A New Proof of God.

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I still contend that ‘Nothingness’ and ‘Somethingness’ are the true dichotomy. True Everythingness is a subset of Somethingness. In other words, the set of all conditions in which ‘Something’ exists, includes the subset in which ‘Everything Possible Exists’.

For example, if the all-powerful Zdak decides to create a pocket universe and decides that it will NOT contain only Nothingness, then Zdak can choose to have the universe contain just a peanut, or sixteen planets each with different colours of traffic lights, or everything that is possible. Each of these sets is a valid subset of Somethingness.

In your model, JJFB, for Somethingness to be a subset of True Everythingness, then True Everythingness must contain all of the subsets in which at least something exists. That is Somethingness. By definition. No need for the contingency of a Constraint to shrink the set of True Everythingness in some way. No justification for suggesting that Everything Possible Must Exist. These logical contortions don’t get us anywhere.

I don’t believe that we have enough information about the nature of universes to formulate such hypotheses. We only have a sample size of one that we can observe. And we have only just begun to be able to investigate it. It’s quite big and very complex. We’ve only just put on our lab coat, sat down at the microscope and begun to take notes. Within the working day of investigating the nature of existence, we should probably wait at least until after lunch before we start to expound hypotheses about how or why universes exist and what the rules are.
 
@Nixbits
“Somethingness” is a subset of true everythingness. “Somethingness” assumes the reality of a Constraint. True everythingness is more encompassing than “somethingness”. True everythingness includes the reality or none reality of a Constraint. Therefore, true everthingness is the correct dichotomy - and “somethingness” is not. The justification for true everythingness is quite simple - it is the exact opposite of true nothingness. True nothingness has this wonderful characteristic of not requiring an explanation for its cause. Hence, the proper dichotomy must be the opposite of true nothingness, i.e. true everythingness. Consequently, ALL THAT IS POSSIBLE MUST BE REAL. As a Constraint appears to be possible, then that Constraint must be real. Once the reality of the Constraint is proven, then the Constraint determines what is real and what is not real. True everythingness answers the question of why the Constraint is real. The answer is because the Constraint is possible. So, I disagree with you that the dichotomy of true everythingness is incorrect or not useful.
Your hypothetical god, Zdak, could not create a state of true nothingness. The dichotomy proves that a state of true nothingness is impossible. Indeed, in a state of true nothingness there would be no god, Zdak.
 
OK. I’ve tried several times, but we’re just not going to agree about the dichotomy. This discussion isn’t developing, so I’ll consign my ongoing involvement in this thread to the set of Nothingness.
 
@Rhubard
No, it is not circular. True everythingness encompases both the possible reality and none reality of the Constraint. The dichotomy does not presume the reality of the Constraint. The dichotomy only presumes that ALL THAT IS POSSIBLE IS REAL. The Constraint is a possible subset of that which is POSSIBLE. For all intents and purposes, if a Constraint is real, that Constraint then determines what is possible and impossible. However, the Constraint cannot determine that the Constraint itself is not possible - as that would violate the state of true everythingness. This Proof of God is extremely useful, because it explains all sorts of seemingly unanswerable questions about reality and about the nature of God. This proof is far from a useless exercise.
 
Your proposed proof has some similarities with St. Anselm’s proof as given in is Proslogion. It goes like this:
a. God is that than which nothing greater can be thought
b. That than which nothing greater can be thought necessarily exists
c. God exists

This is an “a priori” argument, that is, not dependent on external evidence. Thomas Aquinas questioned such an approach and believed it did not establish an extra-mental existence of God. It does have its merits however. Keep up the great work!
 
@tm21
St. Anselm seems pretty smart, but a thought may be real only because the material Universe permits it to be real, and such a purely human thought being derived from the material Universe cannot itself prove its reality beyond our Universe. My proof of God is evidence based. Basically, you would have to prove the reality of an infinite multiverse to come close to disproving it. There is no proof of an infinite multiverse. This lack of proof is all the proof I need to prove God is real. Also, God is capable of creating His own version of a multiverse, it just better not be an infinite multiverse because then one could infer that God is not necessary. However, as even an infinite multiverse must itself be constrained by the laws of physics or form, then there must be a Constraint even on an infinite multiverse. However, as there is an infinite number of possible variations of the laws of physics or forms, then these infinite variations cannot constrain all that is real. Thus, a constraint without free will is impossible, because a constraint without free will on all that is infinitely possible is not possible due to the required beyond infinity of the constraint, and this type of beyond infinity is not possible due to the infinite possibilities of the laws of physics and of form which cannot account for it.
The only way to constrain the infinitely possible is to know the infinitely possible, because the Constraint must be capable of deciding what shall be real and what shall not be real among the infinitely possible, otherwise there would be no creation at all as a constraint on the infinite number of possibilities apparently exists in order for creation itself to exist but a constraint without free will cannot exist because it is not capable of the beyond infinity of knowing the infinitely possible. However, the beyond infinity of knowing the infinitely possible is itself possible and consists of knowing and having power over the infinitely possible, otherwise there apparently would be no creation at all. Hence, the Constraint on the infinite by knowing and having power over the infinite must have free will. Beyond infinity is to take the infinite and let it know itself.
Thus, God must be real or nothing would be real.
 
I’m stuck on this line:

"As true everythingness contains all that is possible, it must contain a constraint on true everythingness, as said constraint is possible and thus must exist. "

Why does the constraint have to exist?
 
@Cone.
The Constraint only has to be real, if the Constraint itself is possible in a state of true everythingness, because a state of true everythingness requires that ALL THAT IS POSSIBLE MUST EXIST. The state of true everythingness is the exact opposite of the state of true nothingness. As the exact opposite of true nothingness, in a state of true everythingness - ALL THAT IS POSSIBLE MUST EXIST. As it appears that a Constraint on true everythingness is possible because we don’t see in our particular Universe all that is seemingly possibly being real, then I am safely presuming that the Constraint on true everythingness is possible and therefore must be real. The dichotomy still stands as true regardless of whether a Constraint is possible or impossible.
 
@EVERYONE

True everythingness is the exact opposite state of true nothingness. In a state of true everythingness ALL IS REAL. If ALL IS REAL, then ALL IS POSSIBLE. If ALL IS POSSIBLE, then ALL THAT IS POSSIBLE MUST BE REAL. This last statement is just another way of stating that ALL THAT IS REAL MUST BE REAL. The statement of ALL THAT IS POSSIBLE MUST EXIST is just my different way of saying the same exact thing, that ALL THAT IS POSSIBLE MUST BE REAL.

Please note that this syllogism is true in the very special case of true everythingness, where indeed all that is possible also must be real.
 
JJFB
Excellent argument presented with exceptional forensic skill. I get the impression that your opposition doesn’t understand your basic premise that “true everythingness is the exact opposite of true nothingness and contains ALL THAT IS POSSIBLE”.
Yppop
 
JJFB said:
@EVERYONETrue everythingness is the exact opposite state of true nothingness. In a state of true everythingness ALL IS REAL. If ALL IS REAL, then ALL IS POSSIBLE.
Click to expand...
This is where you lost me. How can ALL be Real and Possible at the same time?

Doesn’t this contradict the principle of identity.

A thing cannot both be and not be at the same time.
 
@Charlemagne III
Ordinarily, the Real and the Possible are two different things. However, you must consider the special case of true everythingness. True nothingness is the complete and total absence of anything (no time, no space, no matter, no energy, no quantum or Higgs field, no man, no Void, no God and no potential for anything or something). In other words, nothing was, is or ever will be real, except the state of true nothingness itself. Something can absolutely never arise from a state of true nothingness. The state of true nothingness is incapable of creating anything at all. However, true nothingness has this wonderful attribute of not requiring a cause. True nothingness does not need a cause for it to be real.

However, as the state of true nothingness is not real, then the question becomes why isn’t it real? Afterall, why wouldn’t real existence be that which requires no cause? The only explanation for why true nothingness is not real is a dichotomy. The only state of existence that can form a correct dichotomy with true nothingness is the exact opposite of true nothingness. The exact opposite of true nothingness is true everythingness. This exact opposite posits that ALL IS REAL, whereas true nothingness posits that NOTHING IS REAL. It’s either ALL or NOTHING. Due to the dichotomy with the state of true nothingness which does not need a cause, true everythingness must be real and likewise does not need a cause.

In the special case where ALL IS REAL, then it is also true that ALL IS POSSIBLE. Hence, in this special case, the REAL and the POSSIBLE are identical and do not violate the identity principle. In other words, ALL THAT IS REAL IS ALSO ALL THAT IS POSSIBLE and ALL THAT IS POSSIBLE IS ALSO ALL THAT IS REAL. If ALL IS POSSIBLE, then ALL THAT IS POSSIBLE MUST BE REAL. This is an identical assertion to ALL THAT IS REAL MUST BE REAL, in this special case.
 
JJFB said:
If ALL IS POSSIBLE, then ALL THAT IS POSSIBLE MUST BE REAL. This is an identical assertion to ALL THAT IS REAL MUST BE REAL, in this special case.
Click to expand...
Well then, let’s look at this with a given example of the possible and the real.

Some physicist/astronomers contend that our universe is not the only one. They have no proof for this, but they allege the hypothesis that it is possible a multiverse exists.

I take it that you would agree that a multiverse exists in addition to the universe.

I take it you would argue that since a multiverse is possible, it must be real?.
 
@Charlemagne III
My only presumption is that a Constraint on true everythingness is real because the Constraint appears possible. I safely presume this because all that is seemingly possible is not real in our particular Universe, and hence our particular Universe seemingly appears to be constrained. However, if the Constraint is real, then the Constraint for all intents and purposes determines what is and what is not real (aka what is and what is not possible). The nature of the Constraint may or may not have free will. If the Constraint has free will, then this Constraint shares the characteristics of God. If the Constraint does not have free will, then it comes close to sharing the characteristics of the laws of physics and forms, except for the fact that the laws of physics and forms cannot explain the initial starting conditions of our particular Universe.

I am not at all claiming the reality of an infinite multiverse that makes real all the infinite possible laws of physics and forms. In fact, I am using the lack of proof of such infinite multiverse to prove the existence of God. If ALL THAT IS POSSIBLE MUST EXIST, then why isn’t there an infinite multiverse at least? That’s my central proof for the existence of God.

I would argue that as a infinite multiverse is seemingly possible, then why isn’t it real? The lack of proof of the infinite multiverse indicates that the Constraint must have free will to choose not to create an infinite multiverse.
 
JJFB said:
If ALL THAT IS POSSIBLE MUST EXIST, then why isn’t there an infinite multiverse at least? That’s my central proof for the existence of God.

I would argue that as a infinite multiverse is seemingly possible, then why isn’t it real? The lack of proof of the infinite multiverse indicates that the Constraint must have free will to choose not to create an infinite multiverse.
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Those who advocate a multiverse will argue that it is possible, lack of evidence notwithstanding.

So by your thesis, if it is possible, it must exist.

Then god had no choice but to create the multiverse?
 
@Charlemagne III
The issue you are having with understanding my proof is understanding the concept of Constraint. The Constraint assuming it is possible and hence real, is a non-created “thing” that controls the possible if the Constraint does not have free will, or alternately, the Constraint decides what is possible and hence real if the Constraint has free will aka God. God as a Constraint with free will does not have to create an infinite multiverse - although He could, but if He did - then that would raise the question of why do we need a God if a Constraint without free is capable of creating all that is possible and making it real. (Although, I have an answer for that, which I previously posted to another).

God being the Constraint with free will would clearly have the choice not to create a multiverse or an infinite multiverse. God determines what is possible or impossible in a state of true everythingness, because God being a Constraint with free will being possible must be real. The question is which Constraint is truly possible? Is the Constraint with free will possible and hence must be real? Or, is the Constraint without free will possible and hence must be real? My first answer to this question is that as a Constraint without free will is only possible if an infinite multiverse is real, then the lack of proof of an infinite multiverse being real strongly implies that the infinite multiverse is not real. Hence, the other Constraint with free will is possible and hence must be real.

It is the nature of the Constraint that determines whether a multiverse is possible. If the Constraint does not have free will, then an infinite multiverse is seemingly possible and must be real. However, it has to be at least an infinite multiverse to prove that the Constraint does not have free will, because God could create his own version of a less than infinite multiverse. And, again, I do have a second back-up argument for why the Constraint must have free will even if an infinite multiverse is real.
 
@EVERYONE.
I truly appreciate any attempt to knock a hole in my new proof of God. PLEASE KEEP TRYING! Only through your objections can I test my proof. However, I must say that at this point no one has knocked a hole in my proof.
 
JJFB said:
@EVERYONE.
I truly appreciate any attempt to knock a hole in my new proof of God. PLEASE KEEP TRYING! Only through your objections can I test my proof. However, I must say that at this point no one has knocked a hole in my proof.
Click to expand...
At this point I am just too confused to follow up. :whacky:

Your proof makes Anselm’s ontological argument look like child’s play. 😉
 
@Charlemagne III
Keep trying to understand or object! This might help which is a more organized listing of my proof:

A NEW PROOF OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

“God must be real for anything to be real”.
  1. The only true dichotomy of ALL existence is between true nothingness and true everythingness, as they are exact opposites containing ALL POSSIBILE STATES OF EXISTENCE.
  2. As true nothingness does not exist, then true everythingness must exist.
  3. In a state of true everythingness, ALL IS REAL. If ALL IS REAL, then ALL IS POSSIBLE, then ALL THAT IS POSSIBLE MUST BE REAL. True everythingness means ALL THAT IS POSSIBLE MUST EXIST (BE REAL). If a Constraint on ALL THAT IS POSSIBLE exists, then only that which the Constraint allows then becomes POSSIBLE. However, it is always impossible for true nothingness to exist in a state of true everythingness, and if a Constraint on true everythingness is POSSIBLE and hence exists, then the non-existence of that Constraint is also always impossible.
In the special case where ALL IS REAL, then it is also true that ALL IS POSSIBLE. Hence, in this special case, the REAL and the POSSIBLE are identical and do not violate the identity principle. In other words, ALL THAT IS REAL IS ALSO ALL THAT IS POSSIBLE and ALL THAT IS POSSIBLE IS ALSO ALL THAT IS REAL. If ALL IS POSSIBLE, then ALL THAT IS POSSIBLE MUST BE REAL. This is an identical assertion to ALL THAT IS REAL MUST BE REAL, in this special case.
  1. That which constrains ALL cannot itself be created.
  2. There apparently must be a constraint on ALL THAT IS POSSIBLE which is not created, otherwise creation is impossible.
  3. As a Constraint on true everythingness appears to exist, then it may also be POSSIBLE that said Constraint has free will.
  4. If the Constraint has free will, then the Constraint is capable of deciding in an arbitrary manner that which exists and that which does not exist (or that which is Possible and that which is not Possible).
  5. If the Constraint does not have free will, then the Constraint is not capable of deciding in an arbitrary manner that which exists and that which does not exist. Hence, all that can possibly exist under the control of a constraint without free will must exist.
  6. If a Constraint without free will exists, then there must be at least an infinite multiverse with an infinite number of slightly different copies of you that exists in said infinite multiverse.
  7. As there is no evidence of said infinite multiverse and there can never be said evidence because the data necessary for such evidence would only exist beyond the confines of our Universe and as we cannot leave our Universe in order to obtain such evidence, then there is no evidence and never will be evidence that the Constraint does not have free will.
  8. The absence of proof of an infinite multiverse is proof of God’s existence, as the free will of the Constraint is necessary to restrain the existence of said infinite multiverse. If the Constraint did not have free will, then the unprovable must be true that an infinite variations of me exists in an infinite multiverse. As I only have proof of one me, God must exist to decide that there shall be only one me. This absence of proof of an infinite multiverse is also proof that a Constraint exists.
  9. As the Constraint controls all that is POSSIBLE, then the Constraint is omnipotent.
  10. As a Constraint with free will controls all that is POSSIBLE, then the Constraint with free will is also omniscient and omnipresent.
  11. More than one Constraint is impossible, because the multiple Constraints could eliminate one another leaving the state of true everythingness without a Constraint which would violate the state of true everythingness where a Constraint were possible in the first place.
  12. The Constraint with free will, however, could arbitrarily choose to have any number of multiple aspects of the same Constraint.
  13. The Constraint with free will is God and God exists because God is possible.
  14. As even an infinite multiverse must itself be constrained by the laws of physics or form, then there must be a Constraint on the infinite.
  15. As the laws of physics or form do not require only a single Universe, then a Constraint without free will allowing only a single Universe to exist does not itself exist.
  16. As there is an infinite number of possible variations of the laws of physics or forms, then these infinite variations cannot constrain all that is possible. Thus, a constraint without free will is impossible, because a constraint without free will on all that is infinitely possible is not possible due to the required extra-infinity of the constraint, and this type of extra-infinity is not possible due to the infinite possibilities of the laws of physics and of form.
  17. The only way to constrain the infinitely possible is to know the infinitely possible, because the Constraint must be capable of deciding what shall be real and what shall not be real among the infinitely possible, otherwise there would be no creation at all as a constraint on the infinite number of possibilities must exist in order for creation itself to exist but a constraint without free will cannot exist because it is not capable of the extra-infinity of knowing the infinitely possible. However, the extra-infinity of knowing the infinitely possible is itself possible and consists of knowing and having power over the infinitely possible, otherwise there would be no creation at all. Hence, the Constraint on the infinite by knowing and having power over the infinite must have free will. Extra-infinity is to take the infinite and let it know itself.
  18. Thus, God must be real or nothing would be real.
 
@Charlemagne II
This also might help you understand:
In a state of true everythingness nothing is IMPOSSIBLE and ALL is REAL, except the existence of a state of true nothingness and the co-existence of a Constraint and no Constraint.
The Constraint limits true everythingness to only that which the Constraint permits to be real.
If the Constraint is real (almost assuredly it is), then the Constraint no longer permits ALL THAT IS POSSIBLE TO BE REAL. Rather, due to the Constraint, the world returns to a normal state of a difference between the Real and the Possible but this difference only is real because the Constraint would be real.
With the reality of the Constraint, then one must ask what is the nature of this Constraint? Is it God? Is it the laws of physics? However, if the Constraint were the laws of physics and form, then that Constraint would demand that all that can be real under the laws of physics and form must be real. In other words, such a Constraint without free will only limits true everythingness to all that the laws of physics and form permits. Hence, unless you prove the reality of at least an infinite multiverse, then the laws of physics and forms are an inadequate candidate for the Constraint. Leaving no other plausible candidate for the Constraint, God must be real to separate the real from the not real, where God decides in an arbitrary manner that which is real and that which is only possible.
 
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