A New Proof of God.

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@Rhubard
True Everythingness is the state that ALL THAT IS POSSIBLE exists. If there is a constraint, it determines what is POSSIBLE. Hence, ALL THAT IS POSSIBLE takes constraint fully into account whether constraint exists or does not exist with or without free will. As true everythingness fully encompasses all possibilities, then it is the proper subject of a dichotomy with true nothingness.
 
@Imelahn.
True everythingness is ALL THAT IS POSSIBLE MUST EXIST. However, that which is impossible does not exist. So, an M&M with 3 simultaneous colors being impossible is excluded from true everythingness. The constraint is that which determines what becomes real out of the potential possibilities. Hence, the affect of the constraint if it exists determines ALL THAT IS POSSIBLE IN EXISTENCE and thus determines the extent of true everythingness.
 
JJFB said:
@Rhubard
True Everythingness is the state that ALL THAT IS POSSIBLE exists. If there is a constraint, it determines what is POSSIBLE. Hence, ALL THAT IS POSSIBLE takes constraint fully into account whether constraint exists or does not exist with or without free will. As true everythingness fully encompasses all possibilities, then it is the proper subject of a dichotomy with true nothingness.
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“What is possible within the constraints of our existance” and “all possibilities” are not the same thing. They are different concepts. As Imelahn pointed out, we are living in a state of ‘somethingness’ - that is, what is currently possible given the state of affairs of out existance. (We don’t need to define what these states of affairs are even, it’s just the baseline) An existance of everythingness would not just include all practical possibilities but all potential possabilities. It would include EVERYTHING. The dichotomy is false because candidates for existance are not just “nothing” or “what we have in actuality” but a stronger notion of possibility that includes all potentialevels and actual things. “Somethingness” does not, in fact, contain all possibilities because it does not contain Santa Claus, white crows, and married bachelors.

You keep using the phrase 'As it is possible for X, therefore X must exist". What? But not Santa Claus because the constraint doesn’t allow it? As it is possible for the constraint to have free will, it must have free will. Because the constraint does allow it? I can agree there is some constraint on existence - something that makes our existence “somethingness” and not “everythingness” You don’t need to appeal to the possibility of a constraint. You can just say “Everythingness” doesn’t exist, therefore something limits existence to “somethingness”. But that’s not saying much, and it’s a big leap to “that limiting something is God”.
 
@Rhubard.
For a dichotomy of existence to work, it must contain ALL possibilities. It must contain true nothingness and it must contain ALL THAT IS POSSIBLE. A dichotomy with “somethingness” will never work, because "somethingness’ is poorly defined and may or may not contain ALL THAT IS POSSIBLE. However, as true everythingness is defined as ALL THAT IS POSSIBLE EXISTS, and as a constraint probably is possible, then a constraint probably exists controlling what exists in reality and what does not. The question is whether a constraint is possible, and if possible, whether it has free will. The constraint does not decide whether it has or does not have free will. It either does or it doesn’t. However, a constraint with free will would be able to overcome a constraint without free will. Santa Claus does not exist because either God does not allow it or the constraint without free will aka laws of physics (if such a thing exists) does not permit it. In either case, neither constraint cares for Santa Claus. However, if there turns out to be no constraint whatsoever, than if Santa Claus is possible, He exists.
 
JJFB said:
@Rhubard.
For a dichotomy of existence to work, it must contain ALL possibilities. It must contain true nothingness and it must contain ALL THAT IS POSSIBLE. A dichotomy with “somethingness” will never work, because "somethingness’ is poorly defined and may or may not contain ALL THAT IS POSSIBLE. However, as true everythingness is defined as ALL THAT IS POSSIBLE EXISTS, and as a constraint probably is possible, then a constraint probably exists controlling what exists in reality and what does not. The question is whether a constraint is possible, and if possible, whether it has free will. The constraint does not decide whether it has or does not have free will. It either does or it doesn’t. However, a constraint with free will would be able to overcome a constraint without free will. Santa Claus does not exist because either God does not allow it or the constraint without free will aka laws of physics (if such a thing exists) does not permit it. In either case, neither constraint cares for Santa Claus. However, if there turns out to be no constraint whatsoever, than if Santa Claus is possible, He exists.
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Why can’t somebody say there is no constraint.
 
JJFB said:
@without
A constraint with free will is not impossible. In order to prove that a constraint with free will is impossible, you would either have to prove: 1) that a constraint itself is not possible or 2) that the free will of a constraint is impossible. To prove that a constraint is itself not possible, you would have to prove the existence of a multiverse where all possibilities actually exist. For example, you would have to prove there are in actual existence an infinite number of copies of you in the multiverse crossing a street in an infinite number of ways. You can never prove this. The other option is to prove that the free will of the constraint is impossible. However, you would have to prove why a constraint without free will is incapable of creating let’s say a thousand copies of you tilting your head while watching t.v. this morning at infinitely slight angles. Again, you can never prove this. Hence, as there is only evidence of one of you, the free will of the constraint is proven for all intents and purposes.
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  • constraint is obvious, required and exists… I have no doubt!
  • free will of a constraint is not obvious, NOT required (I gave an example without it) and I can’t understand how it can exist as a possibility… That is why I asked for clarification on that point in your proof.
Your concept of multiverse is old and needs updating. Current theory is that there are many universes and that ours interact with them (dark energy is a prime suspect). If so there is no start to time as it has always existed and no nothing (as you have admitted to in your proof). Instead of each universe being different we use Bruno’s theory that whatever the laws are for our world applies to other worlds. So, whatever the laws of physics are in our universe will be the same for others. Probably because the constraint for matter/energy/forces or whatever is the basic building block will be the same for all.
 
@EVERYONE

I think many of your objections can be resolved with this explanation:
In order to create a dichotomy of existence, you must define what the exact opposite of true nothingness is. You could say that the exact opposite is defined as EVERYTHING EXISTS. However, if EVERYTHING EXISTS, then true nothingness would also exist, but you cannot have both something and true nothingness at the same time. Therefore, you could define the exact opposite of true nothingness as EVERYTHING EXISTS EXCEPT TRUE NOTHINGNESS. However, as a constraint on what exists in reality versus what could possibly exist appears to be the case, I have defined TRUE EVERYTHINGNESS as ALL THAT IS POSSIBLE MUST EXIST. If a constraint does not exist, then the definition covers that contingency, because then EVERYTHING EXISTS (less true nothingness) is hence “POSSIBLE”. If a constraint does exist, then the definition covers that contingency as well, because only those things which exist once constrained are hence “POSSIBLE”. Anything less than this definition, such as “somethingness” cannot be the exact opposite of true nothingness and cannot create a correct dichotomy of existence.
 
JJFB said:
@EVERYONE

I think many of your objections can be resolved with this explanation:
In order to create a dichotomy of existence, you must define what the exact opposite of true nothingness is. You could say that the exact opposite is defined as EVERYTHING EXISTS. However, if EVERYTHING EXISTS, then true nothingness would also exist, but you cannot have both something and true nothingness at the same time. Therefore, you could define the exact opposite of true nothingness as EVERYTHING EXISTS EXCEPT TRUE NOTHINGNESS. However, as a constraint on what exists in reality versus what could possibly exist appears to be the case, I have defined TRUE EVERYTHINGNESS as ALL THAT IS POSSIBLE MUST EXIST. If a constraint does not exist, then the definition covers that contingency, because then EVERYTHING EXISTS is hence “POSSIBLE”. If a constraint does exist, then the definition covers that contingency as well, because only those things which exist once constrained are hence “POSSIBLE”. Anything less than this definition, such as “somethingness” cannot be the exact opposite of true nothingness and cannot create a correct dichotomy of existence.
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You are insisting upon a dichotomy when there need not be one. You’re trying to ram the dichotomy in where it clearly doesn’t fit. I understand what you’re saying, it just doesn’t hold water. Consider the following three possibilities.
  1. Nothing exists - this is what you call Nothingness. The universe is an empty set, so to speak. It doesn’t even contain zero.
  2. All that must exist does exist - This is what I’ve been calling “somethingness”. This is the snapshot of the universe we live it. We don’t need to define it, it’s just a placeholder. It is the world as it is. It might include God, it might not. It might include Santa Claus, and it might not. This option is the way things really are, whatever that way may be. This option is somewhere in between 1 and 3. Logically 1 and 3 cannot both be at the same time. So 2 must be what real existence is.
  3. Everything exists. This universe has everything, and the kitchen sink. This is what I’ve been calling “everythingness”, which is slightly different than how you’ve been using the term.
I’m sure metaphysicians and modal-logicians can come up with even more points. I’m saying that there is no dichotomy of existence when we’re discussing potentiality, there are so many potential configurations of existence. I’m with you on the point that there is something (be it God, or chance, or a force, or whatever) that locks our universe into the number 2 category, and keeps it from falling into 1 or growing into 3. Going from this ‘constraint’ as you call it into an omnipotent God is murky at best. I’ve already touched on how it goes from being a constraint to a free-willed constraints is problematic.
 
@Rhubard.
If the constraint does not have free will, then why isn’t there in reality an infinite number of copies of me in slightly different poses watching t.v. this morning? There is no reason why said constraint without free will would not allow it. As the dichotomy insists that ALL THAT IS POSSIBLE MUST EXIST, then why isn’t there an infinite number of copies of me in slightly different poses? You could say there is, we just don’t have evidence of it. BUT, it sounds absurd to me. It makes far far more sense to say that God must exist to decide that there shall not be an infinite number of said copies of me. You could also say that the dichotomy itself is wrong. BUT, it is not.
 
JJFB said:
@Rhubard.
If the constraint does not have free will, then why isn’t there in reality an infinite number of copies of me in slightly different poses watching t.v. this morning? There is no reason why said constraint without free will would not allow it. As the dichotomy insists that ALL THAT IS POSSIBLE MUST EXIST, then why isn’t there an infinite number of copies of me in slightly different poses? You could say there is, we just don’t have evidence of it. BUT, it sounds absurd to me. It makes far far more sense to say that God must exist to decide that there shall not be an infinite number of said copies of me. You could also say that the dichotomy itself is wrong. BUT, it is not.
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Some would say there is a good chance there is an infinite number of you doing all the things you mention - that’s neither here nor there though.

You’re not saying why there MUST be a dichotomy - why must the universe be either exactly one configuration or exactly one other configuration. Except that you need it to be a dichotomy to fit into your proof. When you’re dealing with ‘possible worlds’ you need to take into account the improbable possible worlds.

Secondly, I don’t see why chance can’t be why there isn’t an infinite of you watching TV. Why does the limiting thing need to have free will? Does infinity start running rampant? There are NO other possible reasons why there is not an infinite copies of someone? These sound like assumptions to me. In my mind, existence wouldn’t tend towards the infinite. Needing a Godly constraint seems less plausible than needing a Godly creator.
 
JJFB said:
The constraint is that which determines what becomes real out of the potential possibilities.
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(In friendly banter, Leibniz would be very pleased with your notion.:)).
@Imelahn.
True everythingness is ALL THAT IS POSSIBLE MUST EXIST. However, that which is impossible does not exist. So, an M&M with 3 simultaneous colors being impossible is excluded from true everythingness.
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OK, so if I understand you, then, “existence” for you means “possibility,” not necessarily “reality.” That would be good to specify, because I think in common parlance, “existence” is practically synonymous with “real being.” Horses and men exist, but centaurs (although possible) do not.
Hence, the affect of the constraint if it exists determines ALL THAT IS POSSIBLE IN EXISTENCE and thus determines the extent of true everythingness.
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So if I understood correctly, in your system, notions can be classified into three general categories: “impossible,” “possible” and “real.” Obviously, the “impossibles” are, in reality, a pseudo-category. For you, “everythingness” includes all of the “possibles” and “reals.” “Nothingness” includes all the “impossibles.” (This last is a manner of speaking: we have to speak that way, even though neither “nothingness” nor “impossibles” exist.)

(Here, for the sake of clarity, I am assuming that those classified as “possibles” are not real: they are like the centaurs and griffons. I understand that “real” things are, naturally, also possible in the common sense of the word.)

Did I get that right?
 
@Imelahn.
When I say ALL THAT IS POSSIBLE MUST EXIST, by the word “exist” I mean real. However, as a constraint on ALL THAT IS POSSIBLE appears also to be possible, then what becomes possible and impossible is determined by the constraint.
 
@Imelahn.
I should point out that there is a category of impossible that even the constraint cannot control. This category of impossible would include the existence of true nothingness and the existence of the constraint itself. So, to help clarify, I see these four categories in total:
  1. That which is real
  2. That which is impossible under any circumstances, i.e. true nothingness.
  3. That which is impossible if a constraint exists, i.e. the non-existence of the constraint itself
  4. That which is impossible because the constraint does not allow it.
 
JJFB said:
@Imelahn.
When I say ALL THAT IS POSSIBLE MUST EXIST, by the word “exist” I mean real. However, as a constraint on ALL THAT IS POSSIBLE appears also to be possible, then what becomes possible and impossible is determined by the constraint.
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Ok. No one can deny that a centaur is possible (at least, it is not repugnant to reason, as a square circle would be). However, I don’t consider centaurs to be real; i.e., they don’t exist. Isn’t that an example of something possible that does not exist?

(Understand that I am playing the Devil’s advocate here :).)
 
@Imelahn.
While it is true that a centaur is possible but is not real, the reason centaurs are not real is because the Constraint on all that is possible does not allow it. Hence, without the decision of the Constraint to allow a centaur to be real, the centaur moves from the category of possible to the category of the impossible.
 
@EVERYONE.
Here’s another thought I just had.

As all that is possible must exist, in order to constrain the possible you must know the possible. Hence, the constraint must have free will. The proof is that all that is possible is constrained.
 
JJFB, as Oreoracle and Imelahn have already pointed out long ago, your initial dichotomy is not valid.

In considering what may exist in the universe you have to split the possibilities into two non-overlapping parts that constitute the whole. If one part is ‘True Nothingness’ (i.e. nothing exists at all) then the corresponding counterpart is ‘Not True Nothingness’ which can be called Somethingness (i.e. something exists). Alternatively, if you insist on one part being ‘True Everythingness’ (i.e. everything that is possible exists), then the corresponding counterpart is ‘Not True Everythingness’ (i.e. everything that is possible does not exist, meaning that some possible things may exist or nothing may exist).

Your initial premise defines opposites. It doesn’t set up a valid dichotomy. The rest of your argument, though cunningly conceived, falls apart due to this false foundation.

If, as you claim, the atheists that you discussed this with were not able to counter it, then you weren’t debating very smart atheists, or else you weren’t fighting fair.
 
@Nixbits
A correct dichotomy is a set of two mutually exclusive, jointly exhaustive alternatives. The dichotomy of true nothingness and true everythingness meets this definition of a correct dichotomy. First, both are mutually exclusive as you cannot have co-existing states of both true nothingness and true everythingness. That should be obvious. They are exact opposites and hence mutually exclusive. Second, they both jointly exhaust all alternatives. “Somethingness” is contained within True Everythingness based on the included contingency of a possible Constraint on true everythingness allowing only “Somethingness”. Hence, true everythingness is defined as ALL THAT IS POSSIBLE MUST EXIST. The word “POSSIBLE” in that definition takes “somethingness” fully into account by allowing the contingency of a constraint to determine what is “POSSIBLE”.
 
@Nixbits
A constraint that does not allow all that is seemingly possible is itself a Constraint. Hence, the dichotomy is correct, as said Constraint would still determine what is “POSSIBLE”. For example, you might contend that the laws of physics seemingly allows more than what is real, but that reality contains less than what is seemingly possible, then your hypothetical situation still contains a Constraint which only allows that which seems less than possible to be real. So, the dichotomy still is correct. However, you are left to prove the existence of said hypothetical Constraint. As the laws of physics themselves seemingly allow other universes to exist with different initial conditions, then the laws of physics are not a suitable explanation for your hypothetical Constraint. Although you could claim that your hypothetical Constraint exists because there is only evidence of One Universe, you cannot explain why the laws of physics makes that true. Hence, I would say your hypothetical Constraint does not exist.
 
JJFB said:
@Nixbits
A correct dichotomy is a set of two mutually exclusive, jointly exhaustive alternatives. The dichotomy of true nothingness and true everythingness meets this definition of a correct dichotomy. First, both are mutually exclusive as you cannot have co-existing states of both true nothingness and true everythingness. That should be obvious. They are exact opposites and hence mutually exclusive. Second, they both jointly exhaust all alternatives. “Somethingness” is contained within True Everythingness based on the included contingency of a possible Constraint on true everythingness allowing only “Somethingness”. Hence, true everythingness is defined as ALL THAT IS POSSIBLE MUST EXIST. The word “POSSIBLE” in that definition takes “somethingness” fully into account by allowing the contingency of a constraint to determine what is “POSSIBLE”.
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You claim a dichotomy and seem to use this to argue for this constraint. Now you’re saying the dichotomy depends upon the constraint to limit what counts as everything that is possibly possible? This is circular. What I, and several others have been trying repeatedly to explain is that the candidates of existence are not exhausted by your two options. The logical negation (not nothingness) encompasses at least two options.
  1. Everything that is possible that conforms to the physical and metaphysical laws of existance (possibly possible)
And
  1. Everything that is possible that does not conform to the physical and metaphysical laws of existance. (Possibly conceivable? )
You seem to be using True Nothingness and 1. To argue your constraint, and then using your constraint to argue away 3. That’s a problem.
 
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