Why would God create people he knew would go to hell?

[IWantGod]

If God did not create them he wouldn’t know that they are going to hell. He timelessly created them and that’s why he knows their beginning and end. He knows they are going to hell because he created them. There wasn’t a period of time before creation where he could decide not to create somebody that didn’t exist. God does not know things that he will not do

 

[AveOTheotokos]

But God seems set on limiting our available information, as if providing us with more information would somehow interfere with our free will, rather than assist us in making the correct choice.

If God floated around on a cloud zapping anyone who was bad and all the blessings and grace He dispensed were made visible to everyone, then yes… we would be overwhelmed.

If you knew a rich man was handing out a million dollars and happiness to everyone who loved him and executing anyone who didn’t, there would be an aspect of coercion and/or ulterior motive for those who are choosing Him.

God doesn’t want us to “love” Him because of the good that He does for us, or because we are afraid of the punishment of not loving Him. He wants us to freely choose.

God instead desires for us to develop a relationship with Him. He doesn’t just create a really good profile online that we can pre-read and assess whether we reject or accept His desire for a relationship. We have to come to know Him, and ultimately ourselves, by gradually coming to know Him throughout our lives.

 

[AveOTheotokos]

God does not know things that he will not do

St. Thomas Aquinas, SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES, BOOK 1: GOD

Chapter 66
THAT GOD KNOWS THE THINGS THAT ARE NOT
[1] We must next show that the knowledge even of the things that are not is not lacking to God.

[2] As is clear from what we have said above, the relation of the divine knowledge to the things known is the same as the relation of the things that we know to our knowledge. Now, the relation of a thing known to our knowledge is this, namely, that the known thing can exist without our having a knowledge of it, as Aristotle illustrates of the squaring of a circle; but the converse is not true. The relation of the divine knowledge to other things, therefore, win be such that it can be even of non-existing things.

[3] Again, the knowledge of the divine intellect is to other things as the knowledge of an artisan to artifacts, since through His knowledge God is the cause of things. Now, the artisan knows through his art even those things that have not yet been fashioned, since the forms of his art flow from his knowledge to external matter for the constitution of the artifacts. Hence, nothing forbids that there be in the knowledge of an artisan forms that have not yet come out of it. Thus, nothing forbids God to have knowledge of the things that are not.

[4] Furthermore, through His essence God knows things other than Himself in so far as His essence is the likeness of the things that proceed from Him. This is clear from what we have said. But since, as was shown above, the essence of God is of an infinite perfection, whereas every other thing has a limited being and perfection, it is impossible that the universe of things other than God equal the perfection of the divine essence. Hence, its power of representation extends to many more things than to those that are. Therefore, if God knows completely the power and perfection of His essence, His knowledge extends not only to the things that are but also to the things that are not.

[5] Moreover, by that operation through which it knows what a thing is our intellect can know even those things that do not actually exist. It can comprehend the essence of a lion or a horse even though all such animals were to be destroyed. But the divine intellect knows, in the manner of one knowing what a thing is, not only definitions but also enunciables, as is clear from what we have said. Therefore, it can know even the things that are not.

[6] Furthermore, an effect can be pre-known in its cause even before it exists. Thus, an astronomer pre-knows a future eclipse from a consideration of the order of the heavenly motions. But God knows all things through a cause; for, by knowing Himself, Who is the cause of other things, He knows other things as His effects, as was shown above. Nothing, therefore, prevents God from knowing even the things that are not.

 

[AveOTheotokos]

[7] Moreover, God’s understanding has no succession, as neither does His being. He is therefore an ever-abiding simultaneous whole-which belongs to the nature of eternity. On the other hand, the duration of time is stretched out through the succession of the before and after. Hence, the proportion of eternity to the total duration of time is as the proportion of the indivisible to something continuous; not, indeed, of that indivisible that is the terminus of a continuum, which is not present to every part of a continuum (the instant of time bears a likeness to such an indivisible), but of that indivisible which is outside a continuum and which nevertheless co-exists with any given part of a continuum or with a determinate point in the continuum. For, since time lies within motion, eternity, which is completely outside motion, in no way belongs to time.
Furthermore, since the being of what is eternal does not pass away, eternity is present in its presentiality to any time or instant of time. We may see an example of sorts in the case of a circle. Let us consider a determined point on the circumference of a circle. Although it is indivisible, it does not co-exist simultaneously with any other point as to position, since it is the order of position that produces the continuity of the circumference. On the other hand, the center of the circle, which is no part of the circumference, is directly opposed to any given determinate point on the circumference. Hence, whatever is found in any part of time coexists with what is eternal as being present to it, although with respect to some other time it be past or future. Something can be present to what is eternal only by being present to the whole of it, since the eternal does not have the duration of succession. The divine intellect, therefore, sees in the whole of its eternity, as being present to it, whatever takes place through the whole course of time. And yet what takes place in a certain part of time was not always existent. It remains, therefore, that God has a knowledge of those things that according to the march of time do not yet exist.

[8] Through these arguments it appears that God has a knowledge of non-being. But not all non-beings have the same relation to His knowledge.
For those things that are not, nor will be, nor ever were, are known by God as possible to His power. Hence, God does not know them as in some way existing in themselves, but as existing only in the divine power. These are said by some to be known by God according to a knowledge of simple understanding.
The things that are present, past, or future to us God knows in His power, in their proper causes, and in themselves. The knowledge of such things is said to be a knowledge of vision. For of the things that for us are not yet God sees not only the being that they have in their causes but also the being that they have in themselves, in so far as His eternity is present in its indivisibility to all time.

 

[AveOTheotokos]

[9] Nevertheless, whatever being a thing has God knows through His essence. For His essence can be represented by many things that are not, nor will be, nor ever were. His essence is likewise the likeness of the power of every cause, through which effects pre-exist in their causes. And the being that each thing has in itself comes from the divine essence as from its exemplary source.

[10] Thus, therefore, God knows non-beings in so far as in some way they have being, namely, in His power, or in their causes, or in themselves. This is not incompatible with the nature of knowledge.

[11] The authority of Sacred Scripture likewise offers witness to what has preceded. For it is said in Sirach (23:29): “For all things were known to the Lord God before they were created: so also after they were perfected He beholds all things.” And in Jeremias (1:5): “Before I formed you in the bowels of your mother I knew you.”

[12] It is also clear from what has preceded that we are not forced to say, as some said, that God knows singulars universally because He knows them only in universal causes, just as one would know a particular eclipse not in itself but as it arises from the position of the stars. For we have shown that the divine knowledge extends to singulars in so far as they are in themselves.

 

[IWantGod]

[3] Again, the knowledge of the divine intellect is to other things as the knowledge of an artisan to artifacts, since through His knowledge God is the cause of things. Now, the artisan knows through his art even those things that have not yet been fashioned, since the forms of his art flow from his knowledge to external matter for the constitution of the artifacts. Hence, nothing forbids that there be in the knowledge of an artisan forms that have not yet come out of it. Thus, nothing forbids God to have knowledge of the things that are not.

I agree. God knows what he creates, he knows what he is, and he knows all possibilities because of what he is…

 

[IWantGod]

I agree. However, God would not know that Jason went to hell if he never created Jason. I’m talking about actual events.

 

[AveOTheotokos]

http://dhspriory.org/thomas/ContraGentiles1.htm#67

Chapter 67
THAT GOD KNOWS FUTURE CONTINGENT SINGULARS
[1] From this we can begin to understand somewhat that God had from eternity an infallible knowledge of contingent singulars, and yet they do not cease to be contingent.

[2] The contingent is opposed to the certitude of knowledge only so far as it is future, not so far as it is present. For when the contingent is future, it can not-be. Thus, the knowledge of one conjecturing that it will be can be mistaken: it will be mistaken if what he conjectures as future will not take place. But in so far as the contingent is present, in that time it cannot not-be. It can not-be in the future, but this affects the contingent not so far as it is present but so far as it is future. Thus, nothing is lost to the certitude of sense when someone sees a man running, even though this judgment is contingent. All knowledge, therefore, that bears on something contingent as present can be certain. But the vision of the divine intellect from all eternity is directed to each of the things that take place in the course of time, in so far as it is present, as shown above. It remains, therefore, that nothing prevents God from having from all eternity an infallible knowledge of contingents.

3] Again, the contingent differs from the necessary according to the way each of them is found in its cause. The contingent is in its cause in such a way that it can both not-be and be from it; but the necessary can only be from its cause. But according to the way both of them are in themselves, they do not differ as to being, upon which the true is founded. For, according as it is in itself, the contingent cannot be and not-be, it can only be, even though in the future it can not-be. Now, the divine intellect from all eternity knows things not only according to the being that they have in their causes, but also according to the being that they have in themselves. Therefore, nothing prevents the divine intellect from having an eternal and infallible knowledge of contingents.

[4] Moreover, just as from a necessary cause an effect follows with certitude, so it follows from a complete contingent cause if it be not impeded. But since, as appears from what was said above, God knows all things, He knows not only the causes of contingent things but also those things by which these causes may be impeded. Therefore, He knows with certitude whether contingent things are or are not.

[5] Furthermore, an effect cannot exceed the perfection of its cause, though sometime it falls short of it. Hence, since our knowledge comes to us from things, it happens at times that we know what is necessary not according to the mode of necessity but according to that of probability. Now, just as in us things are the cause of knowledge, so the divine knowledge is the cause of the things known. Therefore, nothing prevents those things from being contingent in themselves of which God has a necessary knowledge.

 

[AveOTheotokos]

[6] Again, an effect whose cause is contingent cannot be a necessary one; otherwise, the effect could be even though the cause were removed. Now, of the most remote effect there is both a proximate and a remote cause. If, then, the proximate cause were contingent, its effect would have to be contingent even though the remote cause is necessary. Thus, plants do not bear fruit of necessity, even though the motion of the sun is necessary, because the intermediate causes are contingent. But the knowledge of God, though it is the cause of the things known through it, is yet a remote cause. Therefore, the contingency of the things known is not in conflict with this necessity, since it may be that the intermediate causes are contingent.

[7] The knowledge of God, furthermore, would not be true and perfect if things did not happen in the way in which God knows them to happen. Now, since God knows all being, and is its source, He knows every effect not only in itself but also in its order to each of its causes. But the order of contingent things to their proximate causes is that they come forth from these causes in a contingent way. Hence, God knows that some things are taking place, and this contingently. Thus, therefore, the certitude and truth of the divine knowledge does not remove the contingency of things.

[8] From what has been said, it is therefore clear bow the objection impugning a knowledge of contingents in God is to be repulsed. For change in that which comes later does not induce change in that which has preceded; for it is possible that from prime necessary causes there proceed ultimate contingent effects. Now, the things that are known by God are not prior to His knowledge, as is the case with us, but, rather, subsequent to it. It does not therefore follow that, if something known by God can change, His knowledge of it can be deceived or in any way changed. We shall be deceived in the consequent therefore, if, because our knowledge of changeable things is itself changeable, we suppose on this account that such is necessarily the case in all knowledge.

 

[AveOTheotokos]

[9] Again, when it is said that God knows or knew this future thing, a certain intermediate point between the divine knowledge and the thing known is assumed. This is the time when the above words are spoken, in relation to which time that which is known by God is said to be future. But this is not future with reference to the divine knowledge, which, abiding in the moment of eternity, is related to all things as present to them. If with respect to the divine knowledge we remove from its intermediate position the time when the words are spoken, we cannot say that this is known by God as non-existent, so as to leave room for the question whether it can not-be; rather, it will be said to be known by God in such a way that it is seen by Him already in its own existence. On this basis there is no room for the preceding question. For that which already is cannot, with respect to that moment of time, not be. We are therefore deceived by the fact that the time in which we are speaking is present to eternity, as is likewise past time (designated by the words God knew). Hence, the relation of past or present time to the future is attributed to eternity, to which such a relation does not belong. It is thus that we commit the fallacy of accident.
There is more. If each thing is known by God as seen by Him in the present, what is known by God will then have to be. Thus, it is necessary that Socrates be seated from the fact that he is seen seated. But this is not absolutely necessary or, as some say, with the necessity of the consequent; it is necessary conditionally, or with the necessity of the consequence. For this is a necessary conditional proposition: if he is seen sitting, he is sitting. Hence, although the conditional proposition may be changed to a categorical one, to read what is seen sitting must necessarily be sitting, it is clear that the proposition is true if understood of what is said, and compositely; but it is false if understood of what is meant, and dividedly. Thus, in these and all similar arguments used by those who oppose God’s knowledge of contingents, the fallacy of composition and division takes place.

[11] That God knows future contingents is also shown by the authority of Sacred Scripture. For it is said of the divine wisdom: “She knows signs and wonders before they be done, and the events of times and ages” (Wis. 8:8). And in Sirach (39:24-25) it is said: “There is nothing hidden from His eyes. He sees from eternity to eternity.” And in Isaiah (48:5): “I foretold you of old, before they came to pass I told you.”

 

[AveOTheotokos]

Chapter 69
THAT GOD KNOWS INFINITE THINGS
[1] After this we must show that God knows infinite things.

[2] By knowing Himself to be the cause of things God knows things other than Himself, as is clear from the above. But God is the cause of infinite things, if there are infinite things, since He is the cause of all things that are. Therefore, God knows infinite things.

[3] Again, as is clear from what we have said, God knows His own power perfectly. But a power cannot be known perfectly unless all that it can do is known, since this is how the magnitude of a power is in a manner gauged. But since, as was shown above, His power is infinite, it extends to infinite things. Therefore, God knows infinite things.

[4] Moreover, if the knowledge of God extends to all things that in any way are, as was shown, He must know not only that which is actual but also that which is potential. But among natural things there is the infinite in potency, though not in act, as the Philosopher proves in Physics III [6]. God, therefore, knows infinite things. So, too, unity, which is the source of number, would know the infinite species of number if it knew whatever was in it potentially; for unity is potentially every number.

 

[AveOTheotokos]

Judaism and Christianity are unique in that they are religions not of Man seeking God, but God seeking Man. The truth of Christianity is predicate on Jesus and whether He was a liar, a lunatic, or Lord.

When you look at the resurrection, the historical evidence, the hostile witnesses, the martyrdom of the apostles when there was nothing to gain by holding to their “story”, you are left with that decision to make: Who was Jesus who was called the Christ?

 

[IWantGod]

It is absurd, but because of the fall the mentality of the human race is warped.

 

[AveOTheotokos]

Seeking Truth Among Different Religions

If Christianity is true, why are there so many different religions? There are things about the Christian faith that I find winsome and attractive, but I can't bring myself to accept it all. It's difficult to take a step like that in the modern world, where we know so much about so many other...

www.focusonthefamily.com

 

[pocaracas]

If you knew a rich man was handing out a million dollars and happiness to everyone who loved him and executing anyone who didn’t, there would be an aspect of coercion and/or ulterior motive for those who are choosing Him.

So… there’s no ulterior motive in wanting to be with god in the afterlife?
No coercion at all, when I read in another thread that “our primary task in this life is to evangelize”?
https://forums.catholic-questions.org/t/advice-from-other-ccd-teachers/464490/16?u=pocaracas

Also, there are many characters in the bible who had direct “coercive” contact with God himself and… it didn’t work out. There’s the Devil, Adam… who else?..

 

[AveOTheotokos]

So… there’s no ulterior motive in wanting to be with god in the afterlife?

That would depend on the individual person and their individual relationship with God. If the desire to be with God in the afterlife is the result of developing a love for Him in this life, then no, that is not an ulterior motive.

If someone just follow a set of rules and practices because they don’t want Hell, then they have not developed a relationship with God based on coming to know Him and love Him.

If someone has desires to go to Heaven only because of the good feelings and consolation they hope to find there, than they have not yet developed a relationship with God. This is why there are experiences like the dark night of the senses and of the soul.

Our relationship with God cannot be contingent on consolation, happiness, fear, feelings, etc…

No coercion at all, when I read in another thread that “our primary task in this life is to evangelize”?

Evangelizing is not an attempt to convince or coerce others. It is our attempt to give others the reason for the hope that we have in us and to share what we have found.

Our job is to inform, not to convince. Only the Holy Spirit can turn the hearts of Men toward God.

Also, there are many characters in the bible who had direct “coercive” contact with God himself and… it didn’t work out. There’s the Devil, Adam… who else?..

The devil is not a human and the experiential reality of his existence is not directly relatable to humanity. As for Adam, why do you say it did not work out for him?

 

[pocaracas]

pocaracas:

So… there’s no ulterior motive in wanting to be with god in the afterlife?

That would depend on the individual person and their individual relationship with God. If the desire to be with God in the afterlife is the result of developing a love for Him in this life, then no, that is not an ulterior motive.

If someone just follow a set of rules and practices because they don’t want Hell, then they have not developed a relationship with God based on coming to know Him and love Him.

If someone has desires to go to Heaven only because of the good feelings and consolation they hope to find there, than they have not yet developed a relationship with God. This is why there are experiences like the dark night of the senses and of the soul.

Our relationship with God cannot be contingent on consolation, happiness, fear, feelings, etc…

Cannot… but it often is. I doubt it would be for most of the users of this forum, but for many people out there.

pocaracas:

No coercion at all, when I read in another thread that “our primary task in this life is to evangelize”?

Evangelizing is not an attempt to convince or coerce others. It is our attempt to give others the reason for the hope that we have in us and to share what we have found.

Our job is to inform, not to convince. Only the Holy Spirit can turn the hearts of Men toward God.

Oh, is that what my wife does when she drags the kids to mass?.. inform.

pocaracas:

Also, there are many characters in the bible who had direct “coercive” contact with God himself and… it didn’t work out. There’s the Devil, Adam… who else?..

The devil is not a human and the experiential reality of his existence is not directly relatable to humanity. As for Adam, why do you say it did not work out for him?

Banished? Banished from God’s garden? Banished from the presence of God?

 

[Hereiam]

Why would God create people he knew would go to hell?

He didn’t.

He only created people he knew COULD go to heaven, gave them the means to do so, and left the decision up to them.

Doesn’t get simpler or more beautiful that that!

 

[AlNg]

nothing prevents God from having from all eternity an infallible knowledge of contingents.

But if God knows what you will do in the future, then do you have any other alternative? Does free will imply the existence of possible alternatives?

 

[2towers]

There is more reading material on this thread then I’ve seen in a while.

I feel like I deserve some credit hours, just for scanning it.