It’s not an unreasonable assumption to make.
The jury was carefully selected to ensure that nobody on the jury would have a reason to be biased for or against Cardinal Pell or the Church. So we can assume that they tried to reach their decision as fairly as possible.
Next, they would have been made aware that they are required to find the defendant guilty with certainty, usually expressed as being beyond reasonable doubt. They will have understood that in the event of their being in any way uncertain about the correct verdict they must find the defendant not guilty. The whole criminal justice system is, quite rightly, weighted in favour of the defendant. If they think that the defendant is probably guilty but they’re not sure, they must acquit him. It is better that somebody who is probably guilty is acquitted than that somebody who is possibly innocent is convicted.
Somebody suggested that it was possible ‘that they were so consumed by the fear of letting a guilty man possibly go free that they became willing to stretch the evidence.’ Now, that is not the way that jury trials work. But I was suggesting that one could consider this kind of scenario: a dozen children in the local area have been kidnapped, raped, and murdered. Everyone is terrified that there is a dangerous maniac on the loose. Their own children could be next. A suspect is caught and is put on trial. The evidence against him is compelling, but there are one or two doubts: a fingerprint that was only a partial match, an alibi that just about holds water. The jury is fairly certain they’ve got the right man, but the strict letter of the law says that they must acquit. Then somebody says, ‘But what if we let him go and the very next day another child goes missing?’ And so, reluctantly, they convict. If the killings stop there, they assume they got the right man, albeit on flimsy evidence; if the killings resume, the police will reopen the investigation, and in time the wrongful conviction should be quashed. In the case of Cardinal Pell, this consideration does not pertain. He is an old man in poor health who will never be allowed near a child again, even if acquitted. Therefore ‘the fear of letting a guilty man possibly go free’ does not pertain. There is no ‘fear of letting a guilty man possibly go free’ unless you think that he could offend again. The law says that if there is a chance that a guilty man is in fact innocent he must be acquitted. The jury will have understood that.