Capital Punishment

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Nonsense. He has no authority unless it is given to him by the patient (as a minimum).
Well that’s a different discussion (one that is not always true I might add).
And as I explained earlier, the morality of his act hangs on considerations well beyond authority.
You’ve lost me. I am simply demonstrating to Ender that the morality of a decision to amputate rests on more than the authority of the doctor but also involves objective decisions re the state of the leg. Amputation therefore can be wrong even if the doctor decides to do so. His authority to do so is not enough to mean it was medically the correct thing to do.

Likewise the power of the State to execute a murderer is not alone sufficient justification for doing so.
For some reason Ender believes it is - and the common good only makes such just decisions better or worse not the difference between moral and immoral.
 
It rarely means “arbitrary” - that is your claim about Ender’s statement, not at all what he said.
In the context of moral assessment, how is that a prudential judgement? It’s a fact.

His point is that an assessment of the morality of CP hinge on the consequences - a matter of prudential judgement. The morality of homosexual acts and masturbation lies in the moral object of those acts. So while one CAN say the same of those two acts, that observation (about consequences) is not the relevant factor in assessing their morality.

The object situation may be that bloodless means exist to render the offender harmless. But that such means that they are the “morally superior” form of punishment would appear to be a prudential judgment (and one made by recent Popes, and FYI, with which I agree), making claims about what is objectively wrong difficult if not impossible to verify.

Morality on the part of the surgeon does not at all hinge on “getting it right”. He must act (with patient concurrence) with the right intention (patient welfare, not, say, fee maximisation), and in the sincere belief that the operation presents a positive likelihood of success.

I believe you have manufactured this argument, claimed that it is Ender who made it, and are now proceeding to shoot it down. 🤷

I think it is your claim as to what is “inexorable logic” that is at fault. And I’m not talking about toes…

IMHO, it’s the former.

Did you think Don Ruggero made any argument that countered Ender’s argument at all? I believe what he did say in “rejecting” Ender’s post was rebutted (post #169). 🤷 He did say other things with which I agreed.
Lets wait for Ender to tell us what he meant then.
 
I am not going through all your posts to repeatedly observe the flawed logic and the poor understanding of the quotes allegedly used to support your strange conflation of the virtue of justice simply to vengeance.
This is somewhat incomprehensible given my statement that there are two aspects to justice, a comment you agreed with.
This is your abiding theological error.
It seems you have never studied the moral theology of a moral act (certainly not Aquinas) if you really believe the wild assertion you keep making here.
Is there an argument here or will there simply be more allegations and assertions with no attempt to justify them?
If vengeance cannot alone fully describe “justice” or a “just act” then we cannot call any example of pure vengeance ordered in its object.
This entire post is arguing a position I explicitly rejected. You talk as if I said vengeance alone justifies capital punishment when, as you yourself noted and agreed with, I said “Clearly there are two aspects to justice here: what is the just punishment for the crime, and what is best for the community at large.” How is it possible to acknowledge this comment and then ignore it in the same post?

Ender
 
That is vague.
I don’t think so. If my intention is good, and the moral object is good, and I judge an act of CP to do more good than harm, I act morally to advocate for it. If you judge it to do more harm than good, and you advocate against it - neither of us can accuse the other of acting immorally.
Is a contraceptor tolerated by his confessor (as per the advice in the Vademecum) acting morally?
Why is this altogether different situation necessary to address the matter above, which is about a matter of prudential judgement?
There is a difference between not being culpable and engaging in objective sin.
What sin, objective or otherwise, do you think arises in the one who believes that an act of CP has 3 good fonts?
 
You’ve lost me. I am simply demonstrating to Ender that the morality of a decision to amputate rests on more than the authority of the doctor but also involves objective decisions re the state of the leg. Amputation therefore can be wrong even if the doctor decides to do so. His authority to do so is not enough to mean it was medically the correct thing to do.
An ineffective analogy as per earlier post.
Likewise the power of the State to execute a murderer is not alone sufficient justification for doing so. For some reason Ender believes it is - and the common good only makes such just decisions better or worse not the difference between moral and immoral.
I am confident that Ender will immediately concur that a SE pursued for evil intentions, or in the belief that that it will do more harm than good, renders the act of the State unjustified and immoral.
 
(a) Since when is “the common good” to be considered identical with “the cardinal virtues”?
That you first have to distort my comments in order to respond to them indicates the difficulty of your position. I never claimed the common good was identical with the cardinal virtues. That’s your own invention, but surely it ought to be obvious that justice is an aspect of the common good. As I asked before: can you imagine a good society that is also unjust?
(e) The question I asked is that you demonstrate from authoritative texts that “the common good” as used by Aquinas is primarily seen in the exercise of vengeance.
This is another personal invention of your own. I certainly never suggested that was his position.
Magisterial opposition is very much morally based.
It is based on the judgment that it is unwise.*Governments will always have the justification to use the death penalty if it is necessary to carry out its task of ensuring social order. What the Church is urging now is that governments exercise their discretion *(Archbishop Gomez, 2016)
What is your point?
That it is not immoral to disagree with prudential judgments.
One may not be morally culpable, but one may still be objectively wrong and in error as to the objective situation given the circumstances accepted by all (eg reasonable bloodless means).
I guess that’s why they are referred to as opinions and not facts.
You still assert the State has a range of licit options do you not and can choose whatever it likes and still be just do you not?
Not quite “whatever it likes”, but, yes, it can still legitimately choose capital punishment.*The Catholic Church has always taught that legitimate governments have the right to impose the death penalty on those guilty of the most serious crimes. This teaching has been consistent for centuries — in the Scriptures, in the writings of the Church Fathers and in the teachings of the popes. The Church is not changing her teaching. *(Archbishop Gomez)
You clearly would have it that the surgeon’s right comes from his authority alone …
No, this is simply another of your inventions. It has nothing to do with anything I’ve said.
You say things whose inexorable logic leads you to further conclusions you then deny.
You ascribe statements to me I’ve never made, and positions I’ve never held. This inexorably leads you to incorrect conclusions.
Either I am inventing…or you simply do not have the theological octane to see the contradictions in your position.
Whatever else may be true, it is surely appropriate to note your inventiveness.

Ender
 
So what. That doesn’t make it wrong just because the Magisterium does not feel the need to advise Ender how it made this determination from tradition or that you personally don’t like or understand it.
Given that both documents point to the other as the source of the limitation, it ought to be reasonably suggestive that there is no better citation available. I have challenged you (and everyone else) to come up with a single reference prior to EV that includes this restriction, and neither you nor anyone else has come up with anything at all. Inasmuch as the claim was made that this was the traditional teaching of the church it is peculiar to say the least that no one can cite any source at all to support it.

Ender
 
If their are legitimate means that better accord with the common good then it is clearly immoral according to Aquinas to ignore application of these principled CG considerations.
Inasmuch as I have said the same thing myself (probably several times) I have to wonder who you’re arguing with.
He simply said there was a better way than what God tolerates in the OT and by the State for those persons are not mature enough to know any better.
Where did he say this? Support your claim.
A universal right of “authority” is not the same as a “intrinsically just” under all conditions as you have confusedly assumed.
You make one unwarranted assumption after another. I addressed only on the question of authority.
Of course he does when the CG is not at all considered and the best choice made.
Whatever. Did you miss the part where that was St. Thomas’ comment and not mine? That you find fault with him in exactly the same way you find it with me ought to alert you to the fact that what you are attacking is your own creative interpretation.

Ender
 
Perhaps you have forgotten your original point which I was observing to be ridiculous?

So its good you now agree with me.
Well, specifically this was the citation and response in #450Ender: If the punishment it is deserved then it would be unjust not to.
Blue Horizon: This is a ridiculous conclusion

And here is the citation and response in #455*Ender: If the punishment was deserved then it would be unjust not to. *
*Blue Horizon: So its good you now agree with me.
*I think you’re just messing with me now, but it is difficult to respond when you yourself don’t seem to know what position you’ve taken.
I suggest you avoid using the passive “deserved” as if its active version (“must be imposed”) is univocal in meaning. It obviously isn’t.
Deserve” and “must be imposed” don’t mean the same thing at all; the latter is surely not the “active version” of the former. The concept of desert, however, is pretty much lost in discussions of capital punishment, which is unfortunate given that it is what justifies punishment in the first place.

Ender
 
It is posible to verify objectively the places, prisons and report whether they are safe enough. Or work so that they are,and thus avoid putting a person to death. Wouldn’t that be more reasonable?
Although I do not believe prisons satisfy that requirement, let us stipulate that they in fact do.
Once one knows there isn’t any practical reason why a person is to be killed,why kill him/ her?
This assumes that the only “practical reason” that exists is protection, but we know that punishment has other objectives. Would they not also provide practical reasons for executions?
What do we go to God with? Retribution? Would God accept it?
You tell me: will God be pleased with us for doing what he has told us to do?

Ender
 
Was Oedipus behaving morally? Were the Congo nuns behaving morally?
I said the only way to behave morally was by doing what you thought was best. I did not say that doing whatever you think is best is always moral. If you do something you think is harmful you have sinned, regardless of what you do or how it turns out, so at a minimum one must do what he thinks is right. That said, any action that involves an intrinsically evil act, or a careless disregard for circumstances will also be evil. Read more carefully.
If secure imprisonment is available then such State Executions are immoral.
What is your problem with this?
First, I disagree with it, but mostly it’s just that this comment has nothing whatever to do with the statement it was made in response to.
Ahem, I was just paraphrasing JPII and the CCC. So no, I think I am in good company - but you not so much.
You call it paraphrasing; I call it inventing. Your versions rarely have much in common with the originals.
Correct, vengeance hardly exhausts the meaning of “the common good” just as Fiat hardly exhausts the meaning of “car.”
I said justice was a part of the common good. I’m pretty sure that doesn’t mean the common good is nothing other than justice.

Ender
 
You are a flat earther Ender. You will always find reasons to object its not traditional. You would also have rejected changes in the teaching on usury, slavery and soldiering for the same reasons had you lived at those times.
Actually I’m a person who believes words have specific meanings, and “traditional” is not an exception. But I’m happy to say this again and again: there is no evidence to support the claim that the restriction cited in 2267 allowing capital punishment *“when this is the only practicable way to defend the lives of human beings effectively against the aggressor” *is in fact the traditional teaching of the church.
It is clear the Pope rests his new practical teachings on traditional principles of common good applied to new concrete conditions. As was the case with usury, slavery and solidering … (and 2nd marriages and communion coming).
What he bases his new teaching on is irrelevant to what constitutes the traditional teaching. Whatever the tradition was is part of the unchangeable past, and while we may change what is taught in the future we cannot change what had been taught before. That’s the only point I’m arguing here: the statement in 2267 is inaccurate as it pertains to the past.

Ender
 
Lets wait for Ender to tell us what he meant then.
Given that Rau has accurately understood what I have been saying I am relieved to know that the communication problems we are having don’t all come back to me.

Ender
 
I am confident that Ender will immediately concur that a SE pursued for evil intentions, or in the belief that that it will do more harm than good, renders the act of the State unjustified and immoral.
I have already said that in order to act morally one must do what he thinks is for the best. Acting with an evil intent, or acting with disregard for the harm it will cause hardly satisfy that criterion. Acting for the best doesn’t guarantee the act is moral, but acting in a way that one believes is harmful renders the act immoral regardless.

Ender
 
Although I do not believe prisons satisfy that requirement, let us stipulate that they in fact do.
This assumes that the only “practical reason” that exists is protection, but we know that punishment has other objectives. Would they not also provide practical reasons for executions?
You tell me: will God be pleased with us for doing what he has told us to do?

Ender
No,I believe He won’ t. Or better say,we cannot fool God.
We have a lot of resources,gifts,talents to put to service so that a person who has made a mistake or some terrible deed may receive the treatment,concretely even psychological,everything and I mean victims family and imprisoned person and family to restore peace and persons back to their communities. Or attempt it.
We have been systematically drawn away from the fact that we,the community are part of the equation for the common good.
We have a responsibility .
I know sometines we can be the worst of brothers,but yet we live within a family.No member of a family is discardable.
So,no,I do not believe that we ever learnt that retribution was more than life.
To tell you the truth,sometines it seems that we have been wrapped in words to cloud the basics.
And then we do not know how to explain what a man,a woman,a person,is,without a users manual and a photo ID.
I ve heard the simplest,and more transparent truths sometines from persons who cannot almost read or write.
 
Actually I’m a person who believes words have specific meanings, and “traditional” is not an exception. …
Ender
The source of the catechism’s authority is in the footnotes referencing Scripture, Tradition, and the Magisterium. If the wording in the catechism is confusing then one must go to the source documents rather than parse the wording in a way that renders a false interpretation as purportedly valid.

If one reviews the source documents (EV 56, 69 Gen 4:10) for 2267, it is clear that you overextend the application of the catechism’s use of the modifier “traditional” to include all that follows in 2267. EV 56 or 69 does not use the word “tradition” or refer to the traditional teaching authority of the Church.

Examining the source documents, shows the proper parsing of 2267 as:

Traditional doctrine:
*Assuming that the guilty party’s identity and responsibility have been fully determined, the traditional teaching of the Church does not exclude recourse to the death penalty, *
Development of doctrine:
if this is the only possible way of effectively defending human lives against the unjust aggressor.
In EV, JPPII explicitly places the morality of the death penalty and develops the doctrine in the context of self-defense. The state’s traditional right to execute the criminal is the same as an individual’s traditional right to act lethally in his own or another one’s self-defense. Neither the state nor the individual possess an absolute but rather a conditional right to take the life of the unjust aggressor. If the threat can be stopped with a non-lethal act then a lethal act is immoral. This principle applies to both the state and the individual.
 
The source of the catechism’s authority is in the footnotes referencing Scripture, Tradition, and the Magisterium. If the wording in the catechism is confusing then one must go to the source documents rather than parse the wording in a way that renders a false interpretation as purportedly valid.

If one reviews the source documents (EV 56, 69 Gen 4:10) for 2267, it is clear that you overextend the application of the catechism’s use of the modifier “traditional” to include all that follows in 2267. EV 56 or 69 does not use the word “tradition” or refer to the traditional teaching authority of the Church.

Examining the source documents, shows the proper parsing of 2267 as:

Traditional doctrine:
*Assuming that the guilty party’s identity and responsibility have been fully determined, the traditional teaching of the Church does not exclude recourse to the death penalty, *
Development of doctrine:
if this is the only possible way of effectively defending human lives against the unjust aggressor.
In EV, JPPII explicitly places the morality of the death penalty and develops the doctrine in the context of self-defense. The state’s traditional right to execute the criminal is the same as an individual’s traditional right to act lethally in his own or another one’s self-defense. Neither the state nor the individual possess an absolute but rather a conditional right to take the life of the unjust aggressor. If the threat can be stopped with a non-lethal act then a lethal act is immoral. This principle applies to both the state and the individual.
What you propose as ‘parsing’ is reasonable as a summary of what EV proposes regarding the appropriateness of CP. Does this lead to the conclusion that 2267 is a remarkably poor attempt to reflect the suggested doctrinal development in EV? Anyone care to check the Latin ccc and advise if it aligns with the parsing above, or does it fail similarly?

Alternatively, 2267 is saying that the rider always applied, but in the past it was s “given” that CP was the only means, so it was never expressed.
 
If one reviews the source documents (EV 56, 69 Gen 4:10) for 2267, it is clear that you overextend the application of the catechism’s use of the modifier “traditional” to include all that follows in 2267. EV 56 or 69 does not use the word “tradition” or refer to the traditional teaching authority of the Church.
EV does not use the term, but both the 1997 and 1992 versions of the catechism do, and what they describe is different.
Examining the source documents, shows the proper parsing of 2267 as:
Traditional doctrine:*Assuming that the guilty party’s identity and responsibility have been fully determined, the traditional teaching of the Church does not exclude recourse to the death penalty, *Development of doctrine:if this is the only possible way of effectively defending human lives against the unjust aggressor.
This is an imaginative explanation, but I don’t think an accurate one. If you said to someone “I told you yesterday you could have it when Jimmy was through with it”, but yesterday had said nothing about Jimmy, you can imagine the response. You have made a claim about yesterday that is inaccurate. In the same way the catechism’s claim about tradition is inaccurate.
In EV, JPPII explicitly places the morality of the death penalty and develops the doctrine in the context of self-defense. The state’s traditional right to execute the criminal is the same as an individual’s traditional right to act lethally in his own or another one’s self-defense.
Actually they are very different, as Francis himself noted.*Nevertheless, the presuppositions of legitimate personal defense do not apply at the social level, without the risk of misinterpretation. When the death penalty is applied, it is not for a current act of aggression, but rather for an act committed in the past.
*So aside from the fact that a death in self defense is accepted but not intended, while in capital punishment it is fully intended, the act of self defense is directed at a “current act of aggression” while capital punishment has an entirely different purpose and is directed at an act “committed in the past.” Those are very different conditions.
Neither the state nor the individual possess an absolute but rather a conditional right to take the life of the unjust aggressor. If the threat can be stopped with a non-lethal act then a lethal act is immoral. This principle applies to both the state and the individual.
But the principles do not apply both to the state and the individual; their rights and duties are entirely different.

Ender
 
EV does not use the term, but both the 1997 and 1992 versions of the catechism do, and what they describe is different.
Of course the teaching is different: the 1997 catechism revises the earlier 1992.

As I have posted repeatedly, the encyclical EV developed the doctrine on capital punishment in 1995. Necessarily, the 1997 catechism revises the 1992 catechism to incorporate the development taught in EV.
This is an imaginative explanation, but I don’t think an accurate one. If you said to someone “I told you yesterday you could have it when Jimmy was through with it”, but yesterday had said nothing about Jimmy, you can imagine the response. You have made a claim about yesterday that is inaccurate. In the same way the catechism’s claim about tradition is inaccurate.
I don’t follow you analogy: who is Jimmy, who am I and whom am I talking to?

What claim about “yesterday” did I make inaccurately? If by “yesterday” you mean the 1992 catechism then re-read #2266 in the 1992 catechism. After reading, one could not say that my explanation is imaginative at all. Rather, my explanation dialectically composes the three documents: 1992 catechism, 1995 EV, and the 1997 Catechism.
Actually they are very different, as Francis himself noted.*Nevertheless, the presuppositions of legitimate personal defense do not apply at the social level, without the risk of misinterpretation. When the death penalty is applied, it is not for a current act of aggression, but rather for an act committed in the past.
*So aside from the fact that a death in self defense is accepted but not intended, while in capital punishment it is fully intended, the act of self defense is directed at a “current act of aggression” while capital punishment has an entirely different purpose and is directed at an act “committed in the past.” Those are very different conditions.
But the principles do not apply both to the state and the individual; their rights and duties are entirely different. Ender
I fear you have grossly misinterpreted Pope Francis in his letter. Your citation in context does not say what you would like it to say. Rather, Pope Francis is, perhaps, preparing you for the next development in the doctrine.

His clear meaning in the letter is to abolish the death penalty, period – with no extreme case exceptions. The “misinterpretation” he points out in paralleling the self-defense doctrine with the capital punishment doctrine is that the lethal blow allowed in self-defense is never allowed in capital punishment because the criminal is already subdued and the immediate threat non-existent.
 
We have a lot of resources,gifts,talents to put to service so that a person who has made a mistake or some terrible deed may receive the treatment,concretely even psychological,everything and I mean victims family and imprisoned person and family to restore peace and persons back to their communities.
Do you see any place for the concept of retribution here?

Ender
 
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