A World without Religion?

[Peter_Plato]

From my person POV, yes insofar as I strongly disapprove of him doing otherwise.

From the “point of view” of the universe itself (that is, in objective terms), no- I don’t think any such responsibilities exist outside the mind of the viewer.

Well this seems confused. How can YOU think the man should not behave in the way he does if those responsibilities do not apply independently of your mind as “viewer?”

If he has no obligation to behave morally then you would have no right to intervene.

 

[ThinkingSapien]

How can YOU think the man** should not** behave in the way he does if those responsibilities do not apply independently of your mind as “viewer?”

If he has** no obligation** to behave morally then you would have no right to intervene.

Consider something said earlier.

…]I do not believe that people are inherently compelled to do anything, let alone follow some “truth.”…].

So I think AnimalSpirits is saying that there are behaviours that s/he discourages and disagrees with and there’s not necessarily anything forcing or preventing someone from engaging in those behaviours. I could be wrong, but I’m sure s/he will provide articulation of his/her position.

 

[AnimalSpirits]

Well tyhis seems confused. How can YOU think the man should not behave in the way he does if those responsibilities do not apply independently of your mind as “viewer?”

If he has no obligation to behave morally then you would have no right to intervene.

I can have feelings about what other people do while recognizing that those feelings are subjective. And what exactly is a “right” to intervene? From this standpoint, whether or not I need a right to intervene is contingent on whether or not he has a right to be left alone. And, from my perspective, your right to be left alone ends when you harm others. Is this an objective rule written into the universe itself like gravity or electromagnetic attraction? I strongly suspect not- as far add I can tell, nothing seems to be enforcing any such rule, except for the humans which subjectively disapprove.

 

[PRmerger]

So I think AnimalSpirits is saying that there are behaviours that s/he discourages and disagrees with and there’s not necessarily anything forcing or preventing someone from engaging in those behaviours.

Well! That’s an otiose statement to assert, then.

Common sense tells us that we all agree with that. No one is (or is it even possible!) forcing or preventing someone from engaging in those behaviors.

As such, it is as inutile as saying, “My position is that dishwashers should wash dishes well!”

 

[Peter_Plato]

Consider something said earlier.

So I think AnimalSpirits is saying that there are behaviours that s/he discourages and disagrees with and there’s not necessarily anything forcing or preventing someone from engaging in those behaviours. I could be wrong, but I’m sure s/he will provide articulation of his/her position.

The fact that moral agents are not “forced” to act would be assumed in the concept of agency. That, however, does not deny the obligation moral agents have to act. It is simply an admission that moral agents are not programmed to act but must do so via their agency.

The question remains as to where the obligation to act morally comes from. It cannot be optional for a moral agent to act morally because it wouldn’t, then, be an obligation. It doesn’t make sense to say “You MUST not murder,” but then add, “If you choose not to.” That is the moral equivalent of saying, “square circles.”

 

[ThinkingSapien]

The question remains as to where the obligation to act morally comes from. It cannot be optional for a moral agent to act morally because it wouldn’t, then, be an obligation. It doesn’t make sense to say “You MUST not murder,” but then add, “If you choose not to.” That is the moral equivalent of saying, “square circles.”

Take a look at #456.

 

[RGCheek]

Well! That’s an otiose statement to assert, then.

Common sense tells us that we all agree with that. No one is (or is it even possible!) forcing or preventing someone from engaging in those behaviors.

As such, it is as inutile as saying, “My position is that dishwashers should wash dishes well!”

‘Otiose’ and ‘inutile’ are not real words. You know that, right?

Lol, just kidding.

Thank you for adding two new words to my vocabulary in ONE POST!

 

[RGCheek]

"Peter Plato:

The question remains as to where the obligation to act morally comes from. It cannot be optional for a moral agent to act morally because it wouldn’t, then, be an obligation. It doesn’t make sense to say “You MUST not murder,” but then add, “If you choose not to.” That is the moral equivalent of saying, “square circles.”

Take a look at #456.

For clarity, I explicitly reject the existence of any obligations for “moral agents”, as well as the existence of objective morals.

And thus the moral chaos and inability to communicate when there are no basic axioms in common.

Peter is saying ‘Because A and B are valid, we must do C’.

In response Animal Spirits is saying ‘Growl.’

 

[PRmerger]

So let’s start with correlation != causation.

You forgot to add an important word: “necessarily”.

Sometimes correlation does indeed equal causation.

For example, it does correlate that each time someone with a fever takes aspirin, his temperature goes down.

Only a dumb-dumb, however, would conclude: well, that doesn’t necessarily mean that taking aspirin reduces one’s fever.

 

[AnimalSpirits]

And thus the moral chaos and inability to communicate when there are no basic axioms in common.

Peter is saying ‘Because A and B are valid, we must do C’.

In response Animal Spirits is saying ‘Growl.’

If there are no axioms in common, I agree that there’s no room for discourse. Put me in Tenochtitlan and I doubt I’ll be able to convince the priests to stop cutting people’s hearts out, because their baseline is so very different from mine.

But we live in a society that does have some widely agreed upon axioms (although there are clear disagreements that I think can be traced to axiomatic differences), so we can reason out done disputes.

 

[RGCheek]

If there are no axioms in common, I agree that there’s no room for discourse. Put me in Tenochtitlan and I doubt I’ll be able to convince the priests to stop cutting people’s hearts out, because their baseline is so very different from mine.

But we live in a society that does have some widely agreed upon axioms (although there are clear disagreements that I think can be traced to axiomatic differences), so we can reason out done disputes.

What is the common basis of engaging in moral reason when one side asserts that nothing can come of the conversation that they will ever regard as binding?

And do you seriously believe that? Do you really think that there is no moral imperative against starving people in the streets or nuking an entire metropolis ‘just because’?

 

[AnimalSpirits]

You forgot to add an important word: “necessarily”.

Sometimes correlation does indeed equal causation.

For example, it does correlate that each time someone with a fever takes aspirin, his temperature goes down.

Only a dumb-dumb, however, would conclude: well, that doesn’t necessarily mean that taking aspirin reduces one’s fever.

We don’t actually disagree here, but for clarity: Causation implies correlation, the converse is not true.Thus the two are not equivalent. That’s all I was getting at.

And with Advil, you identify causation by clinical trials. Some get Advil, others get sugar pills. The difference between the two groups is the effect of the treatment. It’s not possible to reach this level of rigor on the question of casual sex.

 

[RGCheek]

You forgot to add an important word: “necessarily”.

Sometimes correlation does indeed equal causation.

For example, it does correlate that each time someone with a fever takes aspirin, his temperature goes down.

Only a dumb-dumb, however, would conclude: well, that doesn’t necessarily mean that taking aspirin reduces one’s fever.

Correlation is a signal to look further for causation, but it is not to EVER be confused with causation itself as it is nothing of the kind.

And correlation is often used as justification for taking action and so effectively a matter of belief. I have no proof of the causation behind a food additive helping me reduce the pain in my knees, and yet the correlation I see in reduced pain encourages me to continue to take the additive.

That is purely correlation, but it is enough for me to change my behavior. Why remove something from my diet that might indeed be helping my health?

 

[Peter_Plato]

Take a look at #456.

I read it. His comments border on incoherency.

He begins by making a clear, though somewhat dubious statement:

**For clarity, I explicitly reject the existence of any obligations for “moral agents”, as well as the existence of objective morals.
**
And for more clarity, when you say “moral agent” I take that to mean “a thing with moral agency” (something with a sense of right and wrong). However when you say “moral person” I take that to mean something like “good person.” Am I reading you right?

If nobody is compelled to do anything, then clearly nobody is compelled to do anything, then it follows trivially that nobody is compelled to follow some truth. Quite the opposite of self refuting, one follows directly from the other.

What he did was equivocate “obligated” with “compelled” as if obligation must entail some kind of causal relationship, i.e., results necessarily as a natural consequence of what an entity is.

And then tries to salvage what he knows to be problematic by…

You are, in my view, conflating two definitions of “must.” In one definition, must is an obligation- a parent telling a child he must clean his room. The other is a definition requirement- a triangle must have three sides. The child will not cease to be a child if he does not clean his room, and nobody will scold a triangle for having four sides- the two meanings are distinct. I say a good person must do good things, lest they cease to be a good person. You seem to want the former to mean the latter.

He is still willing to use the word “must” in the sense of “obligatory for,” – even though he explicitly denied the existence of moral agents and moral obligation – but now it is merely because moral agents will cease to be morally good agents if they don’t do what a “good” moral agent “must” do to remain one.

How is that not “obligation” in the sense commonly understood in moral parlance, but denied by AnimalSpirits in his first sentence?

 

[PRmerger]

We don’t actually disagree here, but for clarity: Causation implies correlation, the converse is not true.Thus the two are not equivalent. That’s all I was getting at.

Glad we are agreed.

But it makes your comment irrelevant. You don’t know if hedonism causes happiness, nor if it causes despondency and chaos in one’s life.

And with Advil, you identify causation by clinical trials. Some get Advil, others get sugar pills. The difference between the two groups is the effect of the treatment. It’s not possible to reach this level of rigor on the question of casual sex.

Ummmm…you do know that aspirin and Advil are not the same thing, yeah?

I specifically used aspirin because, despite 100 years of being on the market, we are still unsure of its properties and how it works as a fever reducer.

Clinical trials are a great example of correlation not necessarily being equivalent to causation in this case.

(Incidentally, can you cite the reference for clinical trials of aspiring reducing fevers, please?)

 

[Peter_Plato]

You are, in my view, conflating two definitions of “must.” In one definition, must is an obligation- a parent telling a child he must clean his room. The other is a definition requirement- a triangle must have three sides. The child will not cease to be a child if he does not clean his room, and nobody will scold a triangle for having four sides- the two meanings are distinct.** I say a good person must do good things, lest they cease to be a good person**. You seem to want the former to mean the latter.

The above, does actually go to prove a point I was making.

If metaphysical naturalism – in the sense of eliminative materialism – is true, then it follows that “good person” or “good moral agent” is essentially meaningless since there is NO abiding sense in which “good” or “moral” have any ontological ground in reality. They do not signify anything real.

If, however, theism is true and subjectivity or personhood in the sense of intentional agency is the ultimate ground of reality then ceasing to be a “good person” matters and matters in an ultimate sense because ceasing to be a good person has effectively altered the abiding nature of what a “person” qua moral agent is.

The only reason this appears to be a benign distinction is that we don’t know for certain whether naturalism or theism is true, so it appears that vacillating between moral and immoral is merely an “option” and not a necessary obligation.

However, what if that is precisely why it is an option? By making oneself a morally good agent, a being is, in a sense, determining what they are to become – that is, choosing to be a moral agent rather than abdicating the role and thereby losing the possibility of ever being one at an ontological level. Our life here is auditioning for the role of “good moral agent,” so to speak, and deciding whether the role fits us and whether we fit the role – and God is leaving the determination entirely up to us by our willingness to take it on.

In a very real sense, the ground of all reality, AKA God, is saying, "Choose: Do you will to be a moral agent or not? (Cf. Deut. 30:15) By taking up or abdicating the role we determine our own fate relative to what we will become. Perhaps Hell is the ultimate face palm :doh2: where we realize eternally what we could have become but gave it a pass, thus showing we didn’t merit existing as moral beings by our very choice not to be.

We can’t, after the fact, say: “Well I never realized so much hung on my choices or that good and evil were so important,” because that realization is entirely dependent upon our willingness to accept the gravity of what our choices mean – the very method by which we determine ourselves to be good moral agents willing to take on the role.

 

[Charlemagne_III]

Because when people make a society they get to decide how it should operate. Most societies seem to think that bodily autonomy is relatively important, so they make laws with that in mind.

But who gets to make those laws and upon what authority? We have representatives in Congress and Supreme Court Justices going at each other all the time. It is a moral bedlam. From every direction there are subjective interests fighting it out. What are they fighting about? Which of their subjective interest will prevail? Or which one has the objectively right take on what the law should be?

Are you arguing that the law should be based on the biggest guns, or on objective right?

Must be the biggest guns, because you don’t believe in objective right.

And by the way, most societies seem to think bodily autonomy if objectively, not relatively, important. That, logically, should extend to the right of the fetus to live out its life four score plus if the parents are decent human beings who respect bodily autonomy.

 

[AnimalSpirits]

But who gets to make those laws and upon what authority? We have representatives in Congress and Supreme Court Justices going at each other all the time. It is a moral bedlam. From every direction there are subjective interests fighting it out. What are they fighting about? Which of their subjective interest will prevail? Or which one has the objectively right take on what the law should be?

Who decides what the rules are varies by society. Kings, the demos, it varies. As for what people argue about, it depends. If they agree on a common set of principles, then certain things can be objectively right given those principles. If they disagree, we’re in subjective land.

Are you arguing that the law should be based on the biggest guns, or on objective right?

I’m arguing that objective moral right does not exist, and wishing for it will not make it so. And in my view, that’s all you’re doing here- arguing that a world we live in would seem confusing and arbitrary without an all powerful being to tell us how to act. But that’s irrelevant- either there is an objective moral code or there isn’t, no matter what anyone wants.

In general I’ve been discussing the world as I see it, rather than what “should” be. In terms of what should happen, people should find agreement on first principles and from there arrive at specifics using reason. To be clear, those "should"s refer to my personal and subjective views.

I’m hesitant to respond to the abortion bit as I suspect that will come to dominate the discussion if we open that box.

 

[AnimalSpirits]

I read it. His comments border on incoherency.

He begins by making a clear, though somewhat dubious statement:

What he did was equivocate “obligated” with “compelled” as if obligation must entail some kind of causal relationship, i.e., results necessarily as a natural consequence of what an entity is.

And then tries to salvage what he knows to be problematic by…

He is still willing to use the word “must” in the sense of “obligatory for,” – even though he explicitly denied the existence of moral agents and moral obligation – but now it is merely because moral agents will cease to be morally good agents if they don’t do what a “good” moral agent “must” do to remain one.

How is that not “obligation” in the sense commonly understood in moral parlance, but denied by AnimalSpirits in his first sentence?

First: the talk of compulsion was using terminology borrowed from another poster I was responding to. Read back for full context.

Second: I was not using “must” in the obligatory sense. A good person must do good things just like a triangle must have three sides and three vertices. I distinguish between an obligation and a definitional requirement. If we define a good person to be one who follows the ten commandments, then a good person must follow the ten commandments by definition, just as an even number must be divisible by 2.

Nowhere am I supposing moral obligations of any kind- but certain descriptors like “good” can have qualifications attached to them. Only those that meet the qualifications meet the definition of the adjective in question. Thus, there are certain characteristics a person must have to be “good”.

And yes, who is and is not considered good will vary depending on the beliefs of the observer.

 

[davidv]

First: the talk of compulsion was using terminology borrowed from another poster I was responding to. Read back for full context.

Second: I was not using “must” in the obligatory sense. A good person must do good things just like a triangle must have three sides and three vertices. I distinguish between an obligation and a definitional requirement. If we define a good person to be one who follows the ten commandments, then a good person must follow the ten commandments by definition, just as an even number must be divisible by 2.

Nowhere am I supposing moral obligations of any kind- but certain descriptors like “good” can have qualifications attached to them. Only those that meet the qualifications meet the definition of the adjective in question. Thus, there are certain characteristics a person must have to be “good”.

And yes, who is and is not considered good will vary depending on the beliefs of the observer.

So, why should a particular observer’s declaration be accepted?