Avoiding absurdity in preaching the Eucharest

[Linusthe2nd]

Post continued.

The application of the foregoing to the Eucharist is an easy matter. First of all the notion of conversion is verified in the Eucharist, not only in general, but in all its essential details. For we have the two extremes of conversion, namely, bread and wine as the terminus a quo, and the Body and Blood of Christ as the terminus ad quem. Furthermore, the intimate connection between the cessation of one extreme and the appearance of the other seems to be preserved by the fact, that both events are the results, not of two independent processes, as, e.g. annihilation and creation, but of one single act, since, according to the purpose of the Almighty, the substance of the bread and wine departs in order to make room for the Body and Blood of Christ. Lastly, we have the commune tertium in the unchanged appearances of bread and wine, under which appearances the pre-existent Christ assumes a new, sacramental mode of being, and without which His Body and Blood could not be partaken of by men. That the consequence of Transubstantiation, as a conversion of the total substance, is the transition of the entire substance of the bread and wine into the Body and Blood of Christ, is the express doctrine of the Church (Council of Trent, Sess. XIII, can. ii). Thus were condemned as contrary to faith the antiquated view of Durandus, that only the substantial form (forma substantialis) of the bread underwent conversion, while the primary matter (materia prima) remained, and, especially, Luther’s doctrine of Consubstantiation, i.e. the coexistence of the substance of the bread with the true Body of Christ. Thus, too, the theory of Impanation advocated by Osiander and certain Berengarians, and according to which a hypostatic union is supposed to take place between the substance of the bread and the God-man (impanatio = Deus panis factus), is authoritatively rejected. So the Catholic doctrine of Transubstantiation sets up a mighty bulwark around the dogma of the Real Presence and constitutes in itself a distinct doctrinal article, which is not involved in that of the Real Presence, though the doctrine of the Real Presence is necessarily contained in that of Transubstantiation. It was for this very reason that Pius VI, in his dogmatic Bull “Auctorem fidei” (1794) against the Jansenistic pseudo Synod of Pistoia (1786), protested most vigorously against suppressing this “scholastic question”, as the synod had advised pastors to do.
(b) In the mind of the Church, Transubstantiation has been so intimately bound up with the Real Presence, that both dogmas have been handed down together from generation to generation, though we cannot entirely ignore a dogmatico-historical development. The total conversion of the substance of bread is expressed clearly in the words of Institution: “This is my body”. These words form, not a theoretical, but a practical proposition, whose essence consists in this, that the objective identity between subject and predicate is effected and verified only after the words have all been uttered, not unlike the pronouncement of a king to a subaltern: “You are a major”, or, “You are a captain”, which would immediately cause the promotion of the officer to a higher command. When, therefore, He Who is All Truth and All Power said of the bread: “This is my body”, the bread became, through the utterance of these words, the Body of Christ; consequently, on the completion of the sentence the substance of bread was no longer present, but the Body of Christ under the outward appearance of bread. Hence the bread must have become the Body of Christ, i.e. the former must have been converted into the latter. The words of Institution were at the same time the words of Transubstantiation. Indeed the actual manner in which the absence of the bread and the presence of the Body of Christ is effected, is not read into the words of Institution but strictly and exegetically deduced from them.

Linus2nd

 

[Linusthe2nd]

post cont.

But it is clear at first blush, that no doubt can be entertained as to the physical reality, or in fact, as to the identity of the accidents before and after Transubstantiation, This physical, and not merely optical, continuance of the Eucharistic accidents was repeatedly insisted upon by the Fathers, and with such excessive rigor that the notion of Transubstantiation seemed to be in danger. Especially against the Monophysites, who based on the Eucharistic conversion an a pari argument in behalf of the supposed conversion of the Humanity of Christ into His Divinity, did the Fathers retort by concluding from the continuance of the unconverted Eucharistic accidents to the unconverted Human Nature of Christ. Both philosophical and theological arguments were also advanced against the Cartesians, as, for instance, the infallible testimony of the senses, the necessity of the commune tertium to complete the idea of Transubstantiation [see above, (3)], the idea of the Sacrament of the Altar as the visible sign of Christ’s invisible Body, the physical signification of Communion as a real partaking of food and drink the striking expression “breaking of bread” (fractio panis), which supposes the divisible reality of the accidents, etc. For all these reasons, theologians consider the physical reality of the accidents as an incontrovertible truth, which cannot without temerity be called in question.

Note that in the section above the physicality of the accidents is emphasized.

As regards the philosophical possibility of the accidents existing without their substance, the older school drew a fine distinction between modal and absolute accidents, By the modal accidents were understood such as could not, being mere modes, be separated from their substance without involving a metaphysical contradiction, e.g. the form and motion of a body. Those accidents were designated absolute, whose objective reality was adequately distinct from the reality of their substance, in such a way that no intrinsic repugnance was involved in their separability, as, e.g., the quantity of a body. Aristotle, himself taught (Metaphys., VI, 3rd ed. of Bekker, p. 1029, a. 13), that quantity was not a corporeal substance, but only a phenomenon of substance. Modern philosophy, on the other hand, has endeavored since the time of John Locke, to reject altogether from the realm of ideas the concept of substance as something imaginary, and to rest satisfied with qualities alone as the excitants of sensation, a view of the material world which the so-called psychology of association and actuality is trying to carry out in its various details. The Catholic Church does not feel called upon to follow up the ephemeral vagaries of these new philosophical systems, but bases her doctrine on the everlasting philosophy of sound reason, which rightly distinguishes between the thing in itself and its characteristic qualities (color, form, size, etc.). Though the “thing in itself” may even remain imperceptible to the senses and therefore be designated in the language of Kant as a noumenon, or in the language of Spencer, the Unknowable, yet we cannot escape the necessity of seeking beneath the appearances the thing which appears, beneath the colour that which is colored beneath the form that which has form, i.e. the substratum or subject which sustains the phenomena. The older philosophy designated the appearances by the name of accidents, the subject of the appearances, by that of substance. It matters little what the terms are, provided the things signified by them are rightly understood. What is particularly important regarding material substances and their accidental qualities, is the necessity of proceeding cautiously in this discussion, since in the domain of natural philosophy the greatest uncertainty reigns even at the present day concerning the nature of matter, one system pulling down what another has reared, as is proved in the latest theories of atomism and energy, of ions and electrons.

Note in this sectin the distinction between substance and accident. Also note the caution at the end about allowing recent trends in natural philosophy seeming to contradict the teaching of faith in these matters.

The old theology tried with St. Thomas Aquinas (III:77) to prove the possibility of absolute accidents on the principles of the Aristotelean-Scholastic hylomorphism, i.e. the system which teaches that the essential constitution of bodies consists in the substantial union of materia prima and forma substantialis. Some theologians of today would seek to come to an understanding with modern science, which bases all natural processes upon the very fruitful theory of energy, by trying with Leibniz to explain the Eucharistic accidentia sine subjecto according to the dynamism of natural philosophy. Assuming, according to this system, a real distinction between force and its manifestations, between energy and its effects, it may be seen that under the influence of the First Cause the energy (substance) necessary for the essence of bread is withdrawn by virtue of conversion, while the effects of energy (accidents) in a miraculous manner continue. For the rest it may be said, that it is far from the Church’s intention to restrict the Catholic’s investigation regarding the doctrine of the Blessed Sacrament to any particular view of natural philosophy or even to require him to establish its truth on the principles of medieval physics; all that the Church demands is, that those theories of material substances be rejected which not only contradict the teaching of the Church, but also are repugnant to experience and sound reason, as Pantheism, Hylozoism, Monism, Absolute Idealism, Cartesianism, etc.

Linus2nd

 

[Linusthe2nd]

post cont.

b) The second problem arises from the Totality of Presence, which means that Christ in His entirety is present in the whole of the Host and in each smallest part thereof, as the spiritual soul is present in the human body [see above, (2)]. The difficulty reaches its climax when we consider that there is no question here of the Soul or the Divinity of Christ, but of His Body, which, with its head, trunk, and members, has assumed a mode of existence spiritual and independent of space, a mode of existence, indeed, concerning which neither experience nor any system of philosophy can have the least inkling. That the idea of conversion of corporeal matter into a spirit can in no way be entertained, is clear from the material substance of the Eucharistic Body itself. Even the above-mentioned separability of quantity from substance gives us no clue to the solution, since according to the best founded opinions not only the substance of Christ’s Body, but by His own wise arrangement, its corporeal quantity, i.e. its full size, with its complete organization of integral members and limbs, is present within the diminutive limits of the Host and in each portion thereof. Later theologians (as Rossignol, Legrand) resorted to the unseemly explanation, according to which Christ is present in diminished form and stature, a sort of miniature body; while others (as Oswald, Fernandez, Casajoana) assumed with no better sense of fitness the mutual compenetration of the members of Christ’s Body to within the narrow compass of the point of a pin. The vagaries of the Cartesians, however, went beyond all bounds. Descartes had already, in a letter to P. Mesland (ed. Emery, Paris, 1811), expressed the opinion, that the identity of Christ’s Eucharistic with His Heavenly Body was preserved by the identity of His Soul, which animated all the Eucharistic Bodies. On this basis, the geometrician Varignon suggested a true multiplication of the Eucharistic Bodies upon earth, which were supposed to be most faithful, though greatly reduced, miniature copies of the prototype, the Heavenly Body of Christ. Nor does the modern theory of n-dimensions throw any light upon the subject; for the Body of Christ is not invisible or impalpable to us because it occupies the fourth dimension, but because it transcends and is wholly independent of space. Such a mode of existence, it is clear, does not come within the scope of physics and mechanics, but belongs to a higher, supernatural order, even as does the Resurrection from the sealed tomb, the passing in and out through closed doors, the Transfiguration of the future glorified risen Body. What explanation may, then, be given of the fact?
The simplest treatment of the subject was that offered by the Schoolmen, especially St. Thomas (III:76:4), They reduced the mode of being to the mode of becoming, i.e. they traced back the mode of existence peculiar to the Eucharistic Body to the Transubstantiation; for a thing has to so “be” as it was in “becoming”, Since ex vi verborum the immediate result is the presence of the Body of Christ, its quantity, present merely per concomitantiam, must follow the mode of existence peculiar to its substance, and, like the latter, must exist without division and extension, i.e. entirely in the whole Host and entirely in each part thereof. In other words, the Body of Christ is present in the sacrament, not after the manner of “quantity” (per modum quantitatis), but of “substance” (per modum substantiæ), Later Scholasticism (Bellarmine, Francisco Suárez, Billuart, and others) tried to improve upon this explanation along other lines by distinguishing between internal and external quantity. By internal quantity (quantitas interna seu in actu primo) is understood that entity, by virtue of which a corporeal substance merely possesses “aptitudinal extension”, i.e. the “capability” of being extended in tri-dimensional space. External quantity, on the other hand (quantitas externa seu in actu secundo), is the same entity, but in so far as it follows its natural tendency to occupy space and actually extends itself in the three dimensions. While aptitudinal extension or internal quantity is so bound up with the essences of bodies that its separability from them involves a metaphysical contradiction, external quantity is, on the other hand, only a natural consequence and effect, which can be so suspended and withheld by the First Cause, that the corporeal substance, retaining its internal quantity, does not extend itself into space. At all events, however plausibly reason may seem to explain the matter, it is nevertheless face to face with a great mystery.

This section is important because it emphasizes just how Christ’s body is present. It is present with every thing we see in a normal living person. But this presence is a spiritual presence which we cannot matter but it escapes all the limitations of earthly matter.

Linus2nd

 

[Linusthe2nd]

One final post dealing with modes of Christ’s bilocation in regard to the Sacrament.

(c) The third and last question has to do with the multilocation of Christ in heaven and upon thousands of altars throughout the world. Since in the natural order of events each body is restricted to one position in space (unilocatio), so that before the law proof of an alibi immediately frees a person from the suspicion of crime, multilocation without further question belongs to the supernatural order. First of all, no intrinsic repugnance can be shown in the concept of multilocation. For if the objection be raised, that no being can exist separated from itself or show forth local distances between its various selves, the sophism is readily detected; for multilocation does not multiply the individual object, but only its external relation to and presence in space. Philosophy distinguishes two modes of presence in creatures:

•the circumscriptive, and
•the definitive.
The first, the only mode of presence proper to bodies, is that by virtue of which an object is confined to a determinate portion of space in such wise that its various parts (atoms, molecules, electrons) also occupy their corresponding positions in that space. The second mode of presence, that properly belonging to a spiritual being, requires the substance of a thing to exist in its entirety in the whole of the space, as well as whole and entire in each part of that space. The latter is the soul’s mode of presence in the human body. The distinction made between these two modes of presence is important, inasmuch as in the Eucharist both kinds are found in combination. For, in the first place, there is verified a continuous definitive multilocation, called also replication, which consists in this, that the Body of Christ is totally present in each part of the continuous and as yet unbroken Host and also totally present throughout the whole Host, just as the human soul is present in the body. And precisely this latter analogy from nature gives us an insight into the possibility of the Eucharistic miracle. For if, as has been seen above, Divine omnipotence can in a supernatural manner impart to a body such a spiritual, unextended, spatially uncircumscribed mode of presence, which is natural to the soul as regards the human body, one may well surmise the possibility of Christ’s Eucharistic Body being present in its entirety in the whole Host, and whole and entire in each part thereof.
There is, moreover, the discontinuous multilocation, whereby Christ is present not only in one Host, but in numberless separate Hosts, whether in the ciborium or upon all the altars throughout the world. The intrinsic possibility of discontinuous multilocation seems to be based upon the non-repugnance of continuous multilocation. For the chief difficulty of the latter appears to be that the same Christ is present in two different parts, A and B, of the continuous Host, it being immaterial whether we consider the distant parts A and B joined by the continuous line AB or not. The marvel does not substantially increase, if by reason of the breaking of the Host, the two parts A and B are now completely separated from each other. Nor does it matter how great the distance between the parts may be. Whether or not the fragments of a Host are distant one inch or a thousand miles from one another is altogether immaterial in this consideration; we need not wonder, then, if Catholics adore their Eucharistic Lord at one and the same time in New York, London, and Paris. Finally, mention must be made of mixed multilocation, since Christ with His natural dimensions reigns in heaven, whence he does not depart, and at the same time dwells with His Sacramental Presence in numberless places throughout the world. This third case would be in perfect accordance with the two foregoing, were we per impossible permitted to imagine that Christ were present under the appearances of bread exactly as He is in heaven and that He had relinquished His natural mode of existence. This, however, would be but one more marvel of God’s omnipotence. Hence no contradiction is noticeable in the fact, that Christ retains His natural dimensional relations in heaven and at the same time takes up His abode upon the altars of earth.

There is, furthermore, a fourth kind of multilocation, which, however, has not been realized in the Eucharist, but would be, if Christ’s Body were present in its natural mode of existence both in heaven and on earth. Such a miracle might be assumed to have occurred in the conversion of St. Paul before the gates of Damascus, when Christ in person said to him: “Saul, Saul, why persecutest thou me?” So too the bilocation of saints, sometimes read of in the pages of hagiography, as, e.g., in the case of St. Alphonsus Liguori, cannot be arbitrarily cast aside as untrustworthy. The Thomists and some later theologians, it is true, reject this kind of multilocation as intrinsically impossible and declare bilocation to be nothing more than an “apparition” without corporeal presence. But Cardinal De Lugo is of opinion, and justly so, that to deny its possibility might reflect unfavorably upon the Eucharistic multilocation itself. If there were question of the vagaries of many Nominalists, as, e.g., that a bilocated person could be living in Paris and at the same time dying in London, hating in Paris and at the same time loving in London, the impossibility would be as plain as day, since an individual, remaining such as he is, cannot be the subject of contrary propositions, since they exclude one another. The case assumes a different aspect, when wholly external contrary propositions, relating to position in space, are used in reference to the bilocated individual. In such a bilocation, which leaves the principle of contradiction intact, it would be hard to discover an intrinsic impossibility.

Linus2nd

 

[thinkandmull]

**Trent didn’t say you had to read Aristotle in order to understand its teaching. I don’t believe “matter - form” is the substance, because the matter clearly remains the same. I’ve looked the host with all the clarity and awake fullness I had, and my senses say there is bread. Substance is nothing in the “other world”, otherwise you are saying that the matter is an illusion **

 

[thinkandmull]

What you are describing here is not transubstantiation, which is the Catholic view, but rather consubstantiation, which is the view of some mainline Protestant churches. Consubstantiation is the midway position between transubstantiation in the Eucharist and the Eucharist being purely symbolic. It says that the bread and wine are still there substantially but Christ also is present somehow substantially too. But that contradicts what Christ Himself said on the matter, that “this” (referring to the bread) is my body, not my body is associated with this bread.

I think the difficulty you are having is in assuming that “substance” is really just a bundle of specific properties. “Substance” or “essence” as I understand it is that principle by which the properties are unified. So you cannot technically say “oh, the properties aren’t there, therefore the essence is not there” with certainty since the essence is fundamentally prior to the properties but of course, on the other hand, you cannot know that the essence of Christ is really there on anything other than faith.

This issue really does seem to ultimately come down to Christ asking you “who do you say that I am.”

I am the one who is saying what you said in the second paragraph. Substance is not something that is sensed, although the matter which colors inhere in is. You are rebelling against Trent in saying that Jesus is the accidents. Neither I nor Ratzinger, who supported what I said in a number of his books, believe that substance of bread remains after Transubstantiation

 

[thinkandmull]

Trent says the “Eucharistic species” is not identical to Christ. Read the quotes from the CCC and Trent from david previously

 

[CrossofChrist]

In general, the physical attributes of a thing (what my 5 senses detect) enable us to come to what that thing is–the quiddity. For instance, a piece of bread has certain physical qualities that lead me to conclude that what I am dealing with is something of ordinary matter that signifies a piece of food. The only reason I should doubt my senses–whose reliability is founded on God who has created a rational world–is if a greater authority than my reason says so. In the case of the Eucharist, God has revealed that it is the Body of Christ. So perceiving certain physical attributes of the Eucharist, I see it looks and seems like common bread in every way. But God has revealed that it is the Body of Christ, and so both what the Eucharist signifies (Christ) and what it actually is materially (Christ) is the same.

But if you equate matter with what we perceive with our senses (the physical structure of the Eucharist) the above won’t make much sense. On the other hand, if our perception of reality is no different from matter, then it seems matter becomes an illusion. The quiddity of everything would have to be immaterial (since matter is now an accidental quality) and that creates problems (visible creation is essentially denied–pun intended). For just one example of how this creates problems, the soul and the body are both defining aspects of what the human person is.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

Actually it is. The substance is the matter - form structure which exists. What we touch and feel and see, etc are exactly physical qualities which are properly the accidents of quantity, according to Aquinas in the reference I gave Thinkandmull. I recommend that you read the references for yourself.

Linus2nd

I dont agree with “If Jesus is not the accidents, than it can be said in a sense that the host is not Him”.

If you disagree with me then you agree with this statement?

 

[Linusthe2nd]

I dont agree with “If Jesus is not the accidents, than it can be said in a sense that the host is not Him”.

If you disagree with me then you agree with this statement?

I think you misunderstand. Trent made it clear that Jesus was not a part of the accidents, nor were they a part of him. Trent, in its explanation, used the phrase " under the accidents " to describe the mode of Christ’s presence. The Catechism of Trent describe the accidents as a " veil " for Christ’s presence. But the fact is that Christ’s presence permeates the accidents, every atom or them, without being a part of them. The long reference I gave from the Catholic Encyclopedia also makes this clear. Remember that though Christ’s presence is indeed physical, it is a Glorified or spiritualised body that is present. As a spiritualized mode of presence, it is not restricted by the strictures of earthly matter, it transcends or passes through earthly matter. But it is present wherever the earthly matter is present. So when we receive the host, we do receive Christ. But it is not the host which is Christ. But he is in the host; as in, he totally permeates each particle but is not a part of it.

Linus2nd

 

[fred_conty]

I think you misunderstand. Trent made it clear that Jesus was not a part of the accidents, nor were they a part of him. Trent, in its explanation, used the phrase " under the accidents " to describe the mode of Christ’s presence. The Catechism of Trent describe the accidents as a " veil " for Christ’s presence. But the fact is that Christ’s presence permeates the accidents, every atom or them, without being a part of them. The long reference I gave from the Catholic Encyclopedia also makes this clear. Remember that though Christ’s presence is indeed physical, it is a Glorified or spiritualised body that is present. As a spiritualized mode of presence, it is not restricted by the strictures of earthly matter, it transcends or passes through earthly matter. But it is present wherever the earthly matter is present. So when we receive the host, we do receive Christ. But it is not the host which is Christ. But he is in the host; as in, he totally permeates each particle but is not a part of it.

Linus2nd

That was well said.

 

[balto]

I am the one who is saying what you said in the second paragraph. Substance is not something that is sensed, although the matter which colors inhere in is.

Well if you don’t mean by what you actually wrote earlier in this thread, then it is good that the course of this conversation has drawn out what you apparently really mean.

You are rebelling against Trent in saying that Jesus is the accidents.

Obviously you have me confused with someone else because I don’t seem to remember claiming that “Jesus is the accidents.” It would be a little silly to claim something like that, given that accidents inhere in subjects and are not subjects themselves. So yes, the subject of the accidents of the host is Christ just as the subject of the human body that was crucified in the 1st century Palestine is the same Christ. I think Blue Horizon’s analysis is probably correct.

Neither I nor Ratzinger, who supported what I said in a number of his books, believe that substance of bread remains after Transubstantiation

Then why did you write this:

If Jesus is not the accidents, than it can be said in a sense that the host is not Him

So you have Christ and “not-Christ” present which is two substances. I don’t see how else to interpret that statement except as a defense of consubstantiation so maybe you need to clarify your position more.

 

[thinkandmull]

In general, the physical attributes of a thing (what my 5 senses detect) enable us to come to what that thing is–the quiddity. For instance, a piece of bread has certain physical qualities that lead me to conclude that what I am dealing with is something of ordinary matter that signifies a piece of food. The only reason I should doubt my senses–whose reliability is founded on God who has created a rational world–is if a greater authority than my reason says so. In the case of the Eucharist, God has revealed that it is the Body of Christ. So perceiving certain physical attributes of the Eucharist, I see it looks and seems like common bread in every way. But God has revealed that it is the Body of Christ, and so both what the Eucharist signifies (Christ) and what it actually is materially (Christ) is the same.

But if you equate matter with what we perceive with our senses (the physical structure of the Eucharist) the above won’t make much sense. On the other hand, if our perception of reality is no different from matter, then it seems matter becomes an illusion. The quiddity of everything would have to be immaterial (since matter is now an accidental quality) and that creates problems (visible creation is essentially denied–pun intended). For just one example of how this creates problems, the soul and the body are both defining aspects of what the human person is.

But the matter that is sensed when the five senses apprehend the host is not Jesus in the sense in which He is not bread. The soul vs body actually gives an analogy of this

 

[thinkandmull]

I think you misunderstand. Trent made it clear that Jesus was not a part of the accidents, nor were they a part of him. Trent, in its explanation, used the phrase " under the accidents " to describe the mode of Christ’s presence. The Catechism of Trent describe the accidents as a " veil " for Christ’s presence. But the fact is that Christ’s presence permeates the accidents, every atom or them, without being a part of them. The long reference I gave from the Catholic Encyclopedia also makes this clear. Remember that though Christ’s presence is indeed physical, it is a Glorified or spiritualised body that is present. As a spiritualized mode of presence, it is not restricted by the strictures of earthly matter, it transcends or passes through earthly matter. But it is present wherever the earthly matter is present. So when we receive the host, we do receive Christ. But it is not the host which is Christ. But he is in the host; as in, he totally permeates each particle but is not a part of it.

Linus2nd

I agree except in that there must be something with regard to the relativity of space involved here because we shouldn’t say a spiritual body becomes the shape of the host

 

[thinkandmull]

Well if you don’t mean by what you actually wrote earlier in this thread, then it is good that the course of this conversation has drawn out what you apparently really mean.

Obviously you have me confused with someone else because I don’t seem to remember claiming that “Jesus is the accidents.” It would be a little silly to claim something like that, given that accidents inhere in subjects and are not subjects themselves. So yes, the subject of the accidents of the host is Christ just as the subject of the human body that was crucified in the 1st century Palestine is the same Christ. I think Blue Horizon’s analysis is probably correct.

Then why did you write this:

So you have Christ and “not-Christ” present which is two substances. I don’t see how else to interpret that statement except as a defense of consubstantiation so maybe you need to clarify your position more.

1. I said right from the start that the substance that is changed is other than the “substance” of which white is an accident of in the bread
2. The subject of the accidents is not Jesus in the sense in which they inhere in Him. Also, Aquinas’s article Whether Light is a Quality speaks of the accident of light having warmth as an accident. An accident can be a quality. He says that also in his commentary on Sense and Sensible. The matter of the host is a substance together the heavenly substance, one thing, and after consecration it is just accidents (color) of the accident of matter.
3. As quoted earlier in this discussion, Trent said that Jesus is “under the Eucharestic specis” of bread. That why it says He is “in the Eucharest”. The writer James Larson also attacked Ratzinger for saying “in the Eucharest” instead of “is the Eucharest” until I should him that the Church has used the first phrase as well. His thesis “war on being” is a disaster

 

[thinkandmull]

Some important questions:

1. There are the accidents only of bread. So does that mean we have prime matter there?
2. If there is no (secondary) *breadness *of the accidences, than how can we saw there is accidents of bread at all, since the unity is gone. To say there are accidents of the components of bread is not what Trent says

 

[davidv]

Some important questions:

1. There are the accidents only of bread. So does that mean we have prime matter there?

What does one (accidents) have to do with the other (prime matter)? I fail to see any connection.

1. If there is no (secondary) *breadness *of the accidences, than how can we saw there is accidents of bread at all, since the unity is gone.

Seems to me that is the miracle of the Eucharist. The substance changed, but the appearance did not.

To say there are accidents of the components of bread is not what Trent says

Could you restate this? I have no idea what meaning you intend.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

I agree except in that there must be something with regard to the relativity of space involved here because we shouldn’t say a spiritual body becomes the shape of the host

If you reread the information I have provided you will see that the Whole Christ is present under each atom of the species. It is not a question of a spirtual body taking the shape of the host or wine, it is a question of filling the " space " which the species occupies.

Linus2nd

 

[thinkandmull]

I don’t think I’ve said something different than Linus. What I am trying to get at is how much reality the accidents have. I don’t think matter needs a prime matter principle, but is it does, does the accidents have it. What type of unity do the accidents have? It’s not the accidents of water and flour, but both together, but why, since the substance is gone. I understand how to address that, but I was wondering how others on here who thought I was a Lutheran would answer these matters

 

[Linusthe2nd]

I agree except in that there must be something with regard to the relativity of space involved here because we shouldn’t say a spiritual body becomes the shape of the host

I didn’t say that. Christ is present to the host and wine in a way analygous to the way the human soul is present to the body. He is totally and wholely present in every particle and drop. That is not the same as saying he " becomes the shape of the host. " He does not become the shape of the host.

Linus2nd