Why Truman Dropped the Bomb

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mjdonnelly:
True, but the Japanese didn’t know that, and neither did most of the rest of the world. As far as they were concerned, we had more and it is the threat of using them again.
Oh, you bet – we were busting a gut to make everyone think we had a stockpile.

But WE knew we only had two for release, and it was OUR knowledge that informed the decision. Imagine if we’d fired one on a desert island, and the Japanese had given us the finger? What would we do next? Drop one on a city? We did that and a single bomb didn’t convince them – it took two.
 
vern humphrey:
Oh, you bet – we were busting a gut to make everyone think we had a stockpile.

But WE knew we only had two for release, and it was OUR knowledge that informed the decision. Imagine if we’d fired one on a desert island, and the Japanese had given us the finger? What would we do next? Drop one on a city? We did that and a single bomb didn’t convince them – it took two.
Agree, didn’t we also make it know about our test detonation? If we did, that would be the ‘deserted island’.
 
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mjdonnelly:
Awesome!!! I love that idea. But I don’t see France signing a document like that with out tons of clauses, etc.
France will have a simple choice, in or out?

The US can swing it alone. If Britain joins us (as she will), that makes France odd-man-out in Europe. She passes up a chance to be an enforcer and becomes just another enforcee.
 
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mjdonnelly:
Agree, didn’t we also make it know about our test detonation? If we did, that would be the ‘deserted island’.
We couldn’t – for several reasons.

First of all, we could hardly “invite” a high-ranking Japanese delegation to come and see it.

Secondly, we had never detonated a nuclear weapon before – we weren’t sure it would go off (which is why we tested it in the first place. What would happen if we assembled this delegation and it was a dud?

Third, we had to reach the Emperor – and he wouldn’t be part of the delegation. Given the political situation in Japan at the time, it’s likely the delegation would never make back to report to the Emperor.
 
vern humphrey:
We couldn’t – for several reasons.

First of all, we could hardly “invite” a high-ranking Japanese delegation to come and see it.

Secondly, we had never detonated a nuclear weapon before – we weren’t sure it would go off (which is why we tested it in the first place. What would happen if we assembled this delegation and it was a dud?

Third, we had to reach the Emperor – and he wouldn’t be part of the delegation. Given the political situation in Japan at the time, it’s likely the delegation would never make back to report to the Emperor.
Forth, we didn’t know if it would blow up 1/2 of the State (a number of scientists thought that was probable)
 
Vern, et al:

As you probably know, destroying cities to achieve a strategic goal was made into a science by the Mongols.

We (the West) have taught the weaker states that if they get a few nukes we won’t attack them. Nukes for weaker powers have turned into a defensive weapon.
 
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gilliam:
Vern, et al:

As you probably know, destroying cities to achieve a strategic goal was made into a science by the Mongols.

We (the West) have taught the weaker states that if they get a few nukes we won’t attack them. Nukes for weaker powers have turned into a defensive weapon.
You’re dead right – which is why I proposed we announce we will treat any nuclear attack on anyone by anyone for any reason as a nuclear attack on the US.

That would devalue them and take some of the pressure off.
 
Nukes were also to be used in a war of attrition.

Soviet subs were to hunt in pairs. One being the target, the other the hunter. When one of our subs found and fired on the target, their hunter would fire the nuclear torpedo. It would have destroyed their target sub and ours in the process, but when they had more than twice the numbers of our, it wouldn’t have mattered.

Just an example of one of the strategies that have been developed.

Ever hear of an ASROC?
 
vern humphrey:
I refuted what you said, Pete. That’s enough.

After all, if you don’t want anyone to quote the Catechism at you, you can hardly expect to quote authority to anyone else, now can you?
Vern,

‘Every act of war directed to the indiscriminate destruction of whole cities or vast areas with their inhabitants is a crime against God and man, which merits firm and unequivocal condemnation.'

Pete

PS - I only included that quote in this post because with you have a funny case of selective hearing; you only “refute” what doesn’t damage your argument. You ignore everything else. So you’ll look like a real idiot if you only refute the post script here in this post… and if you ignore my post, well, that will speak volumes as well.
 
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Pete2:
Vern,

‘Every act of war directed to the indiscriminate destruction of whole cities or vast areas with their inhabitants is a crime against God and man, which merits firm and unequivocal condemnation.'

Pete

PS - I only included that quote in this post because with you have a funny case of selective hearing; you only “refute” what doesn’t damage your argument. You ignore everything else. So you’ll look like a real idiot if you only refute the post script here in this post… and if you ignore my post, well, that will speak volumes as well.
For a man who gets his tail in a knot when sombody quotes the Catechism, you seem awfully quick to come up with quotes of your own.

If you’ve been following the thread, we’ve shown how the atomic bomb was less indiscriminate that some other weapons – such as firebombing large areas to create fire storms.

That this is addressed specifically at the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki is your imagination.
 
vern humphrey:
For a man who gets his tail in a knot when sombody quotes the Catechism, you seem awfully quick to come up with quotes of your own.

If you’ve been following the thread, we’ve shown how the atomic bomb was less indiscriminate that some other weapons – such as firebombing large areas to create fire storms.

That this is addressed specifically at the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki is your imagination.
The catechism quote supplied by Pete applies to the firebombings. By what reasonable standard does it not also apply to nuking a city? It seems that the destruction of a city - by firebombing, by nuclear bomb, by any means you care to think up - is unequivocably condemned in Catholic theology.
 
vern humphrey:
For a man who gets his tail in a knot when sombody quotes the Catechism, you seem awfully quick to come up with quotes of your own.

If you’ve been following the thread, we’ve shown how the atomic bomb was less indiscriminate that some other weapons – such as firebombing large areas to create fire storms.

That this is addressed specifically at the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki is your imagination.
Good point, you don’t hear of many people protesting the fire bombings. Probably because it isn’t sensational enough, or it would take work to get the details, while the atom bombs are both fairly well known.
 
vern humphrey:
For a man who gets his tail in a knot when sombody quotes the Catechism, you seem awfully quick to come up with quotes of your own.

If you’ve been following the thread, we’ve shown how the atomic bomb was less indiscriminate that some other weapons – such as firebombing large areas to create fire storms.

That this is addressed specifically at the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki is your imagination.
You live in your own world. This isn’t worth the effort.

Pete
 
Philip P:
The catechism quote supplied by Pete applies to the firebombings. By what reasonable standard does it not also apply to nuking a city? It seems that the destruction of a city - by firebombing, by nuclear bomb, by any means you care to think up - is unequivocably condemned in Catholic theology.
Youi’ve got it backwards, M’lad.

The issue is about “Why Truman Dropped the Bomb.” None of those on your side have yet cottoned to the idea that the bomb was not unique – many another bombing did as much or more indiscriminate killing.

By focussing on the atomic bombs, you vitiate your whole argument.

Now, if anyone were to have the guts to say that ALL bombing of cities was wrong, he might have a point. But no one has done that.
 
vern humphrey:
Youi’ve got it backwards, M’lad.

The issue is about “Why Truman Dropped the Bomb.” None of those on your side have yet cottoned to the idea that the bomb was not unique – many another bombing did as much or more indiscriminate killing.

By focussing on the atomic bombs, you vitiate your whole argument.

Now, if anyone were to have the guts to say that ALL bombing of cities was wrong, he might have a point. But no one has done that.
Fine, I’ll say it. Destroying cities is categorically wrong. This includes destroying cities by means of nuclear weapons.
 
Every act of war directed to the indiscriminate destruction of whole cities or vast areas with their inhabitants is a crime against God and man, which merits firm and unequivocal condemnation.’
Interestingly, this sort of consideration, during the cold war era, actually would have given something of a strategic advantage to the side which engaged in a first strike.

At the height of the cold war, both the U.S. and the USSR had several thousand ICBM’s in hardened silos scattered throughout the country. In the case of Minuteman missiles, they could be launched within 30 seconds of executing a valid command.

Now if a country were planning a first strike, what would they target? Not cities. A smart aggressor would target the enemy’s retaliatory capability—all those missile silos as well as the launch control facilities, and B-52 bases, in the hope that any delay in retaliation would leave the attacked country with no strategic force remaining.

Once launched, missiles could not be stopped or recalled. By the time one side detected such a massive first strike attack, it would be too late to protect their missile silos. They could assume those would be destroyed. But they would have about 15 minutes before the incoming strike arrived, in which to launch their own missiles. At that point, there would be no point to attacking enemy missile silos. Those were gone and on their way.

The recipient of an aggressive first strike would then be left only with several deplorable options: (a) refrain from a retaliatory attack, or (b) target enemy cities in an immediate retaliatory strike.

(The buildup of the bomber and submarine fleets made such considerations less valid, since all three could not be simultaneously destroyed.)

Such considerations of city-bombing were even more prevalent in the Eisenhower doctrine of “massive retaliation,” wherein he threatened (and credibly) that any attack on any NATO country by the USSR would be met by “massive retaliation” on Soviet cities to be executed by B-52 bombers. Compared to that policy, MAD was a step forward!
 
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JimG:
Interestingly, this sort of consideration, during the cold war era, actually would have given something of a strategic advantage to the side which engaged in a first strike.

At the height of the cold war, both the U.S. and the USSR had several thousand ICBM’s in hardened silos scattered throughout the country. In the case of Minuteman missiles, they could be launched within 30 seconds of executing a valid command.

Now if a country were planning a first strike, what would they target? Not cities. A smart aggressor would target the enemy’s retaliatory capability—all those missile silos as well as the launch control facilities, and B-52 bases, in the hope that any delay in retaliation would leave the attacked country with no strategic force remaining.

Once launched, missiles could not be stopped or recalled. By the time one side detected such a massive first strike attack, it would be too late to protect their missile silos. They could assume those would be destroyed. But they would have about 15 minutes before the incoming strike arrived, in which to launch their own missiles. At that point, there would be no point to attacking enemy missile silos. Those were gone and on their way.

The recipient of an aggressive first strike would then be left only with several deplorable options: (a) refrain from a retaliatory attack, or (b) target enemy cities in an immediate retaliatory strike.

(The buildup of the bomber and submarine fleets made such considerations less valid, since all three could not be simultaneously destroyed.)

Such considerations of city-bombing were even more prevalent in the Eisenhower doctrine of “massive retaliation,” wherein he threatened (and credibly) that any attack on any NATO country by the USSR would be met by “massive retaliation” on Soviet cities to be executed by B-52 bombers. Compared to that policy, MAD was a step forward!
The nuclear paradox is that in order to prevent nuclear weapons from being used, you have to be prepared to use them – and use them in a horrific manner.
 
Philip P:
Fine, I’ll say it. Destroying cities is categorically wrong. This includes destroying cities by means of nuclear weapons.
I’m with you Philip! 👍
 
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