What I disagree about is your equating a moral question with a question that has a single definite answer in Church doctrine. I am not claiming that moral means âright or wrongâ in the sense of circumstantially correct. I mean good vs. bad - what most people mean (even atheists) when they say âmoralâ.
This is too vague for me; Iâm trying to be as precise as possible so that our disagreements are over more than the meaning of terms. I think the word moral is often incorrectly used and in fact means different things to different people. In my discussions with others I have discovered that for some, an act is moral if it turns out for the best. That clearly is not what the church means by the term.
What you have shown is that prudential and doctrinal are mutually exclusive. But I never disagreed with that. I disagreed with prudential and moral being mutually exclusive. It is only your insistence on equating moral and doctrinal that make that fly.
Say again? The Ten Commandments lists moral obligations and immoral actions: we must not steal, we must honor our parents. Certain acts are forbidden, but our moral obligations are generic: we are not told what specific acts honor or dishonor our parents, so while we may not disagree about whether we must honor them, we may certainly disagree about how we should or should not behave toward them.
This is the distinction Iâm trying to make regarding laws. Specific actions are forbidden while certain obligations are generic: we must not kill, we must do what is reasonable to welcome the stranger. âThe listâ addresses solely those political issues that deal with actions that are specifically forbidden. Neither the list nor the church addresses those issues that allow for a range of acceptable positions.
And when you conclude that âimmigration is not a moral issueâ, what you mean is that the doctrinal admonition to welcome the stranger in need can be met in various ways, and people of good faith can disagree about how to do that.
Exactly.
But when people use that excuse to say that we need not welcome immigrants at all, that is a moral question.
No, that is a judgment of someone else. It is certainly true that people can behave badly about anything, but that doesnât change the nature of the issue. My behavior toward an issue doesnât change what that issue really is. I can make all sorts of bad excuses for not helping my neighbor get his car our of a snowbank, but that doesnât make disagreements over how to do it a moral choice.
So some aspects of the immigration issue are prudential and some are moral. You canât say all questions about immigration are prudential.
You can only say a question about immigration is moral if you phrase it so vaguely as to include the intentions of the people involved, but as I said before, this is invalid. My intentions reflect solely on me, they do not change the essential nature of the problem I am addressing.
What are the three components of an action that determine its morality? They are the nature of the act itself, the intent behind it, and to a lesser extent the circumstances. The list concerns itself only with issues that are determined by the first condition: they are immoral because they involve acts which are intrinsically immoral regardless of ones intention. All of the other issues, such as immigration, cannot be called moral unless one includes a judgment of the intentions of the people involved.
When those âprudentialâ solutions abuse the liberty of prudential judgement so far, so as not to be guided by a well-formed conscience, they do become distinguishable on a moral level. And I do believe that is what is actually happening today.
Yes, you have set yourself up as one capable of judging the intentions of others. This is what it all comes down to.
Ender