Philip P:
I’m sorry, I’m not following.
Actually I have my mind divided at present with errands, so it is difficult for me to follow also. As it stands, I made one huge slip-up already, which was replacing the term ‘proximate intention’ with the term ‘object’ after the first definition of ‘object.’
Philip P:
I don’t think we disagree that the circumstantial intention - neutralizing the Japanese military threat - was good.
Oh but we do disagree. Neutralizing the command, materiels, and troop concentration was not the circumstantial intention. It was the
proximate intention.
Philip P:
Circumstances here would increase the moral goodness.
No. Because the circumstantial intention was to harm the civilian population and that would decrease the moral goodness. (explanation below)
Philip P:
Still, I don’t think we’ve answered whether the act itself is intrinsically evil, or even come to an agreement on what the act itself is.
Still referring to your source, “the object is comprised of two elements: the performance of some behavior and the choice or
proximate intention of some end that a particular behavior serves. Together these elements constitute the ‘matter’ of the action.”
I accept the behavior was the “bombing with atomic ordinance.”
What is the proximate intention? Or do you still hold that the proximate intention was to neutralize the Japanese threat If, so, please explain how this is the proximate, and not circumstantial intention. If not, please put forward what you believe is the proximate intention.
"Since there can be many ends served by a single action, it is important to distinguish between one’s
proximate or
essential intention–one essential element of the object of an act–and the
circumstantial intention.
Circumstantial intentions are those further ends that are chosen in addition to the essential or proximate end of the action. Because such ends
are not essential to the act, circumstantial intentions can only increase or decrease the moral goodness of an already morally good act, but they cannot determine the moral species (i.e., essential moral character) of the act."
Here are two ‘ends’ tied to the object of ending the Pacific War:
1) proximate intention:
To neutralize the threat of Japanese military command, materiels, and troops to the people and legitimate government of the United States.
2) circumstantial intention:
To harm the civilian population. This is also the
indirect intention. It is an
intention because this end (harming the civilian population) was foreseen but a decision was made to accept the end. It is
indirect because, as I have pointed out, the civilian population was not harmed for the sake of harming them nor were they harmed as a means to an end.
The circumstances were that the military hub had embedded in the civilian population. The circumstantial intention (harming the civilian population) served to
decrease the moral goodness of the act. But it does not (and cannot) serve to
change the species (moral character) of the act from morally good to morally bad.
Why? Because this kind of intention is, by nature, circumstantial. If the military hub had been isolated in the middle of a mountain in the wildnerness,
the proximate intention would be the same: to neutralize the command, materiels, and troop concentration;
the behaviour would be the same: to bomb with atomic ordinance. But the circumstantial intention would be different: to harm the civilian population. In fact,
that particular circumstantial intention would be non-existent.