Aristotle's notion of substance

[levinas12]

Is it possible to discuss Aristotle’s notion of substance without bringing in Trent or transubstantiation or, for that matter, Thomas Aquinas?

Additionally, I don’t know what it means to talk about the efficient causality of substance. What does it cause? This is not deny that some substances, i.e., living things, can be efficient causes. But substance qua substance is much closer to what Aristotle understands as “formal cause”, not “efficient cause”.

And I’m somewhat confused when someone says that we do not observe a substance. In Aristotle, substance is what is first disclosed to us, it’s what we’re first aware of. Substance is not inferred or deduced; it is immediately perceived. We are not first aware of accidents, qualities, sensibilia - no, at least in Aristotle, we are first aware of this man, this horse - and there’s nothing hidden about substance; nothing unobservable - it’s out there for all to see in broad daylight.

It’s only in modern philosophy that all this is reversed - with a totally unnecessary assumption that we construct external objects, like tinker toys, from sensations.

We must distinguish the id quo and id quod. The nerve impulses, etc are the id quo, that by which we perceive - but the substance, e.g., this man, this horse, is the id quod, that which is perceived. In a sense, the perceptual is conceptual; and the conceptual is perceptual. Don’t try to separate them.

So let’s revive the war between the ancients and moderns. Maybe Aristotle is not so obsolete.

 

[levinas12]

Is it possible to discuss Aristotle’s notion of substance without bringing in Trent or transubstantiation or, for that matter, Thomas Aquinas?

Additionally, I don’t know what it means to say that substance is an efficient cause. What does it cause? And I’m somewhat confused when someone says that we do not observe a substance. In Aristotle, substance is what is first disclosed to us, it’s what we’re first aware of. Substance is not inferred or deduced; it is immediately perceived. We are not first aware of accidents, qualities, sensibilia - no, at least in Aristotle, we are first aware of this man, this horse -it is “substance” is what everyday consciousness starts with.

It’s only in modern philosophy that all this is reversed - with a totally unnecessary assumption that we construct external objects, like tinker toys, from sensations.

We must distinguish the id quo and id quod. The nerve impulses, etc are the id quo, that by which we perceive - but the substance, e.g., this man, this horse, is the id quod, that which is perceived.

So let’s revive the war between the ancients and moderns. Maybe Aristotle is not so obsolete.

 

[hicetnunc]

Is it possible to discuss Aristotle’s notion of substance without bringing in Trent or transubstantiation or, for that matter, Thomas Aquinas?

So let’s revive the war between the ancients and moderns. Maybe Aristotle is not so obsolete.

Hi Levinas;

Thanks for those great points you raise.

I for one don’t intend to suggest that Aristotle’s notion of substance is obsolete. In fact, one cannot understand St Thomas’ use of the concept without reference to Aristotle. But it is very clear that St Thomas modifies Aristotle’s understanding of substance and that we can’t simply equate Aristotle’s account with that of Thomas. There are 1500 years between Aristotle and St Thomas, and a tremendous amount of discussion about the notion of substance has gone on in that time both among Christian and the Mu’tazilite philosophers. It has not remained a static notion.

First of all, Aristotle uses the term substance in a variety of equivocal ways, not least of which is his distinction between primary and secondary substance, which Thomas adopts and then develops to explain Christian doctrine, which Aristotle did not of course understand. But there was great debating throughout the Scholastic period about how this notion of substance in Aristotle used could be said of God, the exemplar of substance. For although according to Aristotle, substance itself is a genus, it was clear to Christian thinkers that God was not contained in any genus, and so the origin of substance became somewhat contentious. Boethius eventually coined the term super-substance, to distinguish God’s substance from that of the created order. But Boethius got himself into all kinds of trouble with this concept, and so Thomas will later add the notion of subsistence to that of substance to speak about the most perfect exemplar of substance he can think of, which is the person (both Divine and, by participation, human). This is a key concern for St Thomas and the Scholastics, because with the Incarnation and the hypostatic union, there was the need to develop substance even further. More importantly, Thomas is at pains to understand how the subsisting individual can be said to attain the Beatific Vision of God: in what sense can one substance be united to its Exemplar? These are concerns way beyond what Aristotle ever considered, and brought about a whole new development of what is meant by substance. Eventually, by the time we get to Trent, we still have Aristotle’s notion at the base, and his Categories are still a reference point, but it is now, thanks to St Thomas, that we find substance is not simply a metaphysical category but also a theological one. This is key, because it now means a source of reference is not simply Aristotle, but Scripture and Revelation. And key in Thomas’ reference point is now also the likes of mystics, such as Pseudo-Dionysius. The bottom line is that Trent’s formulation of Transubstantion (which, by the way, is expressed in a single sentence!) cannot be read apart from this tradition and development.

 

[Muze]

Aristotle rejects Empedocles identification of the elements with substance, as does Aquinas (see Aquinas’ De generatione et Corruptione, 1 & 2). And Aquinas in particular even treats Aristotle’s use of the elements in an allegorical sense (for example, he treats wind as an allegory of the Spirit).

I knew that Aquinas would have rejected that, which makes St. Thomas’ use of Aristotelian substance theory quirky, since their fundamental understanding of matter is very different.

I’d be interested to hear how you think this allegorization affects Thomas’ use of substance theory.

If we are to get on to Trent’s treatment of “conversio”, we will have to move on from reducing the discussion to Aristotle’s use of substance over St Thomas. Are you happy to focus on St Thomas’ notion of substance in the treatment in Trent? If so, we can move ahead. If not, perhaps you could defend the claim that “Trent relies on a definition of substance derived from Aristotle as opposed to St Thomas.”

I’m not sure I’m clear on what you think the differences are between Aquinas and Aristotle with respect to their definitions of substance and whether Aquinas has substance as a fundamental efficient cause and whether the subject depends on the substance for how it behaves.

 

[Muze]

The bread and wine undergoes a change in its most fundamental reality. The Church used the term " substance " to describe this most basic underlying reality of the being of the bread and wine. Though not stated, it seems clear Trent relied on the definition of substance as used by St. Thomas… It is " explanatory " in regard to the change that takes place. There is a real conversion. However, as far as the substance of Christ is concerned, one must regard it as Second substance. That is, the entire Christ, including all accidents such as quantity, limbs, all body parts, the human nature and the Divine Nature.

The “explanatory” interpretation of Aristotle has to do with the substance describing the subject, and not how it changes.

And, in fact, the fact that the Church claims that there is this “fundamental reality” not seen by modern science is exactly what has been debunked by modern science, and, as the article describes, is incompatible with modern science.

Where as it would seem that as far as the substance of the bread and wine is concerned, the meaning seems more in line with First Substance or a combination of First and Second Substance.

So the Church does not appear to use the term in its exact Thomistic definition. But human language struggles to find the exact and most proper terms to use in describing what takes place. We are some what limited in our ability to describe accurately in technical, philosophical terms what takes place. And of course, modern science has no terms proper to describe what takes place.

And that’s because modern science has displaced Aristotelian substance theory, showing that 100% of the behavior of any material object is observable and definable by science. Substance, then, is displaced by the reality of modern science.

This is incorrect. The claims are based on the miracle, the change called Transubstantion. It is true that the term " substance " is meant to describe the natural state of these things as well as can be described philosophically. And at the time of the definition, the term would have been accepted by the science of the day.

And developments of science have now shown this substance to not have any place in the reality of the subject.

The science which has taken place since Newton and Descartes, etc, has been using the term " substance " in its own way to make scientific eplanations. There is nothing wrong with that. But science has no corner on the use of terms. The term has been used by many people over the passage of thousands of years to describe different things and that is true even today. .

And that’s fine. But the philosophies of these ancient times are often displaced by modern scientific discovery, as is the case with Aristotelian substance theory, unless substance is reduced to merely explaining what the subject is.

No, your statement does not follow at all, it is not a logical statement. Science has no patent on defining and legitimizing the meaning of terms. Check your dictionary, most words have a long etymology explaining different uses of terms. Only those looking for excuses to attack the Church would make such a statement.

I’m sure they do. That’s not the point. You can use whatever terms you want, but the interpretation of substance theory that includes the substance determining how a substance behaves is incompatible with modern science, and that means Trent is in error.

 

[Alberti_Devoveo]

And, in fact, the fact that the Church claims that there is this “fundamental reality” not seen by modern science is exactly what has been debunked by modern science, and, as the article describes, is incompatible with modern science.

Show me a peer-reviewed science (not philosophy) article that states this claim of yours.

 

[Muze]

Show me a peer-reviewed science (not philosophy) article that states this claim of yours.

We’d have to find a history of chemistry of physics book to find when modern science discovered that molecules determined the behavior of a subject. I’m not sure peer reviewed journals go back that far.

 

[Alberti_Devoveo]

We’d have to find a history of chemistry of physics book to find when modern science discovered that molecules determined the behavior of a subject. I’m not sure peer reviewed journals go back that far.

The peer-review process started in the 1500’s (by Catholic Jesuits, no less). The whole Newton vs Leibniz issue on who invented calculus was because Leibniz published his works while Newton did not; this was back in the 1680’s.

Given the ample time of publications, you should be able to find at least one article that makes your precise claim. Please share at least this one with us.

 

[levinas12]

I for one don’t intend to suggest that Aristotle’s notion of substance is obsolete. In fact, one cannot understand St Thomas’ use of the concept without reference to Aristotle. But it is very clear that St Thomas modifies Aristotle’s understanding of substance and that we can’t simply equate Aristotle’s account with that of Thomas. There are 1500 years between Aristotle and St Thomas, and a tremendous amount of discussion about the notion of substance has gone on in that time both among Christian and the Mu’tazilite philosophers. It has not remained a static notion.

I apologize if I sounded a bit testy. But I think, before taking up the scholastic modifications, we have to go back to Aristotle and retrieve the original meaning of “substance”. This is analogous to what Husserl and others were doing in reactivating the original meaning of geometry (and philosophy).

It’s clear that there is a misunderstanding today. Aristotle’s substance is not a hidden “noumenal” thing that is inaccessible to the senses. Just the opposite. It is the most obvious feature of the world. We “use” it all the time. Every time we ask what something “does” we are invoking “substance”. You could say that “substance” is shorthand for how a thing “behaves” or “operates”. One substance can do things that other substances cannot do, e.g., a human being can do “science” but a tree cannot.

Whether the behavior of things reflects an intricate machinery of atoms and particles and strings is another question. What substance describes is what is manifest to us first and foremost.

This is what phenomenology is all about. There is a close connection between Aristotle’s substance and phenomenology. That’s why Heidegger spent so much time on Aristotle.

So it would behoove us to do some more retrieval of what “substance” means.

 

[hicetnunc]

I knew that Aquinas would have rejected that, which makes St. Thomas’ use of Aristotelian substance theory quirky, since their fundamental understanding of matter is very different.

Both Aristotle and Aquinas reject the elements as the basis of substance, so there’s nothing quirky about Aquinas arriving at the same conclusion as Aristotle on this. Nor am I sure why, even if they were different, this would mean that St Thomas’ view was more “quirky” than Aristotle’s simply on account of being different. But a topic for another day perhaps…

I’d be interested to hear how you think this allegorization affects Thomas’ use of substance theory.

It doesn’t. I would be happy to discuss Aristotle’s and Aquinas’ treatment of elemental theory in another thread, but it has little bearing on this discussion at hand, so perhaps we should save it until we make some progress on the question here. I’m trying to get my head around your objection, and would like to help you express it so we can examine it together. I’m still not sure what it is you are arguing for or against. It may well be that you have a case to be answered. It may also be that you have an idea of substance which is wrong. My point is simply that St Thomas’ use of Aristotle needs to be considered in context, but maybe that’s a bit ambitious at present given the limitation of the forum.

So perhaps we could come at the discussion from a slightly different angle, to move things ahead:

(1) Do you think the human person has a soul/spirit? If so, what is it? What is it “made of”?

(2) Do you have an “identity” as a person which can be distinguished from your body? If so, what is this distinct identiy?

 

[hicetnunc]

I apologize if I sounded a bit testy.

Not at all, Levinas. You raised good points, and no apology is necessary. It’s part of nature of the beast that we don’t always come across in text the way we would in person (in fact, I think there is a recent blog on the Catholic Answers website on this very topic!).

But I think, before taking up the scholastic modifications, we have to go back to Aristotle and retrieve the original meaning of “substance”. This is analogous to what Husserl and others were doing in reactivating the original meaning of geometry (and philosophy).

This is a very good point, and I may have been too ambitious in trying to move the discussion ahead too quickly. In fact, prior to seeing your post, I have just suggested the same thing to Muze on reflection. I am happy to stay with Aristotle for the time being. And I totally agree with you that there is great confusion about what substance means today, and even among experts in the field, there is considerable debate about what Aristotle meant. But this is precisely why I prefer St Thomas’ treatment of the subject, because he does what Aristotle couldn’t do, and that is try to get at the fundamental nature of things in the light of the Revelation of Jesus Christ, the source of all creation.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

The “explanatory” interpretation of Aristotle has to do with the substance describing the subject, and not how it changes.

And, in fact, the fact that the Church claims that there is this “fundamental reality” not seen by modern science is exactly what has been debunked by modern science, and, as the article describes, is incompatible with modern science.

And that’s because modern science has displaced Aristotelian substance theory, showing that 100% of the behavior of any material object is observable and definable by science. Substance, then, is displaced by the reality of modern science.

And developments of science have now shown this substance to not have any place in the reality of the subject.

And that’s fine. But the philosophies of these ancient times are often displaced by modern scientific discovery, as is the case with Aristotelian substance theory, unless substance is reduced to merely explaining what the subject is.

I’m sure they do. That’s not the point. You can use whatever terms you want, but the interpretation of substance theory that includes the substance determining how a substance behaves is incompatible with modern science, and that means Trent is in error.

You do seem to be promoting the ideology of scientism. That is, you seem to be convinced that only science can have anything to say about fundamental reality, leaving no place for philosophy and theology and Divine Revelation to stand, reducing them to a valueless state having nothing true to offer humanity. You may take that stand of course but you and those who take it will be the ultimate loosers.

Let me propose an exercise to you. You know what the basic meaning of the truth which the Church is teaching ( i.e. the bread and wine is changed into the body and blood of Christ such that the essential reality of the bread and wine are changed into the Whole Person of Christ, body, blood, soul, and Divinity, such that, as far as the body is concerned, the entire physical body of Christ is present just as it was after the Resurrection but in an invisible manner, such that those things which science calls real about the bread and wine remain but remain without a subject in which to inhere.)

So pretend you were the Pope during the Council of Trent. Write down the words you would use to define this Miracle so that it conveys an explanation of the Miracle of Transubstantiation that Catholics are suppose to believe. Let’s see how well you can do?
And I will give you a grade from " A " to " F. " But remember, if you can’t define it so that the same meaning is maintained, you will fail.

Linus2nd
.

 

[levinas12]

But this is precisely why I prefer St Thomas’ treatment of the subject, because he does what Aristotle couldn’t do, and that is try to get at the fundamental nature of things in the light of the Revelation of Jesus Christ, the source of all creation.

I totally agree. Jesus is the manifestation of God who lights up everything. And what do we see in this light? Substances, accidents, reality of any sort. And all this is seen in the context of love. What is “given” (e.g., substance) is a “gift”.

Aristotle helps us to understand “what is given”. But he did not know about Creation, about Divine Love. And this is where Thomas comes in.

But to thank God for what is “given”, we first have to think about “what” is given. It is this “what” that makes possible human conversation - everyday we talk to each other about many “whats”. These “whats” lead into the “who” (all those wonderful personal pronouns).

And the “who” takes us to Jesus.

Aristotle and the other Greeks opened up the question of the “what” but fell short of the “who”.

 

[hicetnunc]

I totally agree. Jesus is the manifestation of God who lights up everything. And what do we see in this light? Substances, accidents, reality of any sort. And all this is seen in the context of love. What is “given” (e.g., substance) is a “gift”.

Aristotle helps us to understand “what is given”. But he did not know about Creation, about Divine Love. And this is where Thomas comes in.

But to thank God for what is “given”, we first have to think about “what” is given. It is this “what” that makes possible human conversation - everyday we talk to each other about many “whats”. These “whats” lead into the “who” (all those wonderful personal pronouns).

And the “who” takes us to Jesus.

Aristotle and the other Greeks opened up the question of the “what” but fell short of the “who”.

Yes, very well put.

 

[Muze]

Both Aristotle and Aquinas reject the elements as the basis of substance, so there’s nothing quirky about Aquinas arriving at the same conclusion as Aristotle on this. Nor am I sure why, even if they were different, this would mean that St Thomas’ view was more “quirky” than Aristotle’s simply on account of being different. But a topic for another day perhaps…

First, if this were the case, then there would be no need for Aquinas to use allegory for these elements. Yes, Aristotle rejected Empedocles elements, but he did not reject them altogether.

Second, Aristotle was NOT an atomist. And that is the key difference between the two, which would make Aquinas’ use of substance theory a bit quirky, as substance is supposedly present in the subject, but the nature of the physical subject is very different between the two.

It doesn’t. I would be happy to discuss Aristotle’s and Aquinas’ treatment of elemental theory in another thread, but it has little bearing on this discussion at hand, so perhaps we should save it until we make some progress on the question here.

We can leave this for now, but this may be significant.

I’m trying to get my head around your objection, and would like to help you express it so we can examine it together. I’m still not sure what it is you are arguing for or against. It may well be that you have a case to be answered. It may also be that you have an idea of substance which is wrong. My point is simply that St Thomas’ use of Aristotle needs to be considered in context, but maybe that’s a bit ambitious at present given the limitation of the forum.

The answer to the question if whether St. Thomas’ use of substance theory includes the substance being the fundamental, efficient cause, and whether this substance determines the behavior of the subject remains in tact is important to the question.

So perhaps we could come at the discussion from a slightly different angle, to move things ahead:

(1) Do you think the human person has a soul/spirit? If so, what is it? What is it “made of”?

The spirit is spirit.

(2) Do you have an “identity” as a person which can be distinguished from your body? If so, what is this distinct identiy?

The nature of our consciousness and will and mind gives us an identity and self-awareness.

 

[Muze]

You do seem to be promoting the ideology of scientism. That is, you seem to be convinced that only science can have anything to say about fundamental reality, leaving no place for philosophy and theology and Divine Revelation to stand, reducing them to a valueless state having nothing true to offer humanity. You may take that stand of course but you and those who take it will be the ultimate loosers.
.

And you would be wrong. Science doesn’t deal with the topic of God or spirit. Science does not delve into the discovery of truth. Science is concerned with the physical world and facts regarding its nature.

However, when theology or philosophy wanders into the area of science, as Aristotelian substance theory does, then science will have something to say about the matter. Substance theory DOES make claims about the physical, and thus when science disagrees with philosophy about the nature of the physical world, science takes precedence.

This isn’t much different than the Church’s treatment Galileo when science disagreed with the theological stance on whether the earth was the center of the universe.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

And you would be wrong. Science doesn’t deal with the topic of God or spirit. Science does not delve into the discovery of truth. Science is concerned with the physical world and facts regarding its nature.

However, when theology or philosophy wanders into the area of science, as Aristotelian substance theory does, then science will have something to say about the matter. Substance theory DOES make claims about the physical, and thus when science disagrees with philosophy about the nature of the physical world, science takes precedence.

This isn’t much different than the Church’s treatment Galileo when science disagreed with the theological stance on whether the earth was the center of the universe.

I’m glad to see that you agree that science has nothing to say about God or the Spiritual realities. I think it has been pointed out to you that " substance " theory predates modern science by about 3000 years. And indeed it deals about matter but not only matter. Primarily it deals with whatever exists, whether that be matter, or spirit, or accidents, or concepts. Even ordinary people use the term in common speech. So, modern science has no cornor on its valid usage. Your argument has no force.

Indeed Galileo was treated badly but his case is not as you may have been taught but that is another thread. But you can read the Catholic Encyclopedia on the subject if you care to be enlightened. newadvent.org/cathen/06342b.htm

I don’t know why you bring it up. It has nothing to do with the topic under discussion. It just demonstrates your lack of objectivity. Linus2nd

 

[RobbyS]

It did both, adopt and adapt. But this was not an innovation of Nicaea. The Catholic Church has never been fideistic. We don’t find this sort of fideism emerge until the Enlightenment and Protestant Reformation. Christianity has always sought the good in all systems of knowledge, including Greek philosophy, on the firm conviction that the dignity of human reason, and that the image of God in man is the image of reason, should seek to know God as much as reason will allow. Hence, we find, for example, the language of substance (ousia, substantia) in Titian the Syrian (ca.165AD), St Irenaeus (ca.140), who defends the substantiality of the Trinity in his Against Heresies, Tertullian (ca.197), Origen (ca.220), and many others in both the East and West.

As for the “knock against” substance not being a Biblical term, well, neither are most scientific terms we use, such as atom and electron Biblical terms. The Catholic Church, since its origins with Jesus Christ and the Apostles, has never limited the use of reason to Scripture, as though Sacred Scripture is some kind of definitive and limiting lexicon beyond which we cannot move or praise God through the use of reason.

Hope this helps.

Pax.

Well, in general terms, Greek philosophy shaped the intellectual discussion of the world in which Christianity was born, or indeed, the Judaism of Alexandria and of Greater Syria. So I find what you say plausible.

 

[RobbyS]

I’m glad to see that you agree that science has nothing to say about God or the Spiritual realities. I think it has been pointed out to you that " substance " theory predates modern science by about 3000 years. And indeed it deals about matter but not only matter. Primarily it deals with whatever exists, whether that be matter, or spirit, or accidents, or concepts. Even ordinary people use the term in common speech. So, modern science has no cornor on its valid usage. Your argument has no force.

Indeed Galileo was treated badly but his case is not as you may have been taught but that is another thread. But you can read the Catholic Encyclopedia on the subject if you care to be enlightened. newadvent.org/cathen/06342b.htm

I don’t know why you bring it up. It has nothing to do with the topic under discussion. It just demonstrates your lack of objectivity. Linus2nd

There has been a confusion of science with scientism, because of the reductionist materialism of so many scientists. It exercises the same grip as historicism on the Marxists. Each amounts to a faith for the infidel.

 

[RobbyS]

Yes. Are living things merely machines or something else? Apparently, according to the SEP article, Locke had a problem with this question.

But this question is a segue to a more general question: how does the motion of atoms, either outside or inside the human body or both, produce “meanings” such as “bread” or “home” or “mom” or even “atoms, quarks or cosmic strings”.

Hobbes stumbled here. He reduced “meanings” to the “motions of matter” while at the same time insisting that “language” was the result of convention (just like the Leviathan itself). Where does “convention” fit into swirls of atoms?

By the way, there is where relativists have the most difficulty. They cannot explain the origin of the “relativist meanings”.

Using “convention” to explain “meaning” is a deus ex machina. It’s like Lucretius suddenly introducing the “gods” after he reduced everything to showers of atoms and their inexplicable “swerves”.

Thomas Nagel has caught flack for his skpeticism in his book “Mind and Cosmos."

The modern materialist approach to life has conspicuously failed to explain such central mind-related features of our world as consciousness, intentionality, meaning, and value. This failure to account for something so integral to nature as mind, argues philosopher Thomas Nagel, is a major problem, threatening to unravel the entire naturalistic world picture, extending to biology, evolutionary theory, and cosmology.

Since minds are features of biological systems that have developed through evolution, the standard materialist version of evolutionary biology is fundamentally incomplete. And the cosmological history that led to the origin of life and the coming into existence of the conditions for evolution cannot be a merely materialist history, either. An adequate conception of nature would have to explain the appearance in the universe of materially irreducible conscious minds, as such.

Nagel’s skepticism is not based on religious belief or on a belief in any definite alternative. In Mind and Cosmos, he does suggest that if the materialist account is wrong, then principles of a different kind may also be at work in the history of nature, principles of the growth of order that are in their logical form teleological rather than mechanistic.

In spite of the great achievements of the physical sciences, reductive materialism is a world view ripe for displacement. Nagel shows that to recognize its limits is the first step in looking for alternatives, or at least in being open to their possibility.