Why should Calvinists Care about Evangelization?

[cazayoux]

Calvinist theology is. It’s the only version of Protestantism that can compare with Catholicism in this regard, though it’s still crude and barbaric by the standards of Thomism.

Edwin

While Calvinist theology might be well thought out compared to other protestant theologies, it still doesn’t come close to Catholic theology.
It’s all relative.
The Catholic theology is four times as old as Calvinist theology.

michel

 

[Contarini]

While Calvinist theology might be well thought out compared to other protestant theologies, it still doesn’t come close to Catholic theology.
It’s all relative.
The Catholic theology is four times as old as Calvinist theology.

Calvinist theology builds on pre-Reformation Catholic theology (the three pre-Reformation theologians my Calvinist friends seem to mention with most approval are Athanasius, Augustine, and Anselm, but many of them also like Bernard of Clairvaux).

Abraham Kuyper made the claim that Calvinism was “Christianity grown up,” and I’ve heard conservative Calvinists reiterate this claim. I don’t agree with it, but it’s not a patently silly claim.

Am I presumptuous in my suspicion that you haven’t actually read much Calvinist theology?

Edwin

 

[CHESTERTONRULES]

Calvinist theology is. It’s the only version of Protestantism that can compare with Catholicism in this regard, though it’s still crude and barbaric by the standards of Thomism.

Edwin

Calvinism is false and dangerous.

Modern Calvinists are embarrassed by it, and often deny the implications.

I have no idea why you are defending Calvinism, but you consistently misrepresent their views.

According to Calvinism:

NOTHING a man thinks, says, or does impacts his election by God.

NOTHING a man thinks, says, or does will permit him to enter heaven if God has predestined him for hell.

Therefore, evangelization is a waste of time for a Calvinist.

A Calvinist evangelist has not fully accepted, or jettisoned a portion of, five points Calvinism.

Calvin’s Institutes states, “All are not created on equal terms, but** some are preordained to eternal life, others to eternal damnation**; and, accordingly, as each has been created for one or other of these ends, we say that he has been predestinated to life or to death.”

Men are **unconditionally elected by God for His purposes without any prior works (good or evil) by which God would judge them good or evil. **The election of men rests solely on the counsel and purposes of God. God has not decreed anything which he foresaw in the future, for that would place His decree upon foreseeing something in the creature.

Do you still claim that a Calvinist believes the actions of man can change this predestined outcome?

 

[Badaliyyah]

Do you still claim that a Calvinist believes the actions of man can change this predestined outcome?

why would anyone want to believe such a thing? It completely destroys the doctrine of God. As we have already pointed out, the position you are attacking isn’t just Calvin, but Thomas and Augustine, etc. as well. You are attacking Catholic positions.

Moreover, as has also been pointed out several times, the means of grace are still important in Calvin and others. We are still brought to faith by grace through secondary causes (i.e. human freedom is not in competition with divine grace, but is precisely that in and through which grace is active within history).

salaam.

 

[SyCarl]

Do you still claim that a Calvinist believes the actions of man can change this predestined outcome?

Calvinists do not believe that evangelism changes the predestined outcome. However it is the means that God has chosen of implementing that predestined outcome.

I find it disturbing that Catholics will accuse Protestants of misrepresenting Catholic beliefs and then turn around and misrepresent the beliefs of a particular Protestant group and adhere to that false understanding even when the true beliefs of the group are set out.

Whether you care to understand it or believe it, Calvinists do believe that evangelism is important. You may believe they are wrong but do not misrepresent their beliefs.

By the way, like Edward, I am not a Calvinist although I do agree with some of his teachings.

 

[Contarini]

Calvinism is false and dangerous.

So you should be ashamed of yourself for making it seem creditable by your laughable attacks on it.

I have no idea why you are defending Calvinism

Use your imagination and try to conceive of the possibility that I actually believe what I am saying to be true, and that I think truth is worth defending for its own sake. I am not defending the truth of Calvinism but the truth about Calvinism.

but you consistently misrepresent their views.

Then why can’t you actually show me where I am wrong? And why do Calvinists consistently say that you are the one misrepresenting their views?

According to Calvinism:

NOTHING a man thinks, says, or does impacts his election by God.

But God’s election does impact what people think, say, and do.

NOTHING a man thinks, says, or does will permit him to enter heaven if God has predestined him for hell.

The other way round: a person predestined for hell will not think, say, or do anything that will permit them to enter heaven.

Therefore, evangelization is a waste of time for a Calvinist.

Calvinists do not think that fulfilling God’s purpose is a waste of time. Perhaps you have such an inflated sense of your own importance that you refuse to be God’s instrument unless you can believe that you are indispensable. Calvinists are by and large more humble than this, for all their faults.

Do you still claim that a Calvinist believes the actions of man can change this predestined outcome?

There’s no “still.” I never claimed that at all. It is truly amusing that you keep repeating the obvious instead of addressing the point you are allegedly arguing.

You think that the only way your actions are worthwhile is if they can change what God has decreed? This makes no sense.

Why is it not worthwhile to be an instrument of God’s purpose?

Edwin

 

[CHESTERTONRULES]

So you should be ashamed of yourself for making it seem creditable by your laughable attacks on it.

Use your imagination and try to conceive of the possibility that I actually believe what I am saying to be true, and that I think truth is worth defending for its own sake. I am not defending the truth of Calvinism but the truth about Calvinism.

Then why can’t you actually show me where I am wrong? And why do Calvinists consistently say that you are the one misrepresenting their views?

But God’s election does impact what people think, say, and do.

The other way round: a person predestined for hell will not think, say, or do anything that will permit them to enter heaven.

Calvinists do not think that fulfilling God’s purpose is a waste of time. Perhaps you have such an inflated sense of your own importance that you refuse to be God’s instrument unless you can believe that you are indispensable. Calvinists are by and large more humble than this, for all their faults.

There’s no “still.” I never claimed that at all. It is truly amusing that you keep repeating the obvious instead of addressing the point you are allegedly arguing.

You think that the only way your actions are worthwhile is if they can change what God has decreed? This makes no sense.

Why is it not worthwhile to be an instrument of God’s purpose?

Edwin

Unlike Calvinists, and you, apparently, I don’t believe that God has decreed that anyone go to hell.

This is our doing, not his.

 

[myfavoritmartin]

Their efforts can in no way change the number or makeup of the elect.

Their efforts in no way change their status as one of the elect.(assuming they are one of the elect)

Are they just pretending so be polite?

Chesterton whats your hangup with calvinism?
Reversing the question do you think your actions can manipulate God?

 

[myfavoritmartin]

Unlike Calvinists, and you, apparently, I don’t believe that God has decreed that anyone go to hell.

This is our doing, not his.

The Bible says nothing about anyone being predestined to hell only predestination into adoption in Christ .

 

[Contarini]

Unlike Calvinists, and you, apparently, I don’t believe that God has decreed that anyone go to hell.

There’s no “apparently.” I have said nothing to imply this.

I certainly do not believe that God reprobates people unconditionally and directly. I am troubled by the implications of divine foreknowledge and omnipotence, particularly if one agrees with St. Thomas that God’s knowledge is the cause of things. I am not persuaded by the a priori argument that God cannot cause people to act in a specific way while still causing them to act freely. This leaves me in a dilemma. One way out is the Thomist way: a doctrine of single predestination that nonetheless implies that those not predestined are allowed to act in such a way as to merit their damnation. I find this morally repugnant, but I would like to find ways of retaining what I find convincing in the Thomist position. It is also of course possible that God is limited in the ways that “frewill theists” claim, and that the existence of evil choices is an a posteriori argument for this position. It’s also possible that the “open theists” and others are right that God does not foreknow future free choices, but I find this position deeply problematic as well.

I am happy to discuss the difficulties of this issue with you if you really care about them. But so far I have seen no signs that you do, so I won’t bore you.

Edwin

 

[CHESTERTONRULES]

Chesterton whats your hangup with calvinism?
Reversing the question do you think your actions can manipulate God?

I think God created us in his image.

I believe that God wants all people to be saved.

I believe that through Jesus we have all been made alive and that God’s grace enables us to follow his will.

I believe that Calvinism denies God’s justice, mercy, and love.

 

[CHESTERTONRULES]

There’s no “apparently.” I have said nothing to imply this.

 

[Badaliyyah]

Contarini;4928922:

I think Molinism addresses your concerns completely.

Do tell.

 

[Mark77]

Any person that relies on human teaching and follows a faith that lists a man, Calvin, Luther, etc., in their name has a big problem.

Jesus alone is the Savior and He alone contains all Truth. Listen to Him alone!

Sancta Maria, Mater Dei, Ora Pro Nobis Peccatoribus!

Mark

 

[CHESTERTONRULES]

CHESTERTONRULES;4928973:

Do tell.

If you insist!

I’ll start with Contarini’s concerns:

I am troubled by the implications of divine foreknowledge and omnipotence, particularly if one agrees with St. Thomas that God’s knowledge is the cause of things.

Here’s one rational explanation:

Molinists hold that in addition to knowing everything that does or will happen, God also knows what would happen if He acted differently than He does. This gives God the ability to let events play out freely, OR, when necessary to pursue his ultimate purpose, he can intervene without changing our appopropriate eternal destination. He can maintain justice, mercy, and love.

I am not persuaded by the a priori argument that God cannot cause people to act in a specific way while still causing them to act freely. This leaves me in a dilemma. One way out is the Thomist way: a doctrine of single predestination that nonetheless implies that those not predestined are allowed to act in such a way as to merit their damnation. I find this morally repugnant, but I would like to find ways of retaining what I find convincing in the Thomist position. It is also of course possible that God is limited in the ways that “frewill theists” claim, and that the existence of evil choices is an a posteriori argument for this position. It’s also possible that the “open theists” and others are right that God does not foreknow future free choices, but I find this position deeply problematic as well.

I believe all of these concerns are adequately addressed by Molinist theologians and philosophers.

Molinists believe that God does not only have knowledge of necessary truths and contingent truths but that God’s middle knowledge contains, but is not limited to, His knowledge of counterfactuals. A counterfactual is a statement of the form “if it were the case that P, it would be the case that Q”. An example would be, “If Bob were in situation X he would freely choose A over B.” The Molinist claims that even if Bob is never in situation X God could still know what Bob would do. The Molinist believes that God, using his middle knowledge and foreknowledge, surveyed all possible worlds and then actualized a particular one. God’s middle knowledge of counterfactuals would play an integral part in this “choosing” of a particular world.

Molinists say the logical ordering of events for creation would be as follows:

1. God’s knowledge of necessary truths.
2. God’s middle knowledge, (including counterfactuals).

—Creation of the World—

1. God’s free knowledge (the actual ontology of the world).

Hence, God’s middle knowledge plays an important role in the actualization of the world. In fact, it seems as if God’s middle knowledge of counterfactuals plays a more immediate role in creation than God’s foreknowledge. The placing of God’s middle knowledge between God’s knowledge of necessary truths and God’s creative decree is crucial. For if God’s middle knowledge was after His decree of creation, then God would be actively causing what various creatures would do in various circumstances and thereby destroying libertarian freedom. But by placing middle knowledge (and thereby counterfactuals) before the creation decree God allows for freedom in the libertarian sense. The placing of middle knowledge logically after necessary truths, but before the creation decree also gives God the possibility to survey possible worlds and decide which world to actualize.

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Molinism

 

[Contarini]

You defended Calvinism,

As I have pointed out over and over, I am defending the truth about Calvinism, not the truth of Calvinism. You willfully ignore this because you apparently can’t imagine that I could care about truth enough to correct inaccurate statements about a theology in which I don’t believe.

As I said in my previous post, I will grant that one reason I go up against you is that I think you are far too cavalier in your attitude to these issues and don’t understand how many arguments there are for Calvinism. But that doesn’t mean that I agree with Calvinism. I do not agree with any of the points regarding predestination on which Calvinism differs from Thomist Catholicism, and I don’t even agree with Thomism entirely.

I care about these issues deeply. I think Molinism addresses your concerns completely.

I’m not so sure. Molinism is certainly appealing in many ways, but there are philosophical problems with “middle knowledge” and the understanding of divine action in Molinism seems too “external” and manipulative to me.

You defend the worst aspects of Calvinism and I’m not sure why.

Because first of all I care about fairness even to views with which I strongly disagree, and in the second place I think you aren’t taking the challenge of the Augustinian/Thomist tradition seriously enough. As a Catholic with theological interests, you ought to do this instead of dismissing it. Augustinianism is a major thread in your own tradition–indeed in all of Western Christianity. We can’t simply shove it under the rug by attacking some extreme forms of it and pretending that makes the whole set of issues go away.

Edwin

 

[CHESTERTONRULES]

Because first of all I care about fairness even to views with which I strongly disagree, and in the second place I think you aren’t taking the challenge of the Augustinian/Thomist tradition seriously enough. As a Catholic with theological interests, you ought to do this instead of dismissing it. Augustinianism is a major thread in your own tradition–indeed in all of Western Christianity. We can’t simply shove it under the rug by attacking some extreme forms of it and pretending that makes the whole set of issues go away.

Edwin

That’s fine.

However, I have personal knowledge of the damage that Calvinism can do to a person.

I believe it is a dangerous corruption of the gospel.

To the extent that Augustine and Aquinas cross into this confusion, I have no problem addressing their errors to the best of my ability, or accepting the views of more learned men who affirm my views.

Here’s a great critique of Augustine from Fr. William Most.

ewtn.com/library/THEOLOGY/AUGUSTIN.HTM

 

[Contarini]

Here are a few of my problems with your claim that Molinism solves the issues I’ve raised:

1. Many contemporary philosophers criticize Molinism on the basis of something called the “grounding objection.” Essentially this means that there is nothing in virtue of which counterfactuals of freedom can be true. I don’t understand modern philosophy very well, but I note that many Thomist objections to Molinism are very similar. What exactly do we mean when we say that someone “would do” something? I’m not sure it’s as obvious as it sounds.
2. Paradoxically, I find Molinism unduly deterministic. I refer you, for example, to the third paragraph in the section called “Later development of Molinism” in the Catholic Encyclopedia’s article on Molinism. It seems to me that the Biblical evidence for something like “middle knowledge” could be best explained on the grounds Molina himself gave, namely God’s knowledge of the human heart. However, if this knowledge is seen to be certain, we arguably have a more genuine philosophical determinism than anything maintained by the Thomists (i.e., the human heart being such and such, it will inevitably do such and such–this is nothing but the philosophical theory of “compatibilism”). And hence, the CE tells us, later Molinists moved away from this theory. However, I’m not convinced that any form of middle knowledge avoids determinism. To say that humans would always act thus and so when placed in such and such circumstances seems to say that circumstances determine their actions. Otherwise, it would surely be possible for the same person to act differently under the same set of circumstances. Perhaps I just don’t understand the philosophical issues well enough, but certainly your exposition of Molinism has not even addressed this problem, much less solved it.
3. My biggest problem with your position, and the one that is easiest to discuss because it doesn’t involve as many philosophical complexities as the other points, is that I don’t see that middle knowledge solves the real problem. Here’s why: according to middle knowledge (and I believe that Molina and other early Molinists took this view) God can still predestine certain people to damnation. In fact, Molinism arguably makes this position more serious by eliminating (if you accept middle knowledge) the free will objection to it. According to Molinism, God could foresee that a person would reject grace and be damned if placed in circumstances X but would be saved if placed in circumstances Y (see the preceding point). The Biblical example of this would be Matt. 11:21 and 23. But this is just predestination to damnation in another form. In other words, I think that Molinism takes some elaborate theological detours to get us back to the same basic problem: how can we explain damnation? Yes, some theologies put this problem in a starker form than others. But I’m not convinced that Molinism solves it.

Many contemporary Molinists seem to believe (in fact I suspect that this is what most people think Molinism teaches) that God puts everyone in the best possible circumstances for salvation. But that’s precisely what Matt. 11:21 and 23 seem to deny. Instead of God giving certain kinds of opportunities to those whom He knows will make a good use of them, we have God giving great opportunities to those who make a bad use, and denying those opportunities to those who would have used them better. We can get around this by the suggestion that perhaps “more tolerable” means that the Sodomites and Sidonians and Tyrians may be saved, and that’s where in fact I’d come down. But at this point it seems to me that we have completely subverted the original intent of Molinism.

In short, I don’t think Molinism is a magic bullet. It solves some problems but raises plenty of its own. And most basically it has a rather “extrinsic” understanding of God’s grace which I find intuitively unappealing and not well supported either by Scripture or by the Christian Tradition as a whole. Aquinas’s understanding of how God works is superior except for the huge problem that it can’t explain sin and evil and damnation very well! But as I’ve said above, I’m not sure that Molinism can either.

Edwin

 

[Contarini]

That’s fine.

However, I have personal knowledge of the damage that Calvinism can do to a person.

I believe it is a dangerous corruption of the gospel.

To the extent that Augustine and Aquinas cross into this confusion, I have no problem addressing their errors to the best of my ability, or accepting the views of more learned men who affirm my views.

But here’s the problem with your approach: because you refuse to think in a nuanced manner about these issues, you are completely unable to distinguish clearly between the heresies of Calvinism and the possibly problematic views of Catholic Augustinians and Thomists; nor can you do a good job of criticizing Catholic Augustinianism/Thomism and defending the Molinist alternative.

Here’s a great critique of Augustine from Fr. William Most.

ewtn.com/library/THEOLOGY/AUGUSTIN.HTM

You think it’s “great” because it confirms what you believe. But it has huge problems. For instance, this paragraph:

He thought God picked those to rescue blindly, without any consideration of how they lived. He picked them not that He had any love for them, but merely to make a point. Augustine did not see it, but that was a denial of God’s love. For to love is to will good to another for the other’s sake. If I will good to another not for that other’s sake, but for some outside purpose of mine, I am not loving that person, but using him.

misrepresents Augustine (Augustine would never say that God’s love for the elect is not his basis for choosing them) and fails to engage with Augustine’s understanding (or the traditional, classical Catholic understanding generally) of what God’s love means and what it means to will something as an end. Ironically, Most has picked up a fundamentally Protestant view here, that love is altruistic. This is in my opinion untenable. To say that you love another for the other’s good alone or supremely sounds nice, but it’s incoherent. You can’t determine what good is in the first place without some final reference point, and the only such reference point is God. Therefore, both we and God love other humans ultimately for the sake of God, not for the sake of those other humans. Contrary to what Most claims, this is the only way we can truly love at all. All will toward good (which is what love is) must have the ultimate good as its primary object.

This is particularly unfortunate because it fails to engage Augustine’s position where it is truly flawed, which is in the idea that God is glorified through damnation. The problem isn’t with Augustine’s understanding of love, but with Augustine’s understanding of justice (Augustine and Aquinas, with the Western Christian tradition generally, think that God is glorified when He justly damns sinners for their sin, and they seem to think that if some people were not damned God’s glory would somehow be less because this particular aspect of His justice would not be revealed).

I can go on and analyze other parts of Most’s argument, but I don’t have the time right now. The example I’ve given above is fairly typical of the faults I have found in Most’s writing generally.

Edwin

 

[Badaliyyah]

I believe all of these concerns are adequately addressed by Molinist theologians and philosophers.

Molinists believe that God does not only have knowledge of necessary truths and contingent truths but that God’s middle knowledge contains, but is not limited to, His knowledge of counterfactuals. A counterfactual is a statement of the form “if it were the case that P, it would be the case that Q”. An example would be, “If Bob were in situation X he would freely choose A over B.” The Molinist claims that even if Bob is never in situation X God could still know what Bob would do. The Molinist believes that God, using his middle knowledge and foreknowledge, surveyed all possible worlds and then actualized a particular one. God’s middle knowledge of counterfactuals would play an integral part in this “choosing” of a particular world.

Molinists say the logical ordering of events for creation would be as follows:

1. God’s knowledge of necessary truths.
2. God’s middle knowledge, (including counterfactuals).

—Creation of the World—

1. God’s free knowledge (the actual ontology of the world).

Hence, God’s middle knowledge plays an important role in the actualization of the world. In fact, it seems as if God’s middle knowledge of counterfactuals plays a more immediate role in creation than God’s foreknowledge. The placing of God’s middle knowledge between God’s knowledge of necessary truths and God’s creative decree is crucial. For if God’s middle knowledge was after His decree of creation, then God would be actively causing what various creatures would do in various circumstances and thereby destroying libertarian freedom. But by placing middle knowledge (and thereby counterfactuals) before the creation decree God allows for freedom in the libertarian sense. The placing of middle knowledge logically after necessary truths, but before the creation decree also gives God the possibility to survey possible worlds and decide which world to actualize.

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Molinism

God does not know things as “possible”. God is only knows what is actual and knows it to the extent that it is actual, for there is no potency in God (it would imply finitude, the possibility of change, etc., etc.). To talk about God “choosing” between a host of options is either gross anthropomorphism, or it is a very poor attempt to understand the unity of Knowledge and Being in God.

But, for the sake of argument, let us run with your way of thinking for just a moment. In some ways it is worse than anything Thomas could dream up. In Thomas, Being and Knowing are one, God is Intellectus itself, the immediate Truth. Whatever “is”, because it is grounded in God and God is Truth (Knowing and Being not merely as united, but actually as the One), it true to the extent that it is (with the separation and inadequacy necessarily characteristic of the finite). But on your model the truth of creation becomes something that is subsequent, without ground, and there is no Truth in God on the basis of which things are the way they are (otherwise God would not encounter possibles in any way). Instead God is blindly choosing (language which is terribly problematic to start with, because it undermines God as One) between options that stand before God as equally possible (which are themselves already finite creations, etc., etc.). God’s knowledge of what is actual in creation is determined by what is possible. Once you start down this path, you just introduce endless divisions into God, and you are not talking about God any longer.

All the objections that I have are going to boil down to the manner in which God as One is violated, especially by treating Knowledge as if it were not itself actual (things are what they are in the very act of knowing) and making it the result of something else.

Notice, for instance, in Calvinism when you have the discussion of the “order of decrees” in creation, they do it, as much as possible, in such a manner that no potency (i.e., limitation and need for change) is introduced into God. Treating God as something that sits around deliberating about options is mythology.

n.b., “foreknowledge” is itself a problematic and unhelpful term. God is not having knowledge of things that are future. God Knows Being (with all three terms identical).

salaam.