A Scriptural Death Penalty Case

[Ender]

I think there has been a significant change. Prior to JPII teaching on the state’s moral use of capital punishment required two necessary circumstances:

1. identity fully determined
2. guilt fully determined

In developing the doctrine, JPII added a third circumstance:

1. bloodless means are not available to protect society

If you agree that the state’s prudential calculus on the moral use of capital punishment now must consider the third circumstance and find it also true then we agree so far.

No, actually I don’t agree with any of it, but I do think it exposes the real difficulty. Every punishment requires the establishment of guilt; that goes without saying. For the church, what makes any punishment moral is that it is appropriate for the crime, being neither too harsh nor too lenient. That is the primary concern, and is why the catechism (2266) says: “Legitimate public authority has the right and duty to inflict penalties commensurate with the gravity of the crime.”

Your analysis doesn’t recognize this point, and throughout all the changes to 2267 and the discussion of capital punishment in particular, nothing has changed in 2266 that relates to all punishment in general. What doctrine underlies the “third circumstance” that “bloodless means are not available to protect society”? The protection of society is not the principle objective of punishment in the first place, so how can it determine what punishment is or is not just? What is the argument that the primary objective should be ignored and one of three secondary objectives should take precedence?

The bloodless means argument has completely distorted our understanding of the nature of punishment, and until that problem is resolved we cannot have a sensible argument because we are addressing two different conceptions of what constitutes a just punishment in the first place.

However, until I understand the moral meaning of “inadmissible” the teaching remains ambiguous and I cannot follow what I do not understand.

The meaning of “capital punishment is per se contrary to the Gospel” is not ambiguous. Is that an assertion you agree with?

 

[o_mlly]

For the church, what makes any punishment moral is that it is appropriate for the crime, being neither too harsh nor too lenient.

No, and this is the key difference in our understanding of church teaching as exposed by St. JPII. The morality of punishment is not measured as to its harshness or leniency (mercy). The moral punishment is the just punishment as measured appropriate to the medicinal needs of the offender, victim and society.

Punishment is inflicted as a medicine that is corrective of the sin, and also to restore right order violated by the sin. Punishment functions as a medicine inasmuch as fear of punishment deters a man from sinning; that is, a person refrains from performing an inordinate action, which would be pleasing to his will, lest he have to suffer what is opposed to his will. Punishment also restores right order; by sinning, a man exceeds the limits of the natural order, indulging his will more than is right. Hence a return to the order of justice is effected by punishment, whereby some good is withdrawn from the sinner’s will. Thomas Aquinas: Compendium theologiae: English

In the infliction of punishment it is not the punishment itself that is the end in view, but its medicinal properties in checking sin wherefore punishment partakes of the nature of justice, in so far as it checks sin. But if it is evident that the infliction of punishment will result in more numerous and more grievous sins being committed, the infliction of punishment will no longer be a part of justice (Summa Theologiae) II-II, q. 43, a. 7).

The punishments of this life are medicinal rather than retributive, for retribution is reserved to the Divine judgment which is pronounced against sinners "according to the truth” (Romans 2:2). (ST II-II, q. 66, a. 6).

 

[Ender]

No, and this is the key difference in our understanding of church teaching as exposed by St. JPII. The morality of punishment is not measured as to its harshness or leniency (mercy). The moral punishment is the just punishment as measured appropriate to the medicinal needs of the offender, victim and society.

Yes, the moral punishment is the punishment that is just, and a just punishment is determined by two things:

1 - It must be commensurate with the severity of the crime (2266), and
2 - It must not cause more harm than good

The first is a general moral obligation; the second is a prudential judgment regarding conditions in specific instances. The second point is what your second reference to Aquinas addresses. Regarding the third citation, I think this is not as clear as it seems.

That “The punishments of this life are medicinal rather than retributive” has to be understood in light of the fact that retribution is the primary objective of all punishment. This is what point (1) addresses.

The argument Aquinas was responding to was this:

• “mortal sin deserves to be punished with death”
• “in the Law theft is punished not by death”
• “Therefore theft is not a mortal sin.”

He is not disputing that mortal sins don’t deserved to be punished by death, nor that theft is not a mortal sin. He is explaining why some mortal sins aren’t punished with death.

“Wherefore, according to the judgment of the present life the death punishment is inflicted, not for every mortal sin, but only for such as inflict an irreparable harm, or again for such as contain some horrible deformity.”

This goes to the point about retribution, as final retribution is surely left to God. That, however, does not mean that medicinal punishments are not also retributive. Retributive justice is the primary objective of punishment.

the Church in her theory and practice has maintained this double type of penalty (medicinal and vindictive), and that this is more in conformity with what the sources of revelation and traditional doctrine teach regarding the coercive power of legitimate human authority. (Pius XII, 1955)

The end is not punishment, but rather the manifestation of a divine norm of retributive justice, which entails proportionate equality vis-à-vis the crime. While this end is in the wide sense medicinal, its form is retributive–for the divine order participated by temporal penalty has both medicinal and retributive aspects. (Steven A. Long, 1999)

This is all in line with the catechism itself (2266):

The primary scope of the penalty is to redress the disorder caused by the offense. When his punishment is voluntarily accepted by the offender, it takes on the value of expiation. Moreover, punishment, in addition to preserving public order and the safety of persons, has a medicinal scope: as far as possible it should contribute to the correction of the offender.

Retribution is an obligation imposed by justice, and that is not left solely to God. That is an obligation imposed on the State as well.

 

[o_mlly]

That “ The punishments of this life are medicinal rather than retributive ” has to be understood in light of the fact that retribution is the primary objective of all punishment. … Retributive justice is the primary objective of punishment.

? Aquinas quite literally says the opposite.

“the punishments of this life are more medicinal than retributive” ( Summa Theologiae II-II, 66, 6, Regan translation).

And in his encyclical, St. JPII teaches in conformity with Aquinas:

The primary purpose of the punishment which society inflicts is “to redress the disorder caused by the offence” (EV p.56).

When a doctor administers to his patient he seeks to “redress the disorder”. Sound medicinal to me.

Perhaps you should define exactly what you think “retribution” means.

 

[Ender]

Aquinas quite literally says the opposite.

Not really. What he’s saying is that punishment is itself medicinal; it’s retributive aspect included. This distinguishes it from God’s eternal punishment which is solely retributive.

Justice aims not only at removing inequality already existing, by punishing the past fault, but also at safeguarding equality for the future, because according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 3) “punishments are medicinal.” Wherefore satisfaction which is the act of justice inflicting punishment, is a medicine healing past sins and preserving from future sins (Aquinas ST III 12,3

Perhaps you should define exactly what you think “retribution” means.

Yes, this would clarify things immensely.

CCC 2266 The primary scope of the penalty is to redress the disorder caused by the offense.

“Redress the disorder” means retribution, and it is the primary objective of all punishment.

468. What is the purpose of punishment?
A punishment imposed by legitimate public authority has the aim of redressing the disorder introduced by the offense, of defending public order and people’s safety, and contributing to the correction of the guilty party. (Compendium of the catechism)

Within the Catholic tradition, punishment has several purposes: redressing the disorder caused by the offense, i.e., just retribution; defending public order; deterring future wrongdoing; and promoting reform, repentance, and conversion of those who commit evil acts. (USCCB 2005)

Retribution is a matter of justice; it is treating a person in accord with his actions whether that is a reward or a punishment, and, as the primary objective, is the one aspect of punishment that must be satisfied. Punishment is aimed at satisfying the other secondary objectives to the extent it can without sacrificing its primary responsibility.

 

[o_mlly]

o_mlly:

Aquinas quite literally says the opposite.

Not really. What he’s saying is that punishment is itself medicinal; it’s retributive aspect included. This distinguishes it from God’s eternal punishment which is solely retributive.

No, that is incorrect. The medicinal aspect of punishment does not include the retributive aspect. The two are distinct aspects in the three aspects of penal sanctions in scholastic theology.

corrective {medicinal) punishment, a penalty intended to reform the actual wrongdoer.

deterrent (social) punishment, a penalty threatened or inflicted to protect the community and deter any member from harming the community by violating law or rights.

retributive (vindicative ) punishment, a penalty imposed by lawful authority to compensate for the offense to God, the lawgiver, and the community for the wrong done to these; sanction designed to protect the majesty of law and restore the order of justice

(Source: A DICTIONARY OF SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHY, BERNARD WUELLNER, S.J., SECOND EDITION)

CCC 2266 The primary scope of the penalty is to redress the disorder caused by the offense.

“ Redress the disorder ” means retribution, and it is the primary objective of all punishment.

No, redress the disorder does not mean acts toward retribution (vindicative) justice. Redress the disorder includes actions that address all three aspects of penal sanctions. And, Aquinas is affirmed by JPII that the medicinal aspect (individually and collectively) is primary.

The retribution (vindicative) aspect, in the strict active sense of justice, involves the authoritative depriving of a good on a subject who is a wrongdoer, against his will, in order to remove or compensate for a fault already and certainly committed. This narrow sense of retributive (vindicative) justice is not all that retributive (vindicative) justice requires but this narrow part seems to be the only part of retributive (vindicative) justice that proponents of capital punishment wish to emphasize over and against the fullness that retributive (vindicative) requires as well as the other two aspects of redress the disorder, i.e., medicinal and social.

Redressing the disorder can be seen as identical to restoring the tranquility of order or peace:

peace, n. l. “the tranquillity of order” (St. Augustine) ; the calm and contented order of justice; well-ordered union of wills. 2. freedom from war or civil strife; freedom from public disorder, injustice, conflict, and terror. 3. freedom from private disagreement or quarrels; concord; untroubled harmony of. wills (Ibid.)

 

[BornInMarch]

Therefore, no matter the situation in a death penalty case, do you say mankind should or shouldn’t follow Jesus’s example of mercy?

While Christ was doing that, God the Father was causing King Herod to die of worms for blasphemy.

I don’t think one case-study is enough to determine God’s will. Rather I think we need to look at the big picture.

 

[Lunam_Meam]

I don’t think one case-study is enough to determine God’s will. Rather I think we need to look at the big picture.

“For Thou shalt not commit adultery: Thou shalt not kill: Thou shalt not steal, Thou shalt not bear false witness: Thou shalt not covet: and if there be any other commandment, it is comprised in this word, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself” (Rom. 13:9), which is the second greatest commandment (Mat. 22:39), and love is the fulfilling of the Law (Rom. 13:10).

“Be ye therefore merciful, as your Father also is merciful” (Lk. 6:36).

Mercy is an act of love.

 

[Ender]

“Be ye therefore merciful, as your Father also is merciful” (Lk. 6:36).

Mercy is an act of love.

Are you suggesting that mercy should be applied in every case without regard to the attitude of the offender? If so, you are calling for us to be more merciful than God, who does not apply mercy that way or there would be no hell.

Also, I think you are confusing mercy with clemency.

For it belongs to mercy [Cf.30, 1] to relieve another’s unhappiness by a beneficent action, while it belongs to clemency to mitigate another’s unhappiness by the cessation of punishment. (Aquinas ST II-II 159 1 ad 2)

 

[Lunam_Meam]

Are you suggesting that mercy should be applied in every case without regard to the attitude of the offender? If so, you are calling for us to be more merciful than God, who does not apply mercy that way or there would be no hell.

Also, I think you are confusing mercy with clemency.

Firstly, mercy, and clemency, are not mutually exclusive.

Secondly, oh, if God should forgive only those who ask to be forgiven! And, strike at once those who do not repent after sinning! Have you never felt that you had been forgiven before repenting? Can you really say that you repented, and that is why you have been forgiven?

In the death penalty case of the adulterous woman, for example, she was not repentant, and Jesus did not say what He said to other souls whom He had forgiven because they were fully repentant. Instead, He gave that soul time, and possibility to arriving at repentance, and holiness, if she wished to reach them. One must bear in mind, ‘‘not every soul recovers instantaneously from its wounds. Some do so by successive stages, which are often slow, and subject to relapse.

It is essential to possess two things to be true masters, and worthy of being masters. The first thing: an austere life for oneself, so that one may judge without the hypocrisy of condemning in other people what one forgives oneself. The second thing: patient mercy to give souls the time to recover, and fortify themselves.

Temporal judgments, and condemnations, can begin here, but they do not end here. That is why we should leave it to God to avenge (Deut. 32:35, Rom. 12:19), judge (Jas. 4:12), and administer what is merited by each of us: reward, or punishment (Rom. 2:6). To love is man’s task on Earth (Mk. 12:31), which is His second greatest commandment (Rom. 13:9), and to love is the fulfilling of the Law (Rom. 13:10). Mercy is an act of love.

“Be ye therefore merciful, as your Father also is merciful” (Lk. 6:36).

 

[Ender]

Secondly, oh, if God should forgive only those who ask to be forgiven!

Mercy is offered without condition, but it is not unilaterally bestowed. To receive mercy we must in fact repent.

On the part of man only a lack of good will can limit {mercy}, a lack of readiness to be converted and to repent… (JPII, Dives in miserecordia)

In the death penalty case of the adulterous woman, for example, she was not repentant, and Jesus did not say what He said to other souls whom He had forgiven because they were fully repentant.

True, but neither did he forgive her sin, and if you are going to use this example as a paradigm about how punishment should be applied then you need to explain why it doesn’t apply to all punishment in general and not just capital punishment in particular. After all, she received no punishment whatever. Why isn’t that the message of this incident? Isn’t that the more merciful position?

Temporal judgments, and condemnations, can begin here, but they do not end here. That is why we should leave it to God to avenge…

The final punishment is left to God, but temporal punishment is not.

For God promulgates the holy law that the magistrate may punish the wicked … (St Bellarmine)

Legitimate public authority has the right and duty to inflict penalties commensurate with the gravity of the crime. (CCC 2266)

 

[Lunam_Meam]

To receive mercy we must in fact repent.

Oh, if God should forgive only those who ask to be forgiven, and strike at once those who do not repent after sinning! Have you never felt that you had been forgiven before repenting? Can you really say that you repented, and that is why you have been forgiven?

Consider the story of Cain of Adam, where he murdered his brother, Abel, and was unrepentant, yet was administered just punishment, as well as marked with mercy by God.

Additionally, again, in the death penalty case of the adulterous woman, for example, she was not repentant, and Jesus did not say what He said to other souls whom He had forgiven because they were fully repentant, meaning He did not forgive her. Nor did He punish by condemning her to death in that moment.

Instead, He gave that soul time, and possibility to arriving at repentance, and holiness, if she wished to reach them. One must bear in mind, ‘‘not every soul recovers instantaneously from its wounds. Some do so by successive stages, which are often slow, and subject to relapse.

It is essential to possess two things to be true masters, and worthy of being masters. The first thing: an austere life for oneself, so that one may judge without the hypocrisy of condemning in other people what one forgives oneself . The second thing: patient mercy to give souls the time to recover, and fortify themselves.

The final punishment is left to God, but temporal punishment is not.

For God promulgates the holy law that the magistrate may punish the wicked … (St Bellarmine)

Legitimate public authority has the right and duty to inflict penalties commensurate with the gravity of the crime. (CCC 2266)

Those in authority can administer punishment without killing, or show mercy. And, again, temporal judgments, and condemnations, can begin here, but they do not end here. That is why we should leave it to God to avenge (Deut. 32:35, Rom. 12:19), judge (Jas. 4:12), and administer what is merited by each of us: reward, or punishment (Rom. 2:6). To love is man’s task on Earth (Mk. 12:31), which is His second greatest commandment (Rom. 13:9), and to love is the fulfilling of the Law (Rom. 13:10). Mercy is an act of love.

“Be ye therefore merciful, as your Father also is merciful” (Lk. 6:36).

 

[SanctusPeccator]

Instead, He gave that soul time, and possibility to arriving at repentance, and holiness, if she wished to reach them. One must bear in mind, ‘‘not every soul recovers instantaneously from its wounds. Some do so by successive stages, which are often slow, and subject to relapse.

It is essential to possess two things to be true masters, and worthy of being masters. The first thing: an austere life for oneself, so that one may judge without the hypocrisy of condemning in other people what one forgives oneself . The second thing: patient mercy to give souls the time to recover, and fortify themselves.

Seems rather questionable whether excerpts from Maria Valtorta’s controversial The Poem of the Man-God would adequately compare to the Doctor Angelicus on such a controversial topic?

“Finally, the fact that the evil, as long as they live, can be corrected from their errors does not prohibit the fact that they may be justly executed, for the danger which threatens from their way of life is greater and more certain than the good which may be expected from their improvement. They also have at the critical point of death the opportunity to be converted to God through repentance. And if they are so stubborn that even at the point of death their heart does not draw back from evil, it is possible to make a highly probable judgment that they would never come away from evil to the right use of their powers.” —Summa contra Gentiles, III. 146, §10.

 

[Lunam_Meam]

Consider the story of Cain of Adam, where he murdered his brother, Abel, was unrepentant, and received just punishment, yet also marked with mercy by God.

Additionally, again, in the death penalty case of the adulterous woman, for example, she was unrepentant, and Jesus did not say what He said to other souls whom He had forgiven because they were fully repentant, meaning He did not forgive her. Nor did He punish by condemning her to death in that moment.

Instead, He gave that soul time, and possibility to arriving at repentance, and holiness, if she wished to reach them. Not every soul recovers instantaneously from its wounds. Some do so by successive stages, which are often slow, and subject to relapse. Patient mercy gives souls the time to recover, and fortify themselves. That is a fact.

Those in authority can administer punishment without killing. And, again, temporal judgments, and condemnations, can begin here, but they do not end here. That is why we should leave it to God to avenge (Deut. 32:35, Rom. 12:19), judge (Jas. 4:12), and administer what is merited by each of us: reward, or punishment (Rom. 2:6).

To love our neighbor is man’s task on Earth (Eph. 4:2, In. 13:34, Mk. 12:311, Peter 4:8, etc), and it is His second greatest commandment (Rom. 13:9), and to love is the fulfilling of the Law (Rom. 13:10).

“Be ye therefore merciful, as your Father also is merciful” (Lk. 6:36).

Mercy is an act of love.

“Dearly beloved, let us love one another, for charity is of God. And, every one that loveth, is born of God, and knoweth God. He that loveth not, knoweth not God: for God is charity.” (1 Jn. 4:7-10)

 

[SanctusPeccator]

Consider the story of Cain of Adam, where he murdered his brother, Abel, was unrepentant, and received just punishment, yet also marked with mercy by God.

Additionally, again, in the death penalty case of the adulterous woman, for example, she was unrepentant, and Jesus did not say what He said to other souls whom He had forgiven because they were fully repentant, meaning He did not forgive her. Nor did He punish by condemning her to death in that moment.

Instead, He gave that soul time, and possibility to arriving at repentance, and holiness, if she wished to reach them. Not every soul recovers instantaneously from its wounds. Some do so by successive stages, which are often slow, and subject to relapse. Patient mercy gives souls the time to recover, and fortify themselves. That is a fact.

Those in authority can administer punishment without killing. And, again, temporal judgments, and condemnations, can begin here, but they do not end here. That is why we should leave it to God to avenge (Deut. 32:35, Rom. 12:19), judge (Jas. 4:12), and administer what is merited by each of us: reward, or punishment (Rom. 2:6).

To love our neighbor is man’s task on Earth (Eph. 4:2, In. 13:34, Mk. 12:311, Peter 4:8, etc), and it is His second greatest commandment (Rom. 13:9), and to love is the fulfilling of the Law (Rom. 13:10).

“Be ye therefore merciful, as your Father also is merciful” (Lk. 6:36).

Mercy is an act of love.

“Dearly beloved, let us love one another, for charity is of God. And, every one that loveth, is born of God, and knoweth God. He that loveth not, knoweth not God: for God is charity.” (1 Jn. 4:7-10)

Curious as to which of these remarks directly address - let alone incontrovertibly refute - the aforementioned passage from the Summa contra Gentiles ? Also, there would seem to be an exegetical nescience that the teachings from the Sermon on the Mount must be primarily contextualized as evangelical counsels directed to interpersonal relations by the private individuals of domestic society rather than moral precepts addressed to public policy by the public authorities of civil government?

 

[Bernoulli]

Rom. 12:19 also applies to private Christians: Beloved, never avenge yourselves, but leave it to the wrath of God; for it is written, “Vengeance is mine, I will repay, says the Lord.”

It it the next chapter that speaks about the public authority: he is the servant of God to execute his wrath on the wrongdoer. (13:4)

Therefore, appealing to the state respects the exhortation to leave it to the wrath of God.

 

[SanctusPeccator]

Ender:

o_mlly:

Aquinas quite literally says the opposite.

Not really. What he’s saying is that punishment is itself medicinal; it’s retributive aspect included. This distinguishes it from God’s eternal punishment which is solely retributive.

No, that is incorrect. The medicinal aspect of punishment does not include the retributive aspect. The two are distinct aspects in the three aspects of penal sanctions in scholastic theology.

Rather depends . . . sub specie temporis or sub specie aeternitatis? Since temporal punishments undoubtedly cannot achieve the perfect retribution of eternal punishments, the Angelic Doctor notes they must necessarily be sought for “medicinal” ends:

“Now, the punishments of this life are sought, not for their own sake, because this is not the final time of retribution, but in their character of medicine, conducing either to the amendment of the sinner, or to the good of the commonwealth whose calm is ensured by the punishment of evil-doers.” (Summa Theologiae IIa-IIae, q. 68, a. 1, c).

So, the retributive sense could potentially be included ordo intentionis in the actual aspect of medicinality ordo executionis (cf. Summa Theologiae IIa-IIae, q. 65, a. 1, c; Summa contra Gentiles, III. 146, §5). This is emphasized further:

“But punishments that are inflicted in the present life either by God or by man do not always correspond to the gravity of fault, for sometimes a lesser fault is punished with a graver punishment temporarily in order that a greater danger be avoided; for punishments in the present life are used as medicines.” (Quaestiones disputatae de malo, q. 2, a. 10, ad. 4).

Hence, temporal punishments cannot be exacted SOLELY as retribution for [primarily] restoring violated justice and moral order, but also includes the [secondarily] medicinal purpose of obtaining the remote ends – the rehabilitation of the offender, the protection of society, the deterrence of others from crime – through retribution.

 

[SanctusPeccator]

Ender:

CCC 2266 The primary scope of the penalty is to redress the disorder caused by the offense.

“Redress the disorder” means retribution, and it is the primary objective of all punishment.

No, redress the disorder does not mean acts toward retribution (vindicative) justice. Redress the disorder includes actions that address all three aspects of penal sanctions. And, Aquinas is affirmed by JPII that the medicinal aspect (individually and collectively) is primary.

The retribution (vindicative) aspect, in the strict active sense of justice, involves the authoritative depriving of a good on a subject who is a wrongdoer, against his will, in order to remove or compensate for a fault already and certainly committed. This narrow sense of retributive (vindicative) justice is not all that retributive (vindicative) justice requires but this narrow part seems to be the only part of retributive (vindicative) justice that proponents of capital punishment wish to emphasize over and against the fullness that retributive (vindicative) requires as well as the other two aspects of redress the disorder, i.e., medicinal and social.

Redressing the disorder can be seen as identical to restoring the tranquility of order or peace:

peace, n. l. “the tranquillity of order” (St. Augustine) ; the calm and contented order of justice; well-ordered union of wills. 2. freedom from war or civil strife; freedom from public disorder, injustice, conflict, and terror. 3. freedom from private disagreement or quarrels; concord; untroubled harmony of. wills (Ibid.)

I. While likely plausible if this particular phrase is read synchronically and subsequently interpreted in a reductionist manner, does it unwillingly constitute an example of a “hermeneutic of discontinuity and rupture” (cf. Pope Benedict XVI’s Discourse [of 22 December 2005] to the Roman Curia Expergiscere, homo, n. 7)? More certain when this phrase is read diachronically and subsequently interpreted in a holistic manner (via a “hermeneutic of [continuity and] reform”) instead, the meaning must be correctly situated vis-à-vis the living embodiment of the Depositum Fidei?

 

[SanctusPeccator]

II. Per Aquinas, the prominent character of punishment as the restoration of “the equality of justice” provides the organic development for the contemporary definition of retribution contained in a statement from the National Conference of Catholic Bishops:

"Punishment may be considered in two ways. First, under the aspect of punishment, and in this way punishment is not due save for sin, because by means of punishment the equality of justice is restored, in so far as he who by sinning has exceeded in following his own will suffers something that is contrary to this will. Wherefore, since every sin is voluntary, not excluding original sin, as stated above, it follows that no one is punished in this way, except for something done voluntarily. Secondly, punishment may be considered as a medicine, not only healing the past sin, but also preserving from future sin, or conducing to some good . . . " (Summa Theologiae IIa-IIae, q. 108, a. 4, c).

“The third justifying purpose for punishment is retribution or the restoration of the order of justice which has been violated by the action of the criminal.” —“I. Purposes of Punishment, n. 8” from National Conference of Catholic Bishops’ Statement [of 13 November 1980] on Capital Punishment

Note the usage of semicolons (rather than commas) to sequentially distinguish the various ends of punishment in the next document. Hence, the antecedent “redressing the disorder” is subsequently denoted by the postcedent “just retribution” exclusively within the first independent clause of the sentence:

“Within the Catholic tradition, punishment has several purposes: redressing the disorder caused by the offense, i.e., just retribution; defending public order; deterring future wrongdoing; and promoting reform, repentance, and conversion of those who commit evil acts.” —“IV. Catholic Teaching and the Death Penalty, §2” from United States Conference of Catholic Bishops’ Statement [of 15 November 2005] A Culture of Life and the Penalty of Death.

The reader will carefully compare how this is restated from the earlier ecclesiastical template published by the Holy See on 28 June 2005:

“A punishment imposed by legitimate public authority has the aim of redressing the disorder introduced by the offense, of defending public order and people’s safety, and contributing to the correction of the guilty party.” — Compendium of the Catechism of the Catholic Church, n. 468.

 

[o_mlly]

Rather depends . . . sub specie temporis or sub specie aeternitatis ? Since temporal punishments undoubtedly cannot achieve the perfect retribution of eternal punishments, the Angelic Doctor notes they must necessarily be sought for “medicinal” ends: …

The Aquinas citation and logic clearly defeats the mistaken notion that retribution is the primary purpose of punishment.

“The third justifying purpose for punishment is retribution …

As does the citation from the National Conference of Catholic Bishops on Capital Punishment.

Note the usage of semicolons (rather than commas) to sequentially distinguish the various ends of punishment in the next document. …

Duly noted in a previous post (perhaps in a different thread). The grammarian properly uses semicolons when commas are inadequate as separators due to commas prior use in the same sentence. The sentence does not give “just retribution” a higher, and most certainly not an exclusive standing, in the id est string that follows.