Capital Punishment

[Blue_Horizon]

Actually, rereading the sad story of Mrs Squirrel I think Ender could validly be said to have directly procured/intended the death of said Mrs Squirrel.
If he knew it was there and he knew with certainty that the felling of the tree would kill it…then by felling the tree he directly intended/caused it’s death so far as his objective external deeds go. It is simplistic to believe a single moral act cannot have multiple ordered sets of willed means/ends going on, just as Aquinas asserts when distinguishing interior and exterior acts each having their own proper objects.

Obviously re Mrs Squirrel this intention is not what a moral theologian would describe as a direct intention but an indirect one. But within the components of the indirect intent there is no reason why there cannot be another means/end interplay that has a direct connection.
Try and see things are a little more complex and 3D not 2D.

Your ectopic removal example better exemplifies the problem with PODE.
At least with the squirrel we can see the death of the squirrel is not the essential means to protecting dwellers from a rotten tree. (Though it might be if the squirrel itself caused the rot or weakness in the tree over time).

With ectopic it’s different. The removal (which can only be done causing it’s death) of the embryo (not the tube) is essential to the success of this procedure it seems.

So here we have an indirect intention which cannot easily be objectively demonstrated or inferred from the exterior act. It can only be known by the agent himself.

That doesn’t worry me, though this lack of authenticating objective evidence is always troubling to Ender…who wants decisions rendered in this life for every grave matter even if it’s possibly an interior sin only. Except kings of course .

 

[Blue_Horizon]

Certainly he acts not to have you dead as an “end”, for such in the Intention font would always be immoral. But as means - no. Like breaking down your bedroom door to enable you to escape the marauder with the shotgun is a “bad means” but not vandalism. Here we are in search only of the correct description/terminology. No disagreement on what is/is not moral attaches.

Well I assumed it was understood that the tube removal was directly treating the mother, not some trick to get around directly attacking the child! The tube is damaged, commences to bleed and may then haemorahge seriously. I was not ignoring this, rather omitted to state what I thought was understood. But yes, for those not aware of these details, they need to be exposed.

As far as electio of the external mechanics of killing goes the intent to to raise the gun and pull the trigger etc is the directly chosen means to perform one single end…my death.
Therefore doing all these things (as with surgical skill re ectopic) are directly purposed to bring about a foreseen and necessary death.

However that death electio itself is only indirectly intended. The foundation intent (intentio) is in fact preservation of life.
The moral object is the latter, not the former.
The former (the death “act”) is the moral circumstances

 

[Rau]

As far as electio of the external mechanics of killing goes the intent to to raise the gun and pull the trigger etc is the directly chosen means to perform one single end…my death.
Therefore doing all these things (as with surgical skill re ectopic) are directly purposed to bring about a foreseen and necessary death.

One can see how the bolded perhaps described the self-defence case (with the observation that the death/lethal act is not really needed, it just seems our only option, which is why we chose it), but I am much less comfortable when one seeks to apply it to the ectopic pregnancy (Salpingectomy) case. The word “purposed” makes it sound as though the procedure chosen was chosen because it will kill the child. Certainly the procedure is “oriented” to that ultimate result (and others) - oriented in the sense of “will cause” that result. Clearly, that’s not the reason for choosing Salpingectomy - because such a purpose is more readily achieved by other means. Thus, I don’t think you have quite the right form of words.

Were we assessing methotrexate injection (or even Salpingostomy) I would say your statement is a close fit - though I’d replace “necessary” with “unavoidable” which I think is clearer/more accurate. We don’t require the death at all, we just can’t avoid it.

The ectopic off-spring certainly dies as night follows day, in a time and manner dictated by our act (Salpingectomy), but the death is nowhere in Intention (purpose, objective) - it is simply beyond avoiding despite desperate desire to do so. [Formally described as an “indirect abortion”].

However that death electio itself is only indirectly intended. The foundation intent (intentio) is in fact preservation of life.
The moral object is the latter, not the former.

Clearly this is so for Salpingectomy.

Your statement earlier to the effect that the Salpingectomy procedure is directly purposed to bring about a foreseen and -]necessary /-]unavoidable death - is something that can certainly be said of methotrexate injection (which acts to kill the child). I have brought this up a few times only because I would not want anyone to think that the description you’ve proposed for Salpingectomy - which is a moral act - and which is a very apt description for methotrexate injection, could therefore be a basis to conclude that methotrexate injection must therefore also be moral. Our moral principles can accept as moral acts that destroy innocents in a “collateral” fashion (under appropriate conditions), but never as the target.

 

[Rau]

…With ectopic [Salpingectomy or Salpingostomy?]…[t]he removal (which can only be done causing it’s death) of the embryo (not the tube) is essential to the success of this procedure it seems.

Salpingectomy directs treatment to the mothers’ body - it removes a tube rupturing/about to rupture. We seek no harm to the child but cannot avoid it. Salpingostomy makes an incision in the tube and “removes” the embryo, the tube being sewn up and generally preserved. The former is regarded as moral (“indirect abortion”), the latter generally as immoral (“direct abortion”). [Some have argued that the latter could be moral - even in “removing” the embryo from the tube, we don’t want his death, but alas he dies. From what I recall of the literature on this, the reality that the child is so directly targeted, moved to a medical dish and discarded, not to some environment with life-saving potential, weighs against viewing the procedure as moral in the assessment of most theologians.]

So here we have an indirect intention which cannot easily be objectively demonstrated or inferred from the exterior act. It can only be known by the agent himself.

While the bolded part is technically true for Salpingectomy, the prima-facie evidence is powerful, because if the end intended were abortion, this would be an absurd procedure to adopt. It leaves the mother’s fertility damaged whereas other direct abortion techniques do not.

 

[Ender]

Is there a difference between redress of the disorder and retributive justice?

Only in that redressing the disorder is an example of retributive justice, but retribution is more than just redress.

Anyhow, the Church’s position on the death penalty appears to me to be following a similar path as that on slavery.

I would rather not get launched into that debate. The discussion is capital punishment, not slavery, usury, EENS, or any other issue. Whatever capital punishment may have in common with other topics, it is rare to find another one that has been so consistently taught, for so long, by so many of the church’s great theologians, explicitly confirmed by at least 1600 years of papal documents, and contained in virtually every catechism she has produced. Reversing her teaching on the right of States to employ capital punishment is no incidental matter.

Ender

 

[Ender]

I can only conclude you either have difficulties with logic or with writing clear meaningful English statements.

Rats. For a few posts there the debate was enjoyable because it was conducted without rancor. This…not so much.

If I cut down a tree knowing the nest in it will be destroyed then I have in some sense chosen that destruction and also caused it by my own hand.

Of course, but you keep making a distinction between directly intended and indirectly intended results (which has not yet been clarified). Surely if something can be indirectly intended then this would be an example of it. Having said that, I’m not willing to accept that I have willed or intended the destruction of the nest. Let’s say my daughter is scheduled for a concert at Carnegie Hall, my wife falls on the stairs and breaks her leg, and I take her to the hospital. I suppose there is a sense in which you can claim I have chosen to miss my daughter’s concert, but that really misses the nature of the decision. Faced with a choice between bad and worse, I am allowed to select bad without the moral guilt that would come if I chose bad over good.

Likewise your proposition “What is forbidden is deliberately killing the attacker if a non-fatal option is available.”

Your statement only makes logical sense if your condition’s failure implies either:

1. the attacker may then be killed with a direct intention;
2. the attacker may then be killed indirectly
   3 …?

I ruled out the 2nd because most people would just have written “What is forbidden is killing the attacker if a non-fatal option is available.”

Really? All this over the word “deliberately”? Since I don’t know what you mean by the terms direct and indirect intention, I don’t use them. I just stick with the more common terms, like “deliberately”.

But you tell me … perhaps more clearly this time.

As a great philosopher once said, “There you go again.”

Ender

 

[Ender]

No I am not fully committed to the tool of reason (not faith) known as PODE. But I do accept the moral principle this tool attempts to uphold, namely that there are cases where we validly may seem to do evil to achieve good and also appear to break the Commandments validly.

An example of how appearances can be deceiving.

The PODE, by itself, is well known to be problematic in assisting faith explain all such faith conclusions well or consistently.

If it was a tool of reason in the first paragraph it cannot be a faith conclusion in the second.

You are splitting some very subtle “intending” hairs here…

Perhaps, but as you recognized, “intent” needs to be finely defined if this discussion is to make sense.

Why must knowingly choosing to pull the trigger of a gun aimed at someone’s head always be called a direct intent to kill in the sense that moral theologians use that phrase?

Define the phrase if you want it used properly.

It can simply be the indirect executive will, a practical, methodical decision to carry out the direct intent which is protection. I believe Aquinas called this form of external lesser choice “electio” as opposed to more internal acts of will and intent which he calls “intentio” and “consentio”. These subtleties are completely lost on most people who try to analyse moral acts using the simplistic three font tool described in the CCC and do not recognise the gross ambiguity of the English catchall word “intention”.

Define these terms if you want to use them.

And here is where you start a sort of procrustean rationalisation that Rau engages in that ends up with an Emporers clothes denial of what is factually obvious to Catholics not contaminated by a simplistic use of the 3 fonts tool.

“There you go again.”

Killing the embryo here is no different from putting a shotgun to my head and pulling the trigger. Certain death is chosen and willed in some way.

“In some way” being about as generic a catchall as one could imagine.

Therefore the death, despite material appearances can be willed in a way that does not break the 5th.

In a case of self defense, and with the vagueness of “willed in a way”, this is probably true. The issue is whether any of this pertains to capital punishment. In my mind it does not.

As above, a correct understanding of Aquinas’s philosophy of mind and will re stages of applied intentional acts adequately splits the hairs in my mind.

Perhaps it is the hairs in your mind that cause your fuzzy thinking?

Ender

 

[Ender]

And no, the first quote did not start this debate as far as I know. It was part of a prior debate and Ender never answered that question at all.
For obvious reasons.

Wait, what?? What question? I’ll answer anything. If you mean by “obvious reason” that it is obvious I overlooked it, or just got too involved with other things, that’s probably true.

Ender

 

[Ender]

Actually, rereading the sad story of Mrs Squirrel I think Ender could validly be said to have directly procured/intended the death of said Mrs Squirrel.
If he knew it was there and he knew with certainty that the felling of the tree would kill it…then by felling the tree he directly intended/caused it’s death so far as his objective external deeds go.

Obviously this is not what a moral theologian would describe as a direct intention but an indirect one.

In statement one you conclude that I have directly intended the death of the squirrel (but to be fair, I only destroyed the nest), but in statement three you observe that this is really an example of indirect intention. If you note that I have trouble understanding you at least accept that the fault is not entirely mine.

That doesn’t worry me, though this lack of authenticating objective evidence is always troubling to Ender…who wants decisions rendered in this life for every grave matter even if it’s possibly an interior sin only. Except kings of course.

This is another statement I really don’t understand…but for whatever reason it does strike me as humorous. I don’t get the joke, but still find it funny.

Ender

 

[o_mlly]

It is retributive justice that redresses the disorder caused by the offense.

Your argument claims that Evangelium Vitae (EV) contradicts traditional Catholic doctrine by eliminating retribution as a valid moral argument for capital punishment.

I argue that EV developed the doctrine allowing capital punishment with no contradiction to prior doctrine.

To support your argument of contradiction, you must cite an authoritative, historical and magisterial source prior to EV (1995) which teaches that retribution alone is a valid reason for capital punishment.

• The primary purpose of the punishment which society inflicts is “to redress the disorder caused by the offence”. Public authority must redress the violation of personal and social rights* by imposing on the offender an adequate punishment for the crime (JPII, Evangelium vitae #56)

Of course, the word “retribution” does not occur once in EV.

Your citation from EV does confirm the validity of the idea of retribution (“adequate punishment”) but goes no further.

This citation does not support your argument.

Redress in the catechism refers to repairing the disorder inflicted on the moral order. That is what is being redressed, and it is the punishment itself that achieves that. This is retribution: it is nothing more than treating a person according to his actions.*We speak of merit and demerit, in relation to retribution, rendered according to justice. *(Aquinas)

Again, it is not enough for you to claim that Catholic doctrine taught that “it is the punishment itself that achieves [repairing the disorder],” without evidence of a magisterial citation in support. Aquinas’ quote does not support the claim that punishment itself restores right order.

This citation does not support your argument.

The word retribution is not used, which is a great pity given how it has led to a misunderstanding of what that section is actually saying. I can only provide citations that demonstrate that understanding; I have not (yet) found the church document saying specifically that retribution and redress are the same thing, although it is not hard to find others who have explicitly said it.

*“Protecting society is not the primary purpose of punishment,” he *[Fr. Thomas Petri] said. “The primary purpose of punishment is retribution…(Fr. Petri, OP, Dean of the Dominican House of Studies, 2015)
​

Scholarly theologians and saintly priests are not magisterial. A bishop in his own diocese, however, is, and a synod of bishops even more so. If absence of the word “retribution” has caused a misunderstanding then the confusion would be evidenced in the USCCB statements on capital punishment subsequent to 1995. Those USCCB statements do not indicate any misunderstanding or confusion in EV as a licit and valid development of doctrine on limiting capital punishments.

As to the words “redress” and “retribution” having identical meanings in philosophy or law, I still disagree. While redress may certainly include retribution, it is not accomplished by it. Redress seeks to restore the order for all – offender, victim and society. Retribution, as one of the justifications of punishment, is aimed at the offender.

What is more important than what we think is what did JPII think. In EV, he disallows retribution as a morally valid reason for capital punishment. He does allow incarceration as a means of redress indicating to me that in his mind the two – retribution and redress – are most certainly different in meaning. Redress is aimed at restorative justice, that is, the process of returning to their previous condition all parties involved in or affected by the original misconduct, including victims, offenders, the community, and even possibly the government.

The subsection briefly departs from this motif in no. 2266 to introduce punishment’s “primary purpose,” i.e., redressing the disorder introduced by deliberate crime (i.e., retribution) (Dulles)

The saintly scholar is not without his critics (as the article shows). More important, he is not magisterial.

This citation does not support your argument.

*Evangelium Vitae , no. 56, and the *Catechism of the Catholic Church **, no. 2266, agree that “the primary aim” of punishment is the retributive one of “redressing the disorder introduced by the offense.” (Charles E. Rice, Notre Dame Law School)

Charles E. Rice is not magisterial and, I believe, in error in reading the mind of JPII.

This citation does not support your argument.

*In fact, the Church teaches that retributive justice is punishment’s primary purpose. *(Christopher Kaczor, Loyola Marymount, 2004)

Kaczor is correct: punishment’s primary purpose is retributive justice. He does not write, however, (as you claim) that retributive justice is historically in Catholic doctrine a valid moral reason for capital punishment.

This citation does not support your argument.​

 

[Ender]

Your argument claims that Evangelium Vitae (EV) contradicts traditional Catholic doctrine by eliminating retribution as a valid moral argument for capital punishment.

No, that is not my argument. I never claimed that JPII contradicted the traditional teaching on capital punishment. Nor would I make such a claim as I don’t believe it is true. I believe (with Dulles) that doctrine is not changed, and that EV argues against capital punishment on prudential grounds.

To support your argument of contradiction, you must cite an authoritative, historical and magisterial source prior to EV (1995) which teaches that retribution alone is a valid reason for capital punishment.

Again, contradiction is not my argument, however…

*- **The primary scope of the penalty is to redress the disorder… *(CCC 2266)
*- While something may have more than one end, all other ends are necessarily subordinate to whatever is the primary end. *(Roman Rota)

• Therefore all other ends of punishment, including protection, are subordinate to achieving the primary end, which is redress.

*- **Legitimate public authority has the right and duty to inflict penalties commensurate with the gravity of the crime. *(CCC 2266)
*- **It is lawful to kill when fighting in a just war; when carrying out by order of the Supreme Authority a sentence of death in punishment of a crime *(Catechism of Pius X)

• Therefore capital punishment must be commensurate with the severity of (at least) murder, and is therefore a just punishment for that crime (where no other practical objections pertain.)

*-**We grant that the need for retribution does indeed justify punishment *(USCCB 1980)

• Given that retribution justifies punishment, that capital punishment is just, and that all other ends of punishment are subordinate to the primary end (retribution), what is the argument that a person who deserves to die should not be treated as he deserves?

Of course the shorter argument is this one:*Whoever sheds man’s blood, by man his blood shall be shed, for in the image of God He made man. *(God…in Gn 9:6)

Of course, the word “retribution” does not occur once in EV.

I’ll come back to all of this.

Ender

 

[o_mlly]

No, that is not my argument. I never claimed that JPII contradicted the traditional teaching on capital punishment. Nor would I make such a claim as I don’t believe it is true. I believe (with Dulles) that doctrine is not changed, and that EV argues against capital punishment on prudential grounds.
Again, contradiction is not my argument, however…
…

There is no doubt that 2267 is something new, something that has no support in all of church history and simply appeared in 1995. There are no references either in the catechism or Evangelium Vitae to any previous church document to support the claims they make. Each document instead points to the other. The claim made by 2267 about the traditional teaching of the church is contradicted not just by all of church history but more directly by the 1992 version of the same document. How can we explain two contradictory versions appearing in consecutive editions of the same document only five years apart?

?

 

[Blue_Horizon]

In statement one you conclude that I have directly intended the death of the squirrel (but to be fair, I only destroyed the nest), but in statement three you observe that this is really an example of indirect intention. If you note that I have trouble understanding you at least accept that the fault is not entirely mine.
This is another statement I really don’t understand…but for whatever reason it does strike me as humorous. I don’t get the joke, but still find it funny.

Ender

You have trouble understanding that what a moral theologian calls direct intention and what in English most would describe you did to the squirrel/nest … may use the same phrase but in fact mean different things?

Would you also have trouble understanding me if I said that I once pulled the black box out of a crashed plane. I eventually gave it to the investigator who knocked on my door asking for that orange box you’ve got.

It would be helpful if you could contribute some light to your response rather than reach for the can of smoke. We can all do the rhetorical nothing response thing.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

One can see how the bolded perhaps described the self-defence case (with the observation that the death/lethal act is not really needed, it just seems our only option, which is why we chose it), but I am much less comfortable when one seeks to apply it to the ectopic pregnancy (Salpingectomy) case. The word “purposed” makes it sound as though the procedure chosen was chosen because it will kill the child. Certainly the procedure is “oriented” to that ultimate result (and others) - oriented in the sense of “will cause” that result. Clearly, that’s not the reason for choosing Salpingectomy - because such a purpose is more readily achieved by other means. Thus, I don’t think you have quite the right form of words.

Were we assessing methotrexate injection (or even Salpingostomy) I would say your statement is a close fit - though I’d replace “necessary” with “unavoidable” which I think is clearer/more accurate. We don’t require the death at all, we just can’t avoid it.

The ectopic off-spring certainly dies as night follows day, in a time and manner dictated by our act (Salpingectomy), but the death is nowhere in Intention (purpose, objective) - it is simply beyond avoiding despite desperate desire to do so. [Formally described as an “indirect abortion”].

Clearly this is so for Salpingectomy.

Your statement earlier to the effect that the Salpingectomy procedure is directly purposed to bring about a foreseen and -]necessary /-]unavoidable death - is something that can certainly be said of methotrexate injection (which acts to kill the child). I have brought this up a few times only because I would not want anyone to think that the description you’ve proposed for Salpingectomy - which is a moral act - and which is a very apt description for methotrexate injection, could therefore be a basis to conclude that methotrexate injection must therefore also be moral. Our moral principles can accept as moral acts that destroy innocents in a “collateral” fashion (under appropriate conditions), but never as the target.

You are back to your mental reservations thing.
You also like to infiltrate a particular type of intent (or not) by carefully chosen words that pretend to objectively treat of the physical procedure…thereby gaming the system as it were and predetermining the moral conclusion ab initio.

This less than robust approach to moral analysis is more clear in your contributions of Congo nuns. There you will not even accept they were “contracepting” by the physical scientific definition of that procedure.
Clearly by an “act of contraception” the Church means something more complicated and immoral.

I have seen the same thing recently in discussions over the word adultery.
The word to me is defined very precisely and does not involve consent or intent for such a “procedure” to be identified clearly. Yet some reach different moral conclusions re the same incident simply on the basis that the definition always involves intent to be present.

You are doing much the same above it seems to me.

I am also surprised you believe criminal intruders may be directly collaterally targeted while embryos may not.
In fact I am not even sure collateral and directly are words that can ever logically go together in your concluding statement above…which just makes it a rationalist tautology adding no new insight to anything.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

An example of how appearances can be deceiving.
If it was a tool of reason in the first paragraph it cannot be a faith conclusion in the second.
Perhaps, but as you recognized, “intent” needs to be finely defined if this discussion is to make sense.
Define the phrase if you want it used properly.
Define these terms if you want to use them.
“There you go again.”
“In some way” being about as generic a catchall as one could imagine.
In a case of self defense, and with the vagueness of “willed in a way”, this is probably true. The issue is whether any of this pertains to capital punishment. In my mind it does not.
Perhaps it is the hairs in your mind that cause your fuzzy thinking?

Ender

I see the usual Ender empty rhetoric and unwilling to think socratic questions have come to the fore indicating only a pretence of intellectual debate.

Further converse with you is therefore going to be a waste of my time.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

Rats. For a few posts there the debate was enjoyable because it was conducted without rancor. This…not so much.
Of course, but you keep making a distinction between directly intended and indirectly intended results (which has not yet been clarified). Surely if something can be indirectly intended then this would be an example of it. Having said that, I’m not willing to accept that I have willed or intended the destruction of the nest. Let’s say my daughter is scheduled for a concert at Carnegie Hall, my wife falls on the stairs and breaks her leg, and I take her to the hospital. I suppose there is a sense in which you can claim I have chosen to miss my daughter’s concert, but that really misses the nature of the decision. Faced with a choice between bad and worse, I am allowed to select bad without the moral guilt that would come if I chose bad over good.
Really? All this over the word “deliberately”? Since I don’t know what you mean by the terms direct and indirect intention, I don’t use them. I just stick with the more common terms, like “deliberately”.
As a great philosopher once said, “There you go again.”

Ender

No rancour here at all, only mild frustration over your lack of logic or clarity.
I have noted before that you have a tendency to feel deeply slighted whenever somebody might indirectly embarrass you re your self estimation of your academic/intellectual skills.

As for your rationalisation for your slip up in logic/expression…come on now. Do you really think readers are that thick? Much more credible if you just admit you got it wrong and move on rather than tough it out with the absurd rationalisation below.
But that’s just my opinion .

 

[Blue_Horizon]

I do not believe PODE applies to the death penalty in any case. Death is intended and any good effects proceeds only because of that death.

The examples discussed for irregular fetal implantation show this crucial difference. An ectopic pregnancy threatens the mother’s life via ruptured tube as the fetus grows. The excision of the tube saves the mother but kills the baby. The surgery is permissible since it is the tubal excision which saves the mother, not the indirect death of the encapsulated fetus. Hepatic pregnancy surgeries, on the other hand, are not justified because the procedure excises only the fetus and is, therefore, a direct attack on the life of an innocent.

Was hoping you would clarify as per my post #225.

 

[Rau]

You are back to your mental reservations thing.
You also like to infiltrate a particular type of intent (or not) by carefully…

You are back to not addressing specifics. Interesting.

Can I ask you this: Do you believe any of the 3 treatments I’ve referenced for ectopic pregnancy are immoral? Which one(s)?

 

[Blue_Horizon]

You are back to not addressing specifics…

Can I ask you this: …

Sure, whenever you are seriously ready to address the specifics here:
“This less than robust approach to moral analysis is more clear in your contributions re Congo nuns. There you will not even accept they were “contracepting” by the physical scientific definition of that procedure…”

You yourself have declined to address this simple question (were the Congo nuns contracepting in the standard colloquial meaning of that word) in at least two other threads to date I believe.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

You are back to your mental reservations thing…

RAU/ENDER before I sign off from this now stillborn “discussion” I attach this very readable paper on Aquinas’s analysis of “indirect intention”. It concurs with exactly what I thought my Thomist professors taught me 30 yrs ago on this point which I find felicitous.

forums.catholic-questions.org/attachment.php?attachmentid=23973&stc=1&d=1495930225

The author, I believe with strong justification, concludes that todays PODE is significantly different from Aquinas and it is used to justify far more than Aquinas would ever justify.
That’s OK, if the Church says something is licit I will agree even if the alleged explanation for it actually is mistaken.

The author asserts that Aquinas would not consider licit any double effect scenario where death was inevitable. It is only licit if death is a risk, even if highly likely.

His example of the two swordsmen is very interesting. In self defence the Magistrate may licitly deal a cut to the neck (where death is much more than a risk, an inevitability) but a private individual may not (even if it was the only means left to protect himself from his attacker).

The reason the Magistrate can do so is because he is a representative of the State, and as you opine, such may directly intend death (provided no personal animosity is involved).
And the reason Aquinas invokes this principle is clearly because he sees the purposing of a blow that is inevitably lethal (rather than having a lethal risk) as constitutive of direct-intent.

In other words, the purposing of any means that involves foreseeing a certain outcome (ie an inevitable one), by definition defines direct intent regardless of feeling or focus on the good outcome. Yep, you directly intended to destroy Mrs Squirrel’s home.

That is why a private individual may not, according to Aquinas, ever deal a lethal blow that he knows to be inevitably lethal. He may only deal blows that risk death but do not inevitably necessitate death.

Rau, that is why your originally explained Ectopic example, at least according to Aquinas, involves direct intent to kill (because embryonic death is foreseen as inevitably associated with this action) and is therefore not licit. To be honest, so far as Aquinas is concerned, it makes no difference whether the tube is diseased or not.

Clearly the Church accepts the above is licit. On what grounds I do not know. It certainly isn’t justified by this reading of Aquinas who sees only direct intent involved in such a scenario.

The author well summarises the sort of moral analysis I believe you are engaging in - and refutes it, at least so far as Aquinas is concerned. This quote sums up precisely what I have been trying to bring to your attention:

“PODE does not repose – indeed, may not be able to repose – on the
direction, withholding, or paring of one’s intentions. It does, however, rest on
one’s being able to foresee harm without intending harm. It is at best an infelicity
to speak of not intending some foreseen harm as directing one’s intention away
from the foreseen harm. If there were such a method of intention, it would found a
“morality of gestures and poses.” In any case, Aquinas does not propose such a
morality, nor does he use “praeter intentionem” (indirect intent) to refer to some special way of intending.”

How then does the Magisterium explain why the valid ectopic procedure you finally describe is licit if modern PODE understandings are flawed and not based on Aquinas at all? I don’t know. Back to Zika, it just is!

Perhaps authorised doctors of the State, like Aquinas’s example of the Magistrate, are alone allowed to directly intend such inevitable but proportionately chosen deaths by dealing the knowingly lethal blow (as opposed to a high risk blow)?

I don’t like that rationale (though Ender would) because I believe the Magisterium no longer holds to the divine right of kings as Aquinas seems to have.