
I am shocked and disgusted that this topic is even being discussed!!
If you were in that situation what would you do? Suffer and die a slow very painful death? Or a quick, and not so painful? Either way they would have known their fate, and picked the alternative…
They should not be judged, looked down upon and be called sinners, just because they decided to jump!
God is merciful.
Indeed. Even my participation in defending them revolts me as something that can never do justice to them.
But they merit a defense against the notion that any of them may reasonably be thought to be guilty of suicide (since they may
not reasonably be thought to be guilty of suicide), and though I am now arguing on strictly intellectual grounds - which are woefully insufficient to do justice to these poor persons’ end - nonetheless my paltry defense should suffice for paltry attacks.
Actually, yes.
It is not germane to the topic at hand.
I know well the meaning and theory.
Alright, fair enough. I won’t break my earlier promise, but I’ll go through the theory myself after saying this:
You’re right about one thing - there
are two arguments here, one that concerns culpability and one that concerns what can be reasonably assumed about the moral nature of their act.
As to the former, I consider it self-evident that their culpability was demonstrably eliminated. You question this assertion that their culpability’s elimination is self-evident, and I know I won’t convince you at this point. So I don’t mind dropping that argument.
Let other participants read, think, and decide for themselves.
Now, leaving culpability aside…
Properly Applying Moral Theology to the Jumpers
As you probably know, a moral act has three components: its
object, its
end, and its
circumstances. Its object is the deed itself. Its end is the moral agent’s intention or objective - what (s)he desires to achieve.
All three components must be morally good or neutral for the act to be acceptable. If even one is immoral, the act is wrong. An immoral object makes the act immoral. An immoral intention can render even an objectively good act immoral. And certain circumstances too can render immoral even an act whose object and intentions are good.
The
object of the jumpers was jumping out a window and/or away from flames. That’s morally neutral. They’re fine.
Their
intention is to escape pain - the agony of burning or suffocating to death.
That’s a good intention.
The
circumstances, however, include their being far too high to survive a fall. This is where double effect comes in.
Their act has a
good effect - avoiding pain, but also a
bad one - their death. So it is an act that results in a
foreseen evil (foreseen if we leave out all consideration for culpability…)
So does it meet double effect’s four criteria?
Criterion One: Is the object of their act morally good or morally neutral? Yes (see above). It fits this condition.
Criterion Two: Does the moral agent intend or desire the evil effect (as an end)? Obviously not; those people would have preferred to live. It fits this condition.
Criterion Three: Is the good effect (no pain) a direct result of the evil effect (death)? In another words, does the moral agent intend the evil effect as a means?
Obviously not, in this case. It’s not their death which ends their pain, but rather their distance from the flames and the embrace of the cool open air. Both effects here follow from the act; neither effect causes the other. It fits this condition.
Criterion Four: Are the circumstances sufficiently grave to permit the act to cause the foreseen evil?
Of course. This evil effect - their deaths - was totally unavoidable either way. This situation is the very definition of “circumstances sufficiently grave to permit one’s act to cause a foreseen evil.” It fits this condition. It fits all these conditions like a glove fits a hand.
In conclusion:
(A) Your suggestion that it is possible that some of them might have wanted to die is not reasonable. That’s not what “intention” is. Tautologically, intention is what the moral agent wants. None of those people wanted to die that day, so they did not will their deaths as an end. And since the good end they sought - escape from the flames - is not a result of the evil of their deaths, then it’s literally logically
impossible for them to have willed their death as a means.
Thus none of them willed their own deaths as an end or as a means.
(B) That said, there remains their undeniable lack of moral culpability in the face of burning, searing, choking agony. That is the final - and very unnecessary, in light of the above - nail in the coffin of the idea that it is in any way reasonable to think any of the jumpers could be guilty of suicide.