Why Truman Dropped the Bomb

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’Thank God for the Atomic Bomb’
by Austin Bay
August 2, 2005


Discussion Board on this On Point topic

The atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima (Aug. 6, 1945) and Nagasaki (Aug. 9) didn’t end World War II – at least not quite. The six days between Nagasaki and Japan’s surrender on Aug. 15 were six more hideous days of war for U.S. and allied forces. Combat – and Japanese atrocities – continued in China, the Philippines and Southeast Asia.

They were also six days of vicious political intrigue and turmoil in Tokyo, as the so-called “peace” and “war” factions in Japan’s high command struggled for control of the state.

In his classic essay “Thank God for the Atom Bomb,” Paul Fussell (World War II vet and National Book Award-winner) observes, “Allied (Pacific) casualties were running to over 7,000 per week.” After Nagasaki, “captured American fliers were executed (heads chopped off); the U.S. submarine Bonefish was sunk (all aboard drowned); the destroyer Callaghan went down … and the Destroyer Escort Underhill was lost.”

Fussell scorns Harvard prof and insistent anti-nuclear-nit John Kenneth Galbraith’s twaddle that the A-bombs accelerated Japan’s surrender by (quoth Galbraith) “at most, two or three weeks.”

Galbraith’s estimate of Japan’s resiliency is a typical figment of ivory tower fevers – military calculations at the time suggested Japan would fight for another year. But even accepting Galbraith’s breezy guess, three more weeks of war with Japan meant another 21,000 Allied killed and wounded.

Fussell, a combat vet wounded while fighting the Nazis in Europe, was re-assigned to a division slated to assault the Japanese island of Honshu. Galbraith, Fussell says, “worked in the Office of Price Administration in Washington. I don’t demand that he experience having his *** shot off. I merely note that he didn’t.”

Apparently, the moral facility to condemn the bomb is directly related to one’s distance, in space and time, from actual combat.

For those discussing this moral subject, you might find this article, which came out yesterday of interest.
 
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gilliam:
Apparently, the moral facility to condemn the bomb is directly related to one’s distance, in space and time, from actual combat.
Or as a friend put it (concerning the current war), “The more handwringing, the less likely the handwringer has personally been in combat.”
 
vern humphrey:
Or as a friend put it (concerning the current war), “The more handwringing, the less likely the handwringer has personally been in combat.”
Yes…there is something about being two feet in front of a very motivated individual with a very sharp bayonet on the end of a Soviet-made rifle, whose one sole purpose in life is to skewer you on the end of it, that wonderfully clears your mind of all distractions.

If you ain’t been there, then you don’t know.
 
(Part 1/3)

Thanks Ani,

Here’s my response:
The First Test for Double Effect

The object of the act must not be intrinsically contradictory to one’s fundamental commitment to God and neighbor (including oneself), that is, it must be a good action judged by its moral object (in other words, the action must not be intrinsically evil);
Application of the First Test to the act in question*:*

The object of the act was to end the Pacific War and consisted of the following:

Behaviour: bombing with atomic ordinance.

And

Proximate intention: to neutralize the threat of Japanese military command, materiels, and troops to the people and legitimate government of the United States.

Not intrinsically evil: The object was not to countermand a commitment to God, neighbour, or self in that the object was not to destroy the enemy for the sake of destroying the enemy. (For example, the bombing was not comparable to a Honduran torture pit run by sociopaths who had no understanding or interest in Central American peace and stability.)

The object was to neutralize the means by which the enemy could continue to destroy American property and kill American citizens. This object, in itself, therefore was not intrinsically evil.

Therefore the first test of double effect is met.
I believe you are confusing object with intention. As a review, there are three sources upon which the morality of a human act is based:
  1. the object chosen
  2. the end in view or the intention
  3. the circumstances of the action (1750)
The object is “the matter of a human act.” It is “the act of the will” (1751). Intention, meanwhile, is “the purpose pursued in the action.”

If you say that the object was to “neutralize the threat of Japanese military command, materiels,” it seems the actual bombing has disappeared completely from consideration. Where did it go? It is no longer the object. It is not the intention, and it is not the circumstances. Worse, you double-count your intention. While applying your second test, you state that “The direct intention of the bombing was to neutralize the command, materiels, and troops.” How is this different from the object, which you state is “to neutralize the means by which the enemy could continue to destroy American property and kill American citizens?”

I therefore hold that you have not addressed my premise that the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was intrinsically wrong as you have failed to account for the object.
 
Part 2/3
This does end things rather quickly, as we have not even managed to get past step one, so for argument’s sake let’s pretend that you already have met step one and look at the rest of your argument.

Two of your statements:
Harming the civilian population, however, was a necessary consequence of the bombing because the Japanese military hub was embedded in the civilian population. Nevertheless harming the civilian population was not the direct intention of the bombing; it was the indirect intention of the bombing.

(Test 2)
Neutralization was achieved at the same time as the harm to the civilian population but not by means of the harm to the civilian population.
Seem to be in contradiction to this statement:
There were no other means of achieving the beneficial effects – neutralization of the Japanese military – without a demonstration of overwhelming military superiority.
Why was the destruction of the entire city of Hiroshima and the entire city of Nagasaki necessary to demonstrate military superiority? You say that the military hub was embedded in the civilian population. It does not then follow that destroying the hub entails the destruction of the *entire *civilian population. While the military targets were indeed surrounded by civilian areas, the military targets were by no means equally dispersed in a uniform manner throughout the city. Conventional bombing could have targeted the areas in which the military targets were concentrated. Nuclear bombing technology that was available in 1945 could not target in a like manner. To drop the bomb anywhere in the city is to destroy the entire city, including those parts with no military value.

Some may object that conventional bombing, even when aimed at legitimate military targets, still killed many civilians. The moral objection in the Hiroshima and Nagasaki case, though, is not that it killed some civilians, but that it killed *all *civilians. In a morally legitimate conventional bombing raid, the intended target is the military site. If every bomb hit what it was aimed at, no non-military areas would be hit. The civilian deaths are purely accidental, a result of unavoidable human error and technological limitations.

The bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, by contrast, were incapable of missing the civilian targets. Civilians did not die by accident, but because they were part of the target. Unlike conventional bombs, the atomic bombs of 1945 were incapable of being aimed at anything smaller than a city-sized area.
 
Part 3/3

You also mention the enormous civilian casualties that Japan would have suffered had we not dropped the bomb. No doubt the Japanese were aware of this. Yet this prospect was not enough to deter them. In fact, though you do not state it here, others have noted that they were prepared to die to the last man, woman, and child. Clearly, though, the fact that they surrendered after only two cities were destroyed argues otherwise. If they were truly prepared to defend their homeland to the last, why surrender even after the loss of two cities? By you own admission, the bombings killed fewer people than an invasion would have. Why did they surrender, then?

Perhaps they were not quite so ready to fight to the end as they led us to believe, or even as they themselves may have believed. This can happen in war. To take a contemporary example, remember the big bad Republican Guard in Iraq that was supposed to be a major threat to an American invasion? When push came to shove, they collapsed. It is certainly possible that the Japanese would have ended up collapsing in a like manner. This is by no means a certainty, but it is enough to raise reasonable doubt as to those million+ casualty estimates.

Of course, all this remains moot until you address the object. I’ll look forward to your response.
 
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Wolseley:
Yes…there is something about being two feet in front of a very motivated individual with a very sharp bayonet on the end of a Soviet-made rifle, whose one sole purpose in life is to skewer you on the end of it, that wonderfully clears your mind of all distractions.

If you ain’t been there, then you don’t know.
There are plenty of combat vets with sharp criticism of military decisions, past and current. Surely they count, too?
 
Philip P:
I believe you are confusing object with intention…If you say that the object was to “neutralize the threat of Japanese military command, materiels,” it seems the actual bombing has disappeared completely from consideration. Where did it go?
It seems to have disappeared somewhere between the point at which I included it as part of the object and the point at which you removed it. Please read object including the links again.
 
Application of the First Test to the act in question:

The object of the act was to end the Pacific War and consisted of the following:
Behaviour: bombing with atomic ordinance.

And

Proximate intention: to neutralize the threat of Japanese military command, materiels, and troops to the people and legitimate government of the United States.

According to your source, “It is important to notice that the object is comprised of two elements: the performance of some behavior and the choice or proximate intention of some end that a particular behavior serves.”

You do indeed place the dropping of the bomb in the behavior. Where I see you losing the object, though, is when you identify the proximate intention as to neutralize the threat of the Japanese military command. This is too far removed from the actual behavior to properly be the “proximate” intention. Rather, this is the circumstantial intention. The proximate intention is actually the destruction of the city targeted.

According to your same source (click on “proximate intention” above), we must distinguish between the proximate intention, which is essential to the object of the act, and the circumstantial intention, which cannot determine the moral character of the act.

If you drop an atomic bomb (of the sort used in 1945) on a city, the city will be destroyed. It is an essential part of that action. Circumstances can affect the this intention. For instance, if there is a state of war, and the city is an enemy city, destroying the city could also result in the defeat of the enemy. However, if it is a time of peace and you perform the same action, dropping the bomb on the same city (including its military targets), you will not defeat the enemy or cause him to surrender, as there is no enemy. Hence it is improper for you to claim that neutralizing the threat of the Japanese military command is an essential intention, as the very existence of such a threat is entirely contingent upon circumstances. If you change the circumstances, the threat no longer exists to be neutralized. This can therefore not be considered the proximate intent. Meanwhile, dropping an atomic bomb on a city will always destroy it. Hence it is an essential, or proximate, intention.
 
Philip P:
You do indeed place the dropping of the bomb in the behavior. Where I see you losing the object, though, is when you identify the proximate intention as to neutralize the threat of the Japanese military command. This is too far removed from the actual behavior to properly be the “proximate” intention. Rather, this is the circumstantial intention. The proximate intention is actually the destruction of the city targeted.
http://www.ascensionhealth.org/ethics/public/issues/intention.asp

"In some cases, it is necessary to distinguish between what one directly intends and what is *indirectly *intended in the performance of a particular action. Such cases arise when a particular action has two inseparable consequences. A direct intention is that which the agent would choose as the desired object of the action, which also constitutes the essential or proximate intention of the act. An indirect intention is a circumstantial intention that the agent would not consider as the immediately desired result of an action, but as an inevitable and unavoidable consequence of choosing the means to the desired result.

Thus, an indirectly intended bad consequence would be a foreseen and merely tolerated effect of the action but not the ultimate reason for performing the action. The undesirable effect is in a certain sense intended, since one still chooses the means, i.e., performs the action, but it is only indirectly intended since it would have been avoided if possible. This understanding of direct and indirect intent is an essential element of the principle of double effect."

The direct intention was to neutralize the Japanese command, materiels, and concentration of troops in Hiroshima and in Nagasaki.

Thus, an indirectly intended bad consequence would be a foreseen and merely tolerated effect of the action but not the ultimate reason for performing the action.

The indirect intention may be framed, if you will, as the harm to the civilian population in which the Japanese command, materiels, and concentration of troops were embedded.
 
Ani Ibi:
The direct intention was to neutralize the Japanese command, materiels, and concentration of troops in Hiroshima and in Nagasaki.
The direct intention must be essential to the object. How can it be essential if it changes depending on the circumstances? If there was not a war, this would change what you claim is the direct intention. How can something which is essential to the nature of an act change depending upon circumstances?

Please explain how “neutralizing the Japanese command” is not a circumstantial intention.
 
Philip P:
The direct intention must be essential to the object. How can it be essential if it changes depending on the circumstances? If there was not a war, this would change what you claim is the direct intention. How can something which is essential to the nature of an act change depending upon circumstances?

Please explain how “neutralizing the Japanese command” is not a circumstantial intention.
Ani Ibi:
The object of the act was to end the Pacific War and consisted of the following:

Behaviour: bombing with atomic ordinance.

And

Proximate intention: to neutralize the threat of Japanese military command, materiels, and troops to the people and legitimate government of the United States.
Somewhere early on in my explanation, I referred to ‘proximate intention’ instead of to ‘object.’ My mistake. I apologize.

" circumstances contribute to the moral goodness of an act insofar as they may diminish or increase its goodness, but they cannot make an act that is evil in its object, i.e., intrinsically evil, morally good (see the Catechism, Part Three, Section One, Chapter One, Article 4, n. 1754)."
 
Ani Ibi:
Somewhere early on in my explanation, I referred to ‘proximate intention’ instead of to ‘object.’ My mistake. I apologize.

" circumstances contribute to the moral goodness of an act insofar as they may diminish or increase its goodness, but they cannot make an act that is evil in its object, i.e., intrinsically evil, morally good (see the Catechism, Part Three, Section One, Chapter One, Article 4, n. 1754)."

I’m sorry, I’m not following. I don’t think we disagree that the the circumstantial intention - neutralizing the Japanese military threat - was good. Circumstances here would increase the moral goodness. Still, I don’t think we’ve answered whether the act itself is intrinsically evil, or even come to an agreement on what the act itself is.

Still referring to your source, “the object is comprised of two elements: the performance of some behavior and the choice or proximate intention of some end that a particular behavior serves. Together these elements constitute the ‘matter’ of the action.”

I accept the behavior was the “bombing with atomic ordinance.”
What is the proximate intention? Or do you still hold that the proximate intention was to neutralize the Japanese threat? If, so, please explain how this is the proximate, and not circumstantial intention. If not, please put forward what you believe is the proximate intention.
 
To this day, the people of the proud Japanese culture decline to take responsibility for their actions in WWII.

That culture, still protecting its pride 60 years later, generated soldiers willing to hammer chopsticks and pencils into the ears of Chinese civilians in Nanking.

Every year, they mourn the use of The Bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but a newspaper editor who writes, “Hey, we brought it on ourselves!” will suffer terrible national anger and go broke in a month.

So, even two atom bombs were not enough to wake up their culture.

The question is, Will prayers be enough to wake up our own spoiled, fat, gas-guzzling, porn-loving, homosexual-sin-respecting culture?
 
Philip P:
I’m sorry, I’m not following.
Actually I have my mind divided at present with errands, so it is difficult for me to follow also. As it stands, I made one huge slip-up already, which was replacing the term ‘proximate intention’ with the term ‘object’ after the first definition of ‘object.’
Philip P:
I don’t think we disagree that the circumstantial intention - neutralizing the Japanese military threat - was good.
Oh but we do disagree. Neutralizing the command, materiels, and troop concentration was not the circumstantial intention. It was the proximate intention.
Philip P:
Circumstances here would increase the moral goodness.
No. Because the circumstantial intention was to harm the civilian population and that would decrease the moral goodness. (explanation below)
Philip P:
Still, I don’t think we’ve answered whether the act itself is intrinsically evil, or even come to an agreement on what the act itself is.

Still referring to your source, “the object is comprised of two elements: the performance of some behavior and the choice or proximate intention of some end that a particular behavior serves. Together these elements constitute the ‘matter’ of the action.”

I accept the behavior was the “bombing with atomic ordinance.”
What is the proximate intention? Or do you still hold that the proximate intention was to neutralize the Japanese threat If, so, please explain how this is the proximate, and not circumstantial intention. If not, please put forward what you believe is the proximate intention.
"Since there can be many ends served by a single action, it is important to distinguish between one’s proximate or essential intention–one essential element of the object of an act–and the circumstantial intention.

Circumstantial intentions are those further ends that are chosen in addition to the essential or proximate end of the action. Because such ends are not essential to the act, circumstantial intentions can only increase or decrease the moral goodness of an already morally good act, but they cannot determine the moral species (i.e., essential moral character) of the act."

Here are two ‘ends’ tied to the object of ending the Pacific War:

1) proximate intention:

To neutralize the threat of Japanese military command, materiels, and troops to the people and legitimate government of the United States.

2) circumstantial intention:

To harm the civilian population. This is also the indirect intention. It is an intention because this end (harming the civilian population) was foreseen but a decision was made to accept the end. It is indirect because, as I have pointed out, the civilian population was not harmed for the sake of harming them nor were they harmed as a means to an end.

The circumstances were that the military hub had embedded in the civilian population. The circumstantial intention (harming the civilian population) served to decrease the moral goodness of the act. But it does not (and cannot) serve to change the species (moral character) of the act from morally good to morally bad.

Why? Because this kind of intention is, by nature, circumstantial. If the military hub had been isolated in the middle of a mountain in the wildnerness, the proximate intention would be the same: to neutralize the command, materiels, and troop concentration; the behaviour would be the same: to bomb with atomic ordinance. But the circumstantial intention would be different: to harm the civilian population. In fact, that particular circumstantial intention would be non-existent.
 
Philip P:
Or do you still hold that the proximate intention was to neutralize the Japanese threat?
The only way to neutralize the Japanese threat was to compel them to surrender.
 
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Brendan:
No, the point is, if God Himself does it, it by definition cannot be intrinsically immoral.

Intrinsically immoral means that it is never moral under any circumstances.

But, as I have shown, it is moral when God orders it, or somehow approves of it.

There are, then, circumstances were it is moral, ergo the action is not immoral.
What you’ve proven is that when God either directly destroys a city with innocent civilians, or tells humans to destroy a city, then it is moral. So if that’s the point you’re making, then I agree. But there is no case that transfers it to humans.
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Brendan:
In addition, the ‘indiscriminate’ covers the action, not the target. In Moral Theology terms, it means having a lack of discernment, (you didn’t think about it enough before hand)

This definition is also reflected in Websters as well
]

The Church’s press release clarifies what they mean by indiscriminate in this case, and they are talking about the target, not about discernment. The Church’s specific clarification in the context of the issue at hand overrides whatever other definitions we have.
No matter how noble the ends of a war may be, they cannot justify employing means or weapons that fail to discriminate between noncombatants and combatants. As the Second Vatican Council declared, “Every act of war directed to the indiscriminate destruction of whole cities or vast areas with their inhabitants is a crime against God and man, which merits firm and unequivocal condemnation.” (Gaudium et Spes, no. 80)
It isn’t a coincidence that they used the words “fail to discriminate”, and then in the next sentence, quoted Vatican II’s “indiscriminate”.

To try and debate what “indiscriminate” means reminds me of the Lewinsky hearings… it’s missing the big picture. There’s just no question what the Church is trying to tell us on this topic.

Pete
 
Ani Ibi:
I’ll read his statement tomorrow. To tell you the truth I always think twice before swallowing something a bishop says, particularly if the bishop is North American. You would have to have spent more time on the Culture of Death forum to understand what I mean.
Also, consider that it is entirely appropriate that this statement was made by the Church through US bishops, given that the US government dropped the bombs. I don’t know it for a fact, but it’s probably a safe guess that this statement was thoroughly scrubbed by the Vatican before it went out the door.

Pete
 
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