Capital Punishment

[Ender]

To suggest that a doctor, in cutting out 1cm of tube with an implanted embryo does not intend a death in the same way a defender might do by shooting his intruder in the head is beyond credibility. Both are exactly chosen as the only practical means to securing a legitimate greater good. Indeed a focused choice on death as a means and whether the unfortunate victim is guilty or innocent makes little difference in these two PODE examples.

If you accept the validity of PODE as a moral option then you must accept its conditions, one of which is that the harmful effect not be intended. That is we must intend the good effect and accept the harmful one as an unintended consequence. This is why an operation in an ectopic pregnancy that results in the death of the embryo is licit. It is licit precisely because the death is accepted rather than intended.

I respect Ender’s approach here, he at least is willing to accept that in PODE scenarios the defender does choose the death of his attacker and doesn’t pretend the defender only chooses to pull the trigger or the doctor only chooses to remove 1cm of tube with unconvincing mental reservations on the certain deaths that follow.

Not exactly. Killing in self defense as an example of PODE has the same constraints. I may excuse killing as a means of protection, but I may not use protection as an excuse to kill.

My observation on his approach is that he seems to assume this is a direct intention. I disagree, it can still be an indirect one.

Licitly killing in self defense happens when the primary intent is protection, but not when the primary intent is to kill.

I believe you are too wedded to the notion that choosing death as a means must always indicate direct intention.

If I shoot a man at point blank range with a shotgun it is hard to make an argument that I haven’t chosen his death. That said, it is legitimate to distinguish the act based on my intent. If he is charging me with a knife, my options are pretty much limited to killing him or letting him kill me, so my objective is protecting myself even though the only means of doing so will result in his death. I have certainly chosen to shoot him, and with that weapon at that range death is also certain. The question is, if I choose an action can it be said that I also choose all of the consequences of that action? I think that is clearly not the case. Intent is a major font in determining the morality of an act, and if the harmful consequences are not intended, even if they are inevitable, the act can be licit.

Ender

 

[o_mlly]

…While something may have more than one end, all other ends are necessarily subordinate to whatever is the primary end.

OK. What is the primary end of punishment: justice, redress or retribution?

This is true: justice is the primary objective of all punishment.

The primary scope of the penalty is to redress the disorder.

…Retribution (retributive justice) is still the primary objective of punishment, …

Where do you find support for your last claim? The support is not in CCC #2266.

“Punishment has the primary aim of redressing the disorder.” In its full reading, 2266, explains the purposes of punishment “… Punishment then, in addition to defending public order and protecting people’s safety, has a medicinal purpose …” but the paragraph does not list retribution as one of punishment’s objectives, much less, a primary objective.

 

[twf]

No. The position you present in fact is not faithful to the Church.

The position you present in fact is not faithful to papal teaching relative to that corpus in 2017.

The position you present in fact is not faithful to the Bishops, from the perspective of the College.

Your beginning point needs be the declaration by the US Conference of Catholic Bishops

The Church’s Anti-Death Penalty Position

For this is where the Magisterium has arrived.

And we give thanks to God for His guidance of the Magisterium precisely to this position to which He has led it.

Father,
You will find, unfortunately, that for some on this forum the “Magisterium” of the US Republican Party takes precedence over the Church’s Magisterium…at least on certain issues.

 

[Ender]

Father,
You will find, unfortunately, that for some on this forum the “Magisterium” of the US Republican Party takes precedence over the Church’s Magisterium…at least on certain issues.

If you are referring to me, then your accusation is completely fabricated inasmuch as there is nothing whatever in anything I have ever said, going back years, that has anything whatsoever to do with the political perspective of capital punishment. If you believe otherwise then please, cite the comment that contains some political content. I have cited centuries of Catholic documents to support my positions. I have yet to cite anything proposed by a politician.

If you want to engage in the discussion, then at least address the comments that have been made. Don’t just jump in with an invented grievance.

Ender

 

[Blue_Horizon]

Is it not evident that you must decide which ectopic pregnancy treatment you reference, given their morally different nature? Even if you reject that statement, please tell me which ectopic pregnancy you wish to be compared to self-defence and I will try and answer.

You missed my concise expression “ectopic removal”?
That suggests the chances of you seriously reflecting on and understanding what I have actually been saying here are low…which is why I am putting my continued discussion with you on hold for a few days sorry Rau.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

I do not believe PODE applies to the death penalty in any case. Death is intended and any good effects proceeds only because of that death.

The examples discussed for irregular fetal implantation show this crucial difference. An ectopic pregnancy threatens the mother’s life via ruptured tube as the fetus grows. The excision of the tube saves the mother but kills the baby. The surgery is permissible since it is the tubal excision which saves the mother, not the indirect death of the encapsulated fetus. Hepatic pregnancy surgeries, on the other hand, are not justified because the procedure excises only the fetus and is, therefore, a direct attack on the life of an innocent.

OK that’s even more interesting but not quite what I was getting at.

Do you see a moral distinction between the phrases “CP”, “death penalty” and “State executions”?

My reading of you is that you now find all CP immoral in principle (because it implies death purely for retrib justice motives).

However you do see principled justification (but not practical justification) for the Death Penalty (for redress or reform motives if incarceration not possible)?

You have just now added that you see the latter as direct not indirect killing which I find surprising. I agree CP (which implies retrib justice) motives is direct killing.

 

[Ender]

OK. What is the primary end of punishment: justice, redress or retribution?

It is retributive justice that redresses the disorder caused by the offense.

Where do you find support for your last claim? The support is not in CCC #2266. [That retribution is primary.]

• The primary purpose of the punishment which society inflicts is “to redress the disorder caused by the offence”. Public authority must redress the violation of personal and social rights by imposing on the offender an adequate punishment for the crime *(JPII, Evangelium vitae #56)
  Redress in the catechism refers to repairing the disorder inflicted on the moral order. That is what is being redressed, and it is the punishment itself that achieves that. This is retribution: it is nothing more than treating a person according to his actions.*We speak of merit and demerit, in relation to retribution, rendered according to justice. *(Aquinas)

“Punishment has the primary aim of redressing the disorder.” In its full reading, 2266, explains the purposes of punishment “… Punishment then, in addition to defending public order and protecting people’s safety, has a medicinal purpose …” but the paragraph does not list retribution as one of punishment’s objectives, much less, a primary objective.

The word retribution is not used, which is a great pity given how it has led to a misunderstanding of what that section is actually saying. I can only provide citations that demonstrate that understanding; I have not (yet) found the church document saying specifically that retribution and redress are the same thing, although it is not hard to find others who have explicitly said it.*“Protecting society is not the primary purpose of punishment,” he *[Fr. Thomas Petri] said. “The primary purpose of punishment is retribution…(Fr. Petri, OP, Dean of the Dominican House of Studies, 2015)

The subsection briefly departs from this motif in no. 2266 to introduce punishment’s “primary purpose,” i.e., redressing the disorder introduced by deliberate crime (i.e., retribution) (Dulles)

*Evangelium Vitae , no. 56, and the *Catechism of the Catholic Church *, no. 2266, agree that “the primary aim” of punishment is the retributive one of “redressing the disorder introduced by the offense.” *(Charles E. Rice, Notre Dame Law School)

*In fact, the Church teaches that retributive justice is punishment’s primary purpose. *(Christopher Kaczor, Loyola Marymount, 2004)
Ender

 

[Blue_Horizon]

No, I don’t think so. If I have a dead tree in my yard I will choose to take it down because it is dangerous. That there is a squirrel’s nest in that tree that will be destroyed when the tree falls does not mean I intend to destroy the nest. Even though I have chosen something that will clearly have that effect, there is no sense in which I directly intended that result.
No, it means exactly the opposite.
No. If I deliberately kill someone it means that killing him was the direct intent of my action. The action was taken precisely in order to kill.
No. I would accept it in the same sense that I accept the destruction of the squirrel’s nest. The outcome is inevitable but it is not the objective of the act.

Ender

I can only conclude you either have difficulties with logic or with writing clear meaningful English statements.

If I cut down a tree knowing the nest in it will be destroyed then I have in some sense chosen that destruction and also caused it by my own hand .
That is an undeniable conclusion for a sane person.

Likewise your proposition ""What is forbidden is deliberately killing the attacker if a non-fatal option is available. "

Your statement only makes logical sense if your condition’s failure implies either:

1. the attacker may then be killed with a direct intention;
2. the attacker may then be killed indirectly
   3 …?

I ruled out the 2nd because most people would just have written "What is forbidden is killing the attacker if a non-fatal option is available. "

But you tell me … perhaps more clearly this time.

 

[Genesis315]

Is there a difference between redress of the disorder and retributive justice? I understand that the disorder–the unjust result of the crime–is redressed by meting out to the guilty a just retribution. (EDIT: this was addressed in posts that were posted as I typed)

Anyhow, the Church’s position on the death penalty appears to me to be following a similar path as that on slavery. In that case, the Church came to generally abhor and condemn it, while still conceding a theoretical slavery that did not violate the natural law (given the right conditions: title acquired justly; slave treated in a just, moral manner). Here’s excerpt from a good article on how slavery has been treated:
Catholic Encyclopedia:

We may take as representative de Lugo’s statement of the chief argument offered in proof of the thesis that slavery, apart from all abuses, is not in itself contrary to the natural law.

Slavery consists in this, that a man is obliged, for his whole life, to devote his labour and services to a master. Now as anybody may justly bind himself, for the sake of some anticipated reward, to give his entire services to a master for a year, and he would in justice be bound to fulfil this contract, why may not he bind himself in like manner for a longer period, even for his entire lifetime, an obligation which would constitute slavery? (De Justitia et Jure, disp. VI, sec. 2. no. 14.)

It must be observed that the defence of what may be termed theoretical slavery was by no means intended to be a justification of slavery as it existed historically, with all its attendant, and almost inevitably attendant, abuses, disregarding the natural rights of the slave and entailing pernicious consequences on the character of the slave-holding class, as well as on society in general.​

The later moralists, that is to say, broadly speaking, those who have written since the end of the eighteenth century, though in fundamental agreement with their predecessors, have somewhat shifted the perspective. In possession of the bad historical record of slavery and familiar with a Christian structure of society from which slavery had been eliminated, these later moralists emphasize more than did the older ones the reasons for condemning slavery; and they lay less stress on those in its favour. While they admit that it is not, theoretically speaking at least, contrary to the natural law, they hold that it is hardly compatible with the dignity of personality, and is to be condemned as immoral on account of the evil consequences it almost inevitably leads to. It is but little in keeping with human dignity that one man should so far be deprived of his liberty as to be perpetually subject to the will of a master in everything that concerns his external life; that he should be compelled to spend his entire labour for the benefit of another and receive in return only a bare subsistence. This condition of degradation is aggravated by the fact that the slave is, generally, deprived of all means of intellectual development for himself or for his children. This life almost inevitably leads to the destruction of a proper sense of self-respect, blunts the intellectual faculties, weakens the sense of responsibility, and results in a degraded moral standard. On the other hand, the exercise of the slave-master’s power, too seldom sufficiently restrained by a sense of justice or Christian feeling, tends to develop arrogance, pride, and a tyrannical disposition, which in the long run comes to treat the slave as a being with no rights at all. Besides, as history amply proves, the presence of a slave population breeds a vast amount of sexual immorality among the slave-owning class, and, to borrow a phrase of Lecky, tends to cast a stigma on all labour and to degrade and impoverish the free poor.

newadvent.org/cathen/14039a.htm

See also the article on the history of slavery and Christianity here:
newadvent.org/cathen/14036a.htm

 

[Blue_Horizon]

If you accept the validity of PODE as a moral option then you must accept its conditions, one of which is that the harmful effect not be intended.

This seems to be putting the cart before the horse. No I am not fully committed to the tool of reason (not faith) known as PODE. But I do accept the moral principle this tool attempts to uphold, namely that there are cases where we validly may seem to do evil to achieve good and also appear to break the Commandments validly.
The PODE, by itself, is well known to be problematic in assisting faith explain all such faith conclusions well or consistently. The means condition was never given by Aquinas who first systematised this approach to explain how an agent can have multiple ordered objects and intents when acting morally

Not exactly. Killing in self defense as an example of PODE has the same constraints. I may excuse killing as a means of protection, but I may not use protection as an excuse to kill

.
You are splitting some very subtle “intending” hairs here that you wholesale join into mattresses when it comes to squirrel nests!

Licitly killing in self defense happens when the primary intent is protection, but not when the primary intent is to kill.

If only you might approach my point here with the subtility of distinction you split hairs above.
Why must knowingly choosing to pull the trigger of a gun aimed at someone’s head always be called a direct intent to kill in the sense that moral theologians use that phrase?
It isn’t in my book. It can simply be the indirect executive will, a practical, methodical decision to carry out the direct intent which is protection. I believe Aquinas called this form of external lesser choice “electio” as opposed to more internal acts of will and intent which he calls “intentio” and “consentio”. These subtleties are completely lost on most people who try to analyse moral acts using the simplistic three font tool described in the CCC and do not recognise the gross ambiguity of the English catchall word “intention”.

If I shoot a man at point blank range with a shotgun it is hard to make an argument that I haven’t chosen his death.

A refreshing realism that escapes Rau.

That said, it is legitimate to distinguish the act based on my intent. If he is charging me with a knife, my options are pretty much limited to killing him or letting him kill me, so my objective is protecting myself even though the only means of doing so will result in his death. I have certainly chosen to shoot him, and with that weapon at that range death is also certain. The question is, if I choose an action can it be said that I also choose all of the consequences of that action?

Another refreshing exploration of what intent may mean on the ground.

I think that is clearly not the case. Intent is a major font in determining the morality of an act, and if the harmful consequences are not intended, even if they are inevitable, the act can be licit.

And here is where you start a sort of procrustean rationalisation that Rau engages in that ends up with an Emporers clothes denial of what is factually obvious to Catholics not contaminated by a simplistic use of the 3 fonts tool.

It’s clearer in ectopic tube removal.
Killing the embryo here is no different from putting a shotgun to my head and pulling the trigger. Certain death is chosen and willed in some way.
The Church says such a procedure can be moral. This is the starting point of analysis not the end point. The Church is not committed to any single intellectual justification, that is not how the Church concluded it’s acceptability.

Therefore the death, despite material appearances can be willed in a way that does not break the 5th.
Therefore it must be indirect regardless of what some understandings of the PODE or 3Fs might lead us to believe.

As above, a correct understanding of Aquinas’s philosophy of mind and will re stages of applied intentional acts adequately splits the hairs in my mind.

Therefore I have no issue with saying the doctor at some real level does will the death of the embryo, and still directly intends only good in this act.

And the same for squirrel’s.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

Is there a difference between redress of the disorder and retributive justice? I understand that the disorder–the unjust result of the crime–is redressed by meting out to the guilty a just retribution. (EDIT: this was addressed in posts that were posted as I typed)

Anyhow, the Church’s position on the death penalty appears to me to be following a similar path as that on slavery. In that case, the Church came to generally abhor and condemn it, while still conceding a theoretical slavery that did not violate the natural law (given the right conditions: title acquired justly; slave treated in a just, moral manner). Here’s excerpt from a good article on how slavery has been treated:

newadvent.org/cathen/14039a.htm

See also the article on the history of slavery and Christianity here:
newadvent.org/cathen/14036a.htm

And the same for Usury and military service.

 

[Rau]

You missed my concise expression “ectopic removal”?
That suggests the chances of you seriously reflecting on and understanding what I have actually been saying here are low…which is why I am putting my continued discussion with you on hold for a few days sorry Rau.

If you need more time Blue, that’s ok. Check out the difference between “Salpingostomy” and “Salpingectomy”.

 

[Rau]

" one may choose something that will clearly cause death" suggests the something is a means to an end called “death”. Therefore the death is directly intended with this “choosing” of something is it not?

This statement above initiated this sub-debate. I believe it is in error. The description above omits information about the something:

• is it an act of self-defence causing a death?
• an act of war with collateral deaths?
• a medical treatment on a pregnant mother?
• an act aiming to rescue hostages from execution by terrorists where one or more hostages is lost?
  All of these may be acts which cause a death, but do not directly intend it. How can one claim direct intention when the death in question plays no part in giving rise to the ends; when it is “incidental”? To accept Blue’s statements would be to claim that all manner of events incurring foreseen deaths to (innocent) third parties are acts directly intending those deaths and thus immoral.

**Ender **gives an example of cutting down a dangerous dead tree with the unfortunate loss of a squirrel’s nest. In reference to the loss of the nest he said:
“…there is no sense in which I directly intended that result.”

**Blue **then “paraphrases” Ender in these terms:

If I cut down a tree knowing the nest in it will be destroyed then I have in some sense chosen that destruction and also caused it by my own hand . That is an undeniable conclusion for a sane person.

Note how different the 2 statements about the nest incident are. The question to be asked is: Can Blue’s statement and Ender’s both stand? I think they can. The good ends of safety require the tree to be removed (given its fragile state). Harm to the nest has no bearing on that end - so why would one “directly intend” its destruction? [One might be cross with Ender for not climbing the tree and preserving the nest - but perhaps that is undoable.]

Blue’s statement is also valid - clearly the destruction is caused ultimately by Ender’s hand, and clearly he has chosen to accept the destruction of the nest as a consequence of his action against the dangerous tree.

Both Ender and Blue made accurate statement - but Blue’s statement was not an effective paraphrasing of Ender, rather it was a different statement.

 

[Rau]

… I am not fully committed to the tool of reason (not faith) known as PODE. But I do accept the moral principle this tool attempts to uphold, namely that there are cases where we validly may seem to do evil to achieve good and also appear to break the Commandments validly.

The PODE is expressed in many ways, some of them flawed and some of them imprecise. It is a natural outcome of the 3 fonts. The reason to be wisely dubious about the PODE is that it’s expression can be unsound.

**Ender **said: "If I shoot a man at point blank range with a shotgun it is hard to make an argument that I haven’t chosen his death. To which **Blue **remarks: “A refreshing realism that escapes Rau.” And yet I think I have said very largely the same thing as Ender when I have said "one may choose the death of the aggressor as the means to the end of defence.

And here is where you start a sort of procrustean rationalisation that Rau…

Seriously Blue, you are becoming quite obsessed about me…

It’s clearer in ectopic tube removal.
Killing the embryo here is no different from putting a shotgun to my head and pulling the trigger. Certain death is chosen and willed in some way.

I recommend you line up a fuller set of examples to gain context:
1 remove tube section;
2 methotrexate injection;
3 shotgun to the head in self-defence.

Therefore the death, despite material appearances can be willed in a way that does not break the 5th. Therefore it must be indirect…

Certainly true for (1). Certainly not true for (2). Item (3) is what we are seeking to come to grips with.

As above, a correct understanding of Aquinas’s philosophy of mind and will re stages of applied intentional acts adequately splits the hairs in my mind.

It may well, but we have not hit on the explication in this thread.

Therefore I have no issue with saying the doctor at some real level does will the death of the embryo, and still directly intends only good in this act.

It’s a bit of debating the meaning of the word “will”. Does he seek the embryo’s death in service of the end? Is that where his good intent takes him? How can we test that? Ask him a question: "Dr, if after you cut out the section of the tube containing the child, there are means to save that child, would you do it? Given the means selected for this treatment, it seems plain the answer is yes. Were the child’s death the object, he could hardly say yes. He would use the far simpler process of methotrexate injection.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

If you need more time Blue, that’s ok. Check out the difference between “Salpingostomy” and “Salpingectomy”.

D’oh boy.
Concise as in not your methotrexate binary alternative which involves no removal
I thought you were more 3D than Vico or Bookcat.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

This statement above initiated this sub-debate. I believe it is in error. The description above omits information about the something:

• is it an act of self-defence causing a death?
• an act of war with collateral deaths?
• a medical treatment on a pregnant mother?
• an act aiming to rescue hostages from execution by terrorists where one or more hostages is lost?
  All of these may be acts which cause a death, but do not directly intend it. How can one claim direct intention when the death in question plays no part in giving rise to the ends; when it is “incidental”? To accept Blue’s statements would be to claim that all manner of events incurring foreseen deaths to (innocent) third parties are acts directly intending those deaths and thus immoral.

**Ender **gives an example of cutting down a dangerous dead tree with the unfortunate loss of a squirrel’s nest. In reference to the loss of the nest he said:
“…there is no sense in which I directly intended that result.”

**Blue **then “paraphrases” Ender in these terms:

Note how different the 2 statements about the nest incident are. The question to be asked is: Can Blue’s statement and Ender’s both stand? I think they can. The good ends of safety require the tree to be removed (given its fragile state). Harm to the nest has no bearing on that end - so why would one “directly intend” its destruction? [One might be cross with Ender for not climbing the tree and preserving the nest - but perhaps that is undoable.]

Blue’s statement is also valid - clearly the destruction is caused ultimately by Ender’s hand, and clearly he has chosen to accept the destruction of the nest as a consequence of his action against the dangerous tree.

Both Ender and Blue made accurate statement - but Blue’s statement was not an effective paraphrasing of Ender, rather it was a different statement.

Fair enough, indeed I missed that.
But at least when putting a gun to my head when I burst into his bedroom (God forbid) he means to blow my brains out with an indirect intention where with you its probably just pulling the trigger and somehow not connecting that with me slumping to the ground dead by your hand and mind.
Likewise with ectopic tube removal.
(Do note that your ectopic tube example would make much better sense if you understood it as it was actually first presented by a Jesuit in 1940. Essential to the argument was that the tube was diseased I believe. Then your mantra re I am only removing the tube would actually make realistic sense…but probably destroy your theological point in using the example. I don’t believe you fully understand the PODE which is why you cannot see when it is not well applied nor it’s weaknesses).

And no, the first quote did not start this debate as far as I know. It was part of a prior debate and Ender never answered that question at all.
For obvious reasons.

 

[Don_Ruggero]

Father,
You will find, unfortunately, that for some on this forum the “Magisterium” of the US Republican Party takes precedence over the Church’s Magisterium…at least on certain issues.

Indeed. That is, assuredly, quite abundantly clear.

 

[Rau]

Fair enough, indeed I missed that.
But at least when putting a gun to my head when I burst into his bedroom (God forbid) he means to blow my brains out with an indirect intention…

Certainly he acts not to have you dead as an “end”, for such in the Intention font would always be immoral. But as means - no. Like breaking down your bedroom door to enable you to escape the marauder with the shotgun is a “bad means” but not vandalism. Here we are in search only of the correct description/terminology. No disagreement on what is/is not moral attaches.

Do note that your ectopic tube example would make much better sense if you understood it as it was actually first presented by a Jesuit in 1940. Essential to the argument was that the tube was diseased I believe. Then your mantra re I am only removing the tube would actually make realistic sense…

Well I assumed it was understood that the tube removal was directly treating the mother, not some trick to get around directly attacking the child! The tube is damaged, commences to bleed and may then haemorahge seriously. I was not ignoring this, rather omitted to state what I thought was understood. But yes, for those not aware of these details, they need to be exposed.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

Fair enough, indeed I missed that.

Actually, rereading the sad story of Mrs Squirrel I think Ender could validly be said to have directly procured/intended the death of said Mrs Squirrel.
If he knew it was there and he knew with certainty that the felling of the tree would kill it…then by felling the tree he directly intended/caused it’s death so far as his objective external deeds go.

Obviously this is not what a moral theologian would describe as a direct intention but an indirect one.

Your ectopic removal example better exemplifies the problem with PODE.
At least with the squirrel we can see the death of the squirrel is not the essential means to protecting dwellers from a rotten tree. (Though it might be if the squirrel itself caused the rot or weakness in the tree over time).

With ectopic it’s different. The removal (which can only be done causing it’s death) of the embryo (not the tube) is essential to the success of this procedure it seems.

So here we have an indirect intention which cannot easily be objectively demonstrated or inferred from the exterior act. It can only be known by the agent himself.

That doesn’t worry me, though this lack of authenticating objective evidence is always troubling to Ender…who wants decisions rendered in this life for every grave matter even if it’s possibly an interior sin only. Except kings of course .

 

[Blue_Horizon]

Certainly he acts not to have you dead as an “end”, for such in the Intention font would always be immoral. But as means - no. Like breaking down your bedroom door to enable you to escape the marauder with the shotgun is a “bad means” but not vandalism. Here we are in search only of the correct description/terminology. No disagreement on what is/is not moral attaches.

Well I assumed it was understood that the tube removal was directly treating the mother, not some trick to get around directly attacking the child! The tube is damaged, commences to bleed and may then haemorahge seriously. I was not ignoring this, rather omitted to state what I thought was understood. But yes, for those not aware of these details, they need to be exposed.

That you omitted such important details regardless means you grasp of how PODE is applied here was not sound.

But as I keep repeating, the death intent in LSDEFENCE and ectopic removal still appears the same to me - even though one is innocent and the other not. Both are indirect intents regardless. One does NOT need to demonstrate some objective evidence to infer presumptive indirect intent in hidden acts of the will which seems to be your concern. It can be presumptively inferred by other means.