Aquinas's First Way

[JuanFlorencio]

Only the obvious…

Well we simplistically try to think of atoms like something we could see at the macro scale don’t we (eg balls orbiting each other).
Obviously we posit a few “Griffen” like qualities that normal spherical masses don’t possess (eg forces other than gravity which cause attraction etc, no friction etc).

Its interesting that we have been able to “photograph” larger molecules (Iron oxide I think) in crystaline formation - apparantly they look pretty much like we’d expect them to if we rise to a more macro level from the models posited.

Thank you, Blue Horizon! I believe I now understand what you meant.

Every model we propose is intended to mimic certain interactions that we observe. If someone ever conceived the atom as an spherical particle, it must have been because a particle with such shape could take part in some interactions that, in turn, could derive in the interactions that we are able to observe. Those “forces” that you mention are no less a part of the model. We conceive the physical elements (for example, the particles) as having a set of attributes (for example, a field that under certain conditions gives rise to forces). Even including shapes, sizes or any other sensory characteristics, the model is a “mental construct”. What constitutes a model is, in the end, a set of relationships, and any relationship is an intellectual entity.

Best regards!
JuanFlorencio

 

[JuanFlorencio]

JF I don’t significantly disagree with any of this.
My point is otherwise.

Due to the layering of sensible reality forms live within forms as it were. The “matter” of one form is but a different and more abiding “hidden form” multiplied almost infinitely by comparision. In your organic chemistry example above the forms C,O,H appear to fit that bill.

How deep do those layers of forms within forms go I do not know.
But one layer does seem related to its adjacent layer as form to matter.

And when there is a substantial change in a higher layer this is usually only an accidental change in ther lower layer. Exceptions to this rule might be fusion/fission where perhaps two adjacent layers of sensible matter both appear to undergo a substantial change.

Another curious change might be isotopic decay (say D20 to H20). Here there is a substantial change in the lower form (deuterium oxide to hydrogen oxide) but prob only an accidental change in the higher form (both have the same sensible properties of water … though there are a few differences such as relative densities).

I remember that, many years ago, wondering about what we really are, drove me crazy. I thought on the thousands of cells (living beings and, therefore, substances) that form our bodies. I thought that every human being was a kind of society, where hundreds of cells can die everyday while we keep alive. Or, for example, when we donate blood, the blood cells can remain alive far away from our body, without the influence of our vital principle. Nevertheless, in the end I acknowledged that I was not simply an aggregate of living cells. We human beings, are complex organisms; and there is more in us than the organs that we can distinguish in our bodies; there is more in an organ than the cells that compose it; there is more in a cell than the molecules that make it up; there is more in a molecule than the atoms that compose it, and so on.

So, I don’t see any difficulty in saying that a substance can be made up of a set of substances.

In one of my previous posts, I said that the Aristotelian prime matter was not only inconceivable in the strict sense, but also nonexistent. What there exists is already a differentiated matter which, being already formed, is a substance. As a consequence, every chemically complex body, is a substance made up of many other substances. And, similarly to what you said, what for a substance of order Ln -so to say-, is truly a substantial change (where its form is lost), can be just an accidental change for the substances of order Ln-1, which might have suffered a simple local displacement. Need I to say that a substantial change cannot be understood just as a matter of point of view, but as the real loss of certain interactivity?

Best regards
JuanFlorencio

 

[thinkandmull]

I remember that, many years ago, wondering about what we really are, drove me crazy. I thought on the thousands of cells (living beings and, therefore, substances) that form our bodies. I thought that every human being was a kind of society, where hundreds of cells can die everyday while we keep alive. Or, for example, when we donate blood, the blood cells can remain alive far away from our body, without the influence of our vital principle. Nevertheless, in the end I acknowledged that I was not simply an aggregate of living cells. We human beings, are complex organisms; and there is more in us than the organs that we can distinguish in our bodies; there is more in an organ than the cells that compose it; there is more in a cell than the molecules that make it up; there is more in a molecule than the atoms that compose it, and so on.

So, I don’t see any difficulty in saying that a substance can be made up of a set of substances.

In one of my previous posts, I said that the Aristotelian prime matter was not only inconceivable in the strict sense, but also nonexistent. What there exists is already a differentiated matter which, being already formed, is a substance. As a consequence, every chemically complex body, is a substance made up of many other substances. And, similarly to what you said, what for a substance of order Ln -so to say-, is truly a substantial change (where its form is lost), can be just an accidental change for the substances of order Ln-1, which might have suffered a simple local displacement. Need I to say that a substantial change cannot be understood just as a matter of point of view, but as the real loss of certain interactivity?

Best regards
JuanFlorencio

“there is more in a cell than the molecules that make it up; there is more in a molecule than the atoms that compose it”. More matter, or just a new substance by the other elements mingling and interacting.

Also, the way you speak of substance is difference than the substance that is changed in the Eucharest

 

[JuanFlorencio]

“there is more in a cell than the molecules that make it up; there is more in a molecule than the atoms that compose it”. More matter, or just a new substance by the other elements mingling and interacting.

Also, the way you speak of substance is difference than the substance that is changed in the Eucharest

Hi Thinkandmull!,

Not more matter. It is the same matter, but with another form (in Aristotelian terms).

Eucharist is a matter of faith. It cannot be explained using any terminology that we could develop. It is Grace. I don’t rely on Aristotelian philosophy concerning this matters. Jesus’ words are more than enough to me.

Best regards
JuanFlorencio

 

[blase6]

Eucharist is a matter of faith. It cannot be explained using any terminology that we could develop. It is Grace. I don’t rely on Aristotelian philosophy concerning this matters. Jesus’ words are more than enough to me.

Thank you. About time someone said it.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

Thank you, Blue Horizon! I believe I now understand what you meant.

Every model we propose is intended to mimic certain interactions that we observe. If someone ever conceived the atom as an spherical particle, it must have been because a particle with such shape could take part in some interactions that, in turn, could derive in the interactions that we are able to observe. Those “forces” that you mention are no less a part of the model. We conceive the physical elements (for example, the particles) as having a set of attributes (for example, a field that under certain conditions gives rise to forces).

Best regards!
JuanFlorencio

Yes I think you’ve exactly got it. We see pretty much eye to eye here.

Even including shapes, sizes or any other sensory characteristics, the model is a “mental construct”. What constitutes a model is, in the end, a set of relationships, and any relationship is an intellectual entity.

Not sure I quite agree with the “mental construct” predication… a “model” is a bit more “material” than a pure mental construct. But perhaps I misunderstand you.

Would you further agree that Aristotelain “substance” is just as much (if not more) a mental construct as the atomic theory model ?

Or, looking from the other end, I would say that the atomic model is as much metaphysics as is Aristotelian “substance.” Linus would prob disagree with me.

Would you agree that even “the phantasm” is to some extent a “model” a “mental construct” of sorts that allows us to make pre-conceptual sense of a battery of sounds and colours/shapes and tactile impressions…ultimately ending in a well delinated sensible “image” that might get the name “elephant” well before we ever have a “concept” of it. (Like the way an animal “sees” things).

So metaphysics (mental constructs?) may well be operating even in sense cognition (admittedly at a very low level), though we learn to do this automatically at so young an age we are not even aware of the process. It becomes hardwired rather than conscious. Is it not intersting that the optic nerves are so complex that they are regarded as part of the brain all the way to the eyeballs.

So even what we see is not to be wholly trusted - as science has shown in a way that Aristotle never realised.

For example, contrary to the “mental constructs” of the senses, concrete is not actually as concrete as we thought. It is 99.99% empty. While that mistake is not able to be detected by the human body (and is of no consequence for daily life)…there are experiments impossible in Aristotle’s day that prove this by means of the same senses - thanks to new tools such as the neutron gun and neutron detectors.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

Hopefully I have given viewers enough to decide for themselves.

Linus2nd

While you may not like the conclusions I draw Linus I do not see how you can say my application of basic hlyomorphic principles to atomic structures unknown to Aristotle is unacceptable.

Even Scotus, without the benefit of modern Chemistry, used Aristotle in similar fashion to what I have presented. Sure, its not Thomistic Aristotelianism but it is just as consistent and valid a take on Aristotle as Thomas from my limited understanding.

The following may be of interest to readers:
*In an accidental change, a substance persists through the change, having first one accident and then another. But clearly not all changes are accidental changes. There was once a time when I did not exist, and then I came into existence. We can’t analyze this change as an accidental change, since there doesn’t seem to be any substance that persists through the change. Instead, a substance is precisely what comes into being; this is not an accidental but a substantial change. And yet there must be something that persists even through substantial change, since otherwise we wouldn’t have change at all; substances would come to exist from nothing and disappear into nothing. Scotus follows Aristotle in identifying matter as what persists through substantial change and substantial form as what makes a given parcel of matter the definite, unique, individual substance that it is. (There are also accidental forms, which are a substance’s accidental qualities.)

Thus far Scotus is simply repeating Aristotelian orthodoxy, and none of his contemporaries or immediate predecessors would have found any of this at all strange. But as Scotus elaborates his views on form and matter, he espouses three important theses that mark him off from some other philosophers of his day: he holds that there exists matter that has no form whatsoever, that not all created substances are composites of form and matter, and that one and the same substance can have more than one substantial form. Let us examine each of these theses in turn…

First, Scotus argues that there is matter that is entirely devoid of form, or what is known as “prime matter” (Quaestiones in Metaphysicam 7, q. 5; Lectura 2, d. 12, q. un.). Scholars debate now (just as they debated in Scotus’s day) whether Aristotle himself really believed that there is prime matter or merely introduced it as a theoretical substratum for substantial change, believing instead that in actual fact matter always has at least some minimal form (the form of the elements being the most minimal of all)…

Third, Scotus holds that some substances have more than one substantial form (Ordinatio 4, d. 11, q. 3, n. 54). This doctrine of the plurality of substantial forms was commonly held among the Franciscans but vigorously disputed by others. We can very easily see the motivation for the view by recalling that a substantial form is supposed to be what makes a given parcel of matter the definite, unique, individual substance that it is. Now suppose, as many medieval thinkers (including Aquinas) did, that the soul is the one and only substantial form of the human being. It would then follow that when a human being dies, and the soul ceases to inform that parcel of matter, what is left is not the same body that existed just before death. For what made it that very body was its substantial form, which (ex hypothesi) is no longer there. When the soul is separated from the body, then, what is left is not a body, but just a parcel of matter arranged corpse-wise. To Scotus and many of his fellow Franciscans it seemed obvious that the corpse of a person is the very same body that existed before death. Moreover, they argued, if the only thing responsible for informing the matter of a human being is the soul, it would seem that (what used to be) the body should immediately dissipate when a person dies. Accordingly, Scotus argues that the human being has at least two substantial forms. There is the “form of the body” (forma corporeitatis) that makes a given parcel of matter to be a definite, unique, individual human body, and the “animating form” or soul, which makes that human body alive. At death, the animating soul ceases to vivify the body, but numerically the same body remains, and the form of the body keeps the matter organized, at least for a while. Since the form of the body is too weak on its own to keep the body in existence indefinitely, however, it gradually decomposes.

While Scotus’s account of form and matter has clear implications for what happens to the body at death, it is less forthcoming about what happens to the soul. Can the animating soul survive the death of the body it informs? Scotus considers a number of arguments for the incorruptibility of the human soul, but he finds none of them persuasive. This is not to say that he denies the immortality of the soul, of course, but that he does not think it can be proved by human reason unaided by revelation.*plato.stanford.edu/entries/duns-scotus/#MatForBodSou

The Higgs field (if it is proven) seems to be a good example of what Scotus might call prime matter. It does not “exist” by itself (ie cannot be perceived by the senses) yet it “exists” enough (ie has a minimum amount of form so is not quite pure potentiality) to give sensible existence (eg mass and dimension) to otherwise non-existant fundamental particles.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

In one of my previous posts, I said that the Aristotelian prime matter was not only inconceivable in the strict sense, but also nonexistent. What there exists is already a differentiated matter which, being already formed, is a substance. As a consequence, every chemically complex body, is a substance made up of many other substances. And, similarly to what you said, what for a substance of order Ln -so to say-, is truly a substantial change (where its form is lost), can be just an accidental change for the substances of order Ln-1, which might have suffered a simple local displacement. Need I to say that a substantial change cannot be understood just as a matter of point of view, but as the real loss of certain interactivity?

Best regards
JuanFlorencio

Good stuff.

 

[Dr.Bonnette]

I have been busy with some other projects, but just took a few minutes to scan what is going on on this thread. You all have a good discussion going, so I really don’t think I could add much to your comments – although I will tell you that Linus’ arguments appear to follow most closely what I would say myself.

I begin to suspect that a couple of you have not yet taken a look at my video, since it does address the heart of the question about whether substances and forms exist above the “atomic level.” In responding to the worldview of atheistic materialism, that was a central issue in my video. If nothing else, I wanted people to realize the stark alternative posed between atomism and hylemorphism. I do not think it is merely a matter of adopting a “physical perspective” vs. a “metaphysical perspective,” since either substantial forms exist to give substantial unity to, say, a living organism, or not. If they do not, then my point about Richard Dawkins not really existing comes into play – since all that organisms would then have is accidental unity – like a “naturally” produced automobile (only one having intrinsic finality, oddly enough!).

Indeed, the real existence of all of us as unified beings of a given nature is at issue. For, what it means to have a human nature is that each and every part of us that really belongs to “us” shares in the same human nature. That is, what was a sodium ion when outside us as hydrolized salt on a hamburger, when and if it becomes part of our being, must change its nature (and substantial form) so that its nature is no longer that of sodium, but that of “true man.” If you refuse to accept that, then just do the same thing with every other atom that enters your body. When you are done, you will no longer exist at all – but are then merely a pile of atoms in a state of temporary chemical equilibrium.

I am not addressing some of the fascinating questions about transubstantiation and the substantial unity of chemical compounds that you have raised. I am simply pointing out that complete lack of an hylemorphic explanation of things in the macroscopic world plunges us into absurd inferences, such as that you and I and Dawkins do not really exist except as some sort of algorhythm describing a bunch of accidentially united subatomic entities. I prefer to believe in a world of cabbages and kings.

While my video does not and cannot answer all your questions, it is, I think, a cogent summary of the radical alternatives posed between these two opposed worldviews.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

While you may not like the conclusions I draw Linus I do not see how you can say my application of basic hlyomorphic principles to atomic structures unknown to Aristotle is unacceptable…[snip]

.

That was quite a mouth full. The fact is that the Church deemed the explanation of Thomas ( which was fully Aristotelian on this subject) was the best way to explain what happens in Transubstantiation.

Scotus, while a great philosopher, made several errors in his philosophy. One of them was to discard Aristotle’s theory of hylomorphism. I can’t refute Scotus myself because I am not in the class of Thomas Aquinas or the other great scholastics. But many have shown that his philosophy leads to a number of serious problems. I think Edward Feser has commented on Scotus.

Aristotle and Thomas both rejected the notion that there could be two substances in a being having a unified nature.

It is the substantial form which determines or designates what kind of matter a substance will consist of, how it is configured, how it functions in a coordinated fashion for the good of the substance ( animal, vegetable or mineral ). In other words, it is the substantial form which determines the kinds of ultimate particles, energy, etc. will be the " building blocks " of a particular substance.

Now these ultimate particles or building blocks in a particular substance are not substances when they are part of a unified substance. They are in fact what Aristotle called secondary matter. Their existence in this substance depends on the substance, this unique being, this unique thing. They are properly called accidents existing in a substance. This does not mean that they are not real, they are real and they have real properties. But they exist only by reason of the substance whose nature is determined by a single substantial form.

Scotus was wrong in his analysis of the body and the unique place the soul played to the body. He viewed these as two separate substances. If this were true then there would be no such thing as a unified human person. But we are. In fact we experience ourselves as a single person. When I say, " I, " I am stating that I am a single substance, a single human person. I am one thing, one being, not two.

It is true that the soul can exist independently from the body. However, that is not its normal state. Its proper state is as the substantial from of the body. It is a hybrid form, which Scotus failed to take into account.

And when I die my body will decompose into its constituent elements, whatever these may be. When this happens they will become millions, billions of ultimate particles which become individual substances for shorter or longer periods of time. But they do not become individual substances until I die.

No one has ever discovered prime matter. It never exists except in some substance but always as the ultimate substrate of the matter in that substance. I seriously doubt if science will ever discover conclusively what this ultimate substrate is. But it is fun to speculate.

Linus2nd

 

[Blue_Horizon]

.

That was quite a mouth full. The fact is that the Church deemed the explanation of Thomas ( which was fully Aristotelian on this subject) was the best way to explain what happens in Transubstantiation.

This is an argument?

Scotus, while a great philosopher, made several errors in his philosophy. One of them was to discard Aristotle’s theory of hylomorphism. I can’t refute Scotus myself because I am not in the class of Thomas Aquinas or the other great scholastics. But many have shown that his philosophy leads to a number of serious problems. I think Edward Feser has commented on Scotus.

I know the generics too Linus. I am really looking for specific application to the arguments at hand.

Aristotle and Thomas both rejected the notion that there could be two substances in a being having a unified nature.

I am sure they had no conception of the modern day understanding of how layered sensible structures actually are. And if they did, perhaps they would, like myself, see no contradiction with what you say here. Though, as usual with new knowledge, further distinctions and ambiguities in past formulations will need to be made.

Now these ultimate particles or building blocks in a particular substance are not substances when they are part of a unified substance.

Well noone can deny this tautology, one may as well say “nephews are not sons to their uncles.” Is a genus a species? No. Yet on Porphery’s Tree it seems something can be both a genus or a species - depending on whether one perspective is to look at relationships a step higher or a step lower. Same thing. How that reconciles with your tautology above I will leave you to struggle with.

They are in fact what Aristotle called secondary matter. Their existence in this substance depends on the substance, this unique being, this unique thing. They are properly called accidents existing in a substance. This does not mean that they are not real, they are real and they have real properties. But they exist only by reason of the substance whose nature is determined by a single substantial form.

I don’t deny any of this. It does not seem relevent to my observation.

Scotus was wrong in his analysis of the body and the unique place the soul played to the body.

I am only dealing with basic principles and simple observations so discussion doesn’t get over-complicated eg electrolysis of water, puddles disappearing. If I am wrong prove me wrong in the small things first. Then the rest will follow.

And when I die my body will decompose into its constituent elements, whatever these may be. When this happens they will become millions, billions of ultimate particles which become individual substances for shorter or longer periods of time. But they do not become individual substances until I die.

Your last sentence appears mere tautology. I am more interested in actual observed sensible reality than abstract definitions linked together in a tautological sentence if sensible reality is available for observation. And it is. The calcium compounds in your bones will react with acid (whether you are alive or dead) in the same way as the same calcium compunds found in the chemist’s jar won’t they?
Sure, you can say, “but once the acid gets to work on my bone/skin it is no longer part of me.”

And I will say:
(i) thats what I mean by tautology, your statement is always true not as a matter of reason or close observation but as a matter of definition and circular relationship. May as well say “an irrestistable force always moves things” OR
(ii) You speak of “unified substance” … but I believe the unity is NOT of the type you seem to be implying. Why cannot the individual atoms, and molecules of my body still have the same range of possibilities inside my body as they do outside? Sure their behaviour in my body is “cultivated” in a certain way by my soul - but it is still within the range of possibilities that their own independent structure gives them in me or in the lab.

No one has ever discovered prime matter.

Of course not, by definition it can only be inferred.
Though some new sub-atomic effect may make that inference far more logical a one than anything else (its easier than denying causality).

The point I was making was that Scotus had a slightly different definition - and the Higgs Field may come close to it.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

This is an argument?

I know the generics too Linus. I am really looking for specific application to the arguments at hand.

I am sure they had no conception of the modern day understanding of how layered sensible structures actually are. And if they did, perhaps they would, like myself, see no contradiction with what you say here. Though, as usual with new knowledge, further distinctions and ambiguities in past formulations will need to be made.

Well noone can deny this tautology, one may as well say “nephews are not sons to their uncles.” Is a genus a species? No. Yet on Porphery’s Tree it seems something can be both a genus or a species - depending on whether one perspective is to look at relationships a step higher or a step lower. Same thing. How that reconciles with your tautology above I will leave you to struggle with.

I don’t deny any of this. It does not seem relevent to my observation.

I am only dealing with basic principles and simple observations so discussion doesn’t get over-complicated eg electrolysis of water, puddles disappearing. If I am wrong prove me wrong in the small things first. Then the rest will follow.

Your last sentence appears mere tautology. I am more interested in actual observed sensible reality than abstract definitions linked together in a tautological sentence if sensible reality is available for observation. And it is. The calcium compounds in your bones will react with acid (whether you are alive or dead) in the same way as the same calcium compunds found in the chemist’s jar won’t they?
Sure, you can say, “but once the acid gets to work on my bone/skin it is no longer part of me.”

And I will say:
(i) thats what I mean by tautology, your statement is always true not as a matter of reason or close observation but as a matter of definition and circular relationship. May as well say “an irrestistable force always moves things” OR
(ii) You speak of “unified substance” … but I believe the unity is NOT of the type you seem to be implying. Why cannot the individual atoms, and molecules of my body still have the same range of possibilities inside my body as they do outside? Sure their behaviour in my body is “cultivated” in a certain way by my soul - but it is still within the range of possibilities that their own independent structure gives them in me or in the lab.

Of course not, by definition it can only be inferred.
Though some new sub-atomic effect may make that inference far more logical a one than anything else (its easier than denying causality).

The point I was making was that Scotus had a slightly different definition - and the Higgs Field may come close to it.

Just because you disagree with an answer does not make it a tautology. Nor does it make it wrong. I never denied that the constituent elements of a substance had their own legitimate operations or that they were real. I merely said that that they are not substances except by the fact that they inhere in a substance.

My explanations are based on Thomas Aquinas’ use of Aristotle’s Categories not Porphyry’s Tree.

If I loose an finger in the car door, that finger is no longer part of my substance. It is now a substance in its own right, not by its dependency on my substance, my nature. The same with the other physical constituents of my body, " layered " as deep as one cares to go. They all exist only by reason of the fact that I exist. Therefore, they are deemed accidents by Aristotle and Thomas.

And I have given you substantial reasons to accept my definition of substantial change. It is just that you claim that modern science has invalidated it. But this is not the case as I an Juan have shown. Again I remind you that many Catholic scientists are also philosophers as well. And they support my argument and use the precise example of electrolysis and death to prove it. And it is your interpretation of what modern science says, not what science itself says. Modern science does not speak of substantial change at all, in fact.

And remember we are using Aristotle’s definition of substance, nature, essence not that of modern philosophers of nature or science. Remember that Aristotle defined Metaphysics as the science that goes beyond the merely physical to discover the ultimate causes of reality. It deals with the third degree of abstraction. Science, on the other hand, deals strictly with the physical relationships between the physical bodies of existence and in a quantified way.

Linus2nd

Linus2nd

 

[Blue_Horizon]

I begin to suspect that a couple of you have not yet taken a look at my video, since it does address the heart of the question about whether substances and forms exist above the “atomic level.” …

You are right but thats only because I haven’t had time .
In any case those who have seen it and agree should be able to argue that case here in their contemplated understandings. Thats always more helpful in specific discussions than repeating by wrote what a respected authority says in some other possibly less apposite discussion.

On another point I noticed you wrote:

Second, when you talk about causal regressions, never forget that for St. Thomas, in his proofs for God’s existence, he is always talking about causal chains in which each member exists and causes simultaneously with all other members of the chain. In other words, causal regressions do not go back in time; they exist and act

I do not believe this is always the case.
It would seem that (efficient) causal chains of local motion are not simultaneous but must take place over time. The ancient hand/stick/stone example conforms to this observation (even if they all contact each other at the start).

For the stone begins to move only after a measurable time from the first detectable movement of the hand both by reason of the laws of Physics (inertia, compression) and high speed cameras.

Local motion is a valid example of change (motion) even if the philosophic concept is more comprehensive. Therefore if efficient causal regression is not true of a single example (local-motion) then the whole principle falls.
I do not doubt what you say of simultaneity holds for other forms of causal regression.

And if Aristotle is not logically wrong in opining that the world has been in motion eternally (of which the local motion of the celestial spheres is the prime example) … then it would seem that eternal regression of efficient causality is indeed possible and there need be no first mover when it comes to local-motion and efficient causality.

Which I thought was the basis of the First Way?

 

[JuanFlorencio]

Not sure I quite agree with the “mental construct” predication… a “model” is a bit more “material” than a pure mental construct. But perhaps I misunderstand you.

Would you further agree that Aristotelian “substance” is just as much (if not more) a mental construct as the atomic theory model?

Dear Blue Horizon:

In this occasion I would like to address very briefly the topic of mental constructions. I copied some of your words concerning “substance”, but only to tell you that I will come back later to it (perhaps tomorrow).

I distinguish between relations and interactions. Just to illustrate the difference between these two notions, I will propose the following:

a) If you put a small amount of common salt into hot water, you will observe that the salt crystals dissolve into the liquid. The salt affects the liquid and is affected by it; and all this happens independently of your wishes. This is an interaction.

b) If you read a difficult demonstration and you identify its premises, it can happen that you don’t see how the conclusion is obtained from them. The premises do not produce the conclusion, but through you, and you have to meet certain conditions. That is a relation.

Now, we are the kind of beings that belong to the realms of relation and interaction. We belong to the realm of interaction because we are corporeal living beings. And if you allow me to be simplistic, I will say that we belong to the realm of relation thanks to our intelligence; because thinking, understanding, comprehending, reasoning, explaining…, are no other thing but establishing relations.

So, when you say that an object A represents an object B (or that A is a model of B), you are establishing a relation between them. This is an intellectual activity. A is a representation of B through you; through your intelligence. And this relationship that your intelligence establishes between one object and the other is the core of the model. That is why any model is a “mental construct” (I am really using here the terminology that you introduced. I prefer to say that any model is a set of relations).

We mimic interactions through relations. That is what our reason does. So, everything we think or say is a set of relations.

There you have Aristotle trying to explain change. He introduces certain technical terminology (substance, accident, form, act, potency, etcetera). If you pay attention to it, you will notice that each of those terms is a set of relations (plus a nebulous background that comes from the realm of our mundane interaction). So, yes, “substance” is a “mental construct” (“mental construct” is also a mental construct). Is the Aristotelian “substance” just as much (if not more) a mental construct as the atomic theory model? Let me come back to it tomorrow.

Kind regards
JuanFlorencio

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Blue,

Dr. Bonnette stops in from time to time but he doesn’t carry on a running disussion. He has other obligations which prevent that. So I will offer my explanation of the answer to the hand/stick/rock scenario that Thomas uses. Clearly the stick is in immediate contact with the rock and the motion of the stick is simultaneous with that of the rock.

The stick is an incidental mover having received its power to move from the hand. The hand is in immediate contact with the stick and the stick is moving simultaneously with the motion of the hand. The hand receives its power through a chain of nerve, muscle, and neuron synapses. Each member of the chain being in immediate contact with the prior member of the chain and moving simultaneously with it. My mind, more specifically, my will is of course the first mover of the brain activity and bears the same relation to the brain synapses as the other incidental causes have with each other.

Now while it is true that the whole process cannot be termed strictly simultaneous it would seem to be near enough to satisfy the case, especially when it is seen that each member of the chain is moving simultaneously with its adjoining members. And does " here and now " need to be defined as absolutely simultaneous? I don’t think that is required. And did Aristotle and Thomas think of this expression with the same laboratory precision as a scientist would in his lab? I doubt it. And besides, Thomas did not use the term " here and now " in his argument. In fact I don’t know exactly where he did use the phrase and in what exact contaxt.

I really think it is enough that the causal chain is established.

But there is still one step to go because we have not yet reached the ultimate First Cause. It is true that my will is an efficient cause and that each member of the chain has received the power to act from my intellect. But my intellect is in potency and must be moved as well. And the chain must end in a First Cause that is absolutely Unmoved and Unmoveable or the argument fails, at least in regard to local motion.

Aristotle’s answer would probably be that the intellect is moved by the First Sphere and so on up to the Highest and Eternal Sphere, which is in turn moved by the First Unmoved Mover, which in his theodicy was pure act. But this Unmoved Mover moves as a Final Cause only. It was actually, only the lowest Sphere that moved the imperfect, lower world as an efficient cause.

Thomas might respond that the intellect was efficiently moved by an angel, who in turn was efficiently moved by God, the Unmoved and Unmoveable First Mover Who is Purus Actus Subsistens. But in this case we are getting away from Aristotle’s God who was only a Final Mover and going to the notion of the Christian God who was an efficient cause as well.

Or we could say that God is the direct efficient mover of my intellect. But this would seem to oppose human freedom, unless we suppose that God is inspiring my intellect to act, which we know that God does do from time to time, even without our knowing it. However, this would not seem to apply in such a prosaic example.

The best choice would seem to be that God is moving my mind as its creating, efficient causality, by which he has empowerd my mind to act for itself. And God is always sustaining my mind in existence, so he is constantly exercising his efficient causality.

Anyway, that is the way I see it… .
.
Linus2nd

 

[Blue_Horizon]

Blue,

Dr. Bonnette stops in from time to time but he doesn’t carry on a running disussion. He has other obligations which prevent that. So I will offer my explanation of the answer to the hand/stick/rock scenario that Thomas uses. Clearly the stick is in immediate contact with the rock and the motion of the stick is simultaneous with that of the rock…
Linus2nd

Firstly, I appreciate the gesture Linus but we have argued this one endlessly before without clarity so I’ll leave it to Dr. Bonnette to offer a fresh perspective when he’s free. I get email notifications on my chosen threads so time is not of the essence.

Secondly, in any case you haven’t got off the ground with the opening paragraph from what I can see.

If you understood my contribution below you would not write “Clearly the stick is in immediate contact with the rock and the motion of the stick is simultaneous with that of the rock” because I clearly disagree for the reasons given.

I have no reason to believe that Aristotle of Aquinas, when using this example, meant anything else than that the connected assembly was initially at rest and then the hand moved.

You seem to be saying that the whole hand/stick/stone assembly example is to be understood as moving at constant velocity. I do not think so…unless you can prove my understanding of their example is mistaken?

And I do not think that is possible because your statement “I really think it is enough that the causal chain is established.” is flawed if your interpretation of Aquinas’s example is accurate.

According to Newtonian physics if three items in a free connected assembly are at constant velocity in space then there is no way one can infer any order of instrumental motion causality between them. In fact there is no chain of force between them at all because, without friction, none needs its partner to stay at constant velocity. In fact it may be that none caused the motion of the other. There is certainly no simultaneous causality in constant rectilinear motion.

Of course if we are talking rotational motion that is a different matter as acceleration is involved (rather than constant rectilinear motion) and therefore instrumental causality can be determined as originating from the centre of rotation. However I do not believe Aquinas or Aristotle meant a golfers swing at all.

So, unless you can prove that, we have no agreed starting point from which to discuss further.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

I begin to suspect that a couple of you have not yet taken a look at my video, since it does address the heart of the question about whether substances and forms exist above the “atomic level.”

OK, just checked out the video.
At least so far as my contributions here are concerned I didn’t see anything apposite to my observations sorry. The closest it got was 38:00 to 39:00 or so.

I am not a Materialist Atheist (I hate putting people in boxes because nobody’s “system” is exactly the same as others even though some themes may have large overlaps) but I seem to find myself agreeing with them on many of the statements you put in their mouths re atoms in humans.

I find myself thinking that, on the issue with respect to atoms and humans, it really looks like a refutation of a straw man. I am not sure you understand what they are trying to say because, like Linus on this point, you keep concluding you both cannot be right.

You stated "Richard Dawkins doesn’t exist – what exists is only a tremendous pile of trillions of elements and subatomic particles. The atoms that form your body came out of a star and are still what they were originally. "

Is this really Dawkin’s view? I don’t think so.
Why don’t you believe that elemental ions in my body retain their characteristic functionality (which is how you defined Arist substance/essence/form) and also be a human unity with its characteristic functionality?

A behive and its colony of bees is a unity and has a characteristic organisational unity and functionality - much the same around the world. That doesn’t mean the different types of individual bees that make up the unity of the hive don’t have their own individual characteristic functionality. Just as grace builds on nature and doesn’t destroy it why cannot higher forms organise otherwise unrelated aggregates of smaller forms into a single unity without denying their natures?

Sure the characteristic functionality of salt is different from that of its two constituent elements. So what? Water and steam have the same problem in this regard but the ancients still see them as the same substance don’t they? On what basis…their characteristic functionalities are also very different.

I think trying to say that there is an analogy between the form of salt and the form of a human (in so far as the characteristic functionalities of the more complex form are very different from its constituents) is weak.

I agree that in the compound salt this is true to a certain extent (it isn’t true when we compare the action of sodium ions of molten salt with those of molten lye which exhibit the same characteristics even though lye and salt are very different).

But that aside, the atoms that constitute a human are organised in a completely different way from those that constitute a compund.

The human body is a marvellous unity made up of many different types of sub-unities. There are aggregations of inorganic compounds, organic compounds of greatly varying complexity, cells and, surprisingly, a very large percentage by weight of symbiotic bacteria and micro-organisms…all united by the soul into doing things that none of its constituents can do on their own.

So while I agree that in a compound the higher form largely overrides the functionality of the constituent elemental forms of which it is composed … it cannot be assumed that the body does the same. There is no aggregation in a compund, there is in a body.

And, as noted above, even compounds can be made to reveal the characteristic activity of their constituant building blocks by revealing their ionic forms in molten or soluable states.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Firstly, I appreciate the gesture Linus but we have argued this one endlessly before without clarity so I’ll leave it to Dr. Bonnette to offer a fresh perspective when he’s free. I get email notifications on my chosen threads so time is not of the essence.

Secondly, in any case you haven’t got off the ground with the opening paragraph from what I can see.

If you understood my contribution below you would not write “Clearly the stick is in immediate contact with the rock and the motion of the stick is simultaneous with that of the rock” because I clearly disagree for the reasons given.

I have no reason to believe that Aristotle of Aquinas, when using this example, meant anything else than that the connected assembly was initially at rest and then the hand moved.

You seem to be saying that the whole hand/stick/stone assembly example is to be understood as moving at constant velocity. I do not think so…unless you can prove my understanding of their example is mistaken?

And I do not think that is possible because your statement “I really think it is enough that the causal chain is established.” is flawed if your interpretation of Aquinas’s example is accurate.

According to Newtonian physics if three items in a free connected assembly are at constant velocity in space then there is no way one can infer any order of instrumental motion causality between them. In fact there is no chain of force between them at all because, without friction, none needs its partner to stay at constant velocity. In fact it may be that none caused the motion of the other. There is certainly no simultaneous causality in constant rectilinear motion.

Of course if we are talking rotational motion that is a different matter as acceleration is involved (rather than constant rectilinear motion) and therefore instrumental causality can be determined as originating from the centre of rotation. However I do not believe Aquinas or Aristotle meant a golfers swing at all.

So, unless you can prove that, we have no agreed starting point from which to discuss further.

Well, if you insist on misrepresenting what I said and if you are committed to the errors scientism reads into Newto’s works and if you dismiss Aquinas on the basis of the prejudiced opinions of Newton, Descartes, Kant, Darwin and their nodern materialist, naturalist descendents then of course we have nothing more to say to one another.

You have my best wishes -

However I reserve the right to challenge anything you say, whether or not you respond.
And for the viewers of this forum, the idea that newton or any other sceintist has disproven the Five Ways of Thomas Aquinas has been roundly refuted by men and women with solid Catholic, philsophical, theological, and scientific backgrounds. There is also a long discussion on this topic on the thread " The First Way Explained " here: forums.catholic-questions.org/showthread.php?t=826619 . You can easily find refutations in the works of Edward Feser and his blogspot.

Cheers
Linus2nd

 

[Linusthe2nd]

For the viewers. Post 97 by Blue Horizon indicates that the discussion has branched rather far from Aquinas’ First Way to the nature of substances and accidents and to a criticism of a video by Dr. Bonnette. For the latter, the viewers are invited to view the video for themselves or to view similar videos by Edward Feser or Dr. William Carroll on Youtube. For the former on substances and accidents the viewer is invited to read through the thread " What are Substances? " here: forums.catholic-questions.org/showthread.php?t=945507&page=4

Dr. William E. Carroll dhspriory.org/thomas/english/QDdePotentia.htm

Dr. Edward Feser, various lectures. bing.com/videos/search?q=youtube+edward+feser&FORM=VIRE1#view=detail&mid=2DD0A28738823D25A84E2DD0A28738823D25A84E

Linus2nd, " The First Way Explined " bing.com/videos/search?q=youtube+edward+feser&FORM=VIRE1#view=detail&mid=2DD0A28738823D25A84E2DD0A28738823D25A84E

I enclose a quote from that thread, " In Transubstantion the substance of the bread and wine have been changed into the Whole Christ, This would be the First substance, accompanied by the Second Substance. In my explanation First Substance would include what I have described as Second substance. Here First Substance would be the substantial presence the Church speaks of, the Whole Christ.

Whereas, the species remain without a substance. And by species I mean all the accidents of bread and wine, both their internal and their external accidents. By internal accidents I mean the matter as expressed by deminsion, weight, mass, shape,size, the detectable characterisics of their atomic, celleular, and molecular structure, if you will. And by their external accidents I mean their color, taste, feel,smell. All of which are present by a special miracle of God, by Divine intervention.

In regard to the internal accidents, this question came up when a poster said to me that matter is not an accident. And to this I had to agree, but was stumped as to how to explain myself, since Aristotle’s categories do not include matter as an accident. Though it certainly was included under substance.

Then I read something in Ott’s Fundamentasl of Catholic Dogma which turned on a light. In discussing the manner in which the Sacred Species existed, it was pointed out ( pg. 383 in my 1960 paper back ed. ) that " By the appearances is understood everything which is perceived by the senses , such as size, extent, weight, shape, colour, taste, smell. " Then it dawned on me that atoms, cells, molecules of which matter is composed also have size, extent, weight, shape, etc as accompanying accidents. So the substance of the matter ( if I may so speak ) has been changed, but the accidents of the matter do remain. So it would seem that my apparent dilemma is solved. Matter is not an accident, but it does have its own special accidents which remain after the change. "

To be noticed here is that there is a difference between substance and accident. And that accidents exist only because the substance exists. Atoms, cells, molecules do not exist on their own, they are always a constituent element of a substance, they exist in and through the substance.

They do not exist as independent substances. In fact it is rare that these " entities " ever exist alone. And as far as their interior activity is concerned that is highly speculative. We seem to evolve from one theory to another with the passage of time. But it is certain they do have some kind of interior activity. But they would not have if it were not for the substance in which they existed. Without that they simply would not exist at all. And as long as they do exist in a substance their whole purpose of existence is to promote the well bing and perfection of the substance in which they exist.

Is this ground for declaring that either the philosopher or the scientist doesn’t know what they are doing? Of course not. Each works in his own field and neither invalidates the other. It is only certain ill informed, prejudiced individuals or movements who would disallow the validity of the other. Philosophy and science have entirely different material and formal objects. And the work of each is some what speculative and open to correction. And here, in this forum, we are attempting to put foreward the truths of philosophy. Are they absolute? No. So naturally there will be much discussion on what these truths are and their validity. We should at least try to present them clearly and to present our own views clearly.

Linus2nd

 

[Blue_Horizon]

Dear Blue Horizon:

In this occasion I would like to address very briefly the topic of mental constructions. I copied some of your words concerning “substance”, but only to tell you that I will come back later to it (perhaps tomorrow).

I distinguish between relations and interactions. Just to illustrate the difference between these two notions, I will propose the following:

a) If you put a small amount of common salt into hot water, you will observe that the salt crystals dissolve into the liquid. The salt affects the liquid and is affected by it; and all this happens independently of your wishes. This is an interaction.

b) If you read a difficult demonstration and you identify its premises, it can happen that you don’t see how the conclusion is obtained from them. The premises do not produce the conclusion, but through you, and you have to meet certain conditions. That is a relation.

Now, we are the kind of beings that belong to the realms of relation and interaction. We belong to the realm of interaction because we are corporeal living beings. And if you allow me to be simplistic, I will say that we belong to the realm of relation thanks to our intelligence; because thinking, understanding, comprehending, reasoning, explaining…, are no other thing but establishing relations.

So, when you say that an object A represents an object B (or that A is a model of B), you are establishing a relation between them. This is an intellectual activity. A is a representation of B through you; through your intelligence. And this relationship that your intelligence establishes between one object and the other is the core of the model. That is why any model is a “mental construct” (I am really using here the terminology that you introduced. I prefer to say that any model is a set of relations).

We mimic interactions through relations. That is what our reason does. So, everything we think or say is a set of relations.

There you have Aristotle trying to explain change. He introduces certain technical terminology (substance, accident, form, act, potency, etcetera). If you pay attention to it, you will notice that each of those terms is a set of relations (plus a nebulous background that comes from the realm of our mundane interaction). So, yes, “substance” is a “mental construct” (“mental construct” is also a mental construct). Is the Aristotelian “substance” just as much (if not more) a mental construct as the atomic theory model? Let me come back to it tomorrow.

Kind regards
JuanFlorencio

JF the above is a little vague and generalised (which is not a criticism) but I really have no serious issues (yet) with what you say at that level.

The only thing I would observe is that in any syllogism (in so far as you talk of premises) there vare in fact two very different types of “relations” or interactions (as you put it) with the thinker.

There is the relationship seen between the premises - which is mainly what you speak of above.
Then there is the relation made between the individual’s perception and the word or image he uses to represent/symbolise/refer to that perception.
This is a very different type of relationship from the former.

I find that many traditional “metaphysicians” completely under-estimate the importance of “defining the terms” of the premise (ie correlating a term with the actual reality sensibly perceived/signified).

Most asume this is a fairly trivial process. It is not, lots of errors (or lack of applicability) in syllogistic conclusions are due to outright equivocation of terms, defining of related terms more by symbiotic (tautological) apriori definitions than apriori observation of the actual relaities (and their perceived relationships) referred to… and, more subtley, analogical use of the same term in different premises.

The simple fact is, as the ancient Hindu philosophers recognised in this regard, “the reality once named (perceived and defined in words) is no longer the reality.”

Descartes seems to have recognised this problem in philosophy…and was forever insecure wrt the possibility of attaining “clear and distinct” defining of terms/concepts in the philosophic enterprise. I think he was far too optomistic that he could achieve this.

That is, when we try to define a thing with a symbol or a definition it is really only a 2D equivalence to the 3D perceived reality. As Paul Riceour would say, the symbol both reveals and veils the sensible perception we want to communmicate to others.

That is what I see in much of Linus’s argumentation below.
If it is true that we define the different “things” we perceive in a limited 2D way (which may well conveniently leave out the real-world 3D “outlier” examples that don’t fit our understanding of the relationships between those definitions) then…when we correctly relate our premises…then the conclusions must always be true and are non-falsifiable.

But they are non-falsifiable only because we will never “see” the outlier examples in the real world that may well ocurr. We will say "this is not a contradiction of our logical conclusions because that is not in accord with our defined terms).

In this regard my standard example is Galileo who invited a bishop to look through his telescope one night to see the moons orbiting Jupiter. The bishop pretty much said, “Galileo I do not need to look through your misty lenses to know that what you say you see is but a figment of your craving imagination - everybody knows such a thing is impossible by Scripture.”