Aristotle's notion of substance

[Linusthe2nd]

It did both, adopt and adapt. But this was not an innovation of Nicaea. The Catholic Church has never been fideistic. We don’t find this sort of fideism emerge until the Enlightenment and Protestant Reformation. Christianity has always sought the good in all systems of knowledge, including Greek philosophy, on the firm conviction that the dignity of human reason, and that the image of God in man is the image of reason, should seek to know God as much as reason will allow. Hence, we find, for example, the language of substance (ousia, substantia) in Titian the Syrian (ca.165AD), St Irenaeus (ca.140), who defends the substantiality of the Trinity in his Against Heresies, Tertullian (ca.197), Origen (ca.220), and many others in both the East and West.

As for the “knock against” substance not being a Biblical term, well, neither are most scientific terms we use, such as atom and electron Biblical terms. The Catholic Church, since its origins with Jesus Christ and the Apostles, has never limited the use of reason to Scripture, as though Sacred Scripture is some kind of definitive and limiting lexicon beyond which we cannot move or praise God through the use of reason.

Hope this helps.

Pax.

:clapping::clapping::clapping: Linus2nd

 

[Muze]

You say some very curious things. First, what do you mean when you say " … This makes substance actionable…" ?

Trent says that the substance of the bread and wine undergoes a “conversion.” In order for this to occur, the substance must be able to undergo a “conversion.” If substance is only explanatory, there’s nothing to convert.

The Church is not worried that the language it uses to express the miracle of Transubstantion may not be acceptible to science.

And herein lies the problem. Trent makes clear statements about the nature of the physical bread and wine using substance theory, and claims that the substance undergoes a “conversion.” Sure, such a conversion would be a miracle.

But the claims about the bread and wine having a substance that can be converted are not based upon a miracle, but rather are claims about the natural state of these things, and these claims have been shown to be scientifically inaccurate.

So, while it is true that the RCC ignores modern science in this matter, that only exposes the doctrine of transubstantiation as represented at Trent as clearly in error.

 

[levinas12]

Do you mean a robot like the character “Data” in Startrek?

Yes. Are living things merely machines or something else? Apparently, according to the SEP article, Locke had a problem with this question.

But this question is a segue to a more general question: how does the motion of atoms, either outside or inside the human body or both, produce “meanings” such as “bread” or “home” or “mom” or even “atoms, quarks or cosmic strings”.

Hobbes stumbled here. He reduced “meanings” to the “motions of matter” while at the same time insisting that “language” was the result of convention (just like the Leviathan itself). Where does “convention” fit into swirls of atoms?

By the way, there is where relativists have the most difficulty. They cannot explain the origin of the “relativist meanings”.

Using “convention” to explain “meaning” is a deus ex machina. It’s like Lucretius suddenly introducing the “gods” after he reduced everything to showers of atoms and their inexplicable “swerves”.

 

[Muze]

It’s not really an analogy. It’s counterexample to your claim “Explanatory means non-real.” If you want to make some other claim, like “Explanatory means non-real when it comes to objects but events are unique and special and different,” you could defend that claim, but right now you’re just pointing to the difference between events and objects ad hoc.

Except that it isn’t a counterexample as it isn’t given in reference to substance theory. Substance theory doesn’t deal with events.

(And, FYI, I’ve never said that “explanatory means non-real”, so your whole argument is a straw man anyway.)

If I were making an analogy, say “A is to B as X is to Y,” I would of course already know that A and B are different from X and Y. That’s what makes it an analogy. But you can’t defeat an analogy just by pointing out that there’s a difference. You’d have to explain why the difference is relevant to the point being made.

Because you’re not engaging substance theory. Substance theory doesn’t explain events.

It’s like saying that when two atoms form a molecule they share one or more electrons, and then refuting that by saying that when two kids play together, they don’t have to share things… It’s apples and oranges.

No, it does not say that. Such a view would be incoherent, as I have already explained: nothing can be “only explanatory” since an explanation entails an explanandum. It would be like saying that someone is “merely eating” without eating anything.

Actually, such a view is the only valid way for substance theory to be compatible with modern science. If I use the *word *“apple.” That’s purely explanatory. It has no reality beyond the concept that you and I share about the word itself. And what the concept represents only explains a physical object that has particular characteristics.

So, you have your counter example directly from the compatible view of substance theory.

Is the apple real? Assuming that there was a physical apple that we were talking about, yes. But that isn’t the substance of the apple. That’s the whole point of substance theory. The question is whether there is a substance that is the essence of the apple, some fundamental efficient cause for the apple (and this view is incompatible with modern science), or whether the term “apple” is simple a shared concept of language that explains to both of us what this physical object in front of us is (and that’s the compatible view of substance theory.)

The compatible and incompatible interpretation simply disagree about what substances explain: whether they explain the movements of fundamental particles, or something else.

I don’t see how you can hope to persuade anyone of your view when all you have to go on is a severe misinterpretation of a couple of paragraphs on the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

LOL… It’s only a “misinterpretation” because you value the doctrine of transubstantiation more than truth. That’s obvious from your pitiful attempts to invent straw man “counter examples” that don’t engage substance theory. Your struggle to not lose this doctrine is evident.

Bizarre interpretation. This would be hair-splitting if it were right, but it isn’t even right. If substances aren’t meant to explain anything at all beyond the identity of an object, where do you get the incompatible interpretation? To the contrary, as the SEP says, “It would be universally agreed by scholars that substantial forms are real in the sense that they play an irreducible and ineliminable explanatory role in the behaviour of the things in which they are the form.”

You apparently don’t grasp the meaning of the term “explanatory.” Yes, the substance explains real things. It explains the “what” of things. What it is? What makes it an apple? The concept that does the explaining is real. In language. In our minds. We perceive the explanation, and that tells us about the behavior of the things in which they are the form. That’s the point of the “compatible” interpretation.

But they aren’t actionable. There is no “conversion” of these ideas, unless they are changed in the minds of the people who perceive them.

Right, and my point is that by parity of reasoning with the argument you’re trying to make here, no doctrine of the Real Presence could be compatible with modern science.

Well, if that’s what reality tells us, then the RCC will have to rethink its doctrine.

Either the Real Presence entails a change in the behavior of the fundamental particles of the host, or it does not. In the first case, the Real Presence is incompatible with modern science. In the latter case, you have to allow for real, non-causal changes regardless of whether you adopt substance theory. Thus you cannot adopt any doctrine of the Real Presence and adopt modern science while rejecting the possibility of changes that are real but non-causal.

So you claim. If that’s the case, then the RCC has some work to do in reworking its doctrine of Eucharist.

You do realize that this is an argument from bad consequences, right? That this is a fallacy?

 

[Muze]

It did both, adopt and adapt. But this was not an innovation of Nicaea. The Catholic Church has never been fideistic. We don’t find this sort of fideism emerge until the Enlightenment and Protestant Reformation. Christianity has always sought the good in all systems of knowledge, including Greek philosophy, on the firm conviction that the dignity of human reason, and that the image of God in man is the image of reason, should seek to know God as much as reason will allow. Hence, we find, for example, the language of substance (ousia, substantia) in Titian the Syrian (ca.165AD), St Irenaeus (ca.140), who defends the substantiality of the Trinity in his Against Heresies, Tertullian (ca.197), Origen (ca.220), and many others in both the East and West.

As for the “knock against” substance not being a Biblical term, well, neither are most scientific terms we use, such as atom and electron Biblical terms. The Catholic Church, since its origins with Jesus Christ and the Apostles, has never limited the use of reason to Scripture, as though Sacred Scripture is some kind of definitive and limiting lexicon beyond which we cannot move or praise God through the use of reason.

Hope this helps.

Pax.

And the issue with transubstantiation is that it uses substance theory in a way that is now clearly incompatible with modern science with respect to its claims about the nature of the bread and wine and what may be done to them.

 

[hicetnunc]

And the issue with transubstantiation is that it uses substance theory in a way that is now clearly incompatible with modern science with respect to its claims about the nature of the bread and wine and what may be done to them.

So you keep saying. And I get it: Jesus Christ is not capable of doing anything that is not corroborated by “modern science.” There is no such thing as miraculous intervention in the created order that may transcend what “modern science” can determine by its own method, and no possibility of commenting on grace or the Divinity of Christ because neither can these be corroborated by “modern science”. And for two thousand years, the Church which Jesus Christ has founded has been totally misguided in providing a reasonable explanation of what Christians, from the beginning, have believed to be occurring in the Eucharist. We had to wait for “modern science”, and Muze it’s spokesman, to tell Christ’s Church that it has been wrong all along and all of its ecumenical councils are misguided. I think that just about sums up the thread. Have I missed anything?

 

[Muze]

So you keep saying. And I get it: Jesus Christ is not capable of doing anything that is not corroborated by “modern science.” There is no such thing as miraculous intervention in the created order that may transcend what “modern science” can determine by its own method, and no possibility of commenting on grace or the Divinity of Christ because neither can these be corroborated by “modern science”.

It isn’t the act of transubstantiation that is the problem. The problem is the assumption about the state of the bread vis a vis the substance. The claim of Trent is that the “substance” undergoes conversion.

The problem is that modern science has shown that substance theory, given the interpretation that the substance is something more than explanatory which is required for transubstantiation to be true, is invalid.

So, the question isn’t whether Jesus Christ is capable of something, but whether the conditions in which Trent claims He does them can exists. It’s a bit like asking whether God can make a rock large enough that He can’t lift it. It’s a logical absurdity.

If “substance” in substance theory, to be compatible with reality as modern science describes it, is only explanatory, then there isn’t anything for Christ to supernaturally convert.

There may be some other supernatural way that the body and blood are present in the bread and wine, but transubstantiation as the Trent doctrine describes it ain’t it.

And for two thousand years, the Church which Jesus Christ has founded has been totally misguided in providing a reasonable explanation of what Christians, from the beginning, have believed to be occurring in the Eucharist. We had to wait for “modern science”, and Muze it’s spokesman, to tell Christ’s Church that it has been wrong all along and all of its ecumenical councils are misguided. I think that just about sums up the thread. Have I missed anything?

Yes. You’re arguing from bad consequences. That’s a logical fallacy. If the Trent doctrine of transubstantiation is wrong because it utilizes a philosophy that has subsequently been shown to be in error in the way that Trent uses it, then that’s a consequence we’re all going to have to live with.

Bad consequence doesn’t change reality.

Regardless if the Pope and the entire world claims that the earth is the center of the universe, Galileo was correct. Truth isn’t a democracy.

(And, in case you missed the link, I am citing the Standford University school of philosophy. It’s not as though I’m standing alone on the nature of substance theory.)

 

[Eleve]

Yes, hicetnunc, what is your experience as a professional philosopher next to a couple poorly-explicated paragraphs from the SEP?

 

[hicetnunc]

(And, in case you missed the link, I am citing the Standford University school of philosophy. It’s not as though I’m standing alone on the nature of substance theory.)

I’ve already replied to your link to this article in Levinas thread, and pointed out that the Stanford article does not support your claims. I am very familiar with the Stanford article and the work of Howard Robinson who wrote it.

I think you need to go a little bit beyond an encyclopedia article to get a good undertsanding of the meaning of substance, accidents, form, essence, etc.

Now, if you’re interested, I’d like to give this thread one more shot, because it seems to be going nowhere. Let’s start at the very beginning. Let’s go question by question, and see if we can’t, at each step of the journey, see if we can agree or reach a consensus on each step. I am happy to restart another thread if you prefer. We’ll each promise to corroborate each step of the journey with citations and support, and see where we get to.

If you’re game, I propose we start this with your opening thesis, something along the lines of, “modern science has disproved substance” or whatever. In so doing, I’d ask you to define the way in which you are using the word “substance” just so we have no misunderstanding.

 

[Muze]

If you’re game, I propose we start this with your opening thesis, something along the lines of, “modern science has disproved substance” or whatever. In so doing, I’d ask you to define the way in which you are using the word “substance” just so we have no misunderstanding.

That sounds good to me. I’m always open to learning.

Given the way that Trent uses “substance”, the description of it seems to be articulated here:

The stronger, incompatibilitist interpretation is that Aristotle did not believe that the behaviour of complex entities followed from the laws that govern their parts or their matter. (Gotthelf 1987, Robinson 1983) By contrast, the behaviour of the matter is influenced by what it is the matter of. The nature of the matter places restrictions on what the enmattered thing can do—an animal can only be made from living tissue, not of stone or fire—but exactly how that matter behaves depends on the substantial form present in it. The substantial form plays, therefore, an essential role, not merely in certain kinds of scientific explanation, but by being a fundamental efficient cause in its own right.

Thus, if this interpretation is correct, Aristotle believed the substantial form is present in the thing itself.

 

[hicetnunc]

Thus, if this interpretation is correct, Aristotle believed the substantial form is present in the thing itself.

Great. Let’s begin then.

I have two questions:

(1) is your understanding that Trent uses Aristotle’s definition of substance, as opposed to Aquinas’ use of substance? If so, perhaps you could explain why this is the case: in other words, could you defend the claim that, “Trent relies on an Aristotelian concept of substance, and not a Thomistic one.”

(2) Linked to question one, what is your understanding of the expression, “present in”? Given that ‘substance’ is not composed of matter, in what sense is substance, in your view, said to be “in a subject”?

Pax.

 

[Muze]

(1) is your understanding that Trent uses Aristotle’s definition of substance, as opposed to Aquinas’ use of substance? If so, perhaps you could explain why this is the case: in other words, could you defend the claim that, “Trent relies on an Aristotelian concept of substance, and not a Thomistic one.”

Everything I’ve read on the topic both in book and “internet” form says that Aquinas uses Aristotle’s substance theory. In a classroom discussion (for my master of divinity) with a professor (Th.D, I believe), he also said that Aquinas was interacting with followers of Aristotelian philosophy and used substance theory to explain transubstantiation.

here’s one example

(2) Linked to question one, what is your understanding of the expression, “present in”? Given that ‘substance’ is not composed of matter, in what sense is substance, in your view, said to be “in a subject”?
.

In Aristotle (as I understand him), he utilizes Plato’s “form” to describe substance. As in the quote above, it is the “fundamental efficient cause” that underlies matter and determines what the matter may do. I don’t know that Aristotle actually defines what this “form” exists as, only that it is present in the object and cannot be directly observed.

 

[hicetnunc]

Everything I’ve read on the topic both in book and “internet” form says that Aquinas uses Aristotle’s substance theory. In a classroom discussion (for my master of divinity) with a professor (Th.D, I believe), he also said that Aquinas was interacting with followers of Aristotelian philosophy and used substance theory to explain transubstantiation.

Yes, there is no doubt that St Thomas “interacts” with Aristotle. But he also modifies Aristotle’s terms. For Aristotle, every substance is a nature, but Aquinas rejects this (Meta. V, 4,.1014b36). I would suggest that Trent relies on St Thomas’ modification of the notion of substance and nature, as and this is the basis of the teaching in Trent. If you are happy to accept this, I propose we proceed to the next step by relying on a reading of Trent in light of Thomas’ philosophy, as opposed to Aristotle’s. If not, let’s sort this out before proceeding any further.

In Aristotle (as I understand him), he utilizes Plato’s “form” to describe substance. As in the quote above, it is the “fundamental efficient cause” that underlies matter and determines what the matter may do. I don’t know that Aristotle actually defines what this “form” exists as, only that it is present in the object and cannot be directly observed.

Both Aristotle and Aquinas clearly reject Plato’s notion of exemplar forms. Aquinas, for example, says that, “Now it seems that Plato strayed from the truth because, having observed that all knowledge takes place through some kind of similitude, he thought that the form of the thing known must of necessity be in the knower in the same manner as in the thing known.” (ST I, q.84, a.1). So I don’t think we can proceed on a Platonist understanding of substance. If you are happy to accept this, we can proceed. If not, let me know what you disagree with before we go to the next step.

 

[Muze]

Yes, there is no doubt that St Thomas “interacts” with Aristotle. But he also modifies Aristotle’s terms. For Aristotle, every substance is a nature, but Aquinas rejects this (Meta. V, 4,.1014b36). I would suggest that Trent relies on St Thomas’ modification of the notion of substance and nature, as and this is the basis of the teaching in Trent. If you are happy to accept this, I propose we proceed to the next step by relying on a reading of Trent in light of Thomas’ philosophy, as opposed to Aristotle’s. If not, let’s sort this out before proceeding any further.

I’d like to hear more about how St. Thomas modifies the notion of substance, specifically whether the substantial form is still present in the object, and whether it serves as a fundamental efficient cause and whether how the object behaves is dependent upon it.

Both Aristotle and Aquinas clearly reject Plato’s notion of exemplar forms. Aquinas, for example, says that, “Now it seems that Plato strayed from the truth because, having observed that all knowledge takes place through some kind of similitude, he thought that the form of the thing known must of necessity be in the knower in the same manner as in the thing known.” (ST I, q.84, a.1). So I don’t think we can proceed on a Platonist understanding of substance. If you are happy to accept this, we can proceed. If not, let me know what you disagree with before we go to the next step.

Yes, they reject the notion of exemplar forms, and yet they still borrow the idea of “form” from Plato, and modifying it for their own use. At least that’s my recollection.

 

[hicetnunc]

I’d like to hear more about how St. Thomas modifies the notion of substance, specifically whether the substantial form is still present in the object, and whether it serves as a fundamental efficient cause and whether how the object behaves is dependent upon it.

Yes, for Thomas, a substance is “in the subject”, but in a way we haven’t determined yet in our discussion, since we need to solve the second related question first, namely that “in a subject” is not based on Plato’s archetypal forms. Then I propose we move onto this next.

Yes, they reject the notion of exemplar forms, and yet they still borrow the idea of “form” from Plato, and modifying it for their own use. At least that’s my recollection.

It wouldn’t make much sense to reject the notion of forms, and then use it as the basis of something so fundamental as substance. We agreed at the outset to corroborate all of our claims, and so I would ask you to corroborate your claim that St Thomas bases his notion of substance on Plato’s forms, otherwise let’s move ahead. Let’s not use hazy recollection to base our discussion on, otherwise it will devolve very quickly. In Book VIII of his Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, St Thomas explains why he rejects Plato’s forms as being the basis of substance. St Thomas clearly teaches that forms are not of the same order as substances (Metaphysics VII). If you are happy with this, let’s move ahead.

 

[Muze]

Yes, for Thomas, a substance is “in the subject”, but in a way we haven’t determined yet in our discussion, since we need to solve the second related question first, namely that “in a subject” is not based on Plato’s archetypal forms. Then I propose we move onto this next.

That’s fine.

It wouldn’t make much sense to reject the notion of forms, and then use it as the basis of something so fundamental as substance. We agreed at the outset to corroborate all of our claims, and so I would ask you to corroborate your claim that St Thomas bases his notion of substance on Plato’s forms, otherwise let’s move ahead. Let’s not use hazy recollection to base our discussion on, otherwise it will devolve very quickly. In Book VIII of his Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, St Thomas explains why he rejects Plato’s forms as being the basis of substance. St Thomas clearly teaches that forms are not of the same order as substances (Metaphysics VII). If you are happy with this, let’s move ahead.

Yeah, I my intent wasn’t to bring in the entire Platonist idea of forms, but rather to say that they were in some way akin to them. Certainly we can say that they are not of the same order in Aristotle and Plato.

 

[hicetnunc]

That’s fine.

Great! We have our first consensus: Plato’s forms are not the basis of St Thomas’ theory of substance, which I hope to show is the basis of Trent’s teaching.

Which brings us back to the second question, which now remains unanswered (but key):

(2) Now that we have moved away from a neo-Platonic explanation, what is your understanding of the expression, “present in”? Given that ‘substance’ is not composed of matter, in what sense is substance, in your view, said to be “in a subject”?

 

[Muze]

(2) Now that we have moved away from a neo-Platonic explanation, what is your understanding of the expression, “present in”? Given that ‘substance’ is not composed of matter, in what sense is substance, in your view, said to be “in a subject”?

Since Aristotle said that the substance couldn’t be directly observed, I don’t know that he identifies the way that it is ‘in a subject’ other than its purported function, in that it is the fundamental efficient cause, and it is what the matter depends upon it for how it behaves.

The difficulty (at least for me) in this is that Aristotle isn’t an atomist, and thus embraces the “earth, wind, fire, water” view of elements, so his view of “matter” is very different from ours, and thus the interaction of matter and form is a bit foreign to my mind.

 

[hicetnunc]

Since Aristotle said that the substance couldn’t be directly observed, I don’t know that he identifies the way that it is ‘in a subject’ other than its purported function, in that it is the fundamental efficient cause, and it is what the matter depends upon it for how it behaves.

The difficulty (at least for me) in this is that Aristotle isn’t an atomist, and thus embraces the “earth, wind, fire, water” view of elements, so his view of “matter” is very different from ours, and thus the interaction of matter and form is a bit foreign to my mind.

Aristotle rejects Empedocles identification of the elements with substance, as does Aquinas (see Aquinas’ De generatione et Corruptione, 1 & 2). And Aquinas in particular even treats Aristotle’s use of the elements in an allegorical sense (for example, he treats wind as an allegory of the Spirit).

If we are to get on to Trent’s treatment of “conversio”, we will have to move on from reducing the discussion to Aristotle’s use of substance over St Thomas. Are you happy to focus on St Thomas’ notion of substance in the treatment in Trent? If so, we can move ahead. If not, perhaps you could defend the claim that “Trent relies on a definition of substance derived from Aristotle as opposed to St Thomas.”

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Trent says that the substance of the bread and wine undergoes a “conversion.” In order for this to occur, the substance must be able to undergo a “conversion.” If substance is only explanatory, there’s nothing to convert.

The bread and wine undergoes a change in its most fundamental reality. The Church used the term " substance " to describe this most basic underlying reality of the being of the bread and wine. Though not stated, it seems clear Trent relied on the definition of substance as used by St. Thomas… It is " explanatory " in regard to the change that takes place. There is a real conversion. However, as far as the substance of Christ is concerned, one must regard it as Second substance. That is, the entire Christ, including all accidents such as quantity, limbs, all body parts, the human nature and the Divine Nature.

Where as it would seem that as far as the substance of the bread and wine is concerned, the meaning seems more in line with First Substance or a combination of First and Second Substance.

So the Church does not appear to use the term in its exact Thomistic definition. But human language struggles to find the exact and most proper terms to use in describing what takes place. We are some what limited in our ability to describe accurately in technical, philosophical terms what takes place. And of course, modern science has no terms proper to describe what takes place.

And herein lies the problem. Trent makes clear statements about the nature of the physical bread and wine using substance theory, and claims that the substance undergoes a “conversion.” Sure, such a conversion would be a miracle…

But the claims about the bread and wine having a substance that can be converted are not based upon a miracle, but rather are claims about the natural state of these things, and these claims have been shown to be scientifically inaccurate.

This is incorrect. The claims are based on the miracle, the change called Transubstantion. It is true that the term " substance " is meant to describe the natural state of these things as well as can be described philosophically. And at the time of the definition, the term would have been accepted by the science of the day.

The science which has taken place since Newton and Descartes, etc, has been using the term " substance " in its own way to make scientific eplanations. There is nothing wrong with that. But science has no corner on the use of terms. The term has been used by many people over the passage of thousands of years to describe different things and that is true even today. .

So, while it is true that the RCC ignores modern science in this matter, that only exposes the doctrine of transubstantiation as represented at Trent as clearly in error.

No, your statement does not follow at all, it is not a logical statement. Science has no patent on defining and legitimizing the meaning of terms. Check your dictionary, most words have a long etymology explaining different uses of terms. Only those looking for excuses to attack the Church would make such a statement.

Linus2nd