The idea that anything is objectively required of all moral agents is one that I reject. Moral statements, in my view, only make sense when the speaker and listener agree on their framework. If both parties agree that their morals are based on the Hadiths, the ten commandments, or some utilitarian principle, or any other of that sort, they can discuss whether something is moral or immoral given their agreed upon framework.
You have made way too much out of my colloquial use of the word “good.” You had asserted that, with a lack of an objective moral base, people could justify any number of atrocities. I pointed out that clearly religious cultures and governments are not immune. I gave some examples that I thought both of us would find objectionable. Since we were (presumed) to agree on things like child sacrifice and putting unbelievers to the sword, I felt comfortable in using good/bad as descriptors.
Point being? Both atheism and religious belief systems can justify things that you, the reader, find objectionable. Thus it’s improper to raise this objection only against atheistic systems.
Again, you have missed the point. Both atheism and religious belief systems require a substantive ground for any justification of moral beliefs. What you are doing is giving atheistic belief systems a “pass” in this respect. You require objective justification from religious belief systems in order to be binding on you, but when it comes to atheistic morality, you punt to “subjective” feelings as being all that is required simply because that “pleases” you.
In other words, religious moral beliefs require, from you, some compelling objective ground but atheistic belief systems do not, primarily because you are content with no morality or amorality to begin with. Or, at least, what you are doing is calling your subjective “feelings” moral when, in fact, they amount to an abdication of moral beliefs since you don’t allow that morality is at all obligatory.
What you are doing is redefining morality to merely be optional, yet, at the same time insist that actions such as rape, murder, child abuse, etc., are determinably immoral without providing any warrant for making them so. It is a case of having your cake and eating it, too.
Why is it morally wrong for a rapist to rape if you define morality simply on the basis of what is “pleasing” to the agent? That, my friend, IS a case of moving the goalposts since you want to define morality by what is “pleasing” to you but you have no qualms about restricting the rights of others to pleasure merely because their behaviours are displeasing to you.
Either pleasure is the defining principle for morality, even for the rapist, or it is not. If rape displeases you, but pleases the rapist, then there must be a different standard that can be applied to both to determine which behaviour is moral and, therefore, obligatory. Otherwise, we haven’t defined morality, but merely a set of preferences applied arbitrarily.
Morality, to be morality, must be binding on all moral agents without qualification, otherwise we have NO morality to speak of.