A) he can actualize a world in which some choose rightly, but not everyone chooses rightly;
Why can He not actualize a world in which everyone chooses rightly?
B) nothing determines free choices. that’s what it means for a choice to be free: that it is undetermined.
No, that’s not the meaning of free choices, and the compatibilists and Thomists and Molinists disagree with you.
no. since no created being exists in all possible worlds, nothing that any created being does can be logically necessary.
So then, under Thomism, God could certainly create a world in which all creatures chose rightly.
this makes no sense: the ***good ***angels may not have sinned, but the bad angels did sin. so even if god had never created humanity, this is ***still ***a world with sin.
Plantinga’s “transworld depravity” defense is based on the idea that for all we know, every possible creature in each possible world will go wrong at least once. The existence of the good angels refutes this.
premise 1 is false: nothing pre-determines our actions in either Thomism or Molinism.
Premise 1 is true. In the case of Thomism, our actions are pre-determined because God caused them. Look it up if you don’t believe me. (ST I-II Q.79 A.2) In the case of Molinism, our actions are pre-determined because God caused the external circumstances, and the external circumstances are of the nature of a brute fact counterfactual (in every possible world in which X is in situation A, he will do Y).
what we freely choose in the possible worlds in which we make free choices is up to us; god simply chooses which of those worlds to actualize. sure, there are worlds in which god provides grace to certain of his creatures, but the efficacy of it is constituted simply by god’s having actualized the world where the gifted creature co-operates with the grace.
So you prove my point. The efficacy of grace is caused by God. So why couldn’t God have actualized a world in which all creatures cooperate with grace?
i don’t think the kinds of goods (read: values) at stake here are commensurabe in the way you are suggesting: there isn’t a good that is “greater” than the evil of the sufferings of the damned; there isn’t one that’s “worse”, either. i reject consequentialism/utilitarianism both as a paradigm for the moral evaluation of human actions and for divine actions.
Then you have just thrown Catholic moral theology into the toilet. It teaches that one may tolerate an evil for the sake of a
greater good or to avoid a
worse evil. Your categorization of this as “consequentialism/utilitarianism” is way off the mark. If God does
not have a greater good in mind, or avoiding a worse evil, then the evil of damnation is gratuitous and God is not omnibenevolent.
the values i am talking about could simply be the good of the specific kind of freedom instantiated in a world that contains beings who choose eternal hatred of god; and that good does not need to be “better” than the sufferings of the damned in order to justify them…
- What “specific kind of freedom” is that, that doesn’t exist in a world in which no creatures choose eternal hatred of god?
- Yes it does need to be better, or else the evil is gratuitous.
any more than the life of my son needs to be “better” than the life of my friend’s son for me to choose to save my son when i can save only one of the two drowning children.
All analogies limp, and this one suffers permanent paralysis. The proper analogy here is your friend’s son is drowning while your own child is only suffering sunburn, and you choose to apply lotion to your own child rather than rescue your friend’s.
i merely reiterate the possibility that there is no possible world in which every being co-operates with god’s grace.
And I deny the impossibility. In the first place, such a world is not
logically impossible as it entails no contradiction. Under Thomism, God could cause the creatures to cooperate with His grace, so there clearly is a possible world here. Under Molinism, imagine a world with only one rational being. One would be forced to the conclusion then that no matter what being is created, and no matter what external circumstances, his first act must be rejection of God. Yet we know the first act of the good angels was acceptance of God.
sure, but “personal development” isn’t the only value capable of justifying the existence of hell.
OK, then what other value is there?