Why should a person prefer hylomorphic dualism to competing positions in the philosophy of mind?

[inocente]

Right, we recognize “patterns in nature.” So your only objection is that you do not like the term “form” and would rather use “pattern.”

You added the “in nature” bit. Humans can’t help but find patterns, we see faces in clouds, we create superstitions by finding spurious associations between effects, you just linked “form” with “pattern”, as if you couldn’t help it. We all tend to do it, but I doubt any of those patterns are what Aristotle meant by form.

Substance is also not a category since it refers to anything** and could only be contrasted with non-being, which is not a thing and hence not a category.

Have a look at Aristotle’s The Categories. What’s the first category, οὐσία, in English? SUBSTANCE.

Only if you suppose that forms are things, which hylomorphism denies.

I guess you meant if one supposes.

This must be some kind of debating strategy. Never adopt any specific viewpoint explicitly so you can always cry foul and say “that’s not what I meant.” And then invent wild interpretations of what other people wrote so you can feign righteous indignation. I’m sorry, but I am not really amused by mere rhetoric. Would you like to offer an argument against the hylomorphic viewpoint, or should I just keep guessing? I’m not really doing any of this to convert you since I already know that you are not interested in seriously investigating the topic. I am doing it because I think it may help me to understand my own views better and may be helpful to anyone reading this thread that is serious about understanding these issues.

There you go again. Right in the middle of telling me how you don’t make up stuff up about me, you make up some more stuff about me. How can you possibly know that when we’ve never met? I’ve linked research I found in the past, how is that not being serious? I’ve taken part in this kind of thread on CAF several times before, how is that not being serious? Humans might be good at finding patterns, but that’s no reason to ignore all the evidence and assert spurious patterns.

Is any of this relevant to our discussion of hylomorphism? Is there some bogeyman walking around in here or something? Even if there were it has no bearing on whether “a person should prefer hylomorphic dualism to competing positions in philosophy of mind”, so I don’t see the value in discussing it.

I was responding to your “You are asking this question because you suppose that reality is “nothing but” the atoms”, yet another example of your absolute certainty about the spurious conclusions you jump to.

inocente;13409181:

Why should a person prefer hylomorphic dualism? After 70 posts, it would have been good to see just one positive reason.

We have tried to patiently explain it to you on numerous occasions, but you do not want to understand it. My hope is that this discussion has been useful to others.

Is that a royal “we”? I definitely missed all your posts where you patiently explained the reasons why a person should prefer hylomorphism. Earlier, I linked research explaining racism, just one example of why neuroscience might be preferred on moral grounds. Also research which might give sight back to the blind, just one example of why neuroscience might be preferred on compassionate grounds. And that research is based on research which shows that the only information leaving the eyes is a stream of digital codes, which our brains turn into the images we see in our minds, just one example of why neuroscience might be preferred on intellectual grounds.

Perhaps you would be kind enough to repeat, for the benefit of others at least, all the reasons why I’m wrong, and why a more intelligent and more interested person should prefer hylomorphism on moral, compassionate and intellectual grounds.

I’d also vote to either stopping here, or getting back to the subject rather than discussing each other.

 

[inocente]

I did not claim that a paella is not part of our universe. The argument presented above is why Aristotle modified Plato’s theory of forms to the hylomorphic viewpoint, which does not propose that forms are separately-existing entities in some third realm.

Sure, but I was just saying that no thing is truly separate since it is part of the world, dust to dust, etc.

*I doubt too many people have ever heard the term “hylomorphic” or “act/potency” or “form/matter” but I also don’t think that many people understand the terminology that vision scientists use. It would not follow that they do not really see anything since they have not formally considered/understand vision science. Everybody I know reasons by classifying things into particular types. They recognize that things of a particular type tend to have specific activities that flow from the type of thing that they are. They recognize that things really do undergo change without ceasing to be what they are, because there are non-essential elements of the thing that are capable of change. Even the scientists I work with do this. They implicitly assume hylomorphism when they reason about anything. It is a fact that we reason this way. So you either affirm that these thoughts correspond to reality or you deny it, in which case you cannot claim to know anything about reality.

Hylomorphism is a metaphysical theory that attempts to make this phenomenon come under explicit consideration of the intellect. Since good epistemology presupposes good metaphysics, there would be necessary hylomorphic implications on psychology.

What I don’t understand is, when something is unclear to you, you do not just ask for clarification. Instead you seem to resort to being utterly sarcastic and dismissive of everything that people write on the subject. This kind of behavior would not be tolerated in any other form of rational discourse, so I don’t know why it is appropriate for only this subject matter in particular.*

Yet again you jump to a conclusion about me, this time you somehow know what I do and don’t understand. And then you play holier than thou. That kind of behavior should never be tolerated. Etc. :coffeeread:

Still, let’s get back to the subject. A Freudian would likewise claim her theory of psychology is correct. I could ask for your evidence that everyone implicitly assumes hylomorphism, but still think that’s something of a daydream, since if it were true then the subject would be taught in every school, and everyone would have heard of it rather than so few.

Your examples really only show that our minds recognize and analyze patterns, an outcome of multi-layer neuronal circuits. To specifically prove hylomorphism you would need to show that it captures how all humans everywhere reason. In other words map it to the species Homo sapiens rather than just a subset raised in some cultures, but even the latter sounds a tall order. Even then there would be a sting in the tail, since all it could ever tell us is how our minds think about our minds, a self-fulfilling prophecy.

 

[inocente]

This is where I begin to wonder whether you understand some of the very basic building blocks of logic.

I can do little about what causes you bafflement.

*Even if this “one piece of research” did completely demonstrate that every instance of racism ever documented was “born out of ‘irrational’ fears,” the question could still be asked whether racism could ever be, in principle, a reasoned position or whether a group of humans may possibly exist ever that could be rationally feared. The presence or absence of fears does not establish the rational justifiability of racism, only the genesis of it. Whether racism is reaonable or not isn’t a question of measuring fear, it is a question of reason. Fear has really nothing to do with it.

“Do there possibly exist rational – as opposed to irrational – reasons to be racist?” is quite a different question from “Have racists up to now been so because of fear?”

You do understand what the genetic fallacy is, yes?*

Fear is emotion and always irrational. It is mediated by reasoning (not necessarily conscious reasoning) and so can become rational. The racist fear response presumably evolved at some point to provide a survival benefit, perhaps tribal. There are numerous such traits which have outlasted any benefit they may once have conferred, which we also mediate.

A posteriori arguments rest on balance of evidence rather than remote possibilities.

Your argument that we must do nothing to combat racism on the off-chance that someone might be acting rationally has one other flaw. All racists probably believe their racism is rational, but it’s now possible to test the claim. The research tells us exactly where in the brain the fear response originates. If that part of the brain doesn’t light up when the subject views images of other ethnicities, she may be telling the truth. But if it lights up, her racism is irrational, since the fear response comes first.

Here’s hoping that logic is so basic it causes you no further bafflement.

 

[Peter_Plato]

I can do little about what causes you bafflement.

Fear is emotion and always irrational. It is mediated by reasoning (not necessarily conscious reasoning) and so can become rational. The racist fear response presumably evolved at some point to provide a survival benefit, perhaps tribal. There are numerous such traits which have outlasted any benefit they may once have conferred, which we also mediate.

A posteriori arguments rest on balance of evidence rather than remote possibilities.

Your argument that we must do nothing to combat racism on the off-chance that someone might be acting rationally has one other flaw. All racists probably believe their racism is rational, but it’s now possible to test the claim. The research tells us exactly where in the brain the fear response originates. If that part of the brain doesn’t light up when the subject views images of other ethnicities, she may be telling the truth. But if it lights up, her racism is irrational, since the fear response comes first.

Here’s hoping that logic is so basic it causes you no further bafflement.

Well, this is just a bizarre argument. You claim that fear “can become rational,” which, I take it, means something like the external causes of that fear could provide a rational basis for it and, therefore, the fear would be rationally warranted. Ergo, all fears are not irrational, at all. The word “irrational” means “not logical or reasonable.” However, by claiming that fears can “become” rational you are admitting some fears may be justifiable by reason and therefore be “rational” fears, and not “irrational,” after all.

Whether or not a part of the brain shows a fear response has really nothing to do with whether the person has rational warrant to have the fear response. Merely because the fear is there says nothing about the reasons for it being there – lit up brain parts, notwithsatnding – does it?

I would suppose you initially meant that fears are “arational” rather than “irrational.” Which is fine, as far as that goes, but at least be precise about what you mean before you claim it to be true.

A chair is an arational entity, but whether I should make use of one or keep one on hand is, or at least can be, a rational decision. It may be said that my decision to keep a chair at a particular place is an irrational or rational one, but we would NOT call the chair “irrational” merely because of my decision regarding what to do with it. Similarly with fears. They are arational in much the same sense. The fear inside my brain is no more rational or irrational, in and of itself, than the chair that sits beside my desk – although I might be called “irrational” for having certain fears at inapproriate times just as I would be for keeping a chair on my roof. That wouldn’t be the fault of the chair, though. Would it? Nor of the fear, I would suppose. I might be rationally justified in having a fear or I might be called irrational for having it, but the fear wouldn’t be “irrational,” unless one were speaking colloquially or using imprecise language.

The other issue with the claims of your research is that the emotion of fear is – by your analysis – supposed to PRECEDE the rational judgement. I would highly doubt whether that is shown merely by areas of the brain being lit up, since it isn’t clear which areas of the brain are determinably “lit up” by the process of deliberation and the precise moment when a particular individual has decided upon the truth or validity of an impression or whether they were still processing the possible warrant they might have for thinking it to be true when the fear response “lit up” the brain. Did the judgement precede, was simultaneous with or succeed the fear?

Even in the case of ANY of the three possibilities, the question could still be asked whether the fear was rationally justified or not, independent of its mere existence.

Yes, this would seem to be basic logic.

 

[Peter_Plato]

Still, let’s get back to the subject. A Freudian would likewise claim her theory of psychology is correct. I could ask for your evidence that everyone implicitly assumes hylomorphism, but still think that’s something of a daydream, since if it were true then the subject would be taught in every school, and everyone would have heard of it rather than so few.

Hylomorphism is a metaphysical view of reality. Since when is metaphysics taught “in every school?” I rather doubt that “everyone” has heard of most of the terms used by philosophers doing metaphysics.

Is this an argument of yours for why ALL metaphysical views are wrong, then? Because they are not “taught in every school” and because “everyone” has not heard of them?

Isn’t it better explained by the fact that metaphysics, as a discipline, is a higher order one – one that encompasses all disciplines and since most subjects in school specialize because most students would be overwhelmed by trying to grapple with world views before they have any kind of a handle on the specifics, the area of metaphysics is beyond the reach of most individuals?

And, yet here you go trying to pit specific areas of study against the larger views as if they dealt with precisely the same topics at the same level.

Personally, I think your contrasting brain research with hylomorphism is simply making a category error, but then you don’t seem to appreciate the idea of “category” in the first place, so I suppose that would be a “dismissible offense” as far as you are concerned.

 

[balto]

You added the “in nature” bit. Humans can’t help but find patterns, we see faces in clouds, we create superstitions by finding spurious associations between effects, you just linked “form” with “pattern”, as if you couldn’t help it. We all tend to do it, but I doubt any of those patterns are what Aristotle meant by form.

Then what do you think Aristotle meant by form?

Have a look at Aristotle’s The Categories. What’s the first category, οὐσία, in English? SUBSTANCE.

This is actually interesting.
Metaphysics:

But it is impossible for either Unity or Being to be one genus of existing things. For there must be differentiae of each genus, and each differentia must be one2; but it is impossible either for the species of the genus to be predicated of the specific differentiae, or for the genus to be predicated without its species.3 Hence if Unity or Being is a genus, there will be no differentia Being or Unity.But if they are not genera, neither will they be first principles, assuming that it is the genera that are first principles.

Here is Aquinas’ commentary, which is more clear:
Summa Contra Gentiles:

Now, that being cannot be a genus is proved by the Philosopher in the following way [Metaphysics III, 3]. If being were a genus we should have to find a difference through which to contract it to a species. But no difference shares in the genus in such a way that the genus is included in the notion of the difference, for thus the genus would be included twice in the definition of the species. Rather, the difference is outside what is understood in the nature of the genus. **But there can be nothing that is outside that which is understood by being, if being is included in the concept of the things of which it is predicated. Thus, being cannot be contracted by any difference. Being is, therefore, not a genus. **From this we conclude necessarily that God is not in a genus.

Emphasis mine. That seems to support my original claim that substance is not a category (genus), since it would involve contrasting being with non-being, which is not a class since it cannot include anything.

 

[balto]

There you go again. Right in the middle of telling me how you don’t make up stuff up about me, you make up some more stuff about me. How can you possibly know that when we’ve never met? I’ve linked research I found in the past, how is that not being serious? I’ve taken part in this kind of thread on CAF several times before, how is that not being serious?

No I don’t know you, I’ve never met you and you’ve never met me. I only know that whenever these discussions occur it usually ends in some kind of silliness usually involving, but not limited to, accusations of “navel-gazing”, “being anti-scientifc”, not concerned with real world problems like scientists are, non-sequiturs involving lunary spheres and the four elements, being out-of-date, etc. It is not serious when you don’t treat the other position with respect.

Humans might be good at finding patterns, but that’s no reason to ignore all the evidence and assert spurious patterns.

What evidence and what “spurious” patterns?

I was responding to your “You are asking this question because you suppose that reality is “nothing but” the atoms”, yet another example of your absolute certainty about the spurious conclusions you jump to.

Then why are you asking the question? You keep saying that “neuroscientists will figure this out”, implying that the mind reduces to a material phenomenon, so then I try to reason why you might think that way and am met with hostility about how I am insulting you by suggesting that a mother would think her baby is a “bag of atoms.”

Is that a royal “we”? I definitely missed all your posts where you patiently explained the reasons why a person should prefer hylomorphism. Earlier, I linked research explaining racism, just one example of why neuroscience might be preferred on moral grounds. Also research which might give sight back to the blind, just one example of why neuroscience might be preferred on compassionate grounds. And that research is based on research which shows that the only information leaving the eyes is a stream of digital codes, which our brains turn into the images we see in our minds, just one example of why neuroscience might be preferred on intellectual grounds.

See, this is what I mean. Why would neuroscience be preferred to hylomorphism? Neuroscience studies the brain and hylomorphism studies metaphysics. The two are not in competition.

Perhaps you would be kind enough to repeat, for the benefit of others at least, all the reasons why I’m wrong, and why a more intelligent and more interested person should prefer hylomorphism on moral, compassionate and intellectual grounds.

There’s no reason to repeat it, anyone who is interested can simply re-read the thread.

 

[balto]

Sure, but I was just saying that no thing is truly separate since it is part of the world, dust to dust, etc.

And I agreed with that. I was trying to point out that you are having difficulties because you are assuming that a form refers to a separate thing. Let me guess, the response will be that I am jumping to conclusions about your views. Yet if you were not assuming that, you would not have written what you wrote.

Yet again you jump to a conclusion about me, this time you somehow know what I do and don’t understand. And then you play holier than thou. That kind of behavior should never be tolerated. Etc. :coffeeread:

If you understood what was being said here you would not be writing the kinds of responses that you are writing. And when you write things like “did John say God so loved the world that he sent us Aristotle”, “maybe Christians study science because they want to use God’s creation to help people and aren’t afraid to learn”, and “you must have been amused to see that real philosophers call it psychology rather than being smart enough to call it philosophy”, those would be an instances of “being sarcastic” and not taking people seriously.

Still, let’s get back to the subject. A Freudian would likewise claim her theory of psychology is correct. I could ask for your evidence that everyone implicitly assumes hylomorphism, but still think that’s something of a daydream, since if it were true then the subject would be taught in every school, and everyone would have heard of it rather than so few.

You just gave the evidence in the next sentence.

Your examples really only show that our minds recognize and analyze patterns

Why would you think that it would need to be taught everywhere? First of all, not too many people think at a level that is high enough to understand metaphysics. Secondly, why would it be necessary to teach it when everyone implicitly thinks this way, because that is what reasoning is? It would be like saying that we need to teach people about how the eye works because otherwise they can’t really see anything.

an outcome of multi-layer neuronal circuits.

This is debatable however. How is it that we really understand patterns when patterns are “multiply-realizable” and every neuronal instantiation of it will be one particular realization of the pattern and not the pattern itself?

To specifically prove hylomorphism you would need to show that it captures how all humans everywhere reason. In other words map it to the species Homo sapiens rather than just a subset raised in some cultures, but even the latter sounds a tall order.

We already know that this is the case. How else do people reason if not by classification and analyzing the difference between classifications? You keep confusing brain activity with mental activity. The racism study you linked to is a good example. Racism is an intentional phenomenon. You have to interpret a specific instance of fear as being “about” or “meaning” racist thoughts. The fact that the brain oftentimes processes fearful emotions when a person considers racist thoughts does not explain where this intentionality is coming from. That is the difference between intellect (supplies intentionality) and imagination (supplies the emotion as a faculty of the brain).

 

[inocente]

Well, this is just a bizarre argument. You claim that fear “can become rational,” which, I take it, means something like the external causes of that fear could provide a rational basis for it and, therefore, the fear would be rationally warranted. Ergo, all fears are not irrational, at all. The word “irrational” means “not logical or reasonable.” However, by claiming that fears can “become” rational you are admitting some fears may be justifiable by reason and therefore be “rational” fears, and not “irrational,” after all.

Whether or not a part of the brain shows a fear response has really nothing to do with whether the person has rational warrant to have the fear response. Merely because the fear is there says nothing about the reasons for it being there – lit up brain parts, notwithsatnding – does it?

If a screaming maniac has a gun to your head playing Russian Roulette and you have a fear response, you might reasonably conclude that your fear response is reasonable in the circumstances. Unlike someone who has a fear response when safely and calmly looking at pictures of faces.

I would suppose you initially meant that fears are “arational” rather than “irrational.” Which is fine, as far as that goes, but at least be precise about what you mean before you claim it to be true.

The CAF spellchecker has never heard of “arational”, and debating whether obscure words are more precise would seem to obscure the obvious point that fear is a feeling, and a feeling is not a rational argument.

The other issue with the claims of your research is that the emotion of fear is – by your analysis – supposed to PRECEDE the rational judgement. I would highly doubt whether that is shown merely by areas of the brain being lit up, since it isn’t clear which areas of the brain are determinably “lit up” by the process of deliberation and the precise moment when a particular individual has decided upon the truth or validity of an impression or whether they were still processing the possible warrant they might have for thinking it to be true when the fear response “lit up” the brain. Did the judgement precede, was simultaneous with or succeed the fear?

Research on racism makes use of existing knowledge of the function of the brain areas involved. Mediation is performed by the brain area known to be responsible for conflict resolution. It acts after the fear response, since prior to the response there’s obviously no conflict for it to resolve.

Don’t have much time today, sorry. Watch this BBC documentary from 32:30 to 37:00 to see tests being made on the journalist, and her reaction to the findings: youtube.com/watch?v=rP1o0qDIiec

For more detail, here’s Prof. Phelps of NYU: youtube.com/watch?v=aowC79-Au-c

Hylomorphism is a metaphysical view of reality. Since when is metaphysics taught “in every school?” I rather doubt that “everyone” has heard of most of the terms used by philosophers doing metaphysics.

Is this an argument of yours for why ALL metaphysical views are wrong, then? Because they are not “taught in every school” and because “everyone” has not heard of them?

Isn’t it better explained by the fact that metaphysics, as a discipline, is a higher order one – one that encompasses all disciplines and since most subjects in school specialize because most students would be overwhelmed by trying to grapple with world views before they have any kind of a handle on the specifics, the area of metaphysics is beyond the reach of most individuals?

And, yet here you go trying to pit specific areas of study against the larger views as if they dealt with precisely the same topics at the same level.

Personally, I think your contrasting brain research with hylomorphism is simply making a category error, but then you don’t seem to appreciate the idea of “category” in the first place, so I suppose that would be a “dismissible offense” as far as you are concerned.

I think maybe you were in an argumentative mood when you wrote that. Remember that the SEP classes hylomorphism of the mind as part of Aristotle’s psychology, not metaphysics.

The claim I was responding to was that hylomorphism is a true psychology describing how we all think. High school students can take psychology, and hylomorphism doesn’t seem to be on the syllabus. Therefore it would appear that educators don’t agree with the claim.

Anyhow, I don’t agree that students are overwhelmed by metaphysics. I seem to remember we read Herman Hess, Kafka, Salinger… outside school - teenage angst is surely exactly when the nature of being is the most acute question.

 

[Peter_Plato]

The CAF spellchecker has never heard of “arational”, and debating whether obscure words are more precise would seem to obscure the obvious point that fear is a feeling, and a feeling is not a rational argument.

I wouldn’t suppose that the CAF forums have a spellchecker. The one you are using is likely tied to your computer/device OS or accessed somehow by your browser. In either case, you should look into getting a more extensive dictionary on your device/computer. Or do a simple search of online dictionaries.

For example:

arational
Pronunciation: /eɪˈraʃ(ə)n(ə)l/
Definition of arational in English:
adjective
Not based on or governed by logical reasoning.
oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/arational

 

[Peter_Plato]

If a screaming maniac has a gun to your head playing Russian Roulette and you have a fear response, you might reasonably conclude that your fear response is reasonable in the circumstances. Unlike someone who has a fear response when safely and calmly looking at pictures of faces.

So, you are claiming above that fears can either be “rationally justified” or not.

I can do little about what causes you bafflement.

And yet, without hint of any “bafflement” or sense of self-contradiction whatsoever, you claim…

Fear is emotion and always irrational.

So, which is it? “Always irrational” or “reasonable in the circumstances?”

I submit the word “arational” works much better with regards to fear or any emotion as emotion, but that some emotions may have rational warrant – i.e., align with a reasoned response to the world – and others not so much. That “warrant,” however is not locatable in the emotion itself (thus emotions are arational,) but found in the circumstances and what is considered to be a reasoned response to those. Whether or not fear is “reasonable” is determined entirely by whether the circumstances justify the fear as an appropriate response.

That, contrary to your research citations, is not a function of the emotion nor can it be determined merely by the existence of an emotion like fear correlated to some part of the brain being lit up.

 

[inocente]

Then what do you think Aristotle meant by form?

I think he sees form as unable to exist in the abstract, and that matter is unable to exist without a form. A pockmarked asteroid must still have a form, even though it contains no symmetry or pattern.

Emphasis mine. That seems to support my original claim that substance is not a category (genus), since it would involve contrasting being with non-being, which is not a class since it cannot include anything.

Don’t know. You’ll have to debate it with Prof. Studmann, who writes in the SEP:

“Similarly, according to Aristotle, things in the world are not beings because they stand under some genus, being, but rather because they all stand in a relation to the primary being, which in the Categories he says is substance. This explains in part why he says in the Metaphysics that in order to study being one must study substance (1004a32, 1028a10–1028b8).” - plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-categories/

What evidence and what “spurious” patterns?

Like seeing a face in clouds.

Why would neuroscience be preferred to hylomorphism? Neuroscience studies the brain and hylomorphism studies metaphysics. The two are not in competition.

The SEP still classes hylomorphism of the mind as psychology.

Why would you think that it would need to be taught everywhere? First of all, not too many people think at a level that is high enough to understand metaphysics. Secondly, why would it be necessary to teach it when everyone implicitly thinks this way, because that is what reasoning is? It would be like saying that we need to teach people about how the eye works because otherwise they can’t really see anything.

Hang on. You say hylomorphism of the mind is metaphysics. You say metaphysics can only be understood by an elite. Then clearly the answer to the thread’s title question is that a person shouldn’t prefer hylomorphism unless said person thinks at the designated high level, as declared by the existing elite.

Hmmm. Would you say the the people who could see the emperor’s new clothes were thinking at a high-enough level, or the people who couldn’t see a stitch?

This is debatable however. How is it that we really understand patterns when patterns are “multiply-realizable” and every neuronal instantiation of it will be one particular realization of the pattern and not the pattern itself?

As I understand it, a neural circuit might recognize “-”, another “l”, and those two might feed into another which consequently recognizes “t”. Which feeds into another which might recognize “not”, and so on up until one which recognizes “to be or not to be”, and so on. Each level is doing a similar small pattern-matching task, it’s the accumulation of levels which provides the sophistication.

We already know that this is the case. How else do people reason if not by classification and analyzing the difference between classifications? You keep confusing brain activity with mental activity. The racism study you linked to is a good example. Racism is an intentional phenomenon. You have to interpret a specific instance of fear as being “about” or “meaning” racist thoughts. The fact that the brain oftentimes processes fearful emotions when a person considers racist thoughts does not explain where this intentionality is coming from. That is the difference between intellect (supplies intentionality) and imagination (supplies the emotion as a faculty of the brain).

The brain and the mind being the same thing looking from different directions.

I’m not interpreting, the research results speak for themselves. Please see the videos I linked to Peter, or search on Google Scholar.

Sorry, didn’t have much time today. Ignored the personal comments, and will do so from now on.

 

[inocente]

I wouldn’t suppose that the CAF forums have a spellchecker.

Press the CAF quote button, type some words, and those you misspelled are underlined in red. Right-click over such a word and the correct spellings are listed. All courtesy of CAF, no word processors needed.

 

[Peter_Plato]

Press the CAF quote button, type some words, and those you misspelled are underlined in red. Right-click over such a word and the correct spellings are listed. All courtesy of CAF, no word processors needed.

Still a function of your operating system (OS) or browser, not CAF. That same functionality exists on all web pages. I don’t currently use Windows, but I have in the past. Try a different web page or site. Do exactly what you describe above. I am pretty certain the same functionality will be available on those pages. Ergo, not “courtesy of CAF,” courtesy of your OS or browser depending on your device/system.

 

[balto]

I think he sees form as unable to exist in the abstract, and that matter is unable to exist without a form. A pockmarked asteroid must still have a form, even though it contains no symmetry or pattern.

Yes, this is my reading of it as well. I was using other terms such as “pattern” in an attempt to make this understanding connect. Hence the reason why I previously claimed that a form is not a category, since forms do not exist as things in the abstract. I will resume using the term “form” to describe what you have indicated above.

Don’t know. You’ll have to debate it with Prof. Studmann, who writes in the SEP:

“Similarly, according to Aristotle, things in the world are not beings because they stand under some genus, being, but rather because they all stand in a relation to the primary being, which in the Categories he says is substance. This explains in part why he says in the Metaphysics that in order to study being one must study substance (1004a32, 1028a10–1028b8).” - plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-categories/

At this point, I will leave it to the reader to decide for herself if I have said anything erroneous about substance as a category. If I have said something wrong, then I apologize to any injured party. But I don’t think continuing this side discussion is relevant to the main discussion.

Hang on. You say hylomorphism of the mind is metaphysics. You say metaphysics can only be understood by an elite. Then clearly the answer to the thread’s title question is that a person shouldn’t prefer hylomorphism unless said person thinks at the designated high level, as declared by the existing elite.

Hylomorphism is under the domain of metaphysics. The mind no less than any other phenomenon would fall under its purview. I think at this point, in order to resolves any lingering confusions, I would rather take this one step at a time so that everybody’s cards are face up on the table. Do you agree with the following:

The human mind makes the world intelligible by recognizing universals in nature. For instance, our experiences with cats leads us to recognize “catness”, hence we call all instances “cat.” This can be repeated with any other reality in our experience, such as “atom”, “tree”, “human”, “brain”, etc.

At this point I am not asking whether we are right to do this, if catness is really there, or anything like that. I am also not asking about neuroscience, just our ordinary experience as we perceive it from the first person point of view. Do you agree that the human mind does this to make the world intelligible regardless of whether it is actually right to do so or not? If you do not agree with it, can you modify it to something that you are comfortable with?

As I understand it, a neural circuit might recognize “-”, another “l”, and those two might feed into another which consequently recognizes “t”. Which feeds into another which might recognize “not”, and so on up until one which recognizes “to be or not to be”, and so on. Each level is doing a similar small pattern-matching task, it’s the accumulation of levels which provides the sophistication.

The brain and the mind being the same thing looking from different directions.

I’m not interpreting, the research results speak for themselves. Please see the videos I linked to Peter, or search on Google Scholar.

Sorry, didn’t have much time today. Ignored the personal comments, and will do so from now on.

I think we can resume this case study discussion after we have outlined the groundwork that is necessary for understanding the dispute.

 

[inocente]

So, you are claiming above that fears can either be “rationally justified” or not.

And yet, without hint of any “bafflement” or sense of self-contradiction whatsoever, you claim…

So, which is it? “Always irrational” or “reasonable in the circumstances?”

I submit the word “arational” works much better with regards to fear or any emotion as emotion, but that some emotions may have rational warrant – i.e., align with a reasoned response to the world – and others not so much. That “warrant,” however is not locatable in the emotion itself (thus emotions are arational,) but found in the circumstances and what is considered to be a reasoned response to those. Whether or not fear is “reasonable” is determined entirely by whether the circumstances justify the fear as an appropriate response.

That, contrary to your research citations, is not a function of the emotion nor can it be determined merely by the existence of an emotion like fear correlated to some part of the brain being lit up.

Not sure whether you’re arguing that fear is not a feeling, or that we’re incapable of reasoning about feelings. I don’t see the point of us pedantically debating every detail here - no doubt the first time this research is used in court, there will rightly be lots of legal challenges, just as there probably were over admissibility of finger printing, DNA, and other science-based evidence.

Still a function of your operating system (OS) or browser, not CAF. That same functionality exists on all web pages. I don’t currently use Windows, but I have in the past. Try a different web page or site. Do exactly what you describe above. I am pretty certain the same functionality will be available on those pages. Ergo, not “courtesy of CAF,” courtesy of your OS or browser depending on your device/system.

I usually use Firefox but on your advice am typing this into Chrome, and the spellchecking is exactly the same, exactly the same red line under arational. Don’t know. MS Word doesn’t like the word either, and I’d still prefer to not use obscure words, as the point was only that a feeling isn’t a rational argument.

 

[inocente]

Hylomorphism is under the domain of metaphysics. The mind no less than any other phenomenon would fall under its purview. I think at this point, in order to resolves any lingering confusions, I would rather take this one step at a time so that everybody’s cards are face up on the table. Do you agree with the following:

The human mind makes the world intelligible by recognizing universals in nature. For instance, our experiences with cats leads us to recognize “catness”, hence we call all instances “cat.” This can be repeated with any other reality in our experience, such as “atom”, “tree”, “human”, “brain”, etc.

At this point I am not asking whether we are right to do this, if catness is really there, or anything like that. I am also not asking about neuroscience, just our ordinary experience as we perceive it from the first person point of view. Do you agree that the human mind does this to make the world intelligible regardless of whether it is actually right to do so or not? If you do not agree with it, can you modify it to something that you are comfortable with?

The highlighted sentence states that universals exist objectively in nature, and we then recognize them. I disagree. We see patterns.

Consider even something such as the multiplication of 45*10. A computer will calculate that, even if it has made the same calculation billions of times before. We never calculate it as we don’t have an arithmetic unit between our ears. Instead we might recognize the rule that *10 means put a zero on the right of 45. But even if we get the result by long multiplication, we do it with our remembered five-times table and four-times table. Everything we do is based on patterns. Same applies even to logic, since we don’t have a computer’s logic unit between our ears either.

The Problem of Universals is a recognized dispute in metaphysics, and there are all manner of -isms with their own take on the answer. Rather than trying to pick a side, I’d say that we (and all other animals) make the world navigable by recognizing and analyzing patterns, but that a kitten’s analysis that a ball of wool is a substitute mouse doesn’t mean the ball of wool actually contains “mouseness”. We should recognize the pattern that inventing a name for a pattern (universals) doesn’t force the pattern to exist objectively, and recognize the pattern that humans often don’t agree on which patterns exist.

 

[Peter_Plato]

…as the point was only that a feeling isn’t a rational argument.

Which is precisely why the existence of a feeling, by itself, cannot be an argument against racism - which was your initial contention in bringing up research into areas of the brain being “lit” up showing the existence of a feeling of fear and using the existence of that fear to argue that racism has to be irrational.

That claim led to my posts 79 and 84 pointing out, basically, that a feeling “isn’t a rational argument.”

forums.catholic-questions.org/showpost.php?p=13410192&postcount=79

forums.catholic-questions.org/showpost.php?p=13412426&postcount=84

We are now, apparently, on the same page.

(Unless, of course, you are going to meander, inexplicably, back to trying to use feelings as “a rational argument” against racism even though you admit “a feeling isn’t a rational argument.”)

 

[fisherman_carl]

The highlighted sentence states that universals exist objectively in nature, and we then recognize them. I disagree. We see patterns.

Consider even something such as the multiplication of 45*10. A computer will calculate that, even if it has made the same calculation billions of times before. We never calculate it as we don’t have an arithmetic unit between our ears. Instead we might recognize the rule that *10 means put a zero on the right of 45. But even if we get the result by long multiplication, we do it with our remembered five-times table and four-times table. Everything we do is based on patterns. Same applies even to logic, since we don’t have a computer’s logic unit between our ears either.

The Problem of Universals is a recognized dispute in metaphysics, and there are all manner of -isms with their own take on the answer. Rather than trying to pick a side, I’d say that we (and all other animals) make the world navigable by recognizing and analyzing patterns, but that a kitten’s analysis that a ball of wool is a substitute mouse doesn’t mean the ball of wool actually contains “mouseness”. We should recognize the pattern that inventing a name for a pattern (universals) doesn’t force the pattern to exist objectively, and recognize the pattern that humans often don’t agree on which patterns exist.

That’s interesting that you accept patterns, since a things pattern is another way of describing its form.

“The material cause or underlying stuff the ball is made out of is rubber; its formal cause, or the form, pattern, or structure it exhibits, comprises such features as its sphericity, solidity, and bounciness. In other words, the material and formal causes of a thing are just its matter and form, considered as two aspects of a complete explanation of it. Next we have the efficient cause, …” (Edward Feser, ‘Aquinas’)

Universals are grounded in the nature of the things they describe.

"As this indicates, hylemorphism is anything but a “reduction-istic”metaphysical position (that is, one claiming that some seemingly diverse or complex phenomena in reality consist of “nothing but”some more uniform or simpler set of elements). Certainly it is at odds with contemporary materialism; the suggestion that “matter is all that exists”becomes simply incoherent on a hylemorphic conception of matter, since matter by itself without anything else (including any form) would just be non-existent. Furthermore, while the hylemorphist holds that the substances of our ordinary experience are composites of form and matter, form and matter themselves in turn cannot be understood except in relation to the whole substances of which they are components. Hence the hylemorphic account is holistic and in no sense a “reduction”of substances even to their form and matter together.

This also indicates that Aristotle’s and Aquinas’s conception of “form”is not the same as Plato’s. On the hylemorphic analysis, considered apart from the substances that have them, form and matter are mere abstractions; there is no form of the ball apart from the matter that has that form, and no matter of the ball apart from the form that makes it a ball specifically. In particular, the form of a ball does not exist in a “Platonic heaven”of abstract objects outside time and space. All the same, Aris totle and Aquinas are, like Plato, realists about universals: when we grasp “humanity,”“triangularity,”and the like, what we grasp are not mere inventions of the human mind, but are grounded in the natures of real human beings, triangles, or what have you. (More on this later.) Moreover, while (contra Plato) no form exists apart from some particular individual substance that instantiates it, not every form exists in a material substance. There can be forms without matter, and thus immaterial substances –namely, for Aquinas, angels and postmortem human souls. (Again, more on this later.) This recapitulates an asymmetry noted earlier: just as act can exist without potency even though potency cannot exist without act, so too form can exist without matter even though matter cannot exist without form (DEE 4)." (Edward Feser, ‘Aquinas’)

 

[Richca]

I was hoping you would provide a list like this. I seem to remember explaining to you earlier that form and matter do not