Capital Punishment

[Rau]

If I had to have a go at explaining this, perhaps I would argue that when Thomas speaks of what is “intended” he is referring to the moral object. That would be consistent with my earlier explanation of the meaning of “directly intended”. There is the moral object (both for self-defence and for CP) and there is the other effect.

Or maybe…he just got it wrong…

 

[Ender]

Remembering that Aquinas thought is magisterial only if it is cited in a magisterial document, I note further that both your citations indicate justice’s need for punishment but do not specify that that punishment ever need be capital. Life w/o parole is punishment. The citation you are looking for is one where the Church teaches that to redress the disorder** requires** (not merely allows) capital punishment to satisfy justice.

If God says it, is that not sufficiently Magisterial?Whoever sheds the blood of man, by man shall his blood be shed; for God made man in his own image.

In order to move past definitional difficulties, I would accept the identity in the notions of “retribution” and “redress the disorder”, if “retribution” is understood to include the reforming, restoring, stabilizing and maintaining of the just order for victim, offender and community.

If that was true then Dulles erred in distinguishing retribution from the other three objectives given that by your definition there are all merely subsets of retribution.

[Finnis:]* In stressing this, I do not concede that retribution is “purely backward-looking,” as is so often said. The retributive shaping point of punishment, like other purposes to which punishment can be adapted, is forward-looking…*

I like this citation (I don’t agree with it, but it is a thoughtful argument). Let me also point out that, as it is not a Magisterial document I could (as you did with my citations) simply dismiss it, but if my position is valid I should be willing and able to defend it.

• The “medicinal” or “healing” point of punishment, of which Aquinas often speaks, is envisaged by him as including its purpose of retribution. There is a notable difference here between St. Thomas’s terminology and the language of the Catechism of the Catholic Church…*

I agree with both of these points, but I would caution that Aquinas’ use of “medicinal” has to be carefully understood.

• The catechism uses the term “medicinal” to refer exclusively to punishment’s possible value as reformative: “Finally punishment has a medicinal value; as far as possible it should contribute to the correction of the offender.*”…

I would say rather that the catechism only uses “medicinal” to refer to rehabilitation, not that it restricts the term to that purpose alone.

• But when he speaks of punishment’s medicinal function, Aquinas has in mind not only reform and deterrence and restraint and coercive inducement to decent conduct, but also the function which the Catechism calls primary: the redressing of the disorder caused by the offense.*

I think this is true: Aquinas used the term broadly to cover all aspects of punishment.*The punishments of this life are medicinal rather than retributive. For retribution is reserved to the Divine judgment *(ST II-II 66,6)
That said, this cannot mean that Aquinas did not believe in retribution per se, but only that the punishment for mortal sins that were not also grave civil wrongs was left to God.

Why is this medicinal, curative healing? Because it is the healing of a disorder-precisely an unjust inequality-introduced into a whole community by the wrongdoer’s criminal choice and action. (John Finnis, Biolchini Family Professor of Law, Notre Dame University)

I’m not sure I see the point here. If Finnis is right and punishment is medicinal (which seems a justifiable position) what does that mean? Retribution also contributes to the restoration of the disorder and is therefore also medicinal. I don’t believe this citation supports your claim that “redressing the disorder” (viz. retribution) includes all of the other ends of punishment, only that all ends of punishment, including retribution, are medicinal.

Ender

 

[Ender]

Clearly, you have a some problem with what he said but cannot concisely, consistently write exactly what that problem is: “contradicts”, “conflicts” ,?

Between your interpretation of EV and the catechism, and that of Cardinal Dulles, I accept the interpretation that Cardinal Dulles gave. *- The Pope and the bishops, using their prudential judgment, have concluded that in contemporary society, at least in countries like our own, the death penalty ought not to be invoked, because, on balance, it does more harm than good.
*
*- Like the Pope, the bishops do not rule out capital punishment altogether, but they say that it is not justifiable as practiced in the United States today. In coming to this prudential conclusion, the magisterium is not changing the doctrine of the Church. The doctrine remains what it has been: that the State, in principle, has the right to impose the death penalty on persons convicted of very serious crimes. *

See the bold face type above. This citation still does not support what I presently believe is your problem with EV.

I argue one point at a time. I was responding only to your comment about Innocent III and his position on capital punishment.

Ender

 

[Ender]

I have already documented that papal teaching authority does not proscribe development of doctrine. He may not, however, contradict established doctrine. On this, I think, we agree. So, the burden is on the one who claims EV contradicts, conflicts or is, at least, contrary or disordered to what the Church (not her theologians or commentators) has always taught.

1. I have said several times that the opposition to capital punishment in EV is prudential, not doctrinal, therefore since it does not change the doctrine it cannot be said to conflict with it.
2. I have also claimed that the caveat contained in 2267 that the traditional teaching of the church limited capital punishment to those instances where it was necessary for the protection of society is incorrect, and I have challenged you and everyone else to provide even a single example of such a teaching. As I said, I have a dozen (Magisterial) examples where such a limitation is not included; so far no one has produced anything that includes it.

A citation which shows magisterial teaching that capital punishment (not merely punishment) is required (not merely allowed) as the only punishment that satisfies retribution or redress of disorder for certain crimes would end the debate. Do you have one?

First, given that the church has always recognized that there may be valid reasons why capital punishment ought not be used, it would be somewhat unusual to have a doctrine that suggested its use was required. Nor was that ever my point. I have never claimed that it was an absolute requirement. What I claimed was this: 1) It is a just punishment for the crime of murder; 2) the State is obligated to impose just punishments on lawbreakers; 3) if there are no practical reasons not to use it, capital punishment ought to be the punishment for (at least) premeditated murder.

(subject to your next revelation)

Please don’t do this.

Ender

 

[Ender]

This post may be interesting but it deflects from the point. The point is that Innocent III developed Church doctrine further limiting the use of capital punishment. How is Innocent III’s development of doctrine acceptable and John Paul II’s development not acceptable?

Innocent did not change the application of capital punishment; he specified who was and was not eligible to impose and execute it. Given that one of the key passages the church cites to support its use is Rm 13:4, which explicitly recognizes the right of the state to impose capital punishment, the passage in Lateran 4 denying the involvement of clergy in capital proceedings in no way changed the church’s understanding of the legitimacy of capital punishment.

With regard to JPII, since it is Dulles’ (and my) contention that he did not change doctrine there is no question of whether his “changes” are or are not acceptable. If it was however the development you believe it to be, then it would be more than mere development. It would also include repudiation, which cannot be considered legitimate development.**“A development, to be faithful, must retain both the doctrine and the principle with which it started”* (Cardinal Newman)*

You may find the ideas of JAMES J. MEGIVERN, Professor of Religion Emeritus University of North Carolina, Wilmington interesting:
Capital Punishment: The Curious History of its Privileged Place in Christendom

Is he suggesting the church got everything about capital punishment wrong because it started with Greek translations instead of Hebrew ones? I don’t find this a credible position.

Ender

 

[Ender]

OMilly and others have not yet called into question the assertion of your 4 ends of justice approach.

These ends are not “mine”. They are the explanation of Cardinal Dulles about what the church teaches. He gave that as nothing less than an expression of fact. The USCCB also gave a list (in 1980), but it only included three ends. The one they left out was protection, which presumably they subsumed under deterrence. Is this still an open issue?

However they have opined that it seems all four ends must be met, not just the alleged primary one, for the punishment to be judged a good object.
You on the other and take a minimalist binary approach and say the primary alone is not only necessary but suffices as well.

No, I have never said this. First, it is not possible to require that all four ends always be met; that ought to be obvious. (Just recall how many have claimed that even capital punishment does not deter murderers.) Second, that was never what I suggested. My point was that the primary objective (justice) must always be met. If there was a way to accomplish the secondary ends as well then that ought to be a consideration, but it is never valid to sacrifice the primary end in order to achieve a secondary one.

If justice is retributive only then it is not justice.

We’ll come back to this point.

However I cannot personally see how retrib CP alone could ever be indirect.

Remove the word “alone” and I would agree with this.

Which leads me to believe the Magisterium is now saying CP for retrib justice alone is immoral in principle …

The Magisterium could never take such a position as it would condemn God’s actions, and deny the legitimacy of the eternal judgment at the end of time. 1022 *Each man receives his eternal retribution in his immortal soul at the very moment of his death, in a particular judgment that refers his life to Christ: either entrance into the blessedness of heaven-through a purification or immediately, or immediate and everlasting damnation.
*There is certainly no concept of protection, deterrence, or rehabilitation contained in the last judgment. It is solely retributive. It is punishment for the sake of punishment.

and also even if done for the Common Good it is now immoral in practice due to reasonable bloodless means being available.

First, as to whether “bloodless means” are adequate, this is a prudential opinion with which people may disagree. That is not a question of morality but of judgment. Second, your interpretation assumes that justice is achieved via a prison sentence, which is also an opinion. Finally, the common good is more than merely physical protection, and if death is necessary to achieve that good, it cannot be immoral. Certainly this is proved by the fact that the catechism recognizes its use as legitimate when necessary to achieve physical protection.

Ender

 

[Ender]

Speaking generally, I find it hard to understand how it could be held to be wrong to refrain from what seems like the only reasonable defence on account of a view that it renders death of the aggressor inevitable. So much else - be that Scripture or other statements by St Thomas - suggests this ought not be an impenetrable impediment.

That administering death for purposes of punishment and the common good is restricted to proper authority seems wise and appropriate, however it is not evident why the far more restrictive right of killing when necessary to preserve innocent life would be denied to ordinary man.

*“Without doubt one is allowed to resist against the unjust aggressor to one’s life, one’s goods or one’s physical integrity; sometimes, even ’til the aggressor’s death. This act is aimed at preserving one’s life or one’s goods and to make the aggressor powerless. Thus, it is a good act, which is the right of the victim. One is also allowed to kill other people’s unjust aggressor.” *-- St. Thomas Aquinas, (Dizionario ecclesiastico)

 

[Ender]

Moral Object = Object is the proximate end in terms of morality to which the chosen act (“the act itself”) is directly ordered. What is “directly intended” is to rob the bank/ deprive the bank of cash. “Objective” would refer to the Intended End / Purpose.

The intended end and the intended means - all that is intended - are considered to be part of the Intention font.

This is different than the definitions the church uses. She identifies the three fonts as:- the object chosen; *

• the end in view or the intention;
• the circumstances of the action.
  That is, the means (object) are distinct from the ends (intent). As I am unfamiliar with how moral theologians use these terms, the way I use these terms is the way (I perceive) the church defines them.

Ender*

 

[Blue_Horizon]

Or maybe…he just got it wrong…

There is no issue here.
By definition the single object of a single moral act is the end directly intended.
But there can be other choosings in the same act also if there is a double effect.
The harm is chosen…with a “beside intention”. By definition a beside intention must have a beside object in view. That beside object belongs in the circumstances font not in the object font.
Therefore the essential licitness of the act is decided not by the “chosen” harm (circumstances of death of attacker) but by the chosen good in the direct object (protect my life) and the well disposed choosing of that object (with no animosity re the attacker).

Circumstances/consequences cannot change the essential licitness decided by the other two primary fonts… but only aggravate or mitigate culpability. If the other two fonts are good then the whole act is good. If the other two fonts are bad the whole act is bad.

Yet proportionality principles are also in play which makes it look like circumstances font is influencing overall like itness or not of the act by reason of consequences. This is Ron Contes interpretation.

I do not believe this is wholly a correct understanding of how to analyse with the three fonts.
Proportionality principles in my understanding of Aquinas come into play at the very beginning when we decide what details of the act belong to which font. If the material good
foreseen is objectively greater than the harm foreseen then clearly primary intent is the good and the good done belongs to the object font. The harm beside this intent will belong to the circumstances font.

 

[Rau]

This is different than the definitions the church uses. She identifies the three fonts as:- the object chosen; *

• the end in view or the intention;
• the circumstances of the action.
  That is, the means (object) are distinct from the ends (intent). As I am unfamiliar with how moral theologians use these terms, the way I use these terms is the way (I perceive) the church defines them.

Ender*

I don’t think there is really a difference in substance. The section in the catechism on the 3 fonts is exceptionally brief and summarized.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

My point was that the primary objective (justice) must always be met. If there was a way to accomplish the secondary ends as well then that ought to be a consideration, but it is never valid to sacrifice the primary end in order to achieve a secondary one.

This is not logical. You deny saying that the primary is sufficient yet still say the secondaries are merely a “consideration”. Most would understand you to mean “optional” when push comes to shove. Therefore you opine a contradiction here.

Yes the primary must be achieved, which is why I said it was a necessary end…though not sufficient. BUT that would not appear to mean it must be fully met in this life as you also necessitate. While eye for eye is not intrinsically immoral in the OT it is, like divorce, no longer acceptable for Christians. It may well be acceptable to partially fulfill in a lesser degree under the influence of a rehabilitative Christian love/mercy. Final retribution in full is now reserved to the Father it would seem.

We’ll come back to this point.

Did you?

The Magisterium could never take such a position as it would condemn God’s actions, and deny the legitimacy of the eternal judgment at the end of time. 1022 *Each man receives his eternal retribution in his immortal soul at the very moment of his death, in a particular judgment that refers his life to Christ: either entrance into the blessedness of heaven-through a purification or immediately, or immediate and everlasting damnation.
*There is certainly no concept of protection, deterrence, or rehabilitation contained in the last judgment. It is solely retributive. It is punishment for the sake of punishment.

I would think it absurd to believe the last judgement by God is in any way relevant to the morality of the State directly killing criminals out of full retribution motives.

First, as to whether “bloodless means” are adequate, this is a prudential opinion with which people may disagree. That is not a question of morality but of judgment.

We come back again to your appallingly flawed understanding of what moral judgements consist in. Because you care only to define as “moral” a judgement as to the nature of a universal and reject whether a judgement as to whether this particular deed I am actually doing is truly a case of that bad universal … it of course follows that for you prudential judgements are not moral judgements also.
It appears you are invincibly ignorant on this point. Even Fr Ruggero has politely indicated your weakness here.

For the rest of us it is clear that prudentially made judgements are still judgements subject to objective moral assessment … though often this is only known well after the event. Therefore the prudential judgements of the Magisterium re bloodless means being adequate may well be correct and given these details CP today in the US is in fact always and everywhere immoral in itself.

Sure, States that use the same moral principles but prudentially and practically judge that bloodless means are adequate will then err in practical reason and not be culpable for the immoralities they therefore commit. The non imputability is due to blameless ignorance. The longer they disagree with the Papacy, or if they take little trouble to inform themselves more fully, the more likely it is that their ignorance is culpable rather than blameless.

 

[Rau]

…Yet proportionality principles are also in play which makes it look like circumstances font is influencing overall like itness or not of the act by reason of consequences. This is Ron Contes interpretation.

The circumstances need to be good for a moral act. That’s my understanding too. We may not licitly cause more harm than good. Any bad font brings down the entire act.

I do not believe this is wholly a correct understanding of how to analyse with the three fonts.
Proportionality principles in my understanding of Aquinas come into play at the very beginning when we decide what details of the act belong to which font. If the material good
foreseen is objectively greater than the harm foreseen then clearly primary intent is the good and the good done belongs to the object font. The harm beside this intent will belong to the circumstances font.

That’s a new one one me. It seems to me this will enable wrong acts to be judged good by virtue of good Intentions (good consequences intended). The (A?) moral object appears to being taken from intentions, which is contrary to my understanding of Veritatis Splendor and other sources. Would this enable robbery for a good cause? Would it enable contraception for a good Intention?

Are you discussing Aquinas per se or moral theology principles as taught by the church today? I haven’t the expertise to pin-point discrepancies but note Aquinas did not express his ideas strictly in the 3 font model.

 

[Rau]

…Circumstances/consequences cannot change the essential licitness decided by the other two primary fonts… but only aggravate or mitigate culpability. If the other two fonts are good then the whole act is good. If the other two fonts are bad the whole act is good.

1760 A morally good act requires the goodness of its object, of its end, and of its circumstances together.

 

[o_mlly]

If God says it, is that not sufficiently Magisterial?Whoever sheds the blood of man, by man shall his blood be shed; for God made man in his own image.

I believe that citation is certainly biblical and its meaning, as literal or subject to interpretation, is certainly magisterial.

Particular commands like the one found in Genesis 9:6 - “If anyone sheds the blood of man, by man shall his blood be shed” - have a poetic character that indicates an original purpose that was not legal in intent. Such verses convey a pedagogical purpose removed from the sphere of literal legal applications. The Church’s Evolving View on the Death Penalty. Wilton D. Gregory

If that was true then Dulles erred in distinguishing retribution from the other three objectives given that by your definition there are all merely subsets of retribution.

I think you bring up an important point of distinction: what binds the pope. We agree the papal charism of infallibility is bound by his predecessors’ infallible proclamations. Is the pope also bound by prior or contemporary philosophers’ or theologians’ mental constructs, e.g. the nature of punishment? I think not, unless those constructs become in se magisterial.

I like this citation (I don’t agree with it, but it is a thoughtful argument). Let me also point out that, as it is not a Magisterial document I could (as you did with my citations) simply dismiss it, but if my position is valid I should be willing and able to defend it.

I do not dismiss your non-magisterial citations but only relegate them as informative rather than instructive. You certainly may do the same with Finnis.

*The punishments of this life are medicinal rather than retributive. For retribution is reserved to the Divine judgment *(ST II-II 66,6)
[/INDENT]That said, this cannot mean that Aquinas did not believe in retribution per se, but only that the punishment for mortal sins that were not also grave civil wrongs was left to God.

I have trouble parsing this paragraph. Removing the double negation in the first part gives: “This can mean that Aquinas did believe in retribution through itself (satisfies justice?) …” and reversing the negative in the second part gives: “punishment for mortal sins that were grave was left to non-God (the magistrate?).” I do not see these statements as true. Perhaps, I simply do not follow your thought here.

I’m not sure I see the point here. If Finnis is right and punishment is medicinal (which seems a justifiable position) what does that mean? Retribution also contributes to the restoration of the disorder and is therefore also medicinal. I don’t believe this citation supports your claim that “redressing the disorder” (viz. retribution) includes all of the other ends of punishment, only that all ends of punishment, including retribution, are medicinal.

This is the rub, I think. Against your claim of identity, I stated that “redressing the disorder” and “retribution” are not synonyms. I believe your argument of ambiguity in CCC#2266 relies on that false identity. “Redress the disorder” includes but is not limited to retribution which is only one purpose of punishment. Seeing that this definitional difficulty impeded progress in the thread, I did offer substitution iff definitions were agreed identical elevating “retribution” to mean the same as “redress the disorder.”

So, how does one rank and relate the notions? I see the tank as follows:

1. 
   *]Redress the disorder
   *]Punishment
   *]Retribution
   
   You have given commentators’ expressions relating these notions as follows:
   *
   Punishment has four objectives: rehabilitation, defense against the criminal, deterrence, and retribution. * (Avery Dulles)
   “retributive justice is punishment’s primary purpose.” (Christopher Kaczor)
   Retribution … seeks to establish the right order of things (Avery Dulles)
   
   The only magisterial statement is in 2266, * “Punishment has the primary aim of redressing the disorder …” *
   
   Therefore, the magistrate must redress the disorder.
   To redress the disorder, the magistrate must punish.
   To punish, the magistrate must sentence acts of retribution, rehabilitation, defense against the criminal, and deterrence.
   
   A magistrate’s sentence of life imprisonment satisfies all four objectives of punishment. The teaching is that capital punishment is allowed but is never required of the magistrate.
   
   As to prudential leeway in 2266 and 2267, the prudence is limited to the question; “Does the technology exist?” if one believes the technology exists to imprison criminals safely then, ceteris paribus, one must do so and not execute the criminal. The society that has the capability to safely imprison criminals but for economic reasons or reasons of expediency continues to execute rather than imprison, I think, presents a real moral dilemma to Christians citizens.

 

[Rau]

…For the rest of us it is clear that prudentially made judgements are still judgements subject to objective moral assessment … though often this is only known well after the event. Therefore the prudential judgements of the Magisterium re bloodless means being adequate may well be correct and given these details CP today in the US is in fact always and everywhere immoral in itself.

The Magisterium’s capacity to well make prudential judgements must be respected but those who sincerely and with proper effort reach another view are not guilty of anything. This is quite different to rejecting a moral truth taught by the Magisterium. The respect due to each of these types of church statements is not the same. The Church herself said this in some citations I posted earlier (post #169) quite soon after Don Ruggero let fly at Ender.

 

[Rau]

…As to prudential leeway in 2266 and 2267, the prudence is limited to the question; “Does the technology exist?” if one believes the technology exists to imprison criminals safely then, ceteris paribus, one must do so and not execute the criminal.

It is not clear to me that the prudential element is that narrow, though certainly reading the CCC, that comes across as the claim. But where is the doctrine - historically speaking - or the basis for new doctrine - that CP must be reserved to these circumstances? In the absence of this, it is reasonable to view it all as prudential judgement - albeit from the most qualified source - about the balance of consequences.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

Innocent did not change the application of capital punishment; he specified who was and was not eligible to impose and execute it.
Ender

I believe you have completely the wrong perspective on CP and why the Clergy may not kill.

Christians are to live under the New Law, not the Old Law. In the New Law of Christ Christians may not punish with death. Yet the hardness of mens hearts is such that secular society is not mature enough to well live without this Old Law so just as divorce was permitted for similar reasons so is CP tolerated by God re secular rulers.
But for Christians it is immoral, therefore it is immoral for Church Leaders, and I therefore presume, Christian Kings.

Your unqualified acceptance of the Lex Talionis of the OT in NT times does not do justice to the subtle nature of this discussion.

*"Clerics are entrusted with the ministry of the New Law, wherein no punishment of death or of bodily maiming is appointed: wherefore they should abstain from such things in order that they may be fitting ministers of the New Testament. * Aquinas.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

The Magisterium’s capacity to well make prudential judgements must be respected but those who sincerely and with proper effort reach another view are not guilty of anything. This is quite different to rejecting a moral truth taught by the Magisterium. The respect due to each of these types of church statements is not the same. The Church herself said this in some citations I posted earlier (post #169) quite soon after Don Ruggero let fly at Ender.

Nothing new here, standard Catholic conscience teachings.
However, like engaging in grave matter…the longer one is at odds with the Magisterium the more likely one is guilty of something even if it be pride or culpable lack of formation if not the immoral act in question…all the more if one does not take the trouble to blah blah blah (Ender knows this one off by heart as he quotes it often against others ).

I am simply demonstrating to Ender re conscience that he tends to hunt with the hounds and run with the hares when it suits.

That is, he opposes true Catholic teaching on conscience when he sees people contradicting what he believes is a Church teaching on grave matter - but when he opposes what others see as grave matter (eg CP in modern times) he is right and others are wrong because its allegedly a “prudential matter” which doesn’t allow of moral judgements

This is in fact a direct appeal to non culpable erring conscience principles on his part but he does not realise it.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

It is not clear to me that the prudential element is that narrow, though certainly reading the CCC, that comes across as the claim. But **where is the doctrine - historically speaking **- or the basis for new doctrine - that CP must be reserved to these circumstances? In the absence of this, it is reasonable to view it all as prudential judgement - albeit from the most qualified source - about the balance of consequences.

Not sure I get you. Its implicit in the old teaching in so far as the possibility of restriction at a later date is not explicitly excluded by the old understanding or the new understanding does not directly contradict the old understanding.
Isnt this exactly what the legitimate development and unfolding of primal revelation/doctrine is all about?

Just because something is later seen to be allowed/tolerated in old times (in so far as certain exlcusions were never mentioned of old) that doesn’t mean a new doctrine has come about or that the new restrictions are simply “prudential” (ie could be wrong).

Think divorce, think the Old Law, think soldiering, think slavery, think usury, even think Communion for the remarried!

 

[Blue_Horizon]

The circumstances need to be good for a moral act. That’s my understanding too. … Any bad font brings down the entire act.

NO. You cannot expect to understand the three font model from autodidactic reading of dubious sources (esp Ron Conte) nor from the heavily “drivers manual” version briefly summarised in the CCC.

Disbelieve me if you wish, I can only take your horse to water, I cannot make you drink.
Nor can I make you read or seriously reflect on the tertiary level moral theology articles of substance that I place before you which I know may be a little difficult for those without formal training.
But you know my credentials, you choose.

As even the CCC briefly hints:
“1754 The circumstances, including the consequences, are secondary elements of a moral act.They contribute to increasing or diminishing the moral goodness or evil of human acts… They can also diminish or increase the agent’s responsibility. Circumstances of themselves cannot change the moral quality of acts themselves;”

To those who have not studied Moral Theology this seems to contradict:
"1755 A morally good act requires the goodness of the object, of the end, and of the circumstances together. An evil end corrupts the action, even if the object is good in itself (such as praying and fasting “in order to be seen by men”). The object of the choice can by itself vitiate an act in its entirety. "

But it doesn’t. If the two primary fonts are good then the circumstances font cannot make the deed essentially immoral. If it seems to do so then by definition that circumstance is not a circumstance but an essential detail of the object.

I attach this article by Rhonheimer which will probably be too heavy for anyone who hasn’t got a few years of Thomist Moral Theology under their belt.
forums.catholic-questions.org/attachment.php?attachmentid=23982&stc=1&d=1496183146