A colossal accident?

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This is the source of the problem I think.
The source of the problem is you. You refuse to use standard terminology. You refuse to address refutations, and so on.
You recognise that naive empiricism is related to the dogmatic empiricism, but you are unwilling to see there is a difference.
Naive empiricism is the same thing as strong empiricism. The proposition you assert, which is clearly dogmatic. Not that it matters as it is a logical contradiction.
It is to the latter that the logical conundrum applies, and not to the former,
There is no latter and former, they are the same thing.
because only the former can be supported by empirical evidence.
You have no empirical evidence. As I keep pointing out, there is no way to make the leap from premises like “I observe that water oxidizes iron” to “experience is required for knowledge”. The fact is you have no evidence. You may just as well claim that the existence of zoos is evidence that there is water on Mars.
So you do see their similarity,
Not just similarity. They are the same thing. The title of the article “A Defense of Naive Empiricism” means the same thing as if it were titled “A Defense of Strong Empiricism”.
but you cannot apply this rule to all philosophical constructions going by the noun empiricism: “Bertrand Russel pointed out the contradiction in empiricism, therefore if something is called empiricism, it must be self-contradicted”.
That is not what he said. He said…
I will observe, however, that empiricism, as a theory of knowledge,** is self-refuting. For, however it may be formulated, it must involve some general proposition about the dependence of knowledge upon experience;** and that any such proposition, if true, must have as a consequence that itself cannot be known. While, therefore, empiricism may be true, it cannot, if true, be known to be so.
Bertrand Russel may not have been aware of the later formulation.
You are not talking about later formulations. Further, he died in 1972. By which time the issue was settled.
Indeed, I don’t think you can show that the hypothesis is a self-contradiction,
See the quote above. It’s long proven fact. Further, by pointing out that you have no evidence for the proposition you have asserted, I am demonstrating that fact for you.
which is why you have denied that it is a hypothesis.
The words “hypothesis” and “theory” are synonymous.:rolleyes:
 
Well I for one perceive my thoughts. Isn’t being self-aware doing exactly that?
I’ve already explained the difference between the two in a previous post. However, to make the point clear, self-aware is being conscious of oneself, an act not reliant on senses but a part of consciousness.
 
There is no such thing as “naive empiricism”. It is a reference to strong empiricism. Further the words “theory” and “hypothesis” are synonymous.
Can I remind you that you did state that naive empiricism was a hypothesis. If you are using the word I know, you meant by that that this proposition was provisional and dependent upon evidence, therefore you acknowledged implicitly that it is not a dogma. Dogmas, as you should know, are propositions asserted without regard to evidence.

Also as you say, a hypothesis is a theory. However, as needs to be said, a theory is not a dogma.

So do you agree with your own words, or would you like to redefine them? Is naive empiricism a failed hypothesis, or is it a self-contradictory dogma?
 
I’ve already explained the difference between the two in a previous post. However, to make the point clear, self-aware is being conscious of oneself, an act not reliant on senses but a part of consciousness.
So you are saying that sensation is separate from consciousness? Do you accept that they might overlap somewhat?
 
Ok, so if you’re sure of your position Warpspeedpetey, can you explain this:

How is it that ‘any such proposition [making knowledge dependent upon experience], if true, must have as a consequence that itself cannot be known’?

That claim is false!
 
Well, there are beliefs and beliefs. Do I have reason to believe that an invisible Flying Spaghetti Monster is in low earth orbit, sending me pasta recipes? Do we have reason to believe that ice will melt when left out at room temperature, all other things equal?
I not sure what you are necessarily thinking. Why don’t you articulate your position rather than pose a rhetorical question?
How is that actually self-refuting? I don’t think it is.
Stating that having a reason to believe that you have a reason to believe empiricism is true is self-refuting in a similar way when you state that you observe the fact you are observing. It’s a self reinforcing statement and applies a redundancy. When you remove it merely becomes ‘I a reason to believe empiricism is true.’ So, the statement that ‘I have a reason to believe empiricism is true’ is pointless, epistemologically speaking.
That last point was just a musing. I don’t think we can truly split perception from reality with absolute certainty. Even if we could, I still think that all reality when thought of is filtered through the capacities and senses of the human physiology, which alone makes it apprehended.
It’s quite possible what you say is true.
 
So you are saying that sensation is separate from consciousness? Do you accept that they might overlap somewhat?
To clarify, what you do mean by overlap? For instance, you can be aware that you are in pain. Is that what are you referring to?
 
To clarify, what you do mean by overlap? For instance, you can be aware that you are in pain. Is that what are you referring to?
Good point, it needs clarifying, but I don’t think I’ll pursue that because I remember the study showing that certain blind people can use their sight unconsciously. On further thought, I think that consciousness is a sort of perception - it is perception of ourselves. In that way, I don’t think it needs any specific sense to exist, but that it is one. However, I do think that consciousness arises only with the (name removed by moderator)ut of some senses, else we would not know about ourselves. Do you think that someone who had no sight, hearing, tactile or other senses, no sense data, no experience of time, no language, etc etc - do you think that they could realise they existed? I would imagine not.

Given that I think consciousness is a sense, and that we can be aware of thoughts - they happen in our consciousness - the question resolves itself linguistically. Awareness is a sort of perception.
 
I not sure what you are necessarily thinking. Why don’t you articulate your position rather than pose a rhetorical question?
Belief is all we can have, in the absence of certainty - that is what I think. However, we can have greater or lesser reason to believe, and that which we have a lot of reason to believe in we call knowledge. So the FSM does not qualify as known, whereas we can ‘know’ that ice will melt at room temperature without having certainty. I just enjoy talking about the spaghetti monster too much to resist bringing Him in.
Stating that having a reason to believe that you have a reason to believe empiricism is true is self-refuting in a similar way when you state that you observe the fact you are observing. It’s a self reinforcing statement and applies a redundancy. When you remove it merely becomes ‘I a reason to believe empiricism is true.’ So, the statement that ‘I have a reason to believe empiricism is true’ is pointless, epistemologically speaking.
Well I could say I believe empiricism is true therefore I know it to be true, but that is not enough, because empiricism if applied to itself specifies that I must have reason to believe in it according to experienced evidence. Hence if you unpack it all, the only self-consistent way to advocate empiricism is to know by experience that one has to have experience to know anything.

This is done by saying first that knowledge is only ‘reason to believe’, and secondly, that reason to believe can be granted by inductive reasoning. Thirdly, by using individual examples of knowledge gained from experience, plus the lack of any alternatives, we can say that we do have evidence that experience is required for knowledge. Therefore, overall, the formulation is that we have inductive reason to believe that all instances of having reason to believe must contain evidence based on experience. It is not self-supporting or circular, but self-consistent.
 
Can I remind you that you did state that naive empiricism was a hypothesis.
A statement I have made a great many times in the course of this thread. The words “hypothesis” and “theory” are synonyms. “Naive empiricism” is synonymous with “strong empiricism”. The proposition that you have asserted.
If you are using the word I know,
I am using standard terminology.
hy·poth·e·sisNoun/hīˈpäTHəsis/
  1. A supposition or proposed explanation made on the basis of limited evidence as a starting point for further investigation.
  2. A proposition made as a basis for reasoning, without any assumption of its truth
First, as I have pointed out you have no evidence either to form a hypothesis from.
you meant by that that this proposition was provisional and dependent upon evidence,
No, I am repeating the common name of the subject under discussion.
therefore you acknowledged implicitly that it is not a dogma.
No…it is clearly a dogmatic statement by the actual definition of the word.
Dogmas, as you should know, are propositions asserted without regard to evidence.
dog·ma /ˈdôgmə/
Noun: A principle or set of principles laid down by an authority as incontrovertibly true
“experience is required for knowledge” is clearly a dogmatic statement
Also as you say, a hypothesis is a theory. However, as needs to be said, a theory is not a dogma.
and black is not white, what’s your point?
So do you agree with your own words, or would you like to redefine them?
I agree with my own words. No need to redefine them. Your refusal to use standard terminology and lack of experience inn the subject matter causes you to make all sorts of easily refutable errors like this.
Is naive empiricism a failed hypothesis, or is it a self-contradictory dogma?
Yes to both. Strong empiricism is a failed theory because the proposition “experience is required for knowledge” is a dogmatic logical contradiction.With no evidence from which to make that proposition 🙂
 
…How is it that ‘any such proposition [making knowledge dependent upon experience], if true, must have as a consequence that itself cannot be known’?..
Because the proposition itself is knowledge that one does not gain from experience. As I pointed out some 600 posts ago.:rolleyes:
 
Because the proposition itself is knowledge that one does not gain from experience. As I pointed out some 600 posts ago.:rolleyes:
I have just demonstrated above, in a comment to SoG, how one does gain the knowledge of empiricism from experience.
 
A statement I have made a great many times in the course of this thread. The words “hypothesis” and “theory” are synonyms. “Naive empiricism” is synonymous with “strong empiricism”. The proposition that you have asserted.
Ok, so you are saying that naive empiricism is equivalent to strong empiricism, and that it is a theory/hypothesis, and a dogma as well as self-contradictory. I’m not the one who is confused here!
Yes to both. Strong empiricism is a failed theory because the proposition “experience is required for knowledge” is a dogmatic logical contradiction.With no evidence from which to make that proposition 🙂
It is not automatically self-contradictory if it meets the criteria itself that it sets for all knowledge generally. (Do you agree?) It is not dogmatic if it is only asserted conditionally upon evidence. (Do you agree?) The only issue left to deal with is whether you consider it has sufficient evidence in its favour. (Do you agree?)
 
Ok, so you are saying that naive empiricism is equivalent to strong empiricism, and that it is a theory/hypothesis, and a dogma as well as self-contradictory. I’m not the one who is confused here!
That is not what he is saying. He is saying both terms refer to the exact same thing.
It is not automatically self-contradictory if it meets the criteria itself that it sets for all knowledge generally. (Do you agree?) It is not dogmatic if it is only asserted conditionally upon evidence. (Do you agree?) The only issue left to deal with is whether you consider it has sufficient evidence in its favour. (Do you agree?)
No I don’t agree. Your first premise is faulty (“not automatically self-contradictory”). And the basis for the fault has been presented multiple times.
 
I have just demonstrated above, in a comment to SoG, how one does gain the knowledge of empiricism from experience.
I am not reading most of your posts with SoG. You will have to repost it for me, or tell me where it’s at.
 
Ok, so you are saying that naive empiricism is equivalent to strong empiricism,
Not just equivalent, they are the same thing.
and that it is a theory/hypothesis,
Those words mean the same thing as well.
and a dogma as well as self-contradictory.
Yes, though being a dogma has nothing to do with the proposition being a logical contradiction
I’m not the one who is confused here!
You certainly are. You are confuse concerning just about everything.
It is not automatically self-contradictory if it meets the criteria itself that it sets for all knowledge generally. (Do you agree?)
No criteria can make the proposition “experience is required for knowledge” anything but contradictory. All reasoning stops at a contradiction.
It is not dogmatic if it is only asserted conditionally upon evidence. (Do you agree?)
No. The content of a statement determines the statements nature, not the speakers intent.
The only issue left to deal with is whether you consider it has sufficient evidence in its favour. (Do you agree?)
No, you have ignored dozens of refutations through hundreds of posts. There are a great many issues left to deal with. By ignoring them you cede them to me. We are no closer to a conclusion than we were 500 posts ago. Of course you can always admit that empiricism is a long dead theory. As the historical facts, the experts and the demonstrations all bear out.
 
That is not what he is saying. He is saying both terms refer to the exact same thing.
The only problem there is that a genuine hypothesis cannot be a dogma. In making the fundamental principle of naive empiricism a hypothesis, the proposition that knowledge requires experience becomes possible to satisfy with the evidence of experience. Therefore, it is not self-contradictory. I’d look at this article: ‘A Defense of “Naïve” Empiricism: It is Neither Self-Refuting nor Dogmatic’ ithaca.edu/hs/philrel/defense_of_naive_empiricism.pdf
No I don’t agree. Your first premise is faulty (“not automatically self-contradictory”). And the basis for the fault has been presented multiple times.
How is it faulty? I have already explained above how empiricism satisfies its own requirements for knowledge. See post 660
 
What makes it a hypothesis to assert 1 but a dogma to assert 2?:
  1. A certain amount of thrust is required for a rocket of mass x to escape earth’s gravity
  2. A proposition claiming truth is required to be supported by evidence from experience in order to be considered knowledge.
The content is the same. Something is required of something else to achieve a result. The context could be the same - both could be asserted with the full intention of gathering evidence. Therefore, no. 2 can be a hypothesis and not a dogma.
 
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