think all we need to agree on is that “we see it that way”, which we seem to agree upon. It seems more natural to me anyway to accept that we see universals mentally before we ask whether they exist objectively. So it doesn’t matter for the purposes of this argument about the mind if we disagree about the objective status of universals or patterns. I will treat their objective status skeptically and not assume that they exist but I will assume that we really do think in terms of patterns.

OK, I’m still uneasy but let’s see where it takes us.

*I think you are right to bring this up, I should have defined these terms. By “material” I mean ultimately explicable without remainder in terms of the laws of physics, whereas an “immaterial” thing would not be explicable in terms of the laws of physics alone. Your proposed system of neurological circuitry would fit my understanding of material, so nothing you’ve said indicates to me that you are including some reference to an immaterial faculty. Maybe you wouldn’t word it that way so the following may clear up my position:

Going back to the above:

1. Patterns can be understood via material components of the human person only.
2. Patterns can be understood via material and immaterial components of the human person.

With both 1 and 2, given a person’s thought content, you should be able to determine the neurological state. That is true for both 1 and 2. However, if instead you are given the neurological state and a complete understanding of human neurology, with 1 you should be able to determinately identify the person’s thought content (where the thought content is a pattern of some sort), whereas with 2 you would not be able to determine the thought with certainty, even if you knew everything about human neurology. Assuming 2, you should only be able to, at best, give an educated guess about what the thought content is. So we may say that 1 assumes that neurology is determinate and 2 assumes that neurology is indeterminate as regards specific thought content. Does that clear things up? If so, in the next post I would like to explore whether we can decide if a pattern really can be identified with a neurological state.*

This would be in principle of course, since reading thoughts at such a detailed level may never be practical. Let me say it another way to see if we’re on the same page.

In general, the null hypothesis is that all phenomena can be fully explained from what is observed. In studying the mind, this proposes that all mental phenomena are fully explicable in terms of the nervous system. Any phenomena which cannot be explained in those terms would be labelled immaterial and would disprove the null hypothesis.

Thank you, I will check this out later in the week so I can understand more clearly what current thinking on the matter is.

In the section on origami, he says there’s a proof that any 3D form can be made by folding one sheet of paper.

 

[utunumsint]

I just want to make a few short points

In general, the null hypothesis is that all phenomena can be fully explained from what is observed.

This is not a scientific fact and therefore navel gazing.

In studying the mind, this proposes that all mental phenomena are fully explicable in terms of the nervous system.

This is not a scientific fact and therefore navel gazing.

Any phenomena which cannot be explained in those terms would be labelled immaterial and would disprove the null hypothesis.

This is not a scientific fact and therefore navel gazing.

God bless,
Ut

 

[inocente]

It doesn’t mean you aren’t part of one regardless.

Most of us don’t want to be pigeon-holed by a label unless we’ve sure we conform to all of the rules of said -ism.

*It is obstinacy when you spin out comments like this and think you have scored a point when all you have done is shoved your head in the sand and misrepresented what I’m sure by now you ought to know already. *

Why should a person prefer hylomorphic dualism? To avoid being called dumb, obstinate and dishonest.

Not sure who you think you’ll win over to hylomorphism with these emotional outbursts, maybe it works on twitter or some place.

inocente;13426210:

A pockmarked asteroid has a form, but contains no pattern.

A mosque can be decorated with abstract patterns but not with the forms of people or animals.

It’s not obstinacy to know that pattern and form are different, ask any artist. Well, ask anyone. Except, apparently, hylomorphists, who need to make out that the words are synonyms, for reasons I’m hoping someone will explain.

The form and matter distinction has to do with substances. Substances have form. These forms characterize the substance. The universe is made from bottom to top of substances that have forms. From bosons and fermions to human beings and elephants. Forms are a pattern that characterize the substance. The absence of pattern you describe in an asteroid is because it is an amalgamation of different substances. But you would not even have the possibility of an absence of pattern without those substances to arrange in such a disorganized way.

Now, science is in the business of discovering these forms. Every time they make a new discovery about something, they get to know more about its form and how the substances behave. They also discover things about how substances interact with one another, sometimes in orderly, sometimes in disorderly ways. These substances sometimes change. They can be transformed from one substance to another. But with substances, there is always either an accidental change where the substance remains or a substantial change, where the substance changes from one type to another. This change typically means the exchange of one form for another form.

The only possible exception to this might be a black hole where everything that makes up matter is potentially lost forever. But even there, the black hole itself is not nothing. It also has a form, even though we can only really understand its outer edges.

Don’t know why you wrote that, I can’t see any argument for your claim that pattern and form are the same.

This is not a scientific fact and therefore navel gazing.

Agreed, an hypothesis is not a scientific fact.

The clue is in the name.

 

[Peter_Plato]

You may be his greatest fan, but imagining heavy-built henchmen doing violence to people to force them to read him is outrageous.

Almost, as “outrageous” as the way you are now twisting what I said.

I didn’t say Feser should employ henchmen to force people to read what he writes. I said if people are going to take it upon themselves to be his spokesmen and put words into his mouth – especially words he does not say – claiming THOSE words to be his, then I suggested facetiously that he should employ henchmen to coerce SUCH individuals to read until they really understand what he wrote and only then speak that PROPER understanding properly.

It is determinably a case of Feser protecting his oral health – that is, keeping invasive and possibly dangerous foreign busybodies away from his mouth.

 

[Peter_Plato]

Why should a person prefer hylomorphic dualism? To avoid getting repeated personal insults and threats of muscle-bound henchmen.

That isn’t the reason nor does it follow from what I said. Which, again, goes to your willingness to actually understand what others say rather than to put words and implications into their mouths.

Hence, the need for henchmen.

I’m going to ignore all further posts from you on this thread, please calm down.

I expected nothing less.

When you can’t frame the words of others to suit, time to refrain from framing those words.

Which takes us back to the henchmen – they will no longer be needed, then.

BUT, they ARE ready to act should you decide to renege.

I’m just glad you don’t know my home address.

Too, late! I only employ the best.

 

[Peter_Plato]

Don’t know why you wrote that, I can’t see any argument for your claim that pattern and form are the same.

It isn’t clear to me that he said they were “the same.”

Patterns, to be made sense of at all require something very like forms to exist. Patterns are repetitions of determinable features. How are those features determined without a distinctive set of properties that describe the “whatness” or form of the thing? (I.e., the features of the thing which are found to repeat.)

 

[fisherman_carl]

Going back to this idea of contrasting reductionism vs hylemorphism, because I think it is key in answering the OP’s question. I went back to see if anyone actually answered the OP’s question at the start and found they did and it was related to this contrast. There were really two answers that addressed this issue from the start, which I will quote here.

In the following quotes claim reductionism goes both ways to the extremes of materialism or idealism.

I think hylomorphic dualism has a lot going for it because idealism and materialism are really two ends of the same Cartesian substance dualism coin. Materialism tries to reduce or eliminate all mental phenomena to physical interactions. Idealism tries to reduce or eliminate all physical phenomena to mental phenomena. This division was mainly created by Descartes. He could never figure out how his two substances could talk to each other (despite his pineal gland theory).

Hylomorphic dualism resolves this problem by postulating a much richer view of the material world with the four causes and by admitting qualitative features of matter. The Cartesian view eliminates anything but the quantitative features of matter and thus you get a truncated view of the physical world.

God bless,
Ut

You are referring to observed correlations between mental phenomena and biological processes in the human brain. We know these correlations exist, although our knowledge of the details of them are still rather patchy, but our understanding keeps on improving, and we have every reason to believe that our understanding will continue to grow. You, like many other people today, seem to think these correlations are some sort of argument for materialism; I don’t agree.

A reductionist materialist says the mind is correlated with the brain because the mind is reducible to the brain. But, if a correlation between A and B is evidence of a relationship of reduction between A and B, why does the existence of such a correlation dictate that the arrow of reduction go in one direction only? A reductionist idealist can say the same thing with the arrow of reduction reversed: the brain is correlated with the mind because the brain is reducible to the mind.

Even dualists have a response: while the existence of a relationship of reduction is one possible explanation for an observed correlation, there may be non-reductionist explanations of the same correlation. It is possible for A and B to be closely correlated even when A and B are fundamentally irreducible to each other.

So, while it is a good thing that we are learning more and more about these correlations, doing so brings us no closer to answering the big questions in the philosophy of mind. As an idealist, I believe that idealism can explain these correlations just as well as materialism can. I’m sure many dualists take the same view about dualism. No matter how much more information about correlations between the brain and the mind we acquire, it will give us no more reason to believe in materialism, since that information will always have non-materialist interpretations.

Simon

 

[fisherman_carl]

The OP, who was asking about hylemorphism admits the real barrier to accepting it is in understanding it. Which is I think a key point and the crux of our disagreements here. Distracted by the many battlling comments, no one responded to his statement here.

For me, the biggest problem with hylomorphic dualism is that I don’t feel I understand it. I started out as a reductionist materialist - mental phenomena are reducible to physical phenomena. I then realised I could swap the arrow of reduction around, and easily arrive at reductionist idealism - as the mirror image, or dual, of reductionist materialism. So, in that way, both materialism and idealism make sense to me, although I feel idealism is the better of those two options. And if both materialism and idealism make sense to a person, then substance dualism will make sense too - even though I feel it is inferior to the monist alternatives. I have an intellectual structure into which materialism, idealism and substance dualism fit, which I feel gives me an understanding of them, and an ability to decide between them. But I don’t understand how to fit hylomorphic dualism into this structure, so I don’t feel I can understand, nor do I feel capable of judging its truth.

Simon

Perhaps the answer to his question is that hylemorphism is a non-reductionist philosophy. Rather than reducing things to either the mind or matter. Why reduce things to one or the other?

The danger of reductionism is as fr. Spitzer says trying to fit a square peg in a round hole. Trying to force for instance immaterial thoughts into a physical process. In doing so we can commit errors of omission rather than commission. In a reductionist mentality we are losing something that could be of immense value.

 

[utunumsint]

Most of us don’t want to be pigeon-holed by a label unless we’ve sure we conform to all of the rules of said -ism.

Based on the things you’ve said in this thread, I would apply the label scientism to you.

Why should a person prefer hylomorphic dualism? To avoid being called dumb, obstinate and dishonest.

Not sure who you think you’ll win over to hylomorphism with these emotional outbursts, maybe it works on twitter or some place.

I’m just calling a spade a spade. You have made no attempt to understand the explanations given.

Don’t know why you wrote that, I can’t see any argument for your claim that pattern and form are the same.

This just proves my point. And you have misrepresented what I’m arguing for.

Agreed, an hypothesis is not a scientific fact.The clue is in the name.

I think I will open up a new thread on scientism. I don’t think I’ve seen one yet in this form. It would be good to explore the kinds of attitudes on display here.

God bless,
Ut

 

[utunumsint]

The OP, who was asking about hylemorphism admits the real barrier to accepting it is in understanding it. Which is I think a key point and the crux of our disagreements here. Distracted by the many battlling comments, no one responded to his statement here.

Perhaps the answer to his question is that hylemorphism is a non-reductionist philosophy. Rather than reducing things to either the mind or matter. Why reduce things to one or the other?

The danger of reductionism is as fr. Spitzer says trying to fit a square peg in a round hole. Trying to force for instance immaterial thoughts into a physical process. In doing so we can commit errors of omission rather than commission. In a reductionist mentality we are losing something that could be of immense value.

Hi Carl,

I think this is a really good point. Hylomorphism stands between these two extremes.

Its too bad that I did not engage with SimmieKay earlier. Perhaps he could have given some more specifics on what he did not understand.

God bless,
Ut

 

[Ben_Quincy]

Thread Warning:

Discuss the topic, not each other.

 

[balto]

The OP, who was asking about hylemorphism admits the real barrier to accepting it is in understanding it. Which is I think a key point and the crux of our disagreements here. Distracted by the many battlling comments, no one responded to his statement here.

Perhaps the answer to his question is that hylemorphism is a non-reductionist philosophy. Rather than reducing things to either the mind or matter. Why reduce things to one or the other?

The danger of reductionism is as fr. Spitzer says trying to fit a square peg in a round hole. Trying to force for instance immaterial thoughts into a physical process. In doing so we can commit errors of omission rather than commission. In a reductionist mentality we are losing something that could be of immense value.

I think the difficulty lies in the fact that we seem to understand that there is a subjective, first-person point of view which the means by which everyone comes into contact with the objective, external world, and then we erroneously try to interpret that knowledge in a reductionist framework. Materialism, idealism, and substance dualism seem to all rely on reductionist principles, as you noted. Materialism attempts to reduce everything to a fundamental objective unit, idealism attempts to reduce everything to a fundamental subjective unit, and substance dualism tries to reduce everything to either an objective unit or a subjective unit. As long as people are trying to interpret hylomorphism with reductionist principles, it will be difficult for them to understand hylomorphism. We are so tempted to reduce everything to some smaller unit because that is what we have been taught to do for so long. When we, for instance, analyze life at the molecular level, we are at a more abstract level of reality, not a more real level. I think Prof. Feser wrote about this tendency in an article entitled “don’t concretize the abstract”, or something along those lines.