I am astonished with claims that non-human animals do not experience fear and pain.
I think the question hinges on what you mean by “the human experience of pain” and “the animal experience of pain”. If you describe it purely in terms of a physical stimulus that causes a response (of any sort), then it’s clear that animals experience ‘pain.’ At its heart, that’s a simple matter of recognizing that animals respond to external stimuli. That’s a morally neutral definition, wouldn’t you say? In fact, it’s a
good thing: it allows an animal to recognize a situation that isn’t normal, and allows for corrective action. However, is pain
itself ‘evil’, per se? Again, I would have to say “no – it’s morally neutral.”
Does that mean, though, that the experience is one that we desire? Well… now we’ve moved into the realm of humans and rational thought, haven’t we? And once we’ve done that, then the debate changes. Pain is still a perception of a stimulus, but now that we’re in the realm of rationality, we can talk about a range of issues that transcend the mere notion of “physical stimulus and perception thereof.” Once we’re in
that discussion, we can enter into the discussion of the morality of inflicting pain
on a rational individual.
However, if we conclude that it’s immoral to inflict pain on a rational animal, does that then mean that the conclusion applies to animals that do not possess rationality? Without a discussion that provides a reason for such an extrapolation, it’s difficult to assert that it is true. We might make an appeal to emotion, based on anthropomorphism, but if the hinge-point of the discussion is rationality, it makes it difficult to make the claim.
I think the argument vis-a-vis fear works similarly. We have to define what ‘fear’ means, and intuitively, it seems to me, that this definition likewise hinges on rationality. We might want to talk about reactions to perceived immanent pain, but would we call that ‘fear’ in the same way humans experience it?
They’re good questions that you’re raising. I think, though, that they’re
philosophical in nature rather than
theological.