A Scriptural Death Penalty Case

[Ender]

No, that is incorrect. The medicinal aspect of punishment does not include the retributive aspect. The two are distinct aspects in the three aspects of penal sanctions in scholastic theology.

The problem here is that the word “medicinal” has different meanings as used by the different sources. For Aquinas the punishment is medicinal in that it “is a medicine healing past sins…” That is the retributive aspect of punishment. The other three objectives look to the future; it is only retribution that seeks to redress the past. If you’re going to cite Aquinas’ claim that “The punishments of this life are medicinal rather than retributive” then you also have to accept the meaning he gives to the term.

No, redress the disorder does not mean acts toward retribution (vindicative) justice. Redress the disorder includes actions that address all three aspects of penal sanctions.

“Redress the disorder” is a separate and unique objective, and in no way includes the other secondary objectives.

Within the Catholic tradition, punishment has several purposes: redressing the disorder caused by the offense, i.e., just retribution; defending public order; deterring future wrongdoing; and promoting reform, repentance, and conversion of those who commit evil acts. (USCCB)

There they are as explained by the USCCB:

• Redress the disorder, i.e. just retribution
• defending public order
• deterring future wrongdoing
• promoting reform, repentance, and conversion

This is exactly the same thing said by the Texas Conference of Catholic Bishops in 2019:

According to Church teaching, a civil government’s response to crime should be to uphold justice by achieving four goals: rehabilitate the offender, protect society from the offender, deter future offenses, and redress the disorder caused by the offense.

And, Aquinas is affirmed by JPII that the medicinal aspect (individually and collectively) is primary.

Not a bit. The primary objective as stated in the catechism is redressing the disorder. That absolutely does not include the secondary objectives of rehabilitation, deterrence, and protection.

Evangelium Vitae , no. 56, and the Catechism of the Catholic Church , no. 2266, agree that “the primary aim” of punishment is the retributive one of “redressing the disorder introduced by the offense.” (Charles E. Rice, Notre Dame Law School, 2001)

 

[o_mlly]

The problem here is that the word “medicinal” has different meanings as used by the different sources. For Aquinas the punishment is medicinal in that it “ is a medicine healing past sins …” That is the retributive aspect of punishment. The other three objectives look to the future; it is only retribution that seeks to redress the past. If you’re going to cite Aquinas’ claim that “ The punishments of this life are medicinal rather than retributive ” then you also have to accept the meaning he gives to the term.

This argument make no sense. Aquinas makes no distinction on the meaning of medicinal punishment as it to relates to time, i.e, past or future as is shown in the full citation from the Summa:

Wherefore satisfaction which is the act of justice inflicting punishment, is a medicine healing past sins and preserving from future sins: so that when one man makes satisfaction to another, he offers compensation for the past, and takes heed for the future.

The primary objective as stated in the catechism is redressing the disorder. That absolutely does not include the secondary objectives of rehabilitation, deterrence, and protection.

No, you cannot from a mere assertion draw a conclusion. The clipped citation from Rice does not support your conclusion either. Please stop claiming to find a cherry in bowls of raspberries.

A reading of the 1992 and the final 1997 versions of no. 2267 of the Catechism , however, leads to the conclusion that retributive and general deterrent reasons are no longer sufficient to justify use of the death penalty.

 

[Ender]

This argument make no sense. Aquinas makes no distinction on the meaning of medicinal punishment as it to relates to time, i.e, past or future as is shown in the full citation from the Summa:

Yes, it is medicinal in healing past sins, but that is its retributive nature. Protection against future crimes, deterrence against future crimes, and rehabilitation all look forward. The only aspect of punishment that looks back at the past is retribution. Thus Aquinas held that retribution was medicinal.

The clipped citation from Rice does not support your conclusion either.

Of course it does; that claim was made explicitly. Your additional citation addresses an entirely different point. The part I cited said the primary objective of punishment was retributive; that was my claim. The part you cited claimed that retribution is not sufficient to justify capital punishment. That’s a very different point.

I have been addressing only the question of whether or not “redressing the disorder” refers solely to retribution. That’s what all of my citations reveal.

 

[o_mlly]

Yes, it is medicinal in healing past sins, but that is its retributive nature.

This seems to be your invented interpretation and certainly not supported by any author of scholasticism. It blurs the very distinctions Aquinas and the scholastic philosophers made regarding the purposes of punishment:

The punishments of this present life are more medicinal than retributive, for retribution is reserved for the divine judgment. (ST II-II, q. 66, a. 6)

For punishment is imposed as a medicine for guilt, and as setting it in order. As medicine, inasmuch as man, by reason of punishment, is held back from guilt when, in order that he not suffer what is contrary to his will, he foregoes doing a disordered action that would otherwise please his will. (Compendium theologiae, ch. 121)

Medicinal is corrective; retribution is vindictive. Do you have an authoritative source that supports your contradictory notion?

Of course it does; that claim was made explicitly. Your additional citation addresses an entirely different point.

Of course, Rice is not magisterial. However, the additional citation I provided is magisterial and refutes your claim that retribution is primary.

 

[Ender]

This seems to be your invented interpretation and certainly not supported by any author of scholasticism. It blurs the very distinctions Aquinas and the scholastic philosophers made regarding the purposes of punishment:

You cited this yourself: “Aquinas makes no distinction on the meaning of medicinal punishment as it to relates to time, i.e, past or future”… The only aspect of punishment that relates to the past is retribution, therefore if the punishment is medicinal as it relates to the past it is medicinal as it relates to retribution.

Medicinal is corrective; retribution is vindictive. Do you have an authoritative source that supports your contradictory notion?

Again, the problem is you are mixing definitions between authors. Citing Aquinas only, he states that “punishments are medicinal” and this applies to “healing past sins”, but only retribution heals past sins; the other three objectives do not, therefore retribution is medicinal…according to Aquinas.

However, the additional citation I provided is magisterial and refutes your claim that retribution is primary.

I don’t know what citation you refer to, but I’m quite sure it doesn’t refute the catechism when it says: “The primary scope of the penalty is to redress the disorder caused by the offense.” As the USCCB, the Texas bishops, and any number of lay writers have stated, including those who oppose capital punishment, that means retribution.

 

[SanctusPeccator]

SanctusPeccator:

Rather depends . . . sub specie temporis or sub specie aeternitatis ? Since temporal punishments undoubtedly cannot achieve the perfect retribution of eternal punishments, the Angelic Doctor notes they must necessarily be sought for “medicinal” ends: …

The Aquinas citation and logic clearly defeats the mistaken notion that retribution is the primary purpose of punishment.

Only to the correct extent “the Aquinas citation and logic clearly defeats the mistaken notion that retribution is the sole purpose of punishment” . . .

SanctusPeccator:

“The third justifying purpose for punishment is retribution …

As does the citation from the National Conference of Catholic Bishops on Capital Punishment.

Except this citation of the relevant section “I. Purposes of Punishment” from the National Conference of Catholic Bishops’ Statement [of 13 November 1980] on Capital Punishment manifestly demonstrates the numerical ordering [of the various aims of punishment] assigns no teleological priority within the text of the document . . .

SanctusPeccator:

Note the usage of semicolons (rather than commas) to sequentially distinguish the various ends of punishment in the next document. …

Duly noted in a previous post (perhaps in a different thread). The grammarian properly uses semicolons when commas are inadequate as separators due to commas prior use in the same sentence. The sentence does not give “just retribution” a higher, and most certainly not an exclusive standing, in the id est string that follows.

Does it really?

“In such cases the punctuation helps in the perception of the hierarchical structure, with the semi-colon separating constituents HIGHER in the tree structure than the commas.” —“20. Punctuation” in The Cambridge Grammar of the English Language, pp. 1723-1764 at 1740.

So, which of our contested options - (A.) or (B.) - is numerically consonant with proper grammatical usage and best harmonizes with the corresponding citation from the Compendium of the Catechism of the Catholic Church?

(A.) “Within the Catholic tradition, punishment has several purposes: (1) redressing the disorder caused by the offense, i.e., just retribution; (2) defending public order; (3) deterring future wrongdoing; and (4) promoting reform, repentance, and conversion of those who commit evil acts.”

(B.) “Within the Catholic tradition, punishment has several purposes: (1) redressing the disorder caused by the offense, i.e., just retribution; defending public order; deterring future wrongdoing; and (2) promoting reform, repentance, and conversion of those who commit evil acts.”

 

[o_mlly]

You cited this yourself: “ Aquinas makes no distinction on the meaning of medicinal punishment as it to relates to time, i.e, past or future ”… The only aspect of punishment that relates to the past is retribution, therefore if the punishment is medicinal as it relates to the past it is medicinal as it relates to retribution.

Just bizarre. It appears you have a conclusion in a desperate search of an argument in support. Again, I ask do you have an authoritative source?

… therefore retribution is medicinal…according to Aquinas.

No, you strain credulity. Cite in Aquinas a supporting quotation that blurs as you do what the Doctor clearly distinguished as separate purposes of punishment.

Aquinas teaches that punishment that is corrective is medicinal and, more importantly, restores right order.

Punishment is inflicted as a medicine that is corrective of the sin, and also to restore right order violated by the sin (Compendium 121).
For punishment has a medicinal value with regard to sin and restores right order when violated by sin, as we stated above (Ibid (172)

As the USCCB, the Texas bishops, and any number of lay writers have stated, including those who oppose capital punishment, that means retribution.

No. The lay writer are not magisterial and Evangelium Vitae, the Catechism, the USCCB and Texas bishops do not teach that “to redress the disorder caused by the offence” means that retribution is the primary purpose of punishment. That notion is your creation and, as we have agreed in a different thread, your argument depends on that error.

 

[o_mlly]

Only to the correct extent “the Aquinas citation and logic clearly defeats the mistaken notion that retribution is the sole purpose of punishment” . . .

I think Ender’s point, which is critical to his argument, is not that retribution is the sole but is the primary purpose of punishment. On that notion, we have no evidence of authoritative teaching.

Except this citation of the relevant section “I. Purposes of Punishment” from the National Conference of Catholic Bishops’ Statement [of 13 November 1980] on Capital Punishment manifestly demonstrates the numerical ordering [of the various aims of punishment] assigns no teleological priority within the text of the document . . .

Correct. Retribution is not the primary purpose of punishment.

Does it really?

Yes. See the MLA Handbook , 8th edition.

So, which of our contested options - (A.) or (B.) …

Option C. The exact wording and punctuation used:

“Within the Catholic tradition, punishment has several purposes: redressing the disorder caused by the offense, i.e., just retribution; defending public order; deterring future wrongdoing; and promoting reform, repentance, and conversion of those who commit evil acts.”

Retribution is neither excluded nor elevated as a purpose in restoring the disorder caused by the offense.

In the same work, the USCCB writes:

A correct interpretation of these passages indicates, however, that the principal intent of such laws was to limit the retribution that could be exacted for an offense, not to require a minimum punishment.

It would be strange indeed that that which is primary must also be be limited.

 

[SanctusPeccator]

SanctusPeccator:

Only to the correct extent “the Aquinas citation and logic clearly defeats the mistaken notion that retribution is the sole purpose of punishment” . . .

I think Ender’s point, which is critical to his argument, is not that retribution is the sole but is the primary purpose of punishment. On that notion, we have no evidence of authoritative teaching.

Seems highly unlikely, given the apposite citations [others have] repeatedly referenced:

“The primary purpose of the punishment which society inflicts is ‘to redress the disorder caused by the offence.’” (Pope John Paul II’s Encyclical Letter [of 25 March 1995] on the Value and Inviolability of Human Life Evangelium Vitae, n. 56, §1)

“The primary scope of the penalty is to redress the disorder caused by the offense.”
(Catechism of the Catholic Church, n. 2266)

SanctusPeccator:

Except this citation of the relevant section “I. Purposes of Punishment” from the National Conference of Catholic Bishops’ Statement [of 13 November 1980] on Capital Punishment manifestly demonstrates the numerical ordering [of the various aims of punishment] assigns no teleological priority within the text of the document . . .

Correct. Retribution is not the primary purpose of punishment.

Quite incorrect? Especially when the document does not even address the matter [of their teleological priority]??

SanctusPeccator:

Does it really?

Yes. See the MLA Handbook , 8th edition.

Citation(s)?

SanctusPeccator:

So, which of our contested options - (A.) or (B.) …

Option C. The exact wording and punctuation used.
Retribution is neither excluded nor elevated as a purpose in restoring the disorder caused by the offense.

Appears to miss the point? The “exact wording and punctuation used” are not in dispute; rather, the only [two] possible logical options presented - (A.) or (B.) - for its correct interpretation . . .

In the same work, the USCCB writes:

A correct interpretation of these passages indicates, however, that the principal intent of such laws was to limit the retribution that could be exacted for an offense, not to require a minimum punishment.

Except the excerpt above only discusses the necessary condition of proportionate punishment when enacting the lex talionis strictly within the scriptural context of the Pentateuch. The paragraph (from which this comment is cited) does not even address the four ends - let alone the teleological priority - of punishment. (cf. United States Conference of Catholic Bishops’ Statement [of 15 November 2005] A Culture of Life and the Penalty of Death, IV. §4).

 

[o_mlly]

Seems highly unlikely, given the apposite citations [others have] repeatedly referenced

? Seems highly likely that you misunderstand the issue.

Especially when the document does not even address the matter [of their teleological priority]?

? That is exactly the point.

 

[RaisedCatholic]

The main reason Jesus did not allow them to kill her was two-fold:

1. The Jews did not have the ability to enforce the death penalty, because they were under the control of the Roman Empire. That is why they had to go to Pontius Pilot in order to have Jesus executed.
2. in order to execute the woman who committed adultery, the man who she was found committing adultery with would also have to be presented with her to be executed as well, according to the law of Moses. The problem was that the Jewish leaders who presented her, conveniently did not present the man who was with her. When Jesus stated, “he who is without sin cast the first stone,” it may have been the case that one of their own had been the one committing adultery with her, or even done so in the past. This may also be why the older ones had left first. Regardless, since the man was not presented with her, the execution could not take place since they were both guilty of adultery, not just the woman alone.

Jesus himself reinforced the death penalty when he spoke to Peter stating, “he who lives by the sword will die by the sword,” which is why he wanted Peter to put his sword away and why Jesus healed the man’s ear. That way, they could not arrest Peter for attempted murder. Also, the death penalty goes back far before the time of Moses in Genesis 9:6, and even as far back as Genesis 4. After Cain murdered Abel, he knew people would want to kill him to seek justice, which is why God put a mark on Cain. While this was an act of mercy by God, it should not be used as a scriptural example of not enforcing the death penalty, since Capital Punishment was something God had established and commanded in the law of Moses, which was never rescinded in the New Testament era.

While we should exercise Mercy, it should never compromise justice. The two always go hand-in-hand. The only reason God grants us mercy and doesn’t eternally condemn everyone to hell, is because he made a substitute of his son to die in place for all those who would ever believe in him and repent of their (original) sin against God passed down to them through Adam. God‘s justice occurred when he imputed our sin to Jesus on the cross who died for it. That is the gospel.

 

[Ender]

I think Ender’s point, which is critical to his argument, is not that retribution is the sole but is the primary purpose of punishment. On that notion, we have no evidence of authoritative teaching.

If A=B, and B=C, then A=C.

The primary objective of punishment (A) is “to redress the disorder” (B) - CCC 2266
“Redress the disorder” (B) is the same as retribution (C ) - USCCB, Texas bishops, et al
Therefore the primary objective of punishment (A) is retribution (C ).

Retribution is neither excluded nor elevated as a purpose in restoring the disorder caused by the offense.

I think you give “order” much too narrow a definition. It is not the social order alone that is disturbed, and it is not the social order alone that must be restored.

Corresponding to the moral evil of sin is punishment, which guarantees the moral order in the same transcendent sense in which this order is laid down by the will of the Creator and Supreme Lawgiver. (JPII)

Neither preventing future crime nor rehabilitating the criminal do anything whatever to restore the moral order disturbed by a past crime. The retributive aspect of punishment alone does that; it is fundamentally a matter of justice, of treating a person as he deserves based on his actions.

God’s fatherly love does not rule out punishment, even if the latter must always be understood as part of a merciful justice that re-establishes the violated order for the sake of man’s own good (cf. Heb 12: 4-11). (JPII, General Audience 1999)

It would be strange indeed that that which is primary must also be be limited.

Since it is a matter of justice it is not strange at all, which is why the catechism says punishment must be commensurate in severity with the severity of the crime; that it is neither to lenient nor too harsh. This is what makes a punishment just, and distinguishes it from vengeance.

As does the citation from the National Conference of Catholic Bishops on Capital Punishment .

The list provided by the USCCB was unordered. They referred to retribution as the “third justifying purpose” simply because it was the third purpose they addressed, not because it was third in importance. In that same document they also wrote:

The three justifications traditionally advanced for punishment in general are retribution, deterrence, and reform.

Note here they (1) specifically cite retribution without a word about “redress”, (2) put it first in the list [yes, I believe this list is unordered also, but if you believe those lists are ordered this becomes a problem for you], (3) put reform as the least important objective, and (4) never even mention protection as a valid objective.

 

[SanctusPeccator]

SanctusPeccator:

Seems highly unlikely, given the apposite citations [others have] repeatedly referenced

? Seems highly likely that you misunderstand the issue.

Certainly possible, but how precisely?

SanctusPeccator:

Especially when the document does not even address the matter [of their teleological priority]?

? That is exactly the point.

Argumentum ex silentio?

(1) Isaac Cline’s neglect to specifically employ the Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Wind Scale to measure the Great Galveston Storm of 1900 does not thereby negate its reality;
(2) Neil deGrasse Tyson’s failure to emphatically mention the Morgan-Keenan stellar classification system when discussing BAT99-98 does not automatically invalidate its existence;
(3) Luke’s exclusion from the genealogy of Jesus (cf. Luke 3:23-38) unequivocally attesting to the name of Solomon does not ineluctably discount its historical veracity; and
(4) the omission of any explicit reference to the hierarchiam veritatum elaborated by the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith’s Instruction Donum veritatis within the text of Pope Francis’s Encyclical Letter Fratelli tutti does not ipso facto render them null and void . . .

 

[o_mlly]

If A=B, and B=C, then A=C.

The associative argument centers on what is, in evidence, absent, i.e., “B”. Absent B, A ≠ C

I don’t see that batting around the purposes of punishment anymore to be fruitful. You cannot convince me and vice versa. The teaching of St. JPII as regards the death penalty is, for most Catholics after ~ 20 years, settled teaching: In order for the killing of a man to be an act of punishment (a specifically good act) it must be done to one who is guilty of grave evil, by one who has the proper authority to punish evildoers, and killing is exclusively necessary for the sake of the common good.

However, these papal statements appear today to stand in direct contradiction. Since both Popes were speaking ex finestra and not ex cathedra, we can critique the comments always with a hope for synthesis.

First, Pope Pius XII:

When it is a question of the execution of a condemned man, the State does not dispose of the individual’s right to life. In this case it is reserved to the public power to deprive the condemned person of the enjoyment of life in expiation of his crime when, by his crime, he has already disposed himself of his right to live.
His Holiness Pope Pius XII (14 September 1952). Address to the First International Congress on the Histopathology of the Nervous System.

Second Pope Francis:

Today, however, there is an increasing awareness that the dignity of the person is not lost even after the commission of very serious crimes. … Consequently, the Church teaches, in the light of the Gospel, that “the death penalty is inadmissible because it is an attack on the inviolability and dignity of the person”, and she works with determination for its abolition worldwide”.
His Holiness Pope Francix (13 October 2017), Address to Participants in the Meeting organized by the Pontifical Council for the Promotion of the New Evangelization.

Rationally, can any creature change its very nature? No. Can a person by his acts change his nature and, therefore, the natural rights that obtain to that nature? No. I think Pope Francis has the better argument.

CCC#1700 The dignity of the human person is rooted in his creation in the image and likeness of God.

Pius XII’s argument fails in this respect: No creature by their acts can change their nature. The sinner does not through sin become a beast but remains a human being with all the rights inherent in being human.

 

[Ender]

The teaching of St. JPII as regards the death penalty is, for most Catholics after ~ 20 years, settled teaching: In order for the killing of a man to be an act of punishment (a specifically good act) it must be done to one who is guilty of grave evil, by one who has the proper authority to punish evildoers, and killing is exclusively necessary for the sake of the common good.

First, since we are debating your interpretation of JPII’s comments versus my interpretation, neither of us can legitimately claim the debate is settled in our favor. Second, I have never disputed that punishment in general, as well as execution in particular, must be “for the sake of the common good.” That point is settled. Rather, this aspect of the debate is whether the objection that capital punishment is contrary to the common good is a prudential judgment. I don’t see how it could possibly be anything else since that evaluation is conditional on specific circumstances.

I think Pope Francis has the better argument.

Francis didn’t actually make an argument; he simply asserted his position.

CCC#1700 The dignity of the human person is rooted in his creation in the image and likeness of God.

Pius XII’s argument fails in this respect: No creature by their acts can change their nature. The sinner does not through sin become a beast but remains a human being with all the rights inherent in being human.

This is an invented charge: Pius never suggested otherwise, and as JPII pointed out, not holding a person morally responsible for his actions is contrary to his dignity. That is, not applying a punishment that fits the crime is not only unjust but denies man’s dignity.

But it is a truth of faith, also confirmed by our experience and reason, that the human person is free. This truth cannot be disregarded, in order to place the blame for individuals’ sins on external factors such as structures, systems or other people. Above all, this would be to deny the person’s dignity and freedom…

 

[o_mlly]

First, since we are debating your interpretation of JPII’s comments versus my interpretation …

No, it is your interpretation against your bishop’s interpretation. I have asked but you have been unable to cite a concordance of your views with any bishop so I presume that absence of citations includes your bishop.

Rather, this aspect of the debate is whether the objection that capital punishment is contrary to the common good is a prudential judgment. I don’t see how it could possibly be anything else since that evaluation is conditional on specific circumstances.

Presently, those circumstances include the absence of any other means with which to protect society. You disagree. Again, without some bishop somewhere in agreement with you, such disagreement is heterodox.

Pius never suggested otherwise, and as JPII pointed out, not holding a person morally responsible for his actions is contrary to his dignity. That is, not applying a punishment that fits the crime is not only unjust but denies man’s dignity.

But it is a truth of faith, also confirmed by our experience and reason, that the human person is free. This truth cannot be disregarded, in order to place the blame for individuals’ sins on external factors such as structures, systems or other people. Above all, this would be to deny the person’s dignity and freedom…

Pius XII did not suggest, he asserted that the criminal "has already disposed himself of his right to live". The question now, in light of Francis’ teaching, is such a thing possible, i.e., that man through sin can change his very nature?

I argue that he cannot. No creature can change that which it essentially is, especially man. Human dignity does not come from the acts of man but from the acts of God. God has imprinted his own image and likeness on man. Man is the only creature on earth which God willed for itself.

 

[Ender]

The associative argument centers on what is, in evidence, absent, i.e., “B”. Absent B, A ≠ C

By the absence of “B” I assume you mean the absence of a authoritative statement that redressing the disorder means retribution. If so, then what is absent is not evidence that this is so, but only your willingness to accept it.

Retribution: A penalty or reward that a person deserves for moral conduct. (Catholic dictionary)

Within the Catholic tradition, punishment has several purposes: redressing the disorder caused by the offense, i.e., just retribution; defending public order; deterring future wrongdoing; and promoting reform, repentance, and conversion of those who commit evil acts. (USCCB 2005)

Traditionally, punishment has been administered for one or more of the following reasons: deterrence, retribution, rehabilitation of the criminal, and the protection of society. (USCCB 1996)

The three justifications traditionally advanced for punishment in general are retribution, deterrence, and reform. (USCCB 1980)

Punishment is commonly held to have four purposes. They are: (1) protection (of society), (2) retribution, (3) rehabilitation, and (4) deterrence. (Montana Catholic Conference, 1981)

Punishment is held to have a variety of ends that may conveniently be reduced to the following four: rehabilitation, defense against the criminal, deterrence, and retribution. (Cardinal Dulles, 2001)

The reason retribution is used in all these definitions is that it was the common expression prior to the introduction of the rather ambiguous phrase “redress the disorder”.

 

[o_mlly]

The reason retribution is used in all these definitions is that it was the common expression prior to the introduction of the rather ambiguous phrase “redress the disorder”.

What is missing in your citations is the very word, “primary”, that is in dispute. Also absent would be the courteous acknowledgment of "(emphases mine)".

 

[Ender]

No, it is your interpretation against your bishop’s interpretation. I have asked but you have been unable to cite a concordance of your views with any bishop so I presume that absence of citations includes your bishop.

My bishop has said nothing whatever on the subject. He has not offered his opinion.

Presently, those circumstances include the absence of any other means with which to protect society.

Two things: first, any evaluation of circumstances is by definition a judgment, which has been my claim all along. Second, and more significantly, the protection of society is a secondary objective. Whether you admit that retribution is primary, there is no argument whatever that primacy belongs to protection, and there is no argument to be made that a secondary consideration should take precedence over whatever is the more important consideration.

Again, without some bishop somewhere in agreement with you, such disagreement is heterodox.

Well, here is a cardinal who explicitly asserts that this claim is false.

Their prudential judgment, while it is to be respected, is not a matter of binding Catholic doctrine. To differ from such a judgment, therefore, is not to dissent from Church teaching.

Pius XII did not suggest, he asserted that the criminal "has already disposed himself of his right to live ". The question now, in light of Francis’ teaching, is such a thing possible, i.e., that man through sin can change his very nature?

How is it that Pius’ comments are mere assertions while Francis’ comments are “teachings”? They are at the very least equivalent, but your claim is ludicrous to begin with in that Pius never suggested that man could change his nature. No pope would ever claim such a thing.

God has imprinted his own image and likeness on man.

He did indeed, so how is it you ignore God when he explains that the very fact that man was made in God’s image is the reason murderer’s are to be executed? Either God is unaware of man’s dignity, or executing a man for (at least) murder is not contrary to that dignity. The former could hardly be true, therefore the latter must be true as well.

 

[Ender]

What is missing in your citations is the very word, “primary”, that is in dispute. Also absent would be the courteous acknowledgment of " (emphases mine)" .

No, the word primary is not even relevant to what I was addressing.

I was demonstrating solely that “retribution” is synonymous with “redress the disorder” as the church uses, and has used, those terms.

That is what all of my citations show. There are probably a dozen lay authors who explicitly say the same thing, yet you reject them because they are not “magisterial”, as if the ability to understand basic concepts is somehow not available to the lay mind no matter how educated.