A colossal accident?

[warpspeedpetey]

The only problem there is that a genuine hypothesis cannot be a dogma.

your proposition “experience is required for knowledge” is clearly dogmatic. see the words “is required”?

dog·ma
/ˈdôgmə/
Noun: A principle or set of principles laid down by an authority as incontrovertibly true

In making the fundamental principle of naive empiricism a hypothesis,

You are not making a hypothetical statement. You are declaring a dogmatic statement hypothetical. If you want to make a hypothetical statement, you have to change the content of the proposition.

the proposition that knowledge requires experience becomes possible to satisfy with the evidence of experience.

You still have no evidence.

Therefore, it is not self-contradictory. I’d look at this article: ‘A Defense of “Naïve” Empiricism: It is Neither Self-Refuting nor Dogmatic’ ithaca.edu/hs/philrel/defense_of_naive_empiricism.pdf

Which peer reviewed journal published this world changing document?

 

[warpspeedpetey]

Post 660. I can restate it if you want

I looked, but I don’t see any new arguments in that post. Just cut and paste the specific part you are referring too.

 

[warpspeedpetey]

…1. A certain amount of thrust is required for a rocket of mass x to escape earth’s gravity.

This statement is not hypothetical, it is a known fact.

1. A proposition claiming truth is required to be supported by evidence from experience in order to be considered knowledge.

This is not the proposition you asserted.
You asserted that “experience is required for knowledge”. This proposition does not mention truth, or define knowledge, or talk about evidence.

The content is the same. …

The content is not the same. Not that it matters. You can spin your wheels for ages on this and it is still a proposition that is a well known logical contradiction.

 

[Soldier_Of_God]

Belief is all we can have, in the absence of certainty - that is what I think.

So, when you think you only believe you are thinking and there is no certainty?

I just enjoy talking about the spaghetti monster too much to resist bringing Him in.

I admit I like spaghetti so I can appreciate the temptation.

We have inductive reason to believe that all instances of having reason to believe must contain evidence based on experience. It is not self-supporting or circular, but self-consistent.

I guess I’m not seeing the self-consistency. Having a reason to believe that you have a reason to believe appears not only to contain a redundancy but also self reinforcing. The argument simply repeats itself, veiled as a logical statement. It offers no evidence that reasons to believe is sufficient other than to say that there is reason to believe that it is.

 

[Soldier_Of_God]

Awareness is a sort of perception.

You are using the word awareness in a [sensory] perception sense, which doesn’t address the issue of thought, reason and mental state of consciousness. You’ve merely side-stepped the issue with equivocation.

 

[fred_conty]

fortuitous destroy your appreciation of beauty and goodness or diminish your experience of love?

Good point for the here and now!
But the 64 thousand $ question is “is that all there is?”.

 

[James1215]

So, when you think you only believe you are thinking and there is no certainty?

Not quite, there are many nuances and debates over how we can build up from perception to reach any kind of hypothesis in which we have good reason to believe, but many argue we can rely upon a core of perception. Therefore we can tell what we think without needing reason to believe we think what we think we think. Our immediate perceptions and sense-data may tell us little, but they are the raw data about which we can be certain, relative to the large structures of empirical hypotheses which are conditional on numerous perceptions, and may change very easily. This ‘certainty’ is not an assertion that each isolated perception represents ‘reality’, but a reflection of their foundational and taken-for-granted character. The reason we have to take them for granted is that we have no reason to believe that perception is of ‘reality’ or that is not of ‘reality’. Hypotheses cannot be taken for granted, because they depend upon continued support.

Having a reason to believe that you have a reason to believe appears not only to contain a redundancy but also self reinforcing. The argument simply repeats itself, veiled as a logical statement. It offers no evidence that reasons to believe is sufficient other than to say that there is reason to believe that it is.

This is not a matter of nuance or debate, but a mistake I think. It is not a case of having reason to believe that one has reason to believe. In this case, one reason would do, so the second statement would be redundant. Note, instead, that the formulation is that we have reason to believe that all instances of having reason to believe are based on empirical evidence. It could be different and make sense - we could have reason to believe [which means knowledge] that some instances of having reason to believe [of having knowledge] require empirical evidence, but some other instances don’t. Neither formulation is circular.

 

[Soldier_Of_God]

Not quite, there are many nuances and debates over how we can build up from perception to reach any kind of hypothesis in which we have good reason to believe, but many argue we can rely upon a core of perception. Therefore we can tell what we think without needing reason to believe we think what we think we think. Our immediate perceptions and sense-data may tell us little, but they are the raw data about which we can be certain, relative to the large structures of empirical hypotheses which are conditional on numerous perceptions, and may change very easily. This ‘certainty’ is not an assertion that each isolated perception represents ‘reality’, but a reflection of their foundational and taken-for-granted character. The reason we have to take them for granted is that we have no reason to believe that perception is of ‘reality’ or that is not of ‘reality’. Hypotheses cannot be taken for granted, because they depend upon continued support.

This really says nothing with clarity and you use multiple repetitions. I’m not sure what point is being made. You still are avoiding the question I posed in earlier posts. Futhermore, you make a vague appeal to authority with regards to core perception. Citation please!

This is not a matter of nuance or debate, but a mistake I think. It is not a case of having reason to believe that one has reason to believe. In this case, one reason would do, so the second statement would be redundant. Note, instead, that the formulation is that we have reason to believe that all instances of having reason to believe are based on empirical evidence. It could be different and make sense - we could have reason to believe [which means knowledge] that some instances of having reason to believe [of having knowledge] require empirical evidence, but some other instances don’t. Neither formulation is circular.

You are confusing reasons for belief with knowledge. Now you are saying ‘We have [knowledge] that some instances of having [knowledge] require empirical evidence.’ So, you now believe that you have knowledge that some knowledge requires empirical evidence. Now you are saying evidence = reasons for belief = knowledge. How is knowledge the same as reasons for belief or evidence? This is merely more equivocation on your part.

 

[James1215]

This statement is not hypothetical, it is a known fact.

This may be the logical and psychological heart of the matter of why you don’t find naive empiricism satisfying. The statement about thrust is hypothetical (if you (name removed by moderator)ut a value for x) - as indeed is all scientific knowledge - which you would point out in a heartbeat if anyone tried to argue that science could offer us certain knowledge of anything. It just happens to be well-evidenced empirically that a certain rocket requires a certain amount of thrust, backed up by explanations which are just as empirically contingent - about gravity, aerodynamics etc etc. Inductive reasoning does not provide for certainty, but we can make and live by empirical hypotheses very well, which is why some hypotheses are treated as ‘fact’. Therefore, just because naive empiricism is a hypothesis does not mean that it is necessarily unsatisfying, doubtful or weak. Also, given that we cannot hope for what is illogical (certainty from induction), we ought to be satisfied with only having reason to believe proposition 1 was true.

If you accept that number 1 was not dogmatic but hypothetical, you have to accept the same of number 2, because they are formulated in the same way. Therefore, what is entailed is that the assertion requiring empirical evidence for everything must have empirical evidence for itself, else we have no reason to believe it. Just like the first assertion about thrust must have evidence for itself else we’ll remain unconvinced. The 2nd proposition either might be able to gain this, or it might not - it is not a logical contradiction, because there is the possibility that it supports itself in the same way that all knowledge is supposed to. There is nothing to say at the outset that this is impossible, so if you are with me thus far, you have to drop the idea that it is automatically self-contradictory.

But don’t worry, all that means is that you are subjecting the hypothesis of empiricism to the test of evidence, which we should focus on.

You asserted that “experience is required for knowledge”. This proposition does not mention truth, or define knowledge, or talk about evidence.

As a side point, I had given up trying to elaborate the meanings of these because you have a trusty dictionary which is apparently able to read our minds and offer you the ‘real answer’, demoting my argumentation to the status of ‘non-standard terminology’. However, as an example of why dictionaries do not give automatic reason to believe their contents are true, we can see that common sense or some ‘standard definition’ might say that knowledge is having certain belief, when it can be argued that this is impossible.

 

[warpspeedpetey]

This may be the logical and psychological heart of the matter of why you don’t find naive empiricism satisfying…

No, it’s because the proposition you assert is a well known logical contradiction. Logical contradictions are necessarily false. It does not matter if you call it a hypothesis or a theory, it’s still a proposition and a proposition that has been dead for decades at that. That’s before we get to the dozens of other refutations that you have conveniently ignored for hundreds of posts.

As a side point, I had given up trying to elaborate the meanings of these because you have a trusty dictionary which is apparently able to read our minds and offer you the ‘real answer’, demoting my argumentation to the status of ‘non-standard terminology’.

If you cannot use standard terminology to make an argument, then you just cannot make the argument. The claim that dictionaries are tautological and therefore you don’t have to use them like everyone else does is ludicrous. The fact is that if you were to use the words with the definition that everyone else does for the context, your arguments would be obviously false. Trying to pretend there is something wrong with dictionaries is a far less reasonable position than simply admitting the widely accepted and historically demonstrated fact that empiricism, most especially the formulation of the proposition you assert is long dead. Feel free to continue the farce however, the more page views the better. Everyone should get a chance to see that the basis of the new atheism is false.

 

[warpspeedpetey]

This may be the logical and psychological heart of the matter of why you don’t find naive empiricism satisfying.

The facts and argumentation that disproved empiricism decades ago is why I reject it as all the experts did.

Also, given that we cannot hope for what is illogical (certainty from induction), we ought to be satisfied with only having reason to believe proposition 1 was true.

We ought to be satisfied with what is true, not what is convenient.

If you accept that number 1 was not dogmatic but hypothetical, you have to accept the same of number 2, because they are formulated in the same way.

1 is a dogmatic statement. See the words “is required”? Further, “theory” and “hypothesis” are synonyms. Calling it a hypothesis instead of a theory doesn’t change anything. It is still a proposition which forms a well known logical contradiction.

Therefore, what is entailed is that the assertion requiring empirical evidence for everything must have empirical evidence for itself, else we have no reason to believe it.

Thank you for agreeing the proposition is a logical contradiction.

…it is not a logical contradiction, because there is the possibility that it supports itself in the same way that all knowledge is supposed to. There is nothing to say at the outset that this is impossible,

Except there is not. As I have pointed out there is no way to make the leap from an observation like “water oxidizes iron” to “experience is required for knowledge”

so if you are with me thus far, you have to drop the idea that it is automatically self-contradictory.

Not in the least. It is clearly impossible for there to be empirical evidence for the proposition “experience is required for knowledge”. It could be written out in the stars, and from that observation would not follow the conclusion that “experience is required for knowledge”

But don’t worry, all that means is that you are subjecting the hypothesis of empiricism to the test of evidence, which we should focus on.

I don’t care if you want to use the word “hypothesis” instead of “theory”. As they are synonyms, there is no movement from the historical path of this argument. You want to convince me that by using one synonym instead of the other, it changes things. It doesn’t. You have no evidence for the proposition.

As a side point, I had given up trying to elaborate the meanings of these because you have a trusty dictionary which is apparently able to read our minds and offer you the ‘real answer’, demoting my argumentation to the status of ‘non-standard terminology’. However, as an example of why dictionaries do not give automatic reason to believe their contents are true, we can see that common sense or some ‘standard definition’ might say that knowledge is having certain belief, when it can be argued that this is impossible.

If you cannot use standard terminology to make an argument, then you just cannot make the argument. The claim that dictionaries are tautological and therefore you don’t have to use them like everyone else does is ludicrous. The fact is that if you were to use the words with the definition that everyone else does for the context, your arguments would be obviously false. Trying to pretend there is something wrong with dictionaries is a far less reasonable position than simply admitting the widely accepted and historically demonstrated fact that empiricism, most especially the formulation of the proposition you assert is long dead.

 

[James1215]

As I have pointed out there is no way to make the leap from an observation like “water oxidizes iron” to “experience is required for knowledge”

It seems like there is general confusion on your part surrounding the epistemological status of the first proposition about thrust. Is it a ‘fact’, a ‘dogma’ or a ‘hypothesis’ in your mind?

I think it is clearly a hypothesis, therefore in principle of the same epistemological status as [hypothetical] empiricism. Furthermore, your attempt to undermine the self-consistency of empiricism by appealing to its uncertainty is as misguided as your reliance upon inductive reasoning for knowledge is revealing. I believe your willingness to accept inductive reasoning as a legitimate means to knowledge is betrayed by your restatement of a general law (water oxidises iron) as if it was a certainty. That water always oxidises iron we cannot be certain, just as we cannot be certain that every proposition that becomes knowledge has empirical evidence. This does not mean that we cannot come to have strong reason to believe that either is true. I will add that, by your reasoning predicated on the appearance of the word ‘required’ in the sentence, it is not only dogmatic to say that ‘knowledge requires experience’, but also dogmatic to assert that ‘empiricism is required to be demonstrated empirically’.

 

[warpspeedpetey]

It seems like there is general confusion on your part surrounding the epistemological status of the first proposition about thrust. Is it a ‘fact’, a ‘dogma’ or a ‘hypothesis’ in your mind?

See the words “is required”? You want to claim that all knowledge is hypothetical and therefore your statement is hypothetical, yet the proposition that you assert has a dogmatic form. You are asserting a contradiction. “All dogs are black by definition, especially this white one!”

dog·ma/ˈdôgmə/
Noun: A principle or set of principles laid down by an authority as incontrovertibly true

Not that it matters because the proposition you are asserting is a well known logical contradiction.

Furthermore, your attempt to undermine the self-consistency of empiricism by appealing to its uncertainty

I am pointing out that you cannot induct your way into the proposition that you assert. That is not undermining it that is disproving it in the strong form.

is as misguided as your reliance upon inductive reasoning for knowledge is revealing.

You are arguing against yourself again.You are the one claiming that knowledge can only be a result of empirical induction. The more you argue the more you are circling around to our position.

I believe your willingness to accept inductive reasoning as a legitimate means to knowledge is betrayed by your restatement of a general law (water oxidises iron) as if it was a certainty.

Of course I accept inductions without certainty where appropriate. Everyone else does as well.

…I will add that, by your reasoning predicated on the appearance of the word ‘required’ in the sentence, it is not only dogmatic to say that ‘knowledge requires experience’, but also dogmatic to assert that ‘empiricism is required to be demonstrated empirically’.

The empirical proposition you assert “Experience is required for knowledge” implies ‘empiricism is required to be demonstrated empirically’. As it is knowledge and knowledge requires expereince according to the statement.

 

[James1215]

The empirical proposition you assert “Experience is required for knowledge” implies ‘empiricism is required to be demonstrated empirically’. As it is knowledge and knowledge requires expereince according to the statement.

How is it that a supposed dogma can entail some method of being tested, which not only makes the statement conditional upon evidence, but which also might result in it being upheld? I think you must admit that this proposition does not contradict itself, but at best is well-evidenced and at worst is shown to be false.

 

[tonyrey]

**Would believing that your existence is **

As people get older and death approaches they become more realistic and often more cynical. They ask themselves whether all this talk about goodness, beauty and love is wishful thinking and merely a cloak to conceal the absurdity of life. In a pointless universe everything must be pointless!

 

[James1215]

As people get older and death approaches they become more realistic and often more cynical. They ask themselves whether all this talk about goodness, beauty and love is wishful thinking and merely a cloak to conceal the absurdity of life. In a pointless universe everything must be pointless!

Convert or die scared! I think your judgement of what constitutes purpose is based on theism, so naturally if we attribute everything to a sort of deity, then remove the deity, we have nothing valuable left. But why say that without a divine source, everything is pointless? Anyway, if there is a divine source for everything we hold dear, why might we still have room to fear that there might be no purpose, or that love, beauty and goodness are illusory? Correspondingly, if there is no such divine source, it turns out we have been living just fine through belief in these things, and have no reason to fear the ‘absurdity’ of life. Either way you look at it, individual fear of loss contributes nothing towards having reason to believe in divine objective grounding.

 

[warpspeedpetey]

How is it that a supposed dogma can entail some method of being tested, …

Your proposition “experience is required for knowledge” does not entail some method of being tested.

 

[warpspeedpetey]

Convert or die scared! I think your judgement of what constitutes purpose is based on theism, so naturally if we attribute everything to a sort of deity, then remove the deity, we have nothing valuable left…

There is nothing to do the attributing of purpose without G-d. An accident of matter cannot attribute purpose to itself after all. That is the meaningless moaning of one rock to another, so to speak. You cannot say, “I was made for purpose x” if you were not made by an act of volition. You can only say “an accident happened”. If you believe yourself to truly be an accident it is nonsensical to ascribe any purpose or value to your existence. It is that fear of death that makes the atheist ascribe meaning to what he would otherwise call an accident. Take that fear away and the rational act seems to be suicide. Why should one bother to continue experiencing the meaningless, purposeless existence that invariably results in suffering and death? For the paltry moments of youth? when everything works right and feels good? Those things are illusory as well.

 

[James1215]

This really says nothing with clarity and you use multiple repetitions. I’m not sure what point is being made. You still are avoiding the question I posed in earlier posts. Futhermore, you make a vague appeal to authority with regards to core perception. Citation please!

That was not an appeal to any authority as I did not cite an authority. The only relevant point that these mystery other people make is the one I gave here, which can be evaluated without recourse to any authority. What can we be certain of, if all we have is perception? Is there a difference between perceptions and hypotheses based on perception? Some say yes there is, in that perception is immediate and foundational, whereas hypotheses constructed on it are prone to change and doubt. Your question seemed to be whether we simply have belief in our thoughts, or whether we can be certain of them. Posing the above distinction means that having certainty of our thoughts is possible within empiricism, because thoughts can be considered perceived, therefore to be immediate and foundational.

You are confusing reasons for belief with knowledge. Now you are saying ‘We have [knowledge] that some instances of having [knowledge] require empirical evidence.’ So, you now believe that you have knowledge that some knowledge requires empirical evidence. Now you are saying evidence = reasons for belief = knowledge. How is knowledge the same as reasons for belief or evidence? This is merely more equivocation on your part.

Let’s be clear. Naive empiricism specifies that it is a theory about the requirements for knowledge that is not a certain statement, but at most a proposition in which we have reason to believe. We do not have to ‘know’ empiricism in any certain way in order to demonstrate the self-consistency of the proposition. This is just as well, because inductive reasoning cannot provide certainty. Therefore, when we talk about the knowledge that it is necessary to have about empiricism, we talk about the reason to believe which we must have regarding empiricism. To put that in shorthand, if the proposition is supported, we would have knowledge that knowledge needs empirical evidence, in these terms.

We can see clearly that empiricism need not be true, and we might doubt it and continually test it. However, does anyone have any viable way to suggest the truth of a statement about the perceptible world without empirical evidence? I think not, so there is only evidence in favour of empiricism, and none against it, therefore we have reason to believe in empiricism. What are the limitations of this conception of knowledge? It does not explain or include areas of thought or philosophy which might be regarded as ‘knowledge’, namely formal logic and maths. It is limited to knowledge of the perceptible, when some people might prefer to have a theory of knowledge that conceives of knowledge of the imperceptible (whatever that is). Irrespective of these extraneous issues, empiricism need not be self-contradictory or dogmatic.

 

[James1215]

Your proposition “experience is required for knowledge” does not entail some method of being tested.

Yes it does, you just said “experience is required for knowledge” implies that empiricism must be empirically evidenced. In order to assess its self-consistency, we have to see whether there is evidence for/against it. This is a test, and not one that can be bypassed with cries of “It’s a logical contradiction!”