Capital Punishment

[Rau]

Sure, whenever you are seriously ready to address the specifics here:
“This less than robust approach to moral analysis is more clear in your contributions re Congo nuns. There you will not even accept they were “contracepting” by the physical scientific definition of that procedure…”

You yourself have declined to address this simple question (were the Congo nuns contracepting in the standard colloquial meaning of that word) in at least two other threads to date I believe.

So some unaddressed (in your view) issue from a previous thread is grounds for your to refuse in this thread? Yeah, looking back over this thread, I can see how I’ve been holding back in responding to you

If it’s understood that “contracept” is referring to the physical / scientific procedure of preventing conception, then the rape victim in hospital “contracepts” and the congo nuns contracepted in a kind of ‘contingent’ fashion (given reality could, and mostly did, play out with there being no “contraception” as there was no sex, forced or otherwise). We can say definitively the Congo nuns (as legend has it…) made themselves sterile. You could call these acts (in moral-theology speak) indirect contraception.

In neither case were these acts the acts of contraception the Church proscribes.

 

[Rau]

…The author, I believe with strong justification, concludes that todays PODE is significantly different from Aquinas and it is used to justify far more than Aquinas would ever justify. That’s OK, if the Church says something is licit I will agree even if the alleged explanation for it actually is mistaken.

You make it sound as though any departure from Aquinas must be a mistake. Or are you saying the Church misunderstand the basis (Aquinas) for its conclusion?

The author asserts that Aquinas would not consider licit any double effect scenario where death was inevitable. It is only licit if death is a risk, even if highly likely.

Interesting. Thus, when the terrorist air-force flies over out country preparing to drop bombs on our peace-loving citizenry, and we learn there is an innocent child strapped in the back seat (a human shield, if you will), then according to this author, Aquinas would say that shooting down the plane is immoral and therefore must not be done. Are we then faced with the choices: the author misunderstands Aquinas or Aquinas is in error or the Church is in error?

His example of the two swordsmen is very interesting. In self defence the Magistrate may licitly deal a cut to the neck (where death is much more than a risk, an inevitability) but a private individual may not (even if it was the only means left to protect himself from his attacker)…The reason the Magistrate can do so is because he is a representative of the State, and as you opine, such may directly intend death (provided no personal animosity is involved). And the reason Aquinas invokes this principle is clearly because he sees the purposing of a blow that is inevitably lethal (rather than having a lethal risk) as constitutive of direct-intent.

This last question is the one we have all been struggling with, and which I suspect we are yet to struggle with for long enough. Were I a betting man I would probably disagree with the view that the choice of a certainly lethal blow is impermissible. [Don Ruggero said he is a professor of theology - I wonder if he has some theological insights on this??]

In other words, the purposing of any means that involves foreseeing a certain outcome (ie an inevitable one), by definition defines direct intent regardless of feeling or focus on the good outcome. Yep, you directly intended to destroy Mrs Squirrel’s home.

To be clear, this is what the author understand to be the position of Aquinas (and may actually be the position of Aquinas).

That is why a private individual may not, according to Aquinas, ever deal a lethal blow that he knows to be inevitably lethal. He may only deal blows that risk death but do not inevitably necessitate death.

Yet Aquinas also says we owe our own life greater care than another’s.

Rau, that is why your originally explained Ectopic example, at least according to Aquinas, involves direct intent to kill (because embryonic death is foreseen as inevitably associated with this action) and is therefore not licit. To be honest, so far as Aquinas is concerned, it makes no difference whether the tube is diseased or not.

So Aquinas would have called all 3 treatments of Ectopic pregnancy murder (according to the author)? I trust you will also give us your assessment?

How then does the Magisterium explain why the valid ectopic procedure you finally describe is licit if modern PODE understandings are flawed and not based on Aquinas at all? I don’t know.

The history of the expression (in words) of the PODE would be a very worth topic of theological study. Such should not start with a premise that Aquinas made no error.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

You make it sound as though any departure from Aquinas must be a mistake. Or are you saying the Church misunderstand the basis (Aquinas) for its conclusion?

Interesting. Thus, when the terrorist air-force flies over out country preparing to drop bombs on our peace-loving citizenry, and we learn there is an innocent child strapped in the back seat (a human shield, if you will), then according to this author, Aquinas would say that shooting down the plane is immoral and therefore must not be done. Are we then faced with the choices: the author misunderstands Aquinas or Aquinas is in error or the Church is in error?

This last question is the one we have all been struggling with, and which I suspect we are yet to struggle with for long enough. Were I a betting man I would probably disagree with the view that the choice of a certainly lethal blow is impermissible. [Don Ruggero said he is a professor of theology - I wonder if he has some theological insights on this??]

To be clear, this is what the author understand to be the position of Aquinas (and may actually be the position of Aquinas).

Yet Aquinas also says we owe our own life greater care than another’s.

So Aquinas would have called all 3 treatments of Ectopic pregnancy murder (according to the author)? I trust you will also give us your assessment?

The history of the expression (in words) of the PODE would be a very worth topic of theological study. Such should not start with a premise that Aquinas made no error.

And here was me hoping you would actually read and then slowly digest the 24 page tertiary level paper before sounding off. Silly me .
We live in an age of instant everything - including reason.

Yes I will come back to you on your ectopic obsessions after I have read up on the subtle medical differences

 

[Rau]

And here was me hoping you would actually read and then slowly digest the 24 page tertiary level paper before sounding off. Silly me .
We live in an age of instant everything - including reason.

Yes I will come back to you on your ectopic obsessions after I have read up on the subtle medical differences

My remarks are not dependent on the contents. I am not quibbling with your readout on what the author says. I will read it in due course, but am currently reading other material on PODE (so I can start my PhD)

 

[Blue_Horizon]

My remarks are not dependent on the contents.

Doh boy:

“Thus, when the terrorist air-force flies over out country preparing to drop bombs on our peace-loving citizenry, and we learn there is an innocent child strapped in the back seat (a human shield, if you will), then according to this author, Aquinas would say that shooting down the plane is immoral and therefore must not be done. Are we then faced with the choices: the author misunderstands Aquinas or Aquinas is in error or the Church is in error?”
You would not have even asked this if you had read and digested.

“Yet Aquinas also says we owe our own life greater care than another’s.”
Nor this.

"So Aquinas would have called all 3 treatments of Ectopic pregnancy murder (according to the author)? "
Nor this - you would have answered that for yourself then stated whether you disagreed and why.

Re the PhD, just base it on our CAF discussions .
Have you noticed that is what Ron Conte has been doing in his publications (and also Granny over in her interminable OrigSin threads).

But seriously, are you actually doing a PhD?
If so you seem to specialise in Healthcare already by the sound of it.

 

[Rau]

You would not have even asked this if you had read and digested.

Seems I ought not to rely on you to report the import of articles.

 

[Rau]

"So Aquinas would have called all 3 treatments of Ectopic pregnancy murder (according to the author)? "
Nor this - you would have answered that for yourself then stated whether you disagreed and why.

I’ve not read the article. You have. Thus - it would be quicker for you to simply answer the question. And to likewise provide your own assessment (requested of you some 3 times on this thread I think).

 

[Blue_Horizon]

I’ve not read the article. You have. Thus - it would be quicker for you to simply answer the question.

This is just depressing.

 

[o_mlly]

OK that’s even more interesting but not quite what I was getting at.

Do you see a moral distinction between the phrases “CP”, “death penalty” and “State executions”?

My reading of you is that you now find all CP immoral in principle (because it implies death purely for retrib justice motives).

However you do see principled justification (but not practical justification) for the Death Penalty (for redress or reform motives if incarceration not possible)?

Capital punishment is not intrinsically evil and is a moral act if bloodless means are not available to redress the disorder caused by the guilty party whose identity and responsibility have been fully determined.

You have just now added that you see the latter as direct not indirect killing which I find surprising. I agree CP (which implies retrib justice) motives is direct killing.

What else could capital punishment be if not the direct killing, legally authorized, of someone as punishment for a crime? When the state puts the knife to the head of the criminal then the state intends to kill just as the surgeon who puts the scalpel to an unborn child.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

Capital punishment is not intrinsically evil and is a moral act if bloodless means are not available to redress the disorder caused by the guilty party whose identity and responsibility have been fully determined.

What else could capital punishment be if not the direct killing, legally authorized, of someone as punishment for a crime? When the state puts the knife to the head of the criminal then the state intends to kill just as the surgeon who puts the scalpel to an unborn child.

1. Murder manslaughter and killing do not all mean the same thing.
   In your contributions are you making similar distinctions between CP, State Executions and the Death Penalty?
   This is all I was really asking.
2. If criminals are executed because bloodless means are not available, and it is intended as the only means possible for protecting the common good why would you rule out even the possibility of a double effect argument (implying indirect intent) as per individual self defence and this being the only way, under the circumstances, to disable my attacker.
   I accept that a retrib justice motivation always implies direct intent.

I realise this was not the central medieval argument … but common good is now the primary Magisterial argument from my reading of material since the 1990s.

Yet, if purposing to kill in self defence can be indirect then so too can that of a hanging judge and an executioner obeying his just judgement.

 

[Ender]

?

What I was referring to in 2267 was the caveat that capital punishment was accepted by the church “when this is the only practicable way to defend the lives of human beings effectively against the aggressor.” I asserted that this claim was not substantiated by historical church teaching, and I made the point that both the 1997 version and the 1992 version referred to “the traditional teaching of the church”, yet the 1992 version did not contain the restriction claimed in the 1997 version.

The rather obvious point is this: if that really is the traditional teaching of the church then surely someone should be able to cite where it was actually taught. I can cite a dozen (Magisterial) references to capital punishment that don’t include it, but have never seen one that does.
The realm of human affairs is a messy one, full of at least apparent inconsistency and incoherence, and the recent teaching of the Catholic Church on capital punishment—vitiated, as I intend to show, by errors of historical fact and interpretation—is no exception.

*The most reasonable conclusion to draw from this discussion is that, once again, the Catechism is simply wrong from an historical point of view. Traditional Catholic teaching did not contain the restriction enunciated by Pope John Paul II. *
(Kevin L. Flannery, S.J., Pontifical Gregorian University, Rome; Consultor to the CDF, 2007)
Ender

 

[Blue_Horizon]

We can say definitively the Congo nuns (as legend has it…) made themselves sterile. You could call these acts (in moral-theology speak) indirect contraception.

Back to this one…
Finally, an acceptance of what most intelligent people, without alleged religious principles they feel they need to uphold, would immediately conclude.

Therefore if people can in unusual circumstances choose to contracept without “directly intending” to contracept…
then people can, in principle, surely choose to kill without directly intending to kill (though Aquinas may disagree)
and people can, in principle, choose adultery without directly intending to adulter (as AL suggests).

Which is all I ever suggested in our previous discussions on other threads.
Its not a big deal, simply an exploration into what “direct” and “indirect” may actually equate to in practice.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

Certainly for an act to be proper it must be moral. In this case I mean no more than the best choice for the circumstances.
Only if it is understood that what constitutes a just execution is not only the justness of the penalty for the crime, but also its impact on the entire community.

So when evaluating the overall morality of any given instance of a Just Execution (JE) using the three font analysis is the consideration of the common good (“impact on the entire community”) to be found in the circumstances/consequences, the intent or the object by your reasoning?

And do you see this as a proportionality (weighing up goods and bads) argument for ascertaining the overall morality of the JE in question?

 

[Rau]

Believe it or not Blue, we are not disagreeing much on these points, but rather issues of use of language, particularly of words like “directly” which have one meaning in moral theology and potentially another in wider contexts, and a word like “contraception” which may be used with physical or moral meaning, and this creates smoke where there is less fire than might appear. Though I agree I have not been as consistent as I ought wrt PODE which I will aim to remedy in due course.

…Therefore if people can in unusual circumstances choose to contracept without “directly intending” to contracept…then people can…

It is a given that people may (licitly) knowingly choose an act with contraceptive effect, and in doing so the contraceptive effect need not be in the Intention font (ie. an intended end, or an intended means), nor is the moral object ‘contraception’. For example, in the case of rape victims, the administration of a spermicide (hospital) has the good moral object of interrupting a rape - to end the injustice. It is moral to interrupt a rape under the positive precept of “Love of neighbour”. The contraceptive effect is in the 3rd font, and is therefore indirect. Also in the 3rd font is the good effect of stopping an act of physical, emotional and mental harm. For completeness, I believe that abortifacients or subsequent (direct) abortion cannot be used. Killing a child does not interrupt a rape, and to act against the child is intrinsically evil.

in principle, surely [one may] choose to kill without “directly intending” to kill…

I think we have some uncertainty in the meaning of “directly…” and “indirectly…”. Certainly, indirect killing need not morally be morally evil.

In self-defence, every just act of self-defence causing death is an instance of a double effect. The good effect - saving one’s own life, the bad effect, the death of another. The balance is judged good, as preserving an innocent outweighs the loss of the one who is not (for he is guilty of unjust attack). So morality is determined by the other 2 fonts.

NB: Aquinas did not explicitly analyse in terms of the 3 fonts, so reading him may not directly map onto how we analyse acts today by way of the 3 fonts.

It is permissible to intend harm in the means (and death is a form of harm), though never as an end, and only in service of a greater good in the end. Such harm against an aggressor is not morally evil (though may still be called ‘bad’.)

In self-defence, the harm is in the (intended) means, it is not an end, nor is it the moral object. We may weigh the harm in the intended means against the good intentions - both together determine the morality of the Intention font. This is analogous to the physician choosing the “bad” of amputation. He may morally choose that “bad means” because it is outweighed by the good in the intended end. He may not morally choose “amputation” to achieve some minor health benefit.

Regarding “directly intended” - I think this is the proper usage: That which is “directly intended” is the moral object (the end in terms of morality of the chosen act itself). In self-defence, the act itself is killing a person, but he is an aggressor, hence the moral object of that is (not killing an innocent but) defence of innocent life. When we say something is “directly intended” - we refer to an object - which must be good, or evil.

The expression (in our context) “directly intended killing of an aggressor” needs some unpacking. It’s right to say it does not arise in genuine self-defence. It would refer to an act where *the moral object *is killing the one who is the aggressor. This would suggest choosing an act to produce death as an end. Such an act is evidently immoral.

…and people can, in principle, choose adultery without directly intending to adulter.

Do you say “in principle” because at present, you cannot conceive of how such a knowing choice could be moral, or do you rely on a meaning of “adultery” that excises the moral element [despite a knowing choice]? Or are you referring to an “objective adultery”, where the choice was made without knowledge? Perhaps all this strays too far from topic.]

 

[Rau]

Capital Punishment

The good end is the justice of protecting the common good (which consists I think in more than terminating this one criminal’s career). In giving a sentence of death, the judge intends the death of a person - as means, not an end. This intended means is bad in the sense of harm, but not in the sense of immoral. The act itself is defending the community including by the dispensing of justice. The loss of life is a bad consequence (and arguably there are other bad consequences) and there are good consequences pertaining to the care of the common good.

It follows that an act of CP can be moral or immoral depending on the balance of consequences and double effect is applicable.

Acts of CP can readily be distorted to become immoral. For example, when death is chosen to avoid the expense of lifetime incarceration, the killing has become intrinsically evil - yes the prisoner was guilty, but absent a crime deserving a punishment of death, they are “innocent” for purposes of this moral analysis. Or put another way - “guilty, but not guilty unto death”.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

Believe it or not Blue, we are not disagreeing much …

There is nothing in your whole post here I significantly disagree with.
What you say above is all I have ever intended to observe in our last 9 months of on and off again discussion.

That is, things that people might think are direct acts of contraception etc probably are not…though the medical world and objective definitions of the “procedures” chosen may well be rightly called “contracepting” or “killing” or “adultery” in everyday use of those words.

…in the case of rape victims, the administration of a spermicide (hospital) has the good moral object of interrupting a rape - to end the injustice… The contraceptive effect is in the 3rd font, and is therefore indirect.

Of course, but more importantly in terms of colloquial language and understanding of what this may actually look like we must also observe there is a separate secondary “intention” (the praeter intention) which has the 3rd font as its own particular “pseudo object”.

What does a pseudo object and a pseudo intention look like?
It can look like me knowingly pulling the trigger of a loaded gun in my attackers head (if there is no other way) knowing my pseudo object is his death which is (materially) evil.
But as the true object and the true intent is a greater material good (proportionality principle) the act taken as a whole is good because true intention trumps pseudo intention no matter how positive the pseudo intention may appear. Of course the no animosity criterion applies.

Aquinas, I now acknowledge, would likely not agree with the above analysis. He would say that the death is directly willed if it was foreseen as certain. I believe the Magisterium disagrees with Aquinas on this point. The death is not directly willed in its understanding of what constitutes a direct intention because inevitability does not seem to matter.
How the Magisterium defines what constitutes a direct intention then is still a mystery to me!

Also in the 3rd font is the good effect of stopping an act of physical, emotional and mental harm. For completeness, I believe that abortifacients or subsequent (direct) abortion cannot be used. Killing a child does not interrupt a rape, and to act against the child is intrinsically evil.

It would seem a simple matter of proportionality to me. The material evil of the ongoing rape (as you see it) is clearly less than that of killing the child.

I think we have some uncertainty in the meaning of “directly…” and “indirectly…”. Certainly, indirect killing need not morally be morally evil.

That has always logically been the case! Apart from the alleged divine right of kings no one may ever directly break a commandment justly. (Though there does seem to be a similar divine right to adultery if someone could prove God commanded them to cohabit with another as Hosea? was allegedly instructed).

So morality is determined by the other 2 fonts.

This is only true in double effect scenarios where indirect intent is likely possible and proportionality considerations are allowed. Where indirect intent cannot be posited then the 3rd font can never change the moral nature of the act as a whole - only mitigate the culpability or change the evil species of the object.

It is permissible to intend harm in the means (and death is a form of harm), …

I am very wary of the word “means” in this discussion as it is ambiguous. If theft is a means to almsgiving we are probably speaking of two different but related moral acts each with their own proper objects with no indirect intent? But if we speak of lethal self defence we speak of only one moral act and one proper object (the circumstances are a pseudo object).

And as we know even in double effect scenarios when we say the evil must not be the necessary “means” to the good - sometimes it certainly seems to be so.

So the words seem to be different in each scenario and in the latter not really what we wholly mean even in English.

Regarding “directly intended” - I think this is the proper usage: That which is “directly intended” is the moral object (the end in terms of morality of the chosen act itself). In self-defence, the act itself is killing a person, but he is an aggressor, hence the moral object of that is (not killing an innocent but) defence of innocent life. When we say something is “directly intended” - we refer to an object - which must be good, or evil.

Of course. But the object is better described as “disordered” not “evil”. “Evil” leads people to confuse “moral evil” (if the act is bad as a whole) with “material evil” (which resides in the object fontof the act which is clearly only 1/3 of the whole act).

Do you say “in principle” because at present, you cannot conceive of how such a knowing choice could be moral,

Well I believe AL actually says this in practice - but I didn’t want to get too controversial just yet!

or do you rely on a meaning of “adultery” that excises the moral element [despite a knowing choice]? Or are you referring to an “objective adultery”, where the choice was made without knowledge? Perhaps all this strays too far from topic.]

I define adultery as a physical “procedure” in exactly the same way as I did the colloquial meaning of the word “contraception”.
It abstracts completely from the knowledge or intent of the persons - even sleep-walkers can commit adultery don’t they? I wonder if it is a sin if they remember. Regardless it is still gravely “disordered” in all cases, as is contracepting and killing whether in the object or in the circumstances of the agent’s deed.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

Capital Punishment

The good end is the justice of protecting the common good (which consists I think in more than terminating this one criminal’s career). In giving a sentence of death, the judge intends the death of a person - as means, not an end. This intended means is bad in the sense of harm, but not in the sense of immoral. The act itself is defending the community including by the dispensing of justice. The loss of life is a bad consequence (and arguably there are other bad consequences) and there are good consequences pertaining to the care of the common good.

It follows that an act of CP can be moral or immoral depending on the balance of consequences and double effect is applicable.

Acts of CP can readily be distorted to become immoral. For example, when death is chosen to avoid the expense of lifetime incarceration, the killing has become intrinsically evil - yes the prisoner was guilty, but absent a crime deserving a punishment of death, they are “innocent” for purposes of this moral analysis. Or put another way - “guilty, but not guilty unto death”.

Agreed. Also, I find it difficult to see how a retrib justice CP approach can ever be indirect!

Which is why I think Ender is mistaken and why the Magisterium since JPII has been emphasising the Common Good to justify CP (ie indirect intent).

 

[Ender]

So when evaluating the overall morality of any given instance of a Just Execution (JE) using the three font analysis is the consideration of the common good (“impact on the entire community”) to be found in the circumstances/consequences, the intent or the object by your reasoning?

And do you see this as a proportionality (weighing up goods and bads) argument for ascertaining the overall morality of the JE in question?

I am willing to discuss and debate pretty much anything. What I am not willing to do is endure gratuitous taunts, ridicule, and insults, so the choice is yours: keep your comments civil (as you did here) or debate with someone else.

Determining the morality of a just execution is no different than determining the morality of any other act. If the means are acceptable, if the intention is good, and if the foreseeable results are beneficial, the act is moral. That said, if the results of the act turn out badly, so long as the analysis was reasonable, there is no moral fault involved.

For capital punishment, if the crime is deliberate murder then death is a just punishment (font 1). If the intent behind the sentencing is directed at achieving justice then font 2 is satisfied. If the foreseeable outcome of a death sentence is believed to have minimal harmful side effects, the third font is satisfied and the execution is just.

To be clear, the calculation of the side effects of an execution (or any other act) do not involve questions of morality. There is no moral analysis involved in predicting the likely outcome of an action.

The “impact on the community” refers to the consequences of the act, consequences that are, however, influenced by whether the community sees the punishment as just as well as whether they accept the reasons given for applying it. As to whether this is a proportionality argument (how much good v how much bad), to a degree I think it probably is. We shouldn’t do something that brings more harm than good.*That which is hurtful to the many cannot be a species of justice, since justice is directed to the common good. *(Aquinas)
That said, we may surely disagree about what is or is not harmful, and what is or is not good for the community, and as that is not a moral discussion, opposite conclusions are equally justifiable.

Ender

Ender

 

[Ender]

Agreed. Also, I find it difficult to see how a retrib justice CP approach can ever be indirect!

What is the primary objective of punishment? It is to “redress the disorder”. Which of the four objectives of punishment (rehabilitation, retribution, protection, deterrence) does this refer to? If retributive justice is inadequate to justify the use of capital punishment, is it justifiable for LWOP? Finally, if justice itself does not justify capital punishment, how can protection possibly justify it? By saying retributive justice does not permit the death penalty you have essentially said “this person does not deserve to die for his crime”, but if he doesn’t deserve to die for what he has already done how is it possible to believe any situation could justify killing him? You’ve already acknowledged that he doesn’t deserve to die yet you can justify killing him anyway if you perceive him to be a threat. Why bother with trying him for the crimes he has committed, why not just put him in jail to prevent him from committing future ones?

But I agree with this: capital punishment directly intends the death of the prisoner.

Which is why I think Ender is mistaken and why the Magisterium since JPII has been emphasising the Common Good to justify CP (ie indirect intent).

If I rob a bank to get the money necessary for a life saving operation is there any sense in which it can be claimed that robbing the bank was indirectly intended? Yes, I only did it to save a life, which was my ultimate end, but the intermediate end was to steal from a bank, and that intermediate end was directly intended. You cannot strap a person in a chair and electrocute him indirectly. Whatever else was also directly or indirectly intended, his death was as intentional as any act could ever be.

Ender

 

[Rau]

Ender:

But I agree with this: capital punishment directly intends the death of the prisoner.

You are using “directly intended” in an ordinary language sense I believe - which is not the meaning in moral theology.

The phrase “directly intended” is used to refer to the (intentional) choice of the act itself, which is directly ordered toward its object. What is “directly intended” is the moral object.

The intended means (death of the guilty party, a harm, but not immoral) and the intended end are both in the first font of intention.

The second font is always the intentional choice of the act, its nature, and its object.