Can a materialist conception of the mind really preserve free will?

[polytropos]

The law of conservation of energy precludes the existence of free will which implies the existence of a **non-natural **form of energy (rejected on principle by materialists).

This is an open question. Even with a form of dualism I don’t see any reason to suppose that the conservation of energy must be violated.

 

[SentinelofTruth]

polytropos:

This is an open question. Even with a form of dualism I don’t see any reason to suppose that the conservation of energy must be violated.

True, it doesn’t have to be violated. But it’s intuitive to think that it is.
Besides, the law of conservation is already violated by phenomena like fire, which generates mass amounts of energy). So how foolish to use a disproven law as an argument anyway.

 

[polytropos]

True, it doesn’t have to be violated. But it’s intuitive to think that it is.

This might be the impression in the case of Cartesian dualism, in which the mind is a distinct substance which would have to act on the body in some way.

Besides, the law of conservation is already violated by phenomena like fire, which generates mass amounts of energy). So how foolish to use a disproven law as an argument anyway.

Errrrm, no, I don’t believe it is. In combustion, the energy released is the energy that was stored in chemical bonds in whatever is burning. No energy is created or destroyed.

 

[Peter_Plato]

True, it doesn’t have to be violated. But it’s intuitive to think that it is.
Besides, the law of conservation is already violated by phenomena like fire, which generates mass amounts of energy). So how foolish to use a disproven law as an argument anyway.

What?

How does fire “generate” energy as opposed to release or convert it from another form? Recall that matter and energy are convertible.

 

[tonyrey]

This is an open question. Even with a form of dualism I don’t see any reason to suppose that the conservation of energy must be violated.

Isn’t free will a form of spiritual energy that cannot be detected by scientific instruments?

 

[polytropos]

Isn’t free will a form of spiritual energy that cannot be detected by scientific instruments?

I would not say so. I’m not sure what “spiritual energy” would be. I would be more inclined to say that it is just a fact about the way that man is actualized by his soul, but there does not seem to be anything to suggest that there needs to be a disparity in energy. Free will, however you define it, would, I think, not be something that is “present” but a characteristic of the way something acts.

 

[SentinelofTruth]

polytropos:

Errrrm, no, I don’t believe it is. In combustion, the energy released is the energy that was stored in chemical bonds in whatever is burning. No energy is created or destroyed.

I don’t mean to turn this into a science debate, but how can energy be “stored” in a chemical bond (do you mean a covalent bond)?

polytropos:

This might be the impression in the case of Cartesian dualism, in which the mind is a distinct substance which would have to act on the body in some way.

Do you imply that the soul does not act on the body? If so then it would seem free will cannot determine our actions…

 

[polytropos]

I don’t mean to turn this into a science debate, but how can energy be “stored” in a chemical bond (do you mean a covalent bond)?

Covalent, ionic, or whatever other bond.

Energy is actually released when bonds form, since certain atoms/molecules are attracted to each other and their bonding places them in a more stable state. In the case of combustion (of, say, wood), the bonds are broken (requiring an (name removed by moderator)ut of energy) and reformed (requiring an output of energy), the net result being an evolution of energy (this is why you need fire/heat to start a fire - you have to break the bonds first to start the reaction, when then evolves more energy than it requires).

Do you imply that the soul does not act on the body? If so then it would seem free will cannot determine our actions…

In a human substance, there is not a clear cut distinction between soul and body. The body’s acting is the soul’s acting. The soul is not separate and in need of acting on the body.

 

[Bagheera]

polytropos:

I think that the necessary condition I offered for free will is about all we need. My contention is that if one seeks a lower bar for free will, then free will will end up being trivial (ie. if free will just is indeterminism), while materialism is compatible with any definition of free will that meets my necessary condition. This is obviously a generalization, so if someone thinks they have a definition of free will that evades my claim, then they should provide it.

Unfortunately that does not help. Here is one of the usually accepted definitions of free will (yes, there are others), and this is what I accept:

1. The agent wishes to achieve some goal.
2. There are at least two different paths to obtain that goal.
3. The locus of decision rests with the agent, in other words, there is no external causative factor which would force the agent to choose one. (This force could be physical or psychological)

That is all. There is no word being said about the internal process employed by the agent.

This is what you said:

polytropos:

By materialist hypothesis, my mental activity is also fully represented by reductively neural activity.

What do you mean by “reductively”? The brain’s activity (the mind) cannot be reduced to the interaction of the electrons, just like the “wetness” of water cannot be reduced to the properties of oxygen and hydrogen. “Wetness” is an emergent attribute, just like the “mind” is an emergent attribute.

By the same token, an object, which is made up of carbon atoms (and nothing else) is NOT fully represented by those atoms. There is also the connection between the atoms – which is NOT a physical object. The same atoms can be arranged in a flat, hexagonal format (graphite), or they can be arranged in the shape of an octahedron (diamond), and the properties of graphite and diamond cannot be reduced to the same building blocks (carbon atoms).

What you seem to say is like the reductionist view and no “self-respecting” and scientifically trained materialist holds it. Keep in mind that the materialist view does not deny the immaterial aspects of reality, to wit: “activities”, “properties” and “relationships”. None of these are physical objects and yet they cannot exist “on their own” without the physical underlying reality. No materialist would argue that “concepts” are material objects (even though there are quite a few idiots who keep on harping about putting “love” and “beauty” under a microscope).

Admittedly we are barely scratching the surface of neurophysics. The activity of the brain – the mind – has a two-way connection to the “hardware”. The external information creates new pathways, modifying the cellular structures, and also the thinking has a feedback and creates new neural connections (even if one is deprived of all external stimuli). On the other hand the thoughts are electro-chemical activity of the brain. The evidence for this is very strong. “Messing” with the hardware you disturb the working. There is another thing which makes the problem even more complicated. The working of the brain consists of two parts, the conscious and the subconscious. “Where” does the decision making process take place is not known.

 

[polytropos]

Unfortunately that does not help. Here is one of the usually accepted definitions of free will (yes, there are others), and this is what I accept:

1. The agent wishes to achieve some goal.
2. There are at least two different paths to obtain that goal.
3. The locus of decision rests with the agent, in other words, there is no external causative factor which would force the agent to choose one. (This force could be physical or psychological)

That is all. There is no word being said about the internal process employed by the agent.

So, essentially you are defining free will by appearance?

However, the problem is that what I am arguing in the OP is that the agent may “conceptually” “wish” to achieve some goal, but there is not a “locus of decision” that rests with the agent, since the wish (which has to be construed as a part of the supervenient mental) does not have any formal causal influence on efferent brain activity (lest we become dualists).

What do you mean by “reductively”? The brain’s activity (the mind) cannot be reduced to the interaction of the electrons, just like the “wetness” of water cannot be reduced to the properties of oxygen and hydrogen. “Wetness” is an emergent attribute, just like the “mind” is an emergent attribute.

Emergent does not necessarily mean non-reductive. The properties of water can be largely accounted for by the properties of individual water molecules, even though an individual water molecule may not demonstrate such properties (ie. cohesion). To say that mental activity is reductively identified with brain states is to say that those brain states are taken to be a sufficient explanation for the mental activity.

What you seem to say is like the reductionist view and no “self-respecting” and scientifically trained materialist holds it.

Alex Rosenberg? Paul and Patricia Churchland? They are more reductionist that I am making out the materialist view to be. They are certainly scientifically trained - although, given that they have abolished the self, it might be hard to count them among the self-respecting.

Keep in mind that the materialist view does not deny the immaterial aspects of reality, to wit: “activities”, “properties” and “relationships”. None of these are physical objects and yet they cannot exist “on their own” without the physical underlying reality. No materialist would argue that “concepts” are material objects (even though there are quite a few idiots who keep on harping about putting “love” and “beauty” under a microscope).

I am not saying that the materialist view must deny it. You are right, though, that concepts are not material objects and cannot exist on their own. This is why the conceptual framework which supervenes on the brain must be reductively explained by neural activity; materialists can think of them as distinct onta if they want to define them as such, but they can’t have causal efficacy in their theory.

On the other hand the thoughts are electro-chemical activity of the brain.

This is all that I mean that the materialist is committed to when I use the word “reductively.”

 

[Bahman]

Materialist point of view can neither describe free will nor consciousness. State of matter and field evolve based on law of nature which are deterministic, ignoring randomness. Each action or experience is represented by an singularity in electromagnetic acclivity of our brain but the underlying law is determinist. This means the action so called free will cannot be assigned to brain since it is an indeterminsitic event. This also means that any indeterministic event occurring in brain is the result of self/soul.

 

[SentinelofTruth]

Energy is actually released when bonds form, since certain atoms/molecules are attracted to each other and their bonding places them in a more stable state.

If it’s released, then it must have been stored. Where was it, then?

polytropos:

In a human substance, there is not a clear cut distinction between soul and body. The body’s acting is the soul’s acting. The soul is not separate and in need of acting on the body.

How is the soul not separate? It is of completely different nature. It lacks a single characteristic (except existence, which doesn’t really count) in common with the body. Also, to say that the distinction is “not clear cut” implies that it is gradiental, rather than rigid. And if it is a gradient, then there must be something in the middle. Something that is not clearly either bodily or spiritual, but is somehow “both”. I can’t think of anything like that.

 

[polytropos]

If it’s released, then it must have been stored. Where was it, then?

Energy is released because the atoms have gone to a more stable (lower free energy) state. If the free energy of the products is lower than the free energy of the reactants, then energy is evolved. It was “stored” in that the products were of a higher energy than the reactants. Honestly, I’m not sure why it is up for debate whether combustion conserves energy.

How is the soul not separate? It is of completely different nature. It lacks a single characteristic (except existence, which doesn’t really count) in common with the body. Also, to say that the distinction is “not clear cut” implies that it is gradiental, rather than rigid. And if it is a gradient, then there must be something in the middle. Something that is not clearly either bodily or spiritual, but is somehow “both”. I can’t think of anything like that.

This topic is about materialism, which does not even admit of a soul. But you know that I am not a Cartesian dualist, so I do not agree that the soul is not “of a completely different nature.” The distinction is not clear cut because all substances are compounds of matter and form, and human substances are no exception.

It is not about characteristics shared by soul and body; it is about the fact that neither soul nor body can be concretely separated from the ontologically primary human substance.

 

[Bagheera]

polytropos:

So, essentially you are defining free will by appearance?

No. Free will is defined by the three criteria. Appearance has nothing to do with it.

polytropos:

However, the problem is that what I am arguing in the OP is that the agent may “conceptually” “wish” to achieve some goal, but there is not a “locus of decision” that rests with the agent, since the wish (which has to be construed as a part of the supervenient mental) does not have any formal causal influence on efferent brain activity (lest we become dualists).

Dualism has nothing to with it. According to the current understanding, the brain activity “corresponds” to the thoughts, and the thoughts also modify the neural network. Any time we receive an external stimulus, the neural network changes, memory is established. But this “external” stimulus is not required, even if one simply sits and contemplates one’s belly-button, the neural network also changes. These are observed physical changes. You seem to argue that the thought process has nothing to do with the neural network. This would be a purely scientific claim, and as such what you say: “the wish does not have any formal causal influence on efferent brain activity”, and such a claim needs to be established.

polytropos:

Emergent does not necessarily mean non-reductive. The properties of water can be largely accounted for by the properties of individual water molecules, even though an individual water molecule may not demonstrate such properties (ie. cohesion).

You are taking about something different. I am talking about reducing the “wetness” of the water to the oxygen and hydrogen atoms, not the water molecules. I could even go further “down” and look at the quarks, which form the atoms. You cannot explain “wetness” by looking at the quarks.

polytropos:

You are right, though, that concepts are not material objects and cannot exist on their own.

Not just concepts. Attributes and relationships as well. A proposition that “object A is behind object B” presupposes the existence of these two objects, and also an observer, whose position is fundamental to the relationship of “between”. And a position is not a physical object either. The materialist view is loaded with non-material entities; what it denies that these non-material entities are somehow “transcendent” or “supernatural”.

Activities are not material objects either. The activity of walking is not a physical object either, and even though it is impossible without the legs, that does not make walking “supernatural”.

polytropos:

This is why the conceptual framework which supervenes on the brain must be reductively explained by neural activity; materialists can think of them as distinct onta if they want to define them as such, but they can’t have causal efficacy in their theory.

Sorry, I have no idea what this sentence means.

polytropos:

This is all that I mean that the materialist is committed to when I use the word “reductively.”

What of it? The thoughts do not have a one-to-one correspondence to the brain-states. The same thought can be reflected by different brain-states, and the same brain-state can reflect different thoughts. None of these points to some “soul”, it simply means that the activity is very complex.

 

[Peter_Plato]

Originally Posted by polytropos
This is why the conceptual framework which supervenes on the brain must be reductively explained by neural activity; materialists can think of them as distinct onta if they want to define them as such, but they can’t have causal efficacy in their theory.

I am taking Polytropos to mean that any “conceptual framework” that supervenes on the brain must derive or “emerge” from neural activity under a materialist conception and even if these are to be viewed as distinct “onta” by materialists such emergent qualities cannot have causal efficacy of the kind required by free will.

In a previous post, you pointed to arrangements of carbon atoms as “non-physical,” which you implied were a kind of “format” of atoms not reducible to the atoms themselves.

By the same token, an object, which is made up of carbon atoms (and nothing else) is NOT fully represented by those atoms. There is also the connection between the atoms – which is NOT a physical object. The same atoms can be arranged in a flat, hexagonal format (graphite), or they can be arranged in the shape of an octahedron (diamond), and the properties of graphite and diamond cannot be reduced to the same building blocks (carbon atoms).

In these cases - hexagonal or octagonal forms of carbon - the formats might be, similarly, viewed as “onta” of carbon. These forms of carbon are not emergent properties, strictly speaking, but rather imposed by external factors on carbon.

Even if something akin to this process occurs from without to produce “conceptual frameworks” as an aspect of brain function, this would also not be sufficient to entail free will, which can be neither an emergent property of brain function nor the result of the interplay between environmental factors and brain function.

Polytropos point, if I read him correctly, is that the mere existence of “onta” under a materialist’s view is not sufficient to explain novel causal possibilities of the kind required by conceptions of free will.

 

[N0X3x]

This post is directed at varieties of materialist philosophy of mind which hold that all mental activity in some way “supervenes” upon neural activity. What I am essentially arguing is that there is a lite interaction problem for materialists, the resolution of which necessitates the denial of free will…

If I had read this a month ago, I would have agreed with you. strict materialism, with no room for the spirit to influence neural activity, would be incompatible with free will.

However, I have recently considered another line of thought which would allow for both
a fully materialistic universe (where all physical events are either random or have physical causes), and a spiritual, conscious observer with free will.

as I understand it, the many worlds hypothesis holds that for each random quantum event that occurs, there is an alternate universe in which that random event does not occur, and so there is an extremely large, perhaps infinite, number of universes. By this reasoning, every possible quantum event that can happen actually does. The entire multiverse, then, viewed from a fifth-dimensional perspective, would look like a large tree, with branches analogous to various timelines.

Perhaps our wills can, to a certain degree, choose the timeline it wants to experience, by choosing timelines where quantum events affect brain states in a way that conforms to the will.

Just an idea that probably involves a lot of bad physics, but it seems to fit with what I know.

 

[polytropos]

No. Free will is defined by the three criteria. Appearance has nothing to do with it.

OK, but my objection to the second criterium still holds. I am objecting that even if it appears that “the locus of decision rests with the agent,” there are not actually two paths open to the agent; the agent may seem to have a choice, but does not, since his actions are either determined or random, neither of which can produce a substantive free will.

According to the current understanding, the brain activity “corresponds” to the thoughts, and the thoughts also modify the neural network. Any time we receive an external stimulus, the neural network changes, memory is established. But this “external” stimulus is not required, even if one simply sits and contemplates one’s belly-button, the neural network also changes. These are observed physical changes. You seem to argue that the thought process has nothing to do with the neural network. This would be a purely scientific claim, and as such what you say: “the wish does not have any formal causal influence on efferent brain activity”, and such a claim needs to be established.

I am not arguing that the thought process has nothing to do with the neural network. I am saying that the wish qua wish (ie. qua concept) is not what has a causal influence on efferent brain activity. The wish supervenes on some brain structure, but it is the brain structure on which it supervenes that has causal efficacy, not the wish. So what I might object to is the idea that “the thoughts modify the neural network” (bolded above). One can speak of some neural firing pattern (however complex) and one can speak of what (conceptual) thoughts supervene on the neural firing pattern. But what supervenes cannot actually have any causal efficacy because it is conceptual; only the firing pattern, which can represent certain thoughts and be associated with certain thoughts, can have causal efficacy.

You seem to be using thought in a slightly different sense than I am. I would associate “thought” with the conceptual content of what I have called the “conceptual nexus.” A thought is what supervenes on a brain state. There seem to be two routes open: one can agree with my use of “thought,” or one could say that the thought is a brain state; but then, my argument would be that thoughts cannot be free, ie. they are either determined or random, and if a thought seems to have some possibility of leading to two possible options, it is only an illusion; ie. the subsequent thought is either determined or unrelated to the original thought (in which the agent’s “decision” is rooted, if anywhere).

The fact that the neural network changes is really not relevant. I have not claimed that it doesn’t.

I am talking about reducing the “wetness” of the water to the oxygen and hydrogen atoms, not the water molecules. I could even go further “down” and look at the quarks, which form the atoms. You cannot explain “wetness” by looking at the quarks.

You say we cannot reduce wetness to oxygen and hydrogen atoms. Then my questions are: (a) can we reduce wetness to water molecules? and (b) can we reduce a water molecule to oxygen and hydrogen?

I would agree that a water molecule is not just oxygen and hydrogen; I would agree that wetness is not just oxygen and hydrogen; I would agree that thoughts (on any conception) are not just action potentials, neurotransmitters, and brain states. But reductionism does not preclude that a water molecule is oxygen and hydrogen with a particular structure. In that respect, some concept, say, on the conceptual nexus which supervenes on a brain state is identified and reduced to a brain state (it is not relevant whether that is a unique brain state, since I’ve claimed no such thing).

Not just concepts. Attributes and relationships as well. A proposition that “object A is behind object B” presupposes the existence of these two objects, and also an observer, whose position is fundamental to the relationship of “between”. And a position is not a physical object either. The materialist view is loaded with non-material entities; what it denies that these non-material entities are somehow “transcendent” or “supernatural”.

Activities are not material objects either. The activity of walking is not a physical object either, and even though it is impossible without the legs, that does not make walking “supernatural”.

Right, this is what I would attribute to a (non-eliminativist) materialist view.

The activity of walking is not a physical object. But it is explained by the relationships among physical objects.

Sorry, I have no idea what this sentence means.

Peter Plato, I think, has explained my meaning adequately. (And I think this post should clarify/restate.)

The thoughts do not have a one-to-one correspondence to the brain-states. The same thought can be reflected by different brain-states, and the same brain-state can reflect different thoughts.

No one has claimed that thoughts have a one-to-one correspondence to brain states. They do need to have a correspondence to brain states, however, and it must be true that a conceptual thought does not have causal efficacy, but only a brain state.

(That said, can you substantiate the claim that the same brain state can reflect different thoughts? Two brain states can be identical in every way and yet a different thought could “emerge from” or “supervene on” them? This seems implausible to me, on the materialist view. This would almost seem to entail that thoughts are determined by something other than brain states. Please correct me if I am misunderstanding your meaning.)

 

[polytropos]

However, I have recently considered another line of thought which would allow for both
a fully materialistic universe (where all physical events are either random or have physical causes), and a spiritual, conscious observer with free will.

If there is a “spiritual, conscious observer with free will,” then it would seem that it’s not materialism anymore. Cartesian dualism tends to keep step with materialism (roughly speaking) until it reaches the mind.

as I understand it, the many worlds hypothesis holds that for each random quantum event that occurs, there is an alternate universe in which that random event does not occur, and so there is an extremely large, perhaps infinite, number of universes. By this reasoning, every possible quantum event that can happen actually does. The entire multiverse, then, viewed from a fifth-dimensional perspective, would look like a large tree, with branches analogous to various timelines.

Perhaps our wills can, to a certain degree, choose the timeline it wants to experience, by choosing timelines where quantum events affect brain states in a way that conforms to the will.

Just an idea that probably involves a lot of bad physics, but it seems to fit with what I know.

Whether a multiverse is something we should take as straight ontology is debatable. But in any case, there seem to be issues with this:

• (as you perhaps intended it), the observer still needs to be spiritual, or else we’d have to figure out some materialistic course of action for an observer to “choose” one alternate world rather than all of the others; a purely material force, surely, could not determine quantum events
• if we take all of the alternate universes as real, then we actually have infinite observers for any given event/decision - so why think of one particular observer as, say, crossing over from one world to another? wouldn’t it make sense, instead, to say that in each universe, there is a distinct observer whose decision is “made” by a random quantum event?

 

[Peter_Plato]

You are taking about something different. I am talking about reducing the “wetness” of the water to the oxygen and hydrogen atoms, not the water molecules. I could even go further “down” and look at the quarks, which form the atoms. You cannot explain “wetness” by looking at the quarks.

In a very real sense, wetness has nothing, essentially, to do with the molecules of water and hydrogen, but rather with the effects these have on the neural structure of human beings. In that sense, wetness is completely unrelated to or disconnected from the physical stimulus that creates the sensation of wetness.

It need not be obviously stated that wetness is causally inert, regarding molecules of water, but, in sense, substantive free will is akin to having a quality like wetness be, in fact, causally effectual, in some sense.

 

[N0X3x]

If there is a “spiritual, conscious observer with free will,” then it would seem that it’s not materialism anymore. Cartesian dualism tends to keep step with materialism (roughly speaking) until it reaches the mind.

I suppose I should have said, “this theory provides a possible way for materialism to appear to be true and for free will to still exist.” If this idea holds water, then not even complete scientific proof that all neural activity is derived from natural occurrences would disprove the possibility of a free will.

Whether a multiverse is something we should take as straight ontology is debatable. But in any case, there seem to be issues with this:

• (as you perhaps intended it), the observer still needs to be spiritual, or else we’d have to figure out some materialistic course of action for an observer to “choose” one alternate world rather than all of the others; a purely material force, surely, could not determine quantum events

Right. The spirit is able to make a limited decision as to which timeline to perceive.

• so why think of one particular observer as, say, crossing over from one world to another? wouldn’t it make sense, instead, to say that in each universe, there is a distinct observer whose decision is “made” by a random quantum event?

You seem to be thinking of each universe as being entirely different timelines. It may be better to think of the “many worlds” multiverse as a tree, rather than completely unconnected lines.

You may or may not be familiar with the idea that all times actually exist, and our consciousness is moving through time in the same way a projector goes through a film, as this is occasionally how God’s timelessness is explained. Whenever our spirit hits a “branch” on the timeline tree (which as I understand it, happens every plank moment), it makes a decision about which way to go. There is no jumping between universes; one universe smoothly branches into zillions of separate ones.

• if we take all of the alternate universes as real, then we actually have infinite observers for any given event/decision

well, no. In order to observe something, one has to be conscious, and in order to have consciousness, one must have a spirit (according to this theory). All your other bodies in all your other parallel timelines aren’t actually conscious because you didn’t will to observe those timelines. Those bodies exist, but they have no spirit/consciousness.