A theological question Catholics cannot answer?

[HarryStotle]

joeybaggz:

Animals don’t experience fear. Fear is an emotion, something animals are not endowed with.

This is hairsplitting. Whether you differentiate the emotion of “fear” into some other thing from what the animal feels, and setting aside the issue of whether at least some animals feel a basic, primitive level of emotions including fear and love, the bottom line is that animals are not comfortable being eaten, or otherwise maimed or cruelly treated.

Saying “oh it’s just instinct, they really don’t feel bad as they’re being killed” is ridiculous and a bad argument.

Let me put this very plainly…

Concepts, memories, feelings, experiences, imaginings, ideas are all abstractions. These require high level brain function at a level far beyond mere sentience – where perceptual sense data is presented to the brain.

Even computers receive data in the form of mouse clicks, touch screen responses, peripheral data (name removed by moderator)uts, etc. That does not mean computers have awareness in any meaningful sense. They have processing capacity structured to deal with those (name removed by moderator)uts. The question is a wide open one with regard to animal brains.

What is clear is that consciousness deals with abstractions – ideas, memories, visual representations, concepts, etc. that requires very high level brain function. First of all it requires the capacity to create those abstractions from perceptual data and stored memory, and second the capacity to retrieve and analyze those abstractions.

It can’t just be assumed that animals like fish, frogs, cats, dogs, birds, etc., that respond to perceptual data just have consciousness because that presumes they also must have the brain capacity to create and deal with abstractions and not merely to respond to perceptions.

 

[BartholomewB]

Animals don’t experience fear.

Of course they do. A dog can be frightened of a snake, which is a genuine danger, and it can also be frightened of a wheelbarrow, which is not. Fear is fear in both cases.

 

[Wesrock]

Tis_Bearself:

joeybaggz:

Animals don’t experience fear. Fear is an emotion, something animals are not endowed with.

This is hairsplitting. Whether you differentiate the emotion of “fear” into some other thing from what the animal feels, and setting aside the issue of whether at least some animals feel a basic, primitive level of emotions including fear and love, the bottom line is that animals are not comfortable being eaten, or otherwise maimed or cruelly treated.

Saying “oh it’s just instinct, they really don’t feel bad as they’re being killed” is ridiculous and a bad argument.

Let me put this very plainly…

Concepts, memories, feelings, experiences, imaginings, ideas are all abstractions. These require high level brain function at a level far beyond mere sentience – where perceptual sense data is presented to the brain.

Even computers receive data in the for. Of mouse clicks, touch screen responses, peripheral data (name removed by moderator)uts, etc. That does not mean computers have awareness in any meaningful sense. They have processing capacity structured to deal with those (name removed by moderator)uts. The question is a wide open one with regard to animal brains.

What is clear is that consciousness deals with abstractions – ideas, memories, visual representations, concepts, etc. that requires very high level brain function. First of all the capacity to create those abstractions from perceptual data and stored memory, and second the capacity to retrieve and analyze those abstractions.

It can’t just be assumed that animals like fish, frogs, cats, dogs, birds, etc., that respond to perceptual data just have consciousness because that presumes they also must have the brain capacity to deal with abstractions and not merely to respond to perceptions.

A Thomist should have no issue supposing that many animals have some form of memory, feelings, “imaginings” (even a mental image), and experiences. It’s when we abstract from the objects of our experience to universal realities and truths as such that we encounter the leap to rational thought, language, etc…

As for a computer, or a network of trillions of handholding humans behaving like a computer, or any such artifact construction, that could not have these qualia. They are many different pieces not producing any actual information, only what we choose to read out of it in the language we gave it. An animal has a unity beyond anything a computer does. It’s true I can’t read a dog’s experiences, neither can I read yours. But as we can presume a similarity between us I’m comfortable acknowledging that you have these things and aren’t a zombie. Other animals are, admittedly, a larger leap, but insofar as we are also animals with similar material operations and principle of unity to our being we do have a level of commonality to serve as a basis. I reject the idea that qualia or memories (in a basic sense) are limited to rational beings only.

(I need to put this discussion aside for the time being and focus on other matters).

 

[Tis_Bearself]

It can’t just be assumed that animals like fish, frogs, cats, dogs, birds, etc., that respond to perceptual data just have consciousness because that presumes they also must have the brain capacity to create and deal with abstractions and not merely to respond to perceptions.

Okay, then it should be fine for me to just pull the legs off a dog and set it on fire because it doesn’t have the brain capacity of a human. Obviously, it’s not fine.

My point is that for this exercise, we do not care whether they feel pain and fear the same way we do or not. They clearly feel something very unpleasant.
From there we can proceed with the rest of the theological discussion.

P.S. I’m muting the thread now so if you have further points to make, talk to the paw, er, hand

 

[HarryStotle]

Animals can’t abstract from that, but they do feel, not just react. I see no good reason to suppose that animals are zombies in the sense you describe (and I am familiar with the term in this context). We might as well say they don’t experience the color red, or experience a smell, or experience pain (experience being the key word here, the qualia), and that just seems as absurd.

To say “they do feel” is to presume an awareness of those emotions, but, as I have tried to point out, an awareness of those emotional states presumes persistence of consciousness which presumes the brain capacity to process abstractions. It isn’t clear that most animals have that capacity. That means to say animals “feel” pain is merely to beg the question of awareness as if the mere mention of “feeling” pain, for example, implies subjective consciousness. Otherwise, you are using “feel” in a way that means something quite different than when human beings are aware of pain as the subject undergoing pain.

If pain were just a phenomena without a subject undergoing it, pain would be inconsequential. So to say animals feel pain is to presume conscious awareness of pain. But, again, that implies the brain capacity to sustain subjective awareness. Otherwise, from whence does awareness come into play? You can’t just assume it. The physical brain must be capable of producing and processing abstract information. At what level does that occur? I would argue intelligence at a high level is required – probably even requiring the intentionality to deal with universals (abstractions.)

 

[Wesrock]

Perhaps I go too far, so one last thought.

Thomism has no reason to suppose animals are zombies. Can we say they aren’t? I don’t know. That’s a scientific issue. The idea that animals have a level of consciousness and experience qualia and have memories, though, is not contradictory with a Thomistic conception of nature.

It does, however, seem to contradict Descartes’s idea of two separate substances, the res cogitans and the res extensa, the latter of which could not account for animals experiencing things in a perceptual way. I maintain my objection, at the least, that the “animals don’t feel” claim makes a metaphysical assumption that goes beyond the realm of science and one we are not required as Catholics to believe in.

 

[joeybaggz]

Instinct is not fear

 

[Wesrock]

Wesrock:

Animals can’t abstract from that, but they do feel, not just react. I see no good reason to suppose that animals are zombies in the sense you describe (and I am familiar with the term in this context). We might as well say they don’t experience the color red, or experience a smell, or experience pain (experience being the key word here, the qualia), and that just seems as absurd.

To say “they do feel” is to presume an awareness of those emotions, but, as I have tried to point out, an awareness of those emotional states presumes persistence of consciousness which presumes the brain capacity to process abstractions. It isn’t clear that most animals have that capacity

To reiterate, I think we mean different things by abstractions, or at least can make certain distinctions between abstracting to a universal reality or truth and simply conjuring up a mental image. A Thomist would reject the idea that a non-rational animal could do the former but admit the possibility of the latter (perhaps depending upon the animal). The idea that animals have a persistent consciousness is perfectly acceptable in a Thomist worldview.

 

[BartholomewB]

Whether fear is instinctive or not in a particular instance, it is still fear.

 

[HarryStotle]

HarryStotle:

It can’t just be assumed that animals like fish, frogs, cats, dogs, birds, etc., that respond to perceptual data just have consciousness because that presumes they also must have the brain capacity to create and deal with abstractions and not merely to respond to perceptions.

Okay, then it should be fine for me to just pull the legs off a dog and set it on fire because it doesn’t have the brain capacity of a human. Obviously, it’s not fine.

No, actually, merely because animals do not have subjective awareness does not imply that moral agents like human beings can do whatever we want with them.

Obviously, it isn’t “fine.” The question of why it wouldn’t be fine still remains.

There is no logical or direct path from “no subjective awareness” to “fine for me to just pull the legs off a dog and set it on fire.”

It may remove an obvious impediment to that behaviour, but it doesn’t thereby remove all impediments.

In fact you could go the other way, like the OP does, and conclude that if animals are subjectively aware of pain, then God is a moral monster for creating animals that tear each other apart with great frequency.

My point is that animals are not subjectively aware of pain in any way like the way that humans are, which is why there is a moral injunction against humans tearing each other apart or lighting others on fire.

That does not mean a lack of subjective awareness on the part of animals means that humans are then free to tear legs off them or set them on fire. There may be other, very strong impediments, standing in the way of doing things like that to animals.

Houses, grand pianos and automobiles don’t feel pain, but that does not mean we have license to set them on fire or tear them apart.

 

[HarryStotle]

The idea that animals have a persistent consciousness is perfectly acceptable in a Thomist worldview.

Perhaps, but the scientific or biological question remains to be resolved: What is necessary physiologically speaking to enable persistent consciousness? That isn’t answered theoretically or metaphysically. And, I would assert, has not been answered by science nor by philosophers of mind.

 

[HarryStotle]

Perhaps I go too far, so one last thought.

Thomism has no reason to suppose animals are zombies. Can we say they aren’t? I don’t know. That’s a scientific issue. The idea that animals have a level of consciousness and experience qualia and have memories, though, is not contradictory with a Thomistic conception of nature.

It does, however, seem to contradict Descartes’s idea of two separate substances, the res cogitans and the res extensa, the latter of which could not account for animals experiencing things in a perceptual way. I maintain my objection, at the least, that the “animals don’t feel” claims makes a metaphysical assumption that goes beyond the realm of science and one we are not required as Catholics to believe in.

Sure, I can agree with your last point, but add that science hasn’t proven the other side that animals have subjective experience of pain, either.

It remains an open question.

I would also add that a number of large moral questions appear to remain open ones precisely to act as moral filters. They almost force us to refine and resolve our moral thinking at a basic level. They cannot be avoided and the manner in which we resolve them makes us into the kind of moral beings we will choose to be.

 

[Wesrock]

Just thought I’d add an article for further reading on the Aristotlean point of view regarding animal consciousness: Edward Feser: Animals are conscious! In other news, sky is blue, water wet

 

[catholic1seeks]

I think it’s quite obvious to anyone who has a pet dog or cat that animals experience emotions and have memory.

 

[Ioana]

But (sorry if you’ve already answered this) why doesn’t it follow that God does not have moral “obligations”? All the good stuff you’ve mentioned, I wouldn’t call them obligations but to me if God had no reason for not stopping a person from being sick then that would make God totally different from what God is. Pardon, it would almost make God seem evil (which can’t be the case). If God weren’t exactly how he is then God wouldn’t be God. I didn’t have an obligation to choose any of the choices I chose, but I did and they make me me. If God is perfect (in a colloquial sense) then all the choices God made are the “perfect” choice, including the bad stuff. If God wills everybody’s good then all the choices God made lead to that to the maximum possible. It isn’t that God was obliged to do them. God could in theory choose not to do them but that would be contradictory to his nature and in a way impossible. So all the instances of extending a giant helping hand you’ve mentioned weren’t an obligation in the sense that if God hadn’t done them we’d send him to some sort of imaginary court, but they’d just be “impossible” in the sense that it is something God wouldn’t do (not couldn’t do). I thought God permits evil only because God makes good come out of it, but I may be wrong I’m just curious about your idea. Sors for pestering you btw, I’m only doing it because you sound like you know what you are talking about.

 

[Wesrock]

It’s not pestering at all. These are very good questions.

People think God is subject to the moral law. However, he is not. The moral law is what it means for a human to be a good human. When people make this mistake, they point out that God does not follow the moral law or what we’d expect of a good upstanding human. But God is not a moral agent in that way.

There are things that flow naturally from God’s nature. He does will the good. He has reasons for permitting suffering. That includes bring about a greater good and allowing for goods that otherwise could not exist. Now, here people will often object and say “If humans are not allowed to do an evil for a greater good, why can God?” And it’s because God is not a human or a moral agent subject to the moral law. Being human has moral obligations and limits that God is not subject to. And again, the reason he is not subject to them is not because we’re subject to the arbitrary laws of a tyrant who ignores them, or because God is so mighty he can do as he pleases even if it’s immoral, but because what is natural to us and what is natural to him are different.

You are absolutely right that God acts according to his nature. It would be a logical contradiction for him to do otherwise. The issue is that when people think of the term “perfectly good” as applied to God as DIRECTLY meaning “he’s a nice guy who perfectly adheres to human morality.” No, his perfect goodness does come from him being pure act. But, like you say, the story doesn’t stop there. There are things that follow from that as his nature, such as willing the good of others, his call to participation in nature, and more.

As for God creating the most perfect of all possible worlds and him being logically expected to make this by nature, I do not know that we can claim that. Is it really impossible that God could have created a world with one more saint than our current world? I think God had his reasons for creating exactly as he did, but I don’t know if he was necessarily and logically constrained to create exactly the world we have.

 

[jcrichton]

It sounds just right… but as I recall, from my early childhood, when mom would take me to my grandfather’s farm only the pigs and other animals would get the fruit that would drop to the ground… even as a young child (about 5 to 6) I would climb the trees to access the freshly ripening fruits… if you ever make a comparison you will note that when fruit (and other food items) advance to a certain degree past ripening (usually when they drop-off their branches/shrubs) there’s already a degree of decomposition going on… sugarcane begins to ferment, cherries, mangos, papayas… I can’t recall a fruit (or veggie) that simply waited around to be eaten: the processes is simple: the plant/tree/shrub flowers, fruit emerges, fruit ripens, the seeds are released (sometimes using animals and insects to release the seeds–which means the system is set up so that even though there’s consumption the new life emerges), a new birth/shoot emerges and the cycle continues… it’s called life!

So the only time that your scenario would work would be if everyone that claims not to want to kill another creature in order to sustain his/her life would wait till nature takes its course and eat the decaying matter.

I know, not a pretty picture!

Maran atha!

Angel

 

[jcrichton]

Why is it “moral” for animals to eat animals, but it is not for mankind (just another animal?) to eat them? That is a moral question that, IMO, animal rights activists have never been able to satisfactorily answer.

I think that that’s part of the argument; the OP wants no harm to come to any “sentient” animal as “proof” that God exists.

It’s one of those “gotcha” tenets.

Maran atha!

Angel

 

[jcrichton]

How exactly this comports with the theory of evolution and so on is an open question.

It is interesting that Genesis Creation narratives brings us to that point:

29 And God said: Behold I have given you every herb bearing seed upon the earth, and all trees that have in themselves seed of their own kind, to be your meat: 30 And to all beasts of the earth, and to every fowl of the air, and to all that move upon the earth, and wherein there is life, that they may have to feed upon. And it was so done. (Genesis 1)

When we look at the gorilla, elephant, and other species we find that a great many of them survive eating mostly greens–some human have “evolved” into “vegans” and there don’t seem to be an extreme health issue ( Some nutrition experts feel that veganism may lead to certain negative health effects. http://healthyeating.sfgate.com/negative-effects-veganism-3304.html) associated with their habits. So it would seem that Genesis is supported by nature and human return to greens.

So the dog-eat-dog scheme could be attributed to the Fall.

Maran atha!

Angel

 

[jcrichton]

Will there be animal pain in the new Heavens and new Earth?

I don’t think Fido will follow us there.

Maran atha!

Angel