Yes, I get all this. It simply sidesteps the key point, however – the very definition of “good,” to be at all meaningful, requires a qualitative ground for “good” in reality. ANY qualitative determination of “good” can have NO fundamental support in eliminative materialism (aka metaphysical naturalism).
It is like claiming triangles MUST have three sides while at the same time denying that geometry exists; or stating that even numbers MUST be divisible by 2 while insisting that mathematics or number systems are meaningless.
It simply removes the entire basis for determining what “good” can possibly mean, while – at the same time – insisting that a good person “must” do “good.”
If “good" has no objective reality, then – according to you – there can be NO sense in insisting that “good” persons must do “good.” AND certainly there CANNOT be the kind of moral force required to compel others to do “good."
By removing the only grounds for making any determination of “good” to begin with, you have thereby removed the possibility for determining what a “good” person does or how THAT can be known in the first place.
It is like correctly doing addition without numbers or determining the dimensional measurement of lengths and angles without geometry. There are no objectively real grounds upon which you can moor determinations of moral good – if eliminative materialism (atheism) is all there is.
To be consistent, your statement that "A good person must do good things” means about as much in EM reality as “A hfgdyjsdx person must do hfgdyjsdx things.”
By the way, I noticed that you haven’t addressed my
post #870.