Post 2 of 2
The issue is that the electron cannot determine itself to obtain A as opposed to obtaining B or C. Perhaps we can explain its determined behavior in this very moment in terms of other non-intelligent causes (space-time, quantum vibrations, gluons and quarks, or what have you), but that’s passing the buck, as all of these things exhibit determined behaviors as well, an neither can they determine themselves to obtain their ends as opposed to some other ends. So if the electron is determined to its behavior by its quarks, and its quarks by certain quantum states, and its quantum states by something else, all of which are unable to determine themselves towards their own end, we’re endlessly passing the buck, in which case there’s no explanation for any causal power in the system, even if infinitely long. The First Cause or (First Determinator (a made up term) is the explanation of where any such system receives its causal power.
If the First Cause is not intelligent, if it’s simply a non-intelligent thing that determines electrons to A and protons to B, we have an issue, because it simply means the First Cause is determined to cause Set Of Behaviors Y instead of Set of Behaviors Z, in which case we require yet another external explanation or cause as to why the First Cause is determined to do Set Of Behaviors Y as opposed to anything else, which just means that this thing we thought was the First Cause is not the First Cause if it itself needs to be caused by something else. Rather, then, the First Cause must be intelligent in that it had the causal power to determine these ends without requiring any cause prior to itself. And if it chose of its own will to make a set of determinations, and could of made any conceivable set of determinations, and by other arguments (one presented earlier), it follows that it’s also omniscient.
I haven’t really tried using teleological argument before, so I hope I made an okay stab of it. It’s a different argument than the one I presented previously, and definitely not something in any way related to the idea of fine tuning as evidence. Even if only one thing in our experienced reality, even the most fundamental particle or fabric of reality, exhibited any type of teleology, and nothing else did, that would be sufficient to lead to a “First Determinator” that is intelligent.