Alvin Plantinga’s Modal Ontological Argument

[Peter_Plato]

And if at least one necessary being is required in every possible world, then we have our candidate for the MGB, do we not?

Or, put another way, what would be the requirements for an actualizing principle in any possible world to make it necessarily and sufficiently a possible world?

This moves us back to the question: “Can something come from nothing?”

Can possible worlds merely “bootstrap” themselves into existence or even into the realm of possibility?

If they cannot (and I wouldn’t presume they could,) then “possible worlds” have a dependency – i.e., possibility is logically dependent upon actuality and possible worlds are logically dependent upon actuality to even be “possible” in the first place.

 

[inocente]

Logical consistency is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for a possible world to be actualized. If all it has is “logical consistency” and no actualizing principle, it won’t ever be actualized so what sense is there to say it is a possible world?

“Possible” implies that it is possible for that world be made actual, but if there is no possible actualizing principle within the world it will never, ever, be actual, no matter how logically consistent it is.

Again, so in what sense is it realistically a possible world? “Possible” in terms of WHAT, precisely? It can never be actualized, because nothing within that world will ever make it actual – certainly not logical consistency on its own.

It isn’t at all actualizable, because it lacks any actualizing principle whatsoever; therefore, it isn’t “possible” in any meaningful sense.

Or, put another way, a world that can never actually come to be is not a possible world at all. What it lacks is the very thing that it needs to make it possible – that which could actualize it.

Or, put another, another, way, “logical consistency” – in terms of what possible worlds may, in fact, logically require – could very well mean that an actualizing principle is required in order to maintain any “logical consistency” with possibility.

And if that “actualizing principle” is some form of self-existent being – or that which exists by its very essence (Aquinas’ Ipsum Esse Subsistens) – then Necessary Being (MGB) would be required by any and all possible worlds in order for those worlds to be “possible” in any meaningful sense.

Now, you might add the rejoinder that we can think of possible worlds without the necessity of those being actualized, but the only reason we can conceive of them as possible is because we are, in fact, actualized.

If the actualizing principle is outside the possible world, then, still, by itself, that world is not actualizable even though it can be abstractly thought of as “possible.” It is only possible if the actualizing principle outside of that world makes it possible – but that “possible” world, in that thin sense, still requires an actualizing principle. So what makes it “possible,” in that case, is the external actualizing principle, but the world itself qua world is not a “possible” one unless it exists within a larger actual world or, at least, within one which in turn has an actualizing principle within it.

No, these worlds are not actualized. Actualizing means to make real, but possible worlds are not real. The SEP article I linked is headed An Account of Abstract Possible Worlds.

We are real, concrete, but possible worlds are thought experiments, abstract.

Are you using Plantiga’s definitions or your own? He doesn’t mention a need for any “actualizing principle”. In fact he says: “Now a possible world is a possible state of affairs. But not just any possible state of affairs is a possible world; to achieve this distinction, a state of affairs must be complete or maximal.”

So the state of affairs must include everything logically necessary to make it a possible world, there is no extra “actualizing principle”.

For instance, think of 06:00 Groundhog Day, with Bill Murray waking up to I Got You Babe on the alarm for the 300th reincarnation. At that moment it’s a logically consistent, complete state of affairs, therefore a possible world. Doesn’t matter whether an actual world could really reincarnate or whether Bill just dreamed it did, doesn’t matter whether it started from a big bang or got there some other way, the only concern is that at that moment it’s a logically consistent, complete, state of affairs.

 

[Peter_Plato]

No, these worlds are not actualized. Actualizing means to make real, but possible worlds are not real. The SEP article I linked is headed An Account of Abstract Possible Worlds.

We are real, concrete, but possible worlds are thought experiments, abstract.

Are you using Plantiga’s definitions or your own? He doesn’t mention a need for any “actualizing principle”. In fact he says: “Now a possible world is a possible state of affairs. But not just any possible state of affairs is a possible world; to achieve this distinction, a state of affairs must be complete or maximal.”

So the state of affairs must include everything logically necessary to make it a possible world, there is no extra “actualizing principle”.

For instance, think of 06:00 Groundhog Day, with Bill Murray waking up to I Got You Babe on the alarm for the 300th reincarnation. At that moment it’s a logically consistent, complete state of affairs, therefore a possible world. Doesn’t matter whether an actual world could really reincarnate or whether Bill just dreamed it did, doesn’t matter whether it started from a big bang or got there some other way, the only concern is that at that moment it’s a logically consistent, complete, state of affairs.

Well, no, it’s the fact that we as thinkers are here and actual to conceive of possible worlds that is what makes them “possible” in the sense of “a logically consistent, complete, [whatever that means or implies] state of affairs.”

However, without our actual ability to think (the operative actualizing principle in these cases) to give them the patina of “possible,” they would in no means be possible in any sense without some other existent actualizing principle.

My point stands.

 

[Expatreprocedit]

Well, no, it’s the fact that we as thinkers are here and actual to conceive of possible worlds that is what makes them “possible” in the sense of “a logically consistent, complete, [whatever that means or implies] state of affairs.”

However, without our actual ability to think (the operative actualizing principle in these cases) to give them the patina of “possible,” they would in no means be possible in any sense without some other existent actualizing principle.

My point stands.

The logical consistency of a possible world exists independently of our minds. Or do you think that A or B, not A, therefore B would not be true if there was no human mind to think it?

 

[Peter_Plato]

The logical consistency of a possible world exists independently of our minds. Or do you think that A or B, not A, therefore B would not be true if there was no human mind to think it?

Trick question. Of course it would still be true if there was no human mind to think it. There could be other minds. There could be Eternal Mind. The question to be asked is whether it would be true absent all minds.

In what sense would anything be true without any mind whatsoever?

But back to the main issue: It isn’t the logical consistency of possible worlds that makes them possible. They could be logically consistent until the cows come home but they will never be actualized (“possible” being defined as “having the potential to be actualized”) unless there is an actualizing agent as part of the determination of “possibility.” No actualizing agent, no possibility regardless of what logical consistency exists.

Doesn’t it strike you as odd to speak of there being logical consistency – I.e., the existence of logical consistency – within the “possible” world being considered if the world doesn’t “exist” in some actualized form, even if that form is merely a conceptualized one?

It has to come to exist or be actualized in conceptual form by a mind in order for it to be understood to be “logically consistent” in the first place.

Ergo, a dependency exists to some actualizing principle, in this case the mind conceiving of or “actualizing” the logical possibility of the world, determining that it is logically consistent. But with regard to the real possibility of that world, a human mind conceiving of it is not sufficient to actualize it, so the question of whether it is, indeed, “possible” in an unattenuated sense is a moot one. It isn’t actually possible unless some actualizing principle with the power to make that world actually exists in order to create the potential (in a real sense) for moving the world from logically consistent to possible.

If I conceive of a new contraption, I am working out the logistics to the point where I determine its logical consistency, but embedded in that logical consistency is whether I as an actualizing agent can create the possibility of it coming into being.

But possible contraptions and possible worlds are completely different levels of possibility. Can we humans even conceive of a world in such a way as to know for certain whether it is indeed possible? How would we know that for certain and absent the knowledge of what actualizing principle would be required to bring it into existence?

 

[inocente]

However, without our actual ability to think (the operative actualizing principle in these cases) to give them the patina of “possible,” they would in no means be possible in any sense without some other existent actualizing principle.

Plantinga never uses the term. And Google can’t find it anywhere.

 

[Peter_Plato]

Plantinga never uses the term. And Google can’t find it anywhere.

I’ve addressed the implications of Plantinga’s argument in post #50.

The term I have been using was brought in to demonstrate that CuriousCat’s counter argument doesn’t work.

 

[Peter_Plato]

No, these worlds are not actualized. Actualizing means to make real, but possible worlds are not real.

I never said possible worlds are real, I said possible worlds, in order to be at all possible must have some kind of actualizing principle, either built into them or “outside” of them to make them real at some point. Absent both, there is no possibility.

Let me approach this from another angle:

The world that we currently live in, we assume is a possible one, correct? But how do we know that aside from the fact that it actually exists?

Prove, without any reference at all to the fact that this world actually exists, that this world is possible?

I don’t think that can be done.

We have no grounds for knowing whether things like gravity, mass, energy, etc., are in themselves “possible” aside from the fact that we experience them directly. The fact that they are actual is the only grounds we have thinking they are possible.

Without that which does exist we would have absolutely no perspective from which to assess, logically or otherwise, what is or is not possible.

So, logically speaking, we assess whether things are possible or not, logically consistent or not, grounded on the existence of things we see that are actual and then remove impediments to existence with regard to things we might imagine or conceive based upon what does actually exist.

Absent what we know to exist, we would have absolutely no grounds to judge regarding what is or is not “possible.” Which entails that the only grounds we could have with regard to determining the possibility of things is whether or not something that exists could actualize them – an actualizing principle. Absent that connection, we have no grounds for declaring something to be “possible.”

Ergo the possibility of anything (say X) existing depends entirely – as far as humans can legitimately claim – upon whether something that actually exists can or will actualize X. We might further claim that Y is possible if Y is relevantly similar to X and X has been actualized, so the assumption is that whatever actualized X could do the same with Y. But again any statement about the possibility of Y is contingent upon the actuality of X and whatever was/is its actualizing principle.

So to return to Plantinga’s argument. Logically speaking, the MGB in any world would be whatever it is/was that actualized that world, since every other being would be existentially subordinate to and dependent upon that being. Since worlds made up entirely of only contingent entities could not exist because these are logically impossible – i.e., the world itself has no actualizing principle, then the MGB must be necessary in every possible world (otherwise the world could not exist, and would not, therefore, be possible.)

Possible worlds could only be possible given the existence of MGB, i.e., necessary being whose very essence is to exist – it must exist a se.

 

[Expatreprocedit]

I never said possible worlds are real, I said possible worlds, in order to be at all possible must have some kind of actualizing principle, either built into them or “outside” of them to make them real at some point. Absent both, there is no possibility.

Let me approach this from another angle:

The world that we currently live in, we assume is a possible one, correct? But how do we know that aside from the fact that it actually exists?

Prove, without any reference at all to the fact that this world actually exists, that this world is possible?

I don’t think that can be done.

We have no grounds for knowing whether things like gravity, mass, energy, etc., are in themselves “possible” aside from the fact that we experience them directly. The fact that they are actual is the only grounds we have thinking they are possible.

Without that which does exist we would have absolutely no perspective from which to assess, logically or otherwise, what is or is not possible.

So, logically speaking, we assess whether things are possible or not, logically consistent or not, grounded on the existence of things we see that are actual and then remove impediments to existence with regard to things we might imagine or conceive based upon what does actually exist.

Absent what we know to exist, we would have absolutely no grounds to judge regarding what is or is not “possible.” Which entails that the only grounds we could have with regard to determining the possibility of things is whether or not something that exists could actualize them – an actualizing principle. Absent that connection, we have no grounds for declaring something to be “possible.”

Ergo the possibility of anything (say X) existing depends entirely – as far as humans can legitimately claim – upon whether something that actually exists can or will actualize X. We might further claim that Y is possible if Y is relevantly similar to X and X has been actualized, so the assumption is that whatever actualized X could do the same with Y. But again any statement about the possibility of Y is contingent upon the actuality of X and whatever was/is its actualizing principle.

So to return to Plantinga’s argument. Logically speaking, the MGB in any world would be whatever it is/was that actualized that world, since every other being would be existentially subordinate to and dependent upon that being. Since worlds made up entirely of only contingent entities could not exist because these are logically impossible – i.e., the world itself has no actualizing principle, then the MGB must be necessary in every possible world (otherwise the world could not exist, and would not, therefore, be possible.)

Possible worlds could only be possible given the existence of MGB, i.e., necessary being whose very essence is to exist – it must exist a se.

You keep insisting that possible worlds need to be actualized. That is simply not true, at least as the “possible worlds” method of analysis is used in contemporary philosophy. A possible world may also be actual, but it need not be. If it is not actual, by definition it is not actualized. You insist that some actualization is needed even to make it a possible world, but that idea is simply incompatible with the possible worlds analysis that Plantinga and his critics are using.

It seems to me what you are really doing is attacking the notion of “possible worlds” itself as a useful philosophical method. Which is perfectly fine. But since Plantinga is using that ntion, that will necessarily destroy his argument as well as any criticisms of it.

 

[Peter_Plato]

You keep insisting that possible worlds need to be actualized. That is simply not true, at least as the “possible worlds” method of analysis is used in contemporary philosophy. A possible world may also be actual, but it need not be. If it is not actual, by definition it is not actualized.

Actually, and I have been through this in a prior post, I am not claiming “possible worlds need to be actualized,” but I am claiming that possible worlds in order to be “possible” at all need within them an actualizing principle or a connection to an actualizing principle. Otherwise they are in no way possible.

You insist that some actualization is needed even to make it a possible world, but that idea is simply incompatible with the possible worlds analysis that Plantinga and his critics are using.

It seems to me what you are really doing is attacking the notion of “possible worlds” itself as a useful philosophical method. Which is perfectly fine. But since Plantinga is using that ntion, that will necessarily destroy his argument as well as any criticisms of it.

With respect to modal logic, or any other “useful philosophical method,” I would submit that both have implicit within them (as a hidden premise) that actualizing principle in terms of the actual world within which the rational being, engaging in the modal logic or “other philosophical method,” currently resides. We could call it a “trickle down” actualizing effect, but it is there as a kind of background metaphysical “radiation” which makes all thought about reality possible,

 

[inocente]

Absent what we know to exist, we would have absolutely no grounds to judge regarding what is or is not “possible.” Which entails that the only grounds we could have with regard to determining the possibility of things is whether or not something that exists could actualize them – an actualizing principle. Absent that connection, we have no grounds for declaring something to be “possible.”

Ergo the possibility of anything (say X) existing depends entirely – as far as humans can legitimately claim – upon whether something that actually exists can or will actualize X. We might further claim that Y is possible if Y is relevantly similar to X and X has been actualized, so the assumption is that whatever actualized X could do the same with Y. But again any statement about the possibility of Y is contingent upon the actuality of X and whatever was/is its actualizing principle.

So to return to Plantinga’s argument. Logically speaking, the MGB in any world would be whatever it is/was that actualized that world, since every other being would be existentially subordinate to and dependent upon that being. Since worlds made up entirely of only contingent entities could not exist because these are logically impossible – i.e., the world itself has no actualizing principle, then the MGB must be necessary in every possible world (otherwise the world could not exist, and would not, therefore, be possible.)

Possible worlds could only be possible given the existence of MGB, i.e., necessary being whose very essence is to exist – it must exist a se.

I’ll be near a beach this morning. I think of riding a pony on the beach. I won’t have time, so it won’t be feasible, but it’s a logically consistent possible world. I think of wearing a big straw hat. Another possible world. Or let’s pretend ponies evolved with a horn on their nose, and Trump rules the world, and I’m Don Quixote in a big straw hat, riding a unicorn on the beach.

Each of those is a possible world using Plantinga’s definition. You say your “background metaphysical radiation” requires the MGB must necessarily exist in each of them.

Nope. There is a reason why Google can’t find any references anywhere in the world and anywhere in history to your “actualizing principle”.

But the topic is Plantinga’s argument, which seems much more simple than yours, but still unconvincing.

 

[Peter_Plato]

I’ll be near a beach this morning. I think of riding a pony on the beach. I won’t have time, so it won’t be feasible, but it’s a logically consistent possible world. I think of wearing a big straw hat. Another possible world. Or let’s pretend ponies evolved with a horn on their nose, and Trump rules the world, and I’m Don Quixote in a big straw hat, riding a unicorn on the beach.

Each of those is a possible world using Plantinga’s definition. You say your “background metaphysical radiation” requires the MGB must necessarily exist in each of them.

Perhaps you are missing the obvious? You will be near an actual beach and everyone of those “logically consistent possible worlds” are completely dependent upon what you know and take from the actual beach “world” you are near? Ergo, dependent upon the existent and actualized beach world and your actual visit to it.

Now what would it take to actualize any of those logically consistent – i.e., logically consistent with the actual world you live in – worlds you imagined to be actually possible?

Nope. There is a reason why Google can’t find any references anywhere in the world and anywhere in history to your “actualizing principle”.

I use DuckDuckGo. It must use a better search algorithm. Edith Stein comes up.

But that is beside the point. Are you meaning to let on that you can’t think for yourself, but must allow Google to legitimize all of your thoughts?

Is that your response to all arguments you don’t understand – let me see what Google says about that?

Why would anyone choose to enter into discussion with you? Why not cut out the middle man and directly discuss with Google? If I wanted to know what Google can bring up on the subject, I would have gone to Google. Do you care to contribute anything yourself? If not, why are you posting?

But the topic is Plantinga’s argument, which seems much more simple than yours, but still unconvincing.

There’s a “tell” right there: “seems much more simple” and Google can’t translate the meaning for you. Carry on then, no need for you to continue posting replies, unless you can engage directly with the ideas being presented.

 

[Randy_Carson]

You can not have possible worlds which contain logical contradictions. For instance, there are no possible worlds with square circles. A purely contingent world could not exist because logical necessities would be contingent in that world. A contingent necessity is a contradiction. Therefore, it isn’t a possible world.

There are necessary beings in all possible worlds, examples of non-controversially accepted necessary beings are: premises, axioms, numbers, etc.

 

[inocente]

Edith Stein comes up.

I checked why Stein’s name came up. Seems it has nothing to do with your theory:

“Under the potency-act rubric that dominates her work, Stein positions the material body (Körper) as that which is primarily in potentia while positing the soul as the spiritual and actualizing principle of the body. In other words, Stein identifies the soul as the form of the body, though the soul, too, bears in potentia properties.” - Edith Stein: Women, Social-Political Philosophy. Calcagno 2016.

*But that is beside the point. Are you meaning to let on that you can’t think for yourself, but must allow Google to legitimize all of your thoughts?

Is that your response to all arguments you don’t understand – let me see what Google says about that?

Why would anyone choose to enter into discussion with you? Why not cut out the middle man and directly discuss with Google? If I wanted to know what Google can bring up on the subject, I would have gone to Google. Do you care to contribute anything yourself? If not, why are you posting?

There’s a “tell” right there: “seems much more simple” and Google can’t translate the meaning for you. Carry on then, no need for you to continue posting replies, unless you can engage directly with the ideas being presented.*

Most of us have to research things.

Some people’s “tell” is that when they get rattled, they try bullying condescension. Dead give-away though.

 

[Peter_Plato]

I’ll be near a beach this morning. I think of riding a pony on the beach. I won’t have time, so it won’t be feasible, but it’s a logically consistent possible world. I think of wearing a big straw hat. Another possible world. Or let’s pretend ponies evolved with a horn on their nose, and Trump rules the world, and I’m Don Quixote in a big straw hat, riding a unicorn on the beach.

How does the above anecdote argue against the point that I made in this post:

The world that we currently live in, we assume is a possible one, correct? But how do we know that aside from the fact that it actually exists?

Prove, without any reference at all to the fact that this world actually exists, that this world is possible?

I don’t think that can be done.

We have no grounds for knowing whether things like gravity, mass, energy, etc., are in themselves “possible” aside from the fact that we experience them directly. The fact that they are actual is the only grounds we have thinking they are possible.

Without that which does exist we would have absolutely no perspective from which to assess, logically or otherwise, what is or is not possible.

Every one of your “possibilities” depend upon what you know about the actual world you encounter.

You only know that ponies, unicorns, Trump, Don Quixote, etc., are “logically possible” because some version of them exists in the real world within which you live. So what grounds do you have for declaring anything “possible” or “logically consistent” without reference to the fact that relevantly similar things actually have existence in the real world AND that whatever actualized those existing things could potentially actualize the relevantly similar ones?

That is all you have.

Your grounds for declaring those similar things to be “possible” are that the things you actually encounter do exist. That is it. You have nothing else, logically speaking.

Could you show that the actual things in the real world are a priori “possible?” I don’t think you can. There is no test, besides “they exist in the real world,” for determining what is possible or not.

So your whole case for “logical possibility” depends upon the actual existence of what you know to exist and whatever it is that has actualized those existent things – i.e., the actualizing principle behind their existence.

Possibility is predicated on actuality in all logical senses – “logical consistency” means simply “consistency with what we know actually exists.” AND we have no basis from which to determine logical possibility except a posteriori from what actually does exist.

Possibility, in any sense, simply cannot be determined by human thinkers except as a function of actuality – we simply do not have a perspective that permits any other logical determination.

Feel free to argue the point without deflecting to what does or does not show up on Google.

Make the case that anything we have to say about “logical possibility” does not depend upon what we know to actually exist.

I’ll wait here with baited breath.

And popcorn…


:yawn:

 

[TheCuriousCat]

I checked why Stein’s name came up. Seems it has nothing to do with your theory:

“Under the potency-act rubric that dominates her work, Stein positions the material body (Körper) as that which is primarily in potentia while positing the soul as the spiritual and actualizing principle of the body. In other words, Stein identifies the soul as the form of the body, though the soul, too, bears in potentia properties.” - Edith Stein: Women, Social-Political Philosophy. Calcagno 2016.

Most of us have to research things.

Some people’s “tell” is that when they get rattled, they try bullying condescension. Dead give-away though.

You do realize that this argument is fruitless, right? The challenge he is making is: “If you can’t convince me, using my definitions of words, and accepting the validity of all the premises I make (all of which I am free to change at any time) your argument is invalid.” It is the logical equivalent of Three-card Monte, accept he gets to swap cards after you pick.

 

[Peter_Plato]

I checked why Stein’s name came up. Seems it has nothing to do with your theory:

“Under the potency-act rubric that dominates her work, Stein positions the material body (Körper) as that which is primarily in potentia while positing the soul as the spiritual and actualizing principle of the body. In other words, Stein identifies the soul as the form of the body, though the soul, too, bears in potentia properties.” - Edith Stein: Women, Social-Political Philosophy. Calcagno 2016.

Most of us have to research things.

Some people’s “tell” is that when they get rattled, they try bullying condescension. Dead give-away though.

Well, no, there is no “bullying condescension,” only a challenge to you to actually engage with the points rather than hide behind a facade of deflection.

 

[Peter_Plato]

You do realize that this argument is fruitless, right? The challenge he is making is: “If you can’t convince me, using my definitions of words, and accepting the validity of all the premises I make (all of which I am free to change at any time) your argument is invalid.” It is the logical equivalent of Three-card Monte, accept he gets to swap cards after you pick.

What is the “card swapping” that is going on?

I suspect that this argument is “fruitless” purely because it can’t be answered which is why straw men are being stuffed and made ready while unceremonious exit plans are being drawn up.

Do you have an answer to post 74?

Or to the last post I made in response to your argument (#50)?

 

[inocente]

How does the above anecdote argue against the point that I made in this post:

Every one of your “possibilities” depend upon what you know about the actual world you encounter.

You only know that ponies, unicorns, Trump, Don Quixote, etc., are “logically possible” because some version of them exists in the real world within which you live. So what grounds do you have for declaring anything “possible” or “logically consistent” without reference to the fact that relevantly similar things actually have existence in the real world AND that whatever actualized those existing things could potentially actualize the relevantly similar ones?

Long ago, I linked Plantinga’s definition. All I’ve been doing is following his definition, since the OP is about his argument, not yours.

He answers your question with: “Possible worlds themselves are typically ‘taken as primitive’, as the saying goes: but by way of informal explanation it may be said that a possible world is a way things could have been-a total way.” - andrewmbailey.com/ap/Actualism_Possible_Worlds.pdf

Those are his italics btw. He seems very clear “a possible world is a way things could have been”. What is it you don’t understand?

Well, no, there is no “bullying condescension,” only a challenge to you to actually engage with the points rather than hide behind a facade of deflection.

I’ve stuck to the subject, while you keep making personal remarks.

As far as I can tell, your “actualizing principle” notion has never appeared in any literature since time began, and you’ve not shown otherwise. So I suggest you try to turn your notion into an argument, and submit it to philpapers.org/ immediately before someone steals it away.

But I joined the thread to discuss the OP, not your notion.

 

[inocente]

You do realize that this argument is fruitless, right? The challenge he is making is: “If you can’t convince me, using my definitions of words, and accepting the validity of all the premises I make (all of which I am free to change at any time) your argument is invalid.” It is the logical equivalent of Three-card Monte, accept he gets to swap cards after you pick.

Shhh, he doesn’t know this thread is a behavioral experiment.