Atomic Bomb In WWII

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are you saying the allies should have accepted surrender on terms (an impossibility) or that the navy should have starved the japanese into surrender or that DOWNFALL should have gone forward with the resulting million or so casualties?

given the inaccuracy of “strategic” bombing with iron bombs from high altitude, the de-centralized japanese war economy and the fact that the war faction controlled the imperial government, there weren’t many options in 1945.
I think what I said was that IMHO it is wrong to destroy a whole city in order to pressure an enemy government to unconditional surrender. That is my understanding of the Catholic just war theory.
 
the historical revisionism relies on a distinction in means not recognized by the military planners of the time. the primary concern in summer 1945 was not whether the A bomb should be used, but whether DOWNFALL would go forward.

from the USSBS (my emphasis):
“We underestimated the ability of our air attack on Japan’s home islands, coupled as it was with blockade and previous military defeats, to achieve unconditional surrender without invasion. By July 1945, the weight of our air attack had as yet reached only a fraction of its planned proportion, Japan’s industrial potential had been fatally reduced, her civilian population had lost its confidence in victory and was approaching the limit of its endurance, and her leaders, convinced of the inevitability of defeat, were preparing to accept surrender. The only remaining problem was the timing and terms of that surrender.”
japan was brought to the end by airpower. airpower meant both conventional (firebombing) and atomic bombs. the USSBS makes very little distinction between the two, noting:
The atomic bomb, in its present state of development, raises the destructive power of a single bomber by a factor of somewhere between 50 and 250 times, depending upon the nature and size of the target.
in other words, in summer 1945, the A bomb was just a very large, very effective kind of explosive.

today, the revisionists look back the end of WW2 through lenses colored by 50 years of the Cold War and times when the world was on the brink of destruction by weapons far greater than the Japanese bombs.
 
I think what I said was that IMHO it is wrong to destroy a whole city in order to pressure an enemy government to unconditional surrender. That is my understanding of the Catholic just war theory.
I’m not trying to put you on a slippery slope, but you’d be happy with Japan’s surrender on terms? or unconditional surrender caused by something less than a wholesale destruction of a city?
 
the historical revisionism relies on a distinction in means not recognized by the military planners of the time. the primary concern in summer 1945 was not whether the A bomb should be used, but whether DOWNFALL would go forward.

from the USSBS (my emphasis):

japan was brought to the end by airpower. airpower meant both conventional (firebombing) and atomic bombs. the USSBS makes very little distinction between the two, noting:

in other words, in summer 1945, the A bomb was just a very large, very effective kind of explosive.

today, the revisionists look back the end of WW2 through lenses colored by 50 years of the Cold War and times when the world was on the brink of destruction by weapons far greater than the Japanese bombs.
The first quote is from the summary report, and the chapter “Japan’s Struggle to End the War”, and reflects the Pacific Survey chairman Nitze’s philosophy, one the overall survey didn’t necessarily match. See “Advocacy or Assessment:The United States Strategic Bombing Survey of Germany and Japan”, Gian Peri Gentile, in HIROSHIMA IN HISTORY: THE MYTHS OF REVISIONISM. Even so, I think the point you are making is valid.

GKC
 
I’m not trying to put you on a slippery slope, but you’d be happy with Japan’s surrender on terms?
I think that there is an obligation from a moral standpoint to minimise civilian casualties and not to target civilian areas.
Exactly what the terms of surrender would be, I am not sure about that, but I read that there have been historians who have claimed that it was not necessary to mandate an unconditional surrender of Japan.
 
I think that there is an obligation from a moral standpoint to minimise civilian casualties and not to target civilian areas.
Exactly what the terms of surrender would be, I am not sure about that, but I read that there have been historians who have claimed that it was not necessary to mandate an unconditional surrender of Japan.
the phrase “unconditional surrender” actually had a couple of different meanings in this context, see, here.

remember that the chinese had been suffering some 200,000 casualties a month since 1937 and were not interested in anything less than unconditional surrender. the US was more flexible, but what was achieved: the demilitarization of Japan, the reorganization of the Empire into a stable western-style democracy, the rebuilding of the economy, war crimes trials, the “demotion” of hirohito from god-emperor status, all the result of the unconditional surrender demands. Japan did achieve some concessions, for example, hirohito remained emperor and was not tried for war crimes, for which he richly deserved to hang.

when you think Japan should have been given an opportunity to surrender on terms, what terms are you thinking about?

as for the fate of Japanese cities … the Japanese war effort was intentionally decentralized to make targeting of crucial war industry more difficult. to aggravate this, “precision” bombing was a complete misnomer, it is surely a mistake to compare the best efforts of a B-29 formation dropping bombs through the then-unknown jet stream with the precision guided munitions of the recent TV wars.
 
I think what I said was that IMHO it is wrong to destroy a whole city in order to pressure an enemy government to unconditional surrender. That is my understanding of the Catholic just war theory.
In war, as opposed to something less than war, the object is not to “pressure” the enemy.

The object is to destroy the enemy and capture his territory … unless he surrenders and yields his territory and his population.

The notion of “pressure” is to get the enemy to agree to something or other.

That’s not the objective of war.

The objective of war is so horrendous that we don’t do declarations of war anymore. A declaration of war means all-out war … another WW2. Nobody wants a full mobilization with allies and taking of sides by everyone on the planet. And no holds barred.

Since WW2, we have not really had an actual war. We have had some things we refer to as “war”, but in all cases we pulled our punches. Some folks have referred to these other things as “limited war” or “police actions”. But they weren’t war.

Japan wanted to build an empire and in the book “Retribution” there are a couple of maps showing the extent of their empire building. I like maps. In my opinion, the maps in “Retribution” weren’t extensive enough.

Japan considered Manchuria to be THEIRS, for example.

Anyway, one reason for reading all of the books such as “Downfall” and “Retribution” and the rest … because they all work to fill in the gaps … no one author can cover everything. And they have points of view and perspectives.

The Brits had one perspective. [And not just “colonialism”, but also the huge war that took place in the Mediterranean … and the impact on the Black Sea and the oil fields of the region including the southern part of the USSR.]

The French have another.

The U.S. didn’t get into the war until very late. Japan was up in Manchuria early on and a threat to the Soviet Union.

The bloodiest war front was the German-Soviet “Eastern Front”.

Airpower advocates have another perspective. Navy advocates another. There is the Army vs. the Marine Corps. MacArthur fans have another. Eisenhower once commented that he had “studied dramatics under MacArthur” for many years.

Then there are the many books still being written that make use of information based on “venona”. [Venona develops a lot on the Soviet manipulations to get the United States into WWII and in which global theaters.] A year ago, Haynes revealed NEW information that had been developed and verified based on venona … 50 years later.
 
There have been 4152 confirmed US deaths in Iraq.
There have been 94,000 Iraqi casualties.
The Iraq Body Count of 94000 is from an ongoing human security project which maintains and updates the world’s largest public database of violent civilian deaths during and since the 2003 invasion. The count encompasses non-combatants killed by military or paramilitary action and the breakdown in civil security following the invasion.
Here is one estimate of the death toll in World War II:

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_War_II_casualties
 
In war, as opposed to something less than war, the object is not to “pressure” the enemy.

The object is to destroy the enemy and capture his territory … unless he surrenders and yields his territory and his population.

The notion of “pressure” is to get the enemy to agree to something or other.

That’s not the objective of war.

The objective of war is so horrendous that we don’t do declarations of war anymore. A declaration of war means all-out war … another WW2. Nobody wants a full mobilization with allies and taking of sides by everyone on the planet. And no holds barred.

Since WW2, we have not really had an actual war. We have had some things we refer to as “war”, but in all cases we pulled our punches. Some folks have referred to these other things as “limited war” or “police actions”. But they weren’t war.

Japan wanted to build an empire and in the book “Retribution” there are a couple of maps showing the extent of their empire building. I like maps. In my opinion, the maps in “Retribution” weren’t extensive enough.

Japan considered Manchuria to be THEIRS, for example.

Anyway, one reason for reading all of the books such as “Downfall” and “Retribution” and the rest … because they all work to fill in the gaps … no one author can cover everything. And they have points of view and perspectives.

The Brits had one perspective. [And not just “colonialism”, but also the huge war that took place in the Mediterranean … and the impact on the Black Sea and the oil fields of the region including the southern part of the USSR.]

The French have another.

The U.S. didn’t get into the war until very late. Japan was up in Manchuria early on and a threat to the Soviet Union.

The bloodiest war front was the German-Soviet “Eastern Front”.

Airpower advocates have another perspective. Navy advocates another. There is the Army vs. the Marine Corps. MacArthur fans have another. Eisenhower once commented that he had “studied dramatics under MacArthur” for many years.

Then there are the many books still being written that make use of information based on “venona”. [Venona develops a lot on the Soviet manipulations to get the United States into WWII and in which global theaters.] A year ago, Haynes revealed NEW information that had been developed and verified based on venona … 50 years later.
Amen to reading, to learn.

And note that Hastings, in the intro to RETRIBUTION, says that he is in total agreement with Frank and Newman. (Yep. I decided I couldn’t wait for the trade paperback, when I read that).

GKC
 
Amen to reading, to learn.

And note that Hastings, in the intro to RETRIBUTION, says that he is in total agreement with Frank and Newman. (Yep. I decided I couldn’t wait for the trade paperback, when I read that).

GKC
My copy of “Retribution” just arrived by mail, so I can transfer all my “stickies” and still return the library’s copy on time!!

😉

“Retribution” is a massive book and very engrossing.

So I decided to skip around and found really fascinating sections on the B-29 campaign.

My dad was supposed to be on a B-29 flight crew. At the time, the B-29 program was above Top Secret; his orders while he was in basic training got all “messed up” and he ended up as a clerk typist in the Army Signal Corps in the Philippines and up into Osaka.

Decades later he ran into an informal historian who filled him in on what he missed out on … said that in its initial deployment to India and China, the B-29’s had 50% losses.

In “Retribution”, the author, Hastings, goes into a lot of length of the humongous losses the B-29’s endured. As much as 20% per mission. Amazing. And the results were dismal … very few bombs anywhere near the target.

In addition to the terrible mechanical reliability, the fires, the accurate anti-aircraft efforts, and the weather, they discovered the Jet Stream for the first time … 100mph headwinds that not only caused fuel burn “issues”, but also threw bomb aiming accuracy out the window.

The B-29 looked very sleek and photographed well, but it scared the “daylights” out of the crews.

Nowadays losses like that would result in multiple Congressional investigations. But back then, life was brutal and folks accepted what had to be done and the price and cost of doing it.

Hastings does a great job with this book. I want to read the rest of what he has written.
 
a BLOCKADE means that the first people who are going to starve or die from lack of medical care are the noncombatants: women, children, the elderly, foreign workers POWs and anyone else the government considered secondary to national survival.

and can you point to some source indicating that the imperial government was ready to accept an unconditional surrender and/or had communicated that to the allies prior to the first atomic bombing? you are aware that the war faction stated an attempted coup on the day of the surrender?

as one of the recent posters has noted, you really need a lesson in history if you think the IJA and IJN weren’t capable of causing the estimated 50,000 or so american dead.
It seems theres always a drive to one extreme or another here. No possibilities except lose or kill everyone?

America NEVER entertained the possibility of surrender of any kind. The armchair warriors went with, kill everyone or lose. Who says any thousands would have died in a blockade? You are speculating and that is all. The armchair warriors only wanted to end it quickly and they didn’t care how it got done.

What if the blockade went up and food sources would run out in say 3 months, HOWEVER under the Geneva Convention (G. Bush) doesn’t like these words, food and medical supplies were air dropped in WHILE NEGOTIATING??? (remember they have no real defenses at this time, no navy, no airforce.) We have nothing to fear from them. They are helpless and trapped as long as you don’t try to storm their backyard…

Will they all have to fall on their sword? Only the Japanese would know. Will their hearts harden even more? Would they reconsider surrender after treating them with dignity? The point is we all will never know and there is no book that can cover this. I believe it could be a lesson learned.
 
My copy of “Retribution” just arrived by mail, so I can transfer all my “stickies” and still return the library’s copy on time!!

😉

“Retribution” is a massive book and very engrossing.

So I decided to skip around and found really fascinating sections on the B-29 campaign.

My dad was supposed to be on a B-29 flight crew. At the time, the B-29 program was above Top Secret; his orders while he was in basic training got all “messed up” and he ended up as a clerk typist in the Army Signal Corps in the Philippines and up into Osaka.

Decades later he ran into an informal historian who filled him in on what he missed out on … said that in its initial deployment to India and China, the B-29’s had 50% losses.

In “Retribution”, the author, Hastings, goes into a lot of length of the humongous losses the B-29’s endured. As much as 20% per mission. Amazing. And the results were dismal … very few bombs anywhere near the target.

In addition to the terrible mechanical reliability, the fires, the accurate anti-aircraft efforts, and the weather, they discovered the Jet Stream for the first time … 100mph headwinds that not only caused fuel burn “issues”, but also threw bomb aiming accuracy out the window.

The B-29 looked very sleek and photographed well, but it scared the “daylights” out of the crews.

Nowadays losses like that would result in multiple Congressional investigations. But back then, life was brutal and folks accepted what had to be done and the price and cost of doing it.

Hastings does a great job with this book. I want to read the rest of what he has written.
see Army Air Forces Statistical Digest 10% loss per mission was the rough average for B-29s, with the majority being from causes other than AA or enemy fighters (presumably training, operational accidents), not surprising, considering the ranges they had to operate at. the summary for pacific theater B-29s from June '44 to Aug. '45 being 495 lost of which 300 were from “other causes”. I think it had a pretty decent reputation, certainly it was the best of the US heavy or very heavy bombers.
 
My copy of “Retribution” just arrived by mail, so I can transfer all my “stickies” and still return the library’s copy on time!!

😉

“Retribution” is a massive book and very engrossing.

So I decided to skip around and found really fascinating sections on the B-29 campaign.

My dad was supposed to be on a B-29 flight crew. At the time, the B-29 program was above Top Secret; his orders while he was in basic training got all “messed up” and he ended up as a clerk typist in the Army Signal Corps in the Philippines and up into Osaka.

Decades later he ran into an informal historian who filled him in on what he missed out on … said that in its initial deployment to India and China, the B-29’s had 50% losses.

In “Retribution”, the author, Hastings, goes into a lot of length of the humongous losses the B-29’s endured. As much as 20% per mission. Amazing. And the results were dismal … very few bombs anywhere near the target.

In addition to the terrible mechanical reliability, the fires, the accurate anti-aircraft efforts, and the weather, they discovered the Jet Stream for the first time … 100mph headwinds that not only caused fuel burn “issues”, but also threw bomb aiming accuracy out the window.

The B-29 looked very sleek and photographed well, but it scared the “daylights” out of the crews.

Nowadays losses like that would result in multiple Congressional investigations. But back then, life was brutal and folks accepted what had to be done and the price and cost of doing it.

Hastings does a great job with this book. I want to read the rest of what he has written.
The record of the B-29s stationed in the CBI was indeed miserable. But not all that unusual for a sophisticated model just entering service. And a reason that SIlverplate was established, to provide the 509th’s aircraft.

The B-29’s record, under Hansell, in bombing Japan, was similarly non-stellar. And ditto when Lemay first took over XXI Bomber Command.

Unil he switched to low level firebombing. Another story.

I’m about 50 pages into Hastings.

If you haven’t got Frank yet, he covers the same ground, on the B-29.

GKC
 
It may not be reasonable to condemn the use of the atomic bomb out of hand, any more than any other war tactic is condemned.
If that’s true, I’d tend to say “condemn 'em all.” But I’m not convinced that it’s true.
The consequences of not using certain tactics may be losing the war … and losing a war is not an academic exercise.
Neither is losing your soul and leading an entire nation into evil.
The question is: which do we fear more? The enemy, or God?

If there is no possible action (however atrocious) to which defeat would be preferable, then you are not fighting a just war. In fact, you lack the habit of justice which would enable you even to talk about whether a war is just or not. (The “you” here is a hypothetical government–but if you choose to defend such a government, the guilt is on your soul.)
Losing a war traditionally means losing your whole population.
According to what demonic “tradition”? There are few if any wars in history, horrible as they have been, where the loser was simply annihilated. Even Genghis Khan, the major possible exception, probably didn’t annihilate whole populations as often as he claimed (I’ve read that he allowed exaggerated reports of his atrocities to get out in order to terrify people into a quick surrender). And of course most massacres were committed *after *resistance, so insofar as your argument has merit, it’s an argument for pacifism. The best way to avoid the “loss of population” is for the weaker side to surrender immediately and not resist at all. (That is not necessarily a strong argument for pacifism–I think that if pacifism is valid it has to be justified on rather different grounds. But your argument works much better for pacifism than for an anything-it-takes-to-win approach.)

I wasn’t going to jump back into this thread. But I continue to be astounded by the fundamental amorality of the arguments propounded here by normally conservative people.

Edwin
 
It seems theres always a drive to one extreme or another here. No possibilities except lose or kill everyone?

America NEVER entertained the possibility of surrender of any kind. The armchair warriors went with, kill everyone or lose. Who says any thousands would have died in a blockade? You are speculating and that is all. The armchair warriors only wanted to end it quickly and they didn’t care how it got done.

What if the blockade went up and food sources would run out in say 3 months, HOWEVER under the Geneva Convention (G. Bush) doesn’t like these words, food and medical supplies were air dropped in WHILE NEGOTIATING??? (remember they have no real defenses at this time, no navy, no airforce.) We have nothing to fear from them. They are helpless and trapped as long as you don’t try to storm their backyard…

Will they all have to fall on their sword? Only the Japanese would know. Will their hearts harden even more? Would they reconsider surrender after treating them with dignity? The point is we all will never know and there is no book that can cover this. I believe it could be a lesson learned.
Let me guess. You have no idea how much of SEA the Japanese controlled in 1945, or what was happening to the peoples of the area.

GKC
 


What if the blockade went up and food sources would run out in say 3 months, HOWEVER under the Geneva Convention (G. Bush) doesn’t like these words, food and medical supplies were air dropped in WHILE NEGOTIATING??? (remember they have no real defenses at this time, no navy, no airforce.) We have nothing to fear from them. They are helpless and trapped as long as you don’t try to storm their backyard… …
the allies were not ever going to air drop food to the Japanese. that’s incredibly naive to think that such was ever an option. it is just as naive to believe that the military government would feed and care for women, children, foreign workers, allied POWs and let the military starve.

the Japanese land defenses were formidable, both in fortifications, strategy and manpower, as even a casual reading of any of the several sources already cited here will show, and actually underestimated by the allied planners.

the IJN and IJA air forces massed around 15,000 kamikaze aircraft for the invasion, I need to find a public source for an exact number, but history demonstrates about 15% would get through and strike their targets. given the preference to strike troopships, the loss of life was potentially catastrophic.

as has been said many times here, you’ve got to read history.

george bush was a bomber pilot in the war. apart from another ad hom. directed against either him or his son, what does he have to do with this discussion?
 
If that’s true, I’d tend to say “condemn 'em all.” But I’m not convinced that it’s true.

Neither is losing your soul and leading an entire nation into evil.
The question is: which do we fear more? The enemy, or God?

If there is no possible action (however atrocious) to which defeat would be preferable, then you are not fighting a just war. In fact, you lack the habit of justice which would enable you even to talk about whether a war is just or not. (The “you” here is a hypothetical government–but if you choose to defend such a government, the guilt is on your soul.)

According to what demonic “tradition”? There are few if any wars in history, horrible as they have been, where the loser was simply annihilated. Even Genghis Khan, the major possible exception, probably didn’t annihilate whole populations as often as he claimed (I’ve read that he allowed exaggerated reports of his atrocities to get out in order to terrify people into a quick surrender). And of course most massacres were committed *after *resistance, so insofar as your argument has merit, it’s an argument for pacifism. The best way to avoid the “loss of population” is for the weaker side to surrender immediately and not resist at all. (That is not necessarily a strong argument for pacifism–I think that if pacifism is valid it has to be justified on rather different grounds. But your argument works much better for pacifism than for an anything-it-takes-to-win approach.)

I wasn’t going to jump back into this thread. But I continue to be astounded by the fundamental amorality of the arguments propounded here by normally conservative people.

Edwin
I’m not addressing the body of your argument here. But I do maintain that the policy that resulted in 80% fewer casualties, by best estimate, is by far the more moral one.

Edwin, have you read any serious discussion on this matter? From revisionist (Alperovitz, say) to current counter-revisionist (Frank, Newman, Maddux)?

This is history. To understand it, you have to know it.

There was no way to end this war, given the conditions that prevailed, which is what humans have to work with, and nothing else, that would have resulted in fewer casualties than the one taken. Save, of course, the surrender of the United States.

Two bombs. Fewer deaths. End of war. Good.

GKC
 
the allies were not ever going to air drop food to the Japanese. that’s incredibly naive to think that such was ever an option. it is just as naive to believe that the military government would feed and care for women, children, foreign workers, allied POWs and let the military starve.

the Japanese land defenses were formidable, both in fortifications, strategy and manpower, as even a casual reading of any of the several sources already cited here will show, and actually underestimated by the allied planners.

the IJN and IJA air forces massed around 15,000 kamikaze aircraft for the invasion, I need to find a public source for an exact number, but history demonstrates about 15% would get through and strike their targets. given the preference to strike troopships, the loss of life was potentially catastrophic.

as has been said many times here, you’ve got to read history.

george bush was a bomber pilot in the war. apart from another ad hom. directed against either him or his son, what does he have to do with this discussion?
My sources put the available aircraft at between a low of 7,000 and a high of roughly 12,000, IIRC. The potential success rate was estimated to be potentially higher than seen at Iwo Jima and Okinawa, due to the shorter flight paths, with less area to place picket ships in to intercept the Special Units.

GKC
 
My sources put the available aircraft at between a low of 7,000 and a high of roughly 12,000, IIRC. The potential success rate was estimated to be potentially higher than seen at Iwo Jima and Okinawa, due to the shorter flight paths, with less area to place picket ships in to intercept the Special Units.

GKC
but potentially lower because upon the arrival of Bearcat squadrons.

my dad would have been on one of the attack transports and a prime target for sea and air suicide attackers.
 
This is just going to be a general “reply” to many of the responses in this forum. I graduated from high school six months after Pearl Harbor and since I live in San Francisco saw many service men, particularly Navy, leaving to go to the South Pacific.
As I recall history, the Japanese Emperor actually had a speech to his people prepared advising them that Japan was going to surrender, and his Generals wouldn’t permit him to give it. My husband was in the Army and they were preparing to invade Japan and I’m sure many of our men would have died in this invation.
Also I seem to recall that the U.S. demanded “unconditional surrender” and I believe that if we hadn’t made these demands Germany might have surrendered and Hitler may have survived. I don’t know whether any of you remember the Bataan Death March, and in hearing about this terrible situation, Japan was as cruel as any country ever could be.
I attended a public affairs forum last year where a German historian questioned the “morality” of the U.S. bombing German cities. No one at this Forum ever mentioned the bombing each and every night for many months of London, and I truly believe that when all of the World War II veterans pass away Germany is going to change history – they weren’t responsible for the war – Great Britain and the USA was.
 
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