Can a materialist conception of the mind really preserve free will?

[polytropos]

You use the concept of “reductive” in a different meaning from mine. It is NOT reductive to the properties of an individual atom.

You seem to view materialism as a crude, simplistic mechanistic view, where properties are additive and transitive. Nothing could be further from the truth. It is unfortunate that for the last 3+ years there has been a moratorium on atheism and materialism, since your presented ideas show a dire need for in-depth discussion of these subjects. Too bad that even such a mild “criticism” might be taken as a “petition” to change the rules, and as such it might result in a banning, or a closing of the thread. But that is life.

I was a materialist for many years. You may correct me if I am misrepresenting materialism, but what you are saying seems to be inconsistent.

What explains a critical mass of uranium? Why does it behave the way it does rather than not? Does it have to do with the atomic structure of uranium? Is it just a brute fact? (Is there a third possibility that I am missing here?)

Also, you are claiming that a single brain state can lead to two distinct thoughts. So let us consider a hypothetical: Two brains are exactly identical in every way, down to each connection between neurons, action potential, etc. (this is what it would mean for the two brains to have the same brain state; they are structurally identical, have all of the same memories and capabilities, etc.). They are both experiencing different thoughts. Why are the thoughts different? Is there a material explanation for the difference in thought?

 

[SentinelofTruth]

NOX3x:

the big difference is that in this theory, the will does not actually affect the brain states; those are entirely the result of determined or random processes.

In that case the soul would have to be a separate substance having nothing to do with the brain, in which case it’s not materialism at all.

polytropos:

But the original question was whether the soul must act on the body (in a way that violates conservation of energy) and whether they are completely distinct substances because they lack things in common. And the answer, even if they don’t and couldn’t have anything “in common,” is still that the soul acts on the body by formal causality and is not a distinct substance but another part of the same substance.

What is this “formal” causality? If it still involves the soul causing a change in the brain/body that could not have been predicted by looking at the preceding physical state alone, then it’s the same as “efficient” causation. If it does not involve such a thing, then it isn’t really causation at all and could still not account for the existence of free will.

 

[Bagheera]

polytropos:

What explains a critical mass of uranium? Why does it behave the way it does rather than not? Does it have to do with the atomic structure of uranium? Is it just a brute fact? (Is there a third possibility that I am missing here?)

Such questions should be directed to nuclear physicists.

polytropos:

The “virtual world” created by the computer does not actually exist.

What do you mean by “actually”? It is represented by the computer’s processing. You could also say that Hamlet does not exist. It exists as a set of concepts, and it is represented by those “squiggly” lines in a book, or by the spoken words uttered by the actors. None of them exist as physical objects, but that does not mean that they are “supernatural”. They are concepts, ideas, which are represented by physical means. The method of representation is not relevant, Hamlet is the same whether it is read or performed.

But enough of this.

Your original theorem was that materialists have no epistemological foundation to any kind of mental freedom, be it artistic creativity or decision making. Your only argument was that all those activities can “finally” be reduced to the electro-chemical activity of the brain, which is called the “mind”, and since those activities are purely physical, they must either be determined or random. In this you argued for complete reducibility of the mental processes to the lowest physical level.

This kind of reductionism is NOT professed by materialists. As the complexity of the structures grows, some new attributes MAY arise. Some of these emergent attributes CAN be reduced to the previous level, but some need a new explanation, which CANNOT be reduced. The next level of complexity after the individual atoms is chemistry. Some, but not all chemical reactions can be directly reduced to physics. After chemistry comes the level of biology. Some, but not all biological activities can be reduced directly to physics, others can be reduced to chemistry, but some need a brand new, biological explanation, which cannot be reduced. Part of biology is the neuro-physics. Again, it is not totally reducible to the lower levels of complexity, namely they cannot be reduced to atoms and their properties. There are more levels, the social sciences, and they have their own sets of laws, over and beyond the physical, chemical and biological laws. (Of course these are still very important, but they are not sufficient any more.)

This refutes your thesis about the materialists’ alleged “total reducibility” of mental processes.

polytropos:

You will have to show that the “software” (thoughts) of the brain do modify the brain. This is not the same as showing that during the process of thinking, the brain changes, since the latter does not preclude the brain changing due to physical causes rather than by the software.

This kind of misunderstanding is why I referred to cellular kind of architecture. In a cellular environment there is no “distinct” hardware and no “distinct” software. There is no separate “processing unit”, and no separate “memory”. The cells, their electrical states in the computer, and their electro-chemical states in the brain represent both the “hardware” (or “wetware” in the brain) and the “software” or thoughts in the mind. Moreover, the connectivity of the cells is also dynamic.

The only valid questions are: “how” does consciousness arise, and “how” does our apparent freedom exist. These are valid questions, and they are under investigation. But your starting idea of full reducibility is incorrect.

 

[Bahman]

This depend whether you believe on reductionism on state of matter or not. In first case it can be shown that state of matter evolve based on determinism and randomness. The free will in a materialist point of view who believe on reductionism is an random event since only determinism cannot lead to free will. If you don’t believe on reductionism, then it means that a sort of complexity could emerge from state of matter which we call it brain. The question which is left is that is complexity of brain enough to allow such a complex process so called free will? All experimental and theoretical evidences in smaller scale (DNA, RNA, etc) show that reductionism is true.

 

[SentinelofTruth]

Bagheera:

This kind of reductionism is NOT professed by materialists. As the complexity of the structures grows, some new attributes MAY arise. Some of these emergent attributes CAN be reduced to the previous level, but some need a new explanation, which CANNOT be reduced. The next level of complexity after the individual atoms is chemistry. Some, but not all chemical reactions can be directly reduced to physics. After chemistry comes the level of biology. Some, but not all biological activities can be reduced directly to physics, others can be reduced to chemistry, but some need a brand new, biological explanation, which cannot be reduced. Part of biology is the neuro-physics. Again, it is not totally reducible to the lower levels of complexity, namely they cannot be reduced to atoms and their properties. There are more levels, the social sciences, and they have their own sets of laws, over and beyond the physical, chemical and biological laws. (Of course these are still very important, but they are not sufficient any more.)

How can these things not be reduced? If nothing was added to them that is outside of the “lower level”, then everything about them is reducible to the lower level.

 

[Peter_Plato]

How can these things not be reduced? If nothing was added to them that is outside of the “lower level”, then everything about them is reducible to the lower level.

What might add some complexity to the issue is that biology is strictly not reducible to neurology since some aspects of physiology, sociology, psychology, etc. depend upon the interplay between the organism (all of its constituent biochemistry) and the environment around it. This is where Bagheera can “hide” his “science of the gaps” because that interplay is not clearly understood and therefore cannot be reduced simply to the causal and material mechanisms within the organism.

The image on a computer screen is not, strictly speaking, reducible to the hardware of the computer since it is the human observer that “creates” the image qua image and not the computer that merely assembles the elements required on the screen to enable the human observer to “visualize” the image.

It could be argued that the same kind of distinction is at play between the neurochemistry that “creates” the qualia available to consciousness and the conscious agent him/herself. This entails that the conscious agent as the “observer” of the qualia is not reducible to the neurochemistry of the body but rather more like the human observer relative to the computer monitor.

That would seem to imply a Cartesian kind of dualism, however.

I suspect Polytropos is attempting to stake out a “middle ground” where the observer of qualia is not outside of the workings of the computer, as a human operator would be (a la Descartes ghost residing in the machine), but rather that regarding human existence the observer is the “living” aspect of the body that enables and empowers all of the physiology including the emergent characteristics but is not reducible to it.

One reason for thinking Polytropos is correct is that human programmers constructed the computer in such a way as to “create” the kind of qualities on the computer monitor that would enable the “observer” to visualize the image appropriately.

That would mean the human agent must be “tuned” to the body and its neurology in a similar way to how a computer monitor is tuned to the human operator. The qualia made available to consciousness are of a kind that must be accessible to it and, furthermore, the activity of the agent must also access and alter the material functions of the body.

A strictly dualistic Cartesian view of ghost in the machine would have some difficulty explaining this bilateral functionality without resort to an independent “tuner” or Creator of the human machine. On the other hand, eliminative materialism can not adequately explain novel causality or bilateral functionality of the kind implied by free will without some external tuning agent which explains why a libertarian concept of free will is problematic to a materialistic world view. This is why a strictly materialistic view must propose consciousness as emergent and free will as illusory.

 

[polytropos]

Such questions should be directed to nuclear physicists.

At least answer the parallel questions in #61 having to do with the mind.

However, I think I’ve made my point about reductionism. If there is a reason that a critical mass of uranium behaves the way it does, it is in the atomic structure of uranium, ie. what uranium is. What else could explain it? There is a reason why uranium behaves that way while other elements do not. It does not mean that a reductionist must hold that individual atoms behave like a critical mass; that is nonsense.

What do you mean by “actually”? It is represented by the computer’s processing.

I mean that there is not another world with different laws, because the computer does not create another world at all, anymore than my television creates another world when I watch a movie.

A computer’s processes - including whatever images it produces or calculations it does - are indeterminate. They do not have intrinsic meaning; whatever meaning they have is imparted by a human observer. When I write a word on a piece of paper, it is not the ink and paper that have meaning; whatever meaning they have only comes along with a language community. Likewise with spoken sound waves. Likewise with a computer.

For that reason, it can only be said in a very loose sense that the “virtual world” is “represented” by the activity of the computer, because the computer’s processing is indeterminate and only means anything because you or I look at it. We cannot make the same move, then, with the mind, because in that case we can’t find an external observer without opting for some sort of dualism.

So I can take a calculator - or more advanced computer - and run a calculation. But the calculator is not thinking - even if it is running some sort of self-modifying algorithm. Sure, it can be said to embody some concept of arithmetic (I would dispute whether it can do so fully - but that’s another topic), but what it’s doing is not analogous - or at least has not been demonstrated to be analogous - to the conscious embodiment of concepts above our brains. This is why the virtual world analogy fails.

Your original theorem was that materialists have no epistemological foundation to any kind of mental freedom, be it artistic creativity or decision making. Your only argument was that all those activities can “finally” be reduced to the electro-chemical activity of the brain, which is called the “mind”, and since those activities are purely physical, they must either be determined or random.

As I stated in the original OP, I was referring to varieties of materialism which hold that the conceptual content of thought “supervenes” on particular brain states. My point still holds; if that is the view taken, then the conceptual content of thought has no causal efficacy, even though it is represented by a physical brain state (how it does that is nebulous - but it is taken for granted in this topic that it is possible).

But you still have not answered my questions in #61. If we have a case where two distinct thoughts arise from the same brain state, what - on the materialist view - accounts for the difference in thought? Is there a material explanation for their difference?

This kind of reductionism is NOT professed by materialists. As the complexity of the structures grows, some new attributes MAY arise. Some of these emergent attributes CAN be reduced to the previous level, but some need a new explanation, which CANNOT be reduced. The next level of complexity after the individual atoms is chemistry. Some, but not all chemical reactions can be directly reduced to physics. After chemistry comes the level of biology. Some, but not all biological activities can be reduced directly to physics, others can be reduced to chemistry, but some need a brand new, biological explanation, which cannot be reduced. Part of biology is the neuro-physics. Again, it is not totally reducible to the lower levels of complexity, namely they cannot be reduced to atoms and their properties. There are more levels, the social sciences, and they have their own sets of laws, over and beyond the physical, chemical and biological laws. (Of course these are still very important, but they are not sufficient any more.)

Can you give some examples of what you mean? You have deferred the example of uranium to physicists (and it seems that the behavior of the critical mass must be accounted for by the atomic structure of uranium, unless it is a brute fact), and you did not answer my questions about the mind in #61.

If the mind is not reduced to a particular brain state, then you need to offer some explanation which shows that things like free will and consciousness at least in principle could arise. Saying that the brain is complex or that the brain modifies itself during thought are insufficient explanations. A computer is complex but does not think. Even if it embodies concepts it is not creating a “virtual world.”

 

[polytropos]

This kind of misunderstanding is why I referred to cellular kind of architecture. In a cellular environment there is no “distinct” hardware and no “distinct” software. There is no separate “processing unit”, and no separate “memory”. The cells, their electrical states in the computer, and their electro-chemical states in the brain represent both the “hardware” (or “wetware” in the brain) and the “software” or thoughts in the mind. Moreover, the connectivity of the cells is also dynamic.

But this will not actually get you to free will. The electro-chemical states in the brain are the hardware, we perhaps agree. But even if they also “represent” the software, one electro-chemical state only leads to the next electro-chemical state qua hardware, not qua software. So even if they “represent” a shift from one conceptual state to another, it is the hardware that’s doing all of the “heavy lifting.” The software is just along for the ride. And the process, since it is qua hardware (ie. qua physical), is therefore either determined or random.

 

[polytropos]

What is this “formal” causality? If it still involves the soul causing a change in the brain/body that could not have been predicted by looking at the preceding physical state alone, then it’s the same as “efficient” causation. If it does not involve such a thing, then it isn’t really causation at all and could still not account for the existence of free will.

Formal causality is the principle by which the efficient causality in a substance is determined. A substance behaves according to its form; that is just how forms and substances work in hylemorphism. Hylemorphists would hold that the rational aspects of man are immaterial (and so operate independently of matter, which means they could not be determined or random in a way that precludes free will), and on the hylemorphic view will follows from intellect (since intellect can “choose” independently of matter). The question is whether the activity of the will occurs with conservation of energy or not. I am suggesting that this is an open question, and it’s not impossible that the substance could behave in a way so that its free actions conserve energy (it’s also possible that energy is not conserved).

 

[Just_Lurking]

There are computer programs that take in an initial configuration of atoms, and simulate the future behavior of that system, using just the equations of quantum mechanics. The number of atoms that can be simulated, and the time scale of the simulation, is growing as our computer power is growing.

At what point will these simulations fail to match reality due to the failure of materialism/reductionism? A single celll? A small multicellular plant? An insect? A mammal? A neanderthal? A human being?

 

[tonyrey]

There are computer programs that take in an initial configuration of atoms, and simulate the future behavior of that system, using just the equations of quantum mechanics. The number of atoms that can be simulated, and the time scale of the simulation, is growing as our computer power is growing.

At what point will these simulations fail to match reality due to the failure of materialism/reductionism? A single celll? A small multicellular plant? An insect? A mammal? A neanderthal? A human being?

Even a single cell does not function with mathematical precision. Its plasticity distinguishes it from inorganic structures.

 

[SentinelofTruth]

Peter Plato:

I suspect Polytropos is attempting to stake out a “middle ground” where the observer of qualia is not outside of the workings of the computer, as a human operator would be (a la Descartes ghost residing in the machine), but rather that regarding human existence the observer is the “living” aspect of the body that enables and empowers all of the physiology including the emergent characteristics but is not reducible to it.

I certainly agree that the the soul enables and empowers the body, but I think this actually conflicts with hylomorphism, in which the soul is supposed to be the “form” of the body (ie. its characteristics), in which case every property of the soul would be traceable to some property of the body, making hylomorphism as vulnerable as materialism to the free will argument.

polytropos:

Formal causality is the principle by which the efficient causality in a substance is determined. A substance behaves according to its form; that is just how forms and substances work in hylemorphism. Hylemorphists would hold that the rational aspects of man are immaterial (and so operate independently of matter, which means they could not be determined or random in a way that precludes free will), and on the hylemorphic view will follows from intellect (since intellect can “choose” independently of matter). The question is whether the activity of the will occurs with conservation of energy or not. I am suggesting that this is an open question, and it’s not impossible that the substance could behave in a way so that its free actions conserve energy (it’s also possible that energy is not conserved).

Could you elaborate on the first sentence?

tonyrey:

Even a single cell does not function with mathematical precision. Its plasticity distinguishes it from inorganic structures.

You draw too deep a line between organic and inorganic. What really is the difference?
And yes, a cell does function with mathematical precision. Unless it’s one of the cells that directly interacts with the soul, it’s deterministic.

 

[polytropos]

I certainly agree that the the soul enables and empowers the body, but I think this actually conflicts with hylomorphism, in which the soul is supposed to be the “form” of the body (ie. its characteristics), in which case every property of the soul would be traceable to some property of the body, making hylomorphism as vulnerable as materialism to the free will argument.

Forms are not equivalent to characteristics.

If we are being precise, souls do not have properties; nor, even, is it that precise to say that bodies have properties, if we are that there is some separation between soul and body (besides death). Substances have properties (which are essential accidents). Without a soul, the animating and unifying principle of a human substance, you do not have a live human at all.

The idea that the soul has properties “traceable” to those of the body seems to imply that they are two separate substances which happen to coincide. That is a decidedly a Cartesian notion, but it is, again, a category mistake to compare soul and body in such a way in hylemorphism.

Could you elaborate on the first sentence?

Form unifies a thing and accounts for the way it behaves. So whatever goes on in a human - even by efficient causation - is subsumed by the form, which is actualizing the substance. The soul determines how the substance acts, but it is not a separate “thing” acting efficiently on the body.

The determination that humans have free will does not have to do with the “characteristics” attributable to the soul and body acting in some way; that is just a vacuous notion in hylemorphism. We deduce that human intellectual operations are immaterial, and free will follows from that (our immaterial operations are not determined by matter).

 

[Bagheera]

polytropos:

If the mind is not reduced to a particular brain state, then you need to offer some explanation which shows that things like free will and consciousness at least in principle could arise.

By the same principle that the water’s wetness arises, even though the constituent parts are not ‘wet”. By the same principle that the qualitative changes can result in quantitative changes.

I did not argue that the computer “thinks”, or it has “free will”. This discussion was not about that, even though you never defined what “thinking” is or what “free will” is. The analogy of computer’s activity was not an equivalence with the activity of brain/mind complex. The point was that the laws of physics are inapplicable in the virtual reality of a computer generated “world”, and they are not applicable in our mind. Therefore none of them can be reduced to the dancing of the electrons. My argument is very simple. You stated that at least one higher level of existence (thinking and decision making) is reducible to the lower level of physical interaction of atoms. I pointed out that this reductionism is incorrect. There is nothing else to talk about.

 

[Peter_Plato]

By the same principle that the water’s wetness arises, even though the constituent parts are not ‘wet”. By the same principle that the qualitative changes can result in quantitative changes.

The wetness of water is not even an emergent property of water because “wetness” is a perception of human sensibilities about water.

It is not any clearer how the mind or consciousness could “arise” in the same way without presuming a “perceived” of consciousness in the same way wetness depends on the perception of the human interacting with the water.

This doesn’t serve to explain anything except that “something” beyond neuronal functioning is required.

 

[tonyrey]

You draw too deep a line between organic and inorganic. What really is the difference?
And yes, a cell does function with mathematical precision. Unless it’s one of the cells that directly interacts with the soul, it’s deterministic.

You have answered your own question!

 

[tonyrey]

The question then would seem to be, “Does God require energy of some kind to actualize matter or is energy simply a physical manifestation of God’s actualizing of potential?”

How is energy measured except as some discernible change in matter?

Your question presupposes the omnipresence of matter! Are our beliefs, values, choices and conclusions **always **caused by physical events?

 

[tonyrey]

Hylemorphism isn’t materialism, so it would not hold that material things (matter/energy) cannot be subsumed by the human substance to direct its actions. I am not saying that I know whether or not the activity of the soul violates conservation of energy, but it is something that could be studied empirically at the least.

No, we have free will, and are made in God’s image in the respect that we have intellect and will. I am just saying that the activity of the will as it is physically manifested need not violate conservation of energy.

If physical energy is the sole form of energy how did it become autonomous and purposeful?

 

[Bahman]

If physical energy is the sole form of energy how did it become autonomous and purposeful?

State of vegetate is autonomous too.

 

[tonyrey]

State of vegetate is autonomous too.

Not in the same sense. It is not rational or responsible.