Capital Punishment

[Blue_Horizon]

…continued…

There are no moral principles that can make capital punishment per se immoral as you have recognized that its application may be just - it is what is deserved.
How can doing what is just be immoral?
Ender

This is teeming with logical inconsistencies and equivocal use of words.
(a) Noone has ever said that State Executions (CE) is intrinsically evil. How could that be if even the Magisterium acknowledges that in less recent times it has been reasonable and just.
However your binary thinking then leads you to believe this MUST mean that the object font of CE is always good. That is incorrect logic. Some acts have moral objects that must satisfy a number of descriptive and principled requirements before their moral character can be fully identified.
For example is the object matter of stealing mortal or venial? We need to know more details re the object matter font (NOT more detail of the circumstance font).
For example, is the object matter of coitus good or bad? We need to know more details of the object matter font…is my partner my wife or not?
Likewise with State Executions, we need to know more detail of the object matter font…is the death proportionate and does it satisfy the common good requirements?

You deny that these are “moral judgements” but strangely suggest they are morally irrelevant because they are “prudential”. Of course they are prudential - as is all information gathering. Yet such information gathering has very significant moral implications for judging the morality of any given State Execution surely?

Fr Ruggero has already long ago observed your flawed thinking in this area - as have I.

You strangely believe such things as these common good, proportionality details are mere consequences of an already justified abstract act of CP.

Your confusion is no different from trying to assert that sex is moral and just though its wiser to do so with consent, with someone over 12 or with someone of the opposite sex or with someone I am married to…as if these circumstances do not flesh out the very poorly defined object we started with in a very significant and moral way.

(b) “…it is what is deserved”. This certainly does not make it just for a vigilante to impose the deserved punishment does it? There are more requirements than mere proportionate retribution that must be met before an execution can be justified surely?
You do accept that pure individuals may not do so? Why?

Likewise nor may authorised persons of the State do so unless criteria specific to an authorised State are followed. Being authorised (allegedly by God) is not enough to make a proportionate execution a just CP.
Clearly the remaining principle that must be satisfied is the serving of the common good. If there are a variety of ways to do this then the only moral and just way will be the one that is prudentially judged to do this best. If bloodless means are reasonably within reach then the Magisterium categorically asserts the moral principles that define a just CP demand that such bloodless means be chosen under pain of sin.

The Magisterium may be mistaken about whether bloodless means are now, in modern times, more reasonable and viable - it is a prudential judgement afterall. However most would agree that mass imprisionment is now effectively a new option not readily available of old.

Regardless, it also appears a clear, traditional and principled teaching that the common good must be served to make a CP just; and life imprisionment, when a feasible and reasonable option, is always and everywhere the better way for the common good than killing.

(c) “How can doing what is just be immoral?”
What you are actually saying is “how can doing what is “deserved” be immoral?”
As addressed above, meeting only one of the criteria (vengeance aka retrib justice) needed to make the object of State Execution good does not make the object good or “just”.
For the object of State Execution to be good or “just” (ie licit) requires more than satisfying “(retributive) justice”. It requires satisfying common good criteria also.

You are merely rhetorically playing with the equivocal or partial meanings of the words “deserved”, “(retrib) justice”, “just” and “moral”.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

It is - the footnote in 2267 points to EV 56 as its source. The thing is, the footnote in EV 56 points to CCC 2267. They each point to the other as the source of that restriction, which seems accurate to me since I’ve been unable to find anything like it anywhere else.

Ender

Why is this a problem?
Footnotes do not always indicate a source, often they simply acknowledge a similar point made elsewhere .
It’s good enough for me that it’s in an Ecyclical, even better it’s also in the CCC.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

I think you draw a long bow here. You are asserting that it is somehow “so clear” that CP is inappropriate that the one who chooses it must be doing so out of wrong Intention. You are denying the “honesty” of the prudential judgement of the one choosing CP.

I think I am asserting that if certain details re the object font are such as to render the object disordered they how can the act as a whole be objectively good regardless of the goodness of intent and circumstance fonts .
Coitus is not intrinsically bad object matter. However if he’s doing it with someone who turns out not to be his wife it’s objectively disordered even if his intentions are good as was the case with Oedipus. It’s still immoral objectively, it’s still adultery…though likely not personally imputable. Why do you think State executions are any different re such an analysis?

Because CP is not intrinsically evil whereas theft and adultery are.

No, CP, sex and taking the property of another are the equivalent analogues I speak of. All are insufficiently described to as yet have a determined ordered or disordered judgement applied to them as yet.

Above you are injecting an understanding of concrete details back into the object font to accord with the moral outcome you have already decided upon before analysing the actual situation .
That is hardly open, objective analysis … it is procrustean rationalism … a weakness in your way of thinking I have noticed a number of times now .

And I think you know that the status of a sexual partner as spouse or not is not a proper application of the Circumstances font.

I never said that.
Of course such important details cannot belong to the circumstances font. We all know that circumstances font cannot change the moral goodness or badness of a complete act by itself. So by definition, if some detail regarding a complete act does seem to change it from good to bad or vice versa then we must be changing or improving our identification of what the moral object/matter is. Such “circumstances” are not 3rd font details but 1st font details.
It isn’t rocket science yet the theologically uneducated just cannot comprehend there are different types of “circumstances” involved in correctly understanding the three font model.
They are best called details. Some are substantial and shape/describe the moral object while others do not and so are accidental and secondary and form only the 3rd font.

Clearly proportionality and common good concerns belong to shaping the object font.
Ender denies this.
So do you it seems.

 

[Rau]

I think I am asserting that if certain details re the object font are such as to render the object disordered they how can the act as a whole be objectively good regardless of the goodness of intent and circumstance fonts;

When the/a moral object is evil, the act is always and everywhere immoral. CP as I understand that term is not intrinsically evil. CP is immoral ONLY when the one who pursues it does so with wrong intent, or in the knowledge that the bad consequences outweigh the good.

Coitus is not intrinsically bad object matter.

“Coitus” is an inadequate description of an act to pass any moral observation whatsoever. It is not possible to recognise a moral object in acts described as such. The deficiency is not the act - merely its inadequate description.

I think you are wanting to see (these days) an evil moral object in acts of CP. Can you identify the moral evil in question?

Above you are injecting an understanding of concrete details back into the object font to accord with the moral outcome you have already decided upon before analysing the actual situation.

As I use the term CP, it is by definition, an act with a good moral object. It does not refer to all acts of State Execution at large - such as one may find in some corrupt 3rd world dictatorship. If you use CP to refer to any State Execution (includes murder etc.) then we are speaking of different things.

We all know that circumstances font cannot change the moral goodness or badness of a complete act by itself.

Any act wherein the consequences are foreseen by the actor to do more harm than good is an immoral act for that actor. A differently held prudential judgement changes the act to moral for that actor.

I refer you back to post #324, particularly the formulation in the Compendium.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

When the/a moral object is evil, the act is always and everywhere immoral.

Yes, if the object matter in a concrete example is adequately described and it is objectively judged to be disordered then the act as a whole is immoral if engaged in freely and knowingly. If the matter is grave it will be an mortal sin, otherwise only venial sin. Some words, like stealing, are descriptive enough for us to know whether or not the object is already bad but not how bad. If we add that the amount taken is large then this further qualifies the object matter (not the 3rd font) and we know, if done with full consent, an actual mortal sin was done. If we are simply told that he took another’s property then the object matter has not been well enough described for us to judge whether the object is disordered or not…let alone how grave it is. That’s because there are times when taking another’s property is just. It is not stealing at those times.

Likewise I suggest we have similar issues with exactly what State Execution and CP mean in English. For me SE is not as well described as CP. Yet nor do I believe CP is always well ordered in its object as stealing is always disordered in its object.
CP by definition for some people means well ordered in its object. For others it’s undecided. That is why I prefer to speak of SE…it’s more like “taking another’s property” where it’s not yet known if the object is disordered or not. More info is needed to decide that.

CP as I understand that term is not intrinsically evil.

I tend to agree as above. That therefore means we need more detail before we can decide if what we speak of in concrete cases is disordered in its object.
If the common good is harmed when other aternatives avail that do not so harm…then this object is disordered, though perhaps only venially.
I assume intention is good (ie no animosity by the state).

CP is immoral ONLY when the one who pursues it does so with wrong intent, or in the knowledge that the bad consequences outweigh the good.

If you speak of details that bear on proportionality of retribution or are inimical to the common good when alternatives avail I agree. But that is because in this type of case the object is always disordered, not simply because intent has to be wrong or circumstances font somehow make it so.

“Coitus” is an inadequate description of an act to pass any moral observation whatsoever.

I agree…just as is the case of Ender’s generic and abstract cases of State Executions.

As I use the term CP, it is by definition, an act with a good moral object. It does not refer to all acts of State Execution at large - such as one may find in some corrupt 3rd world dictatorship. If you use CP to refer to any State Execution (includes murder etc.) then we are speaking of different things.

I do not, nor do many others

 

[Rau]

…Likewise I suggest we have similar issues with exactly what State Execution and CP mean in English. For me SE is not as well described as CP. Yet nor do I believe CP is always well ordered in its object as stealing is always disordered in its object.
CP by definition for some people means well ordered in its object. For others it’s undecided. That is why I prefer to speak of SE…it’s more like “taking another’s property” where it’s not yet known if the object is disordered or not. More info is needed to decide that.

State Executions as a term I think fairly plainly suffers from lack of fixed meaning. I’m sure we can all point to some that were nothing other than murder. I think it is unhelpful in this thread, at this late stage, to posit that the term CP suffers the same lack of specificity as to meaning as does SE. For Catholics, the Church has for as long as anyone can find evidence deemed CP to be an act with a good moral object.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

I think you are wanting to see (these days) an evil moral object in acts of CP. Can you identify the moral evil in question?

Your terminology here is flawed.
We do not speak of moral evil being in the object. Moral evil resides only in the complete act if any one of the fonts is bad.
When badness resides in the object matter font it is bad because of an objective disorder in that object. As has been stated numerous times if the retribution is disproportionate to the crime then the SE is immoral due to a disordered object. We all surely agree on that. Retribution must be well ordered otherwise the eye for eye principle involved is void and the retribution is unjust.
Also, as Aquinas and others state, the common good condition must also be respected and well ordered. If it is not (eg incarceration for life is judged to best serve the common good not immediate death) then the object becomes disordered so the act as a whole cannot be moral.
Admittedly we may not be talking grave object matter nevertheless it renders the act immoral as a whole regardless of good intentions.

As I use the term CP, it is by definition, an act with a good moral object

.
To clarify below response, I disagree. It’s object’s order or disorder is unknown until we know more about what sort of common good considerations are in play. We usually assume proportionality principles are met (ie we are dealing with a recidivist murderer) re the object.

It does not refer to all acts of State Execution at large - such as one may find in some corrupt 3rd world dictatorship.

Why don’t we?

If you use CP to refer to any State Execution (includes murder etc.) then we are speaking of different things.

Well murder is different from killing and most are clear re the difference. However few seem to agree re the difference between CP and SE which is why I raised the issue.
Moral analysis cannot proceed if we sing from different songsheets.

Any act wherein the consequences are foreseen by the actor to do more harm than good is an immoral act for that actor.

Of course, but this is of absolutely no assistance to us in making an analysis of different classes of deeds re their objectively agreed disordered components.

A differently held prudential judgement changes the act to moral for that actor.

Of course, but as in all matters of serious morality we are often able to identify categories of deeds that are objectively disordered regardless of good intentions and circumstances. That remains true even if some of us are invincably ignorant and unable to correctly reason to this objective judgement and so non culpably see things differently and so act differently.

Both may be without sin yet one will still be in objective error.
If I am in any doubt and am up against the prudential judgements (which does not merely mean disciplinary re CP and bloodless means) of three Magisterial generations I know who I will follow.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

State Executions as a term I think fairly plainly suffers from lack of fixed meaning. I’m sure we can all point to some that were nothing other than murder. I think it is unhelpful in this thread, at this late stage, to posit that the term CP suffers the same lack of specificity as to meaning as does SE. For Catholics, the Church has for as long as anyone can find evidence deemed CP to be an act with a good moral object.

What is wrong with speaking of just or unjust State Executions and the conditions that make this so or not?

Adopting your terminology would imply that all CP done without animosity is always moral.
Because consequences are in the 3rd font, and the 3rd font never by itself changes the moral quality of a complete act (Unless it’s indirect which retribution motive is not), then considerations of common good are irrelevant re licitness and only reflect wise or less wise just choices as Ender argues.

Ender is mistaken. Common good considerations are intrinsic to the object font in question along with proportionate retribution.

If CP was long regarded as good in its object that was only because the common good considerations of the time were assumed to be obviously met…as is still the case for POWS on the front line in a fast changing campaign who may be shot because imprisonment of largish numbers is often not a reasonable option and may result in losing the battle.

 

[Rau]

Your terminology here is flawed…

To return to the question Blue, what evil moral object do you “see” in an act of CP? My concerns about the morality of CP are connected with things like:

• A desire to appeal to the voters baying for “blood”;
• A desire to save the State the costs of incarceration;
• Corruption that see CP as a means to eliminate political foes;
• Harm arising from a numbing attitude to killing, and from a too ready forsaking on the aim of rehabilitation, etc
• etc.

It does not follow that an evil moral object attaches to the act (though it may).

To clarify below response, I disagree [that CP is an act with a good moral object].

Do you take this view in considering the possible scenario of CP as punishment for, say, spitting on the sidewalk (ie. punishment out of proportion to crime)? Do you take the view that CP is an act with a good moral object when the crime is a recidivist murderer?

Why don’t we?

Because the State is capable of murder in the guise of CP. An act with a different moral object.

If I am in any doubt and am up against the prudential judgements (which does not merely mean disciplinary re CP and bloodless means) of three Magisterial generations I know who I will follow.

And no one could find such a decision as without basis or merit. But nor is it binding (as Cardinal Ratzinger et al have stated) - per post #169.

 

[Rau]

Common good considerations are intrinsic to the object font in question along with proportionate retribution.

Whether or not an instance - or indeed a policy - of CP will serve the Common Good (a hugely broad notion - and one not readily distinguishable from the balance of consequences, as it happens) is of course a matter of prudential judgement.

CP has the moral object of protecting (innocent) society, for the common good, against gravely unjust acts. Aquinas: * “Now every individual person is compared to the whole community, as part to whole. Therefore if a man be dangerous and infectious to the community, on account of some sin, it is praiseworthy and advantageous that he be killed in order to safeguard the common good… it is lawful to kill an evildoer in so far as it is directed to the welfare of the whole community, so that it belongs to him alone who has charge of the community’s welfare… a public authority is requisite in order to condemn him to death for the common good.”*

If “CP” is pursued believing it will not serve the common good, that it will harm the common good, then the moral object for this act - which is now better described as a “state execution”, rather than CP - is something else - and thus for me (and speaking from a moral theology perspective), the act is not CP.

If we accept that, say, US authorities believe CP in their country serves the common good, and they act with that intent, then they act morally in pursuing it. Recent Pope’s have called into question whether the common good really is served by CP - a matter of prudential judgement.

 

[Ender]

Given that Aquinas opposes CG to mere vengeance justice, which is what you seem to mean by “justice” above, it would seem he speaks of the objects of the other secondary ends of justice not vengeance.

Clearly there are two aspects to justice here: what is the just punishment for the crime, and what is best for the community at large.

CG then is fairly readily to be understood as a justice that does not interfere with the rights and goods of other citizens. Vengeance, deserved or not, easily contaminates others as even the Lex Talionis law of the OT was intended to limit…Indeed most observe that was why it was set in place to begin with.

Predicting the effect of any act is a matter of judgment, it is not a moral choice.

And here you try to argue vengeance is one of the most desirable objects of the CGood.

Well, yes. You use “vengeance” because of its connotation, but the word “justice” equally applies. It’s just easier to denigrate vengeance than justice.

But by all means provide clear Thomistic and Magisterial quotes that vengeance is the pearl of the Common Good …

OK.*On the contrary, Tully says (De Offic. i, 7): “Justice is the most resplendent of the virtues, and gives its name to a good man.” *(Aquinas ST II-II 58,12)

*The law, nevertheless, is clear that for public prosperity it is to the interest of all that virtue - and justice especially, which is the mother of all virtues - should be practiced *(Leo XIII, Exeunte iam anno)

The problem is that you believe the State has a range of objectively licit options.
This is denied by recent Popes. The full moral principles associated with analysing State Executions make it clear that in modern times that bloodless means are the only licit options.

Current opposition to the use of capital punishment is not based on moral grounds but on prudential ones. It is not immoral to believe that executions will not have harmful effects on society. That belief may be mistaken, but it is not immoral to hold it. There are no “full moral principles” involved in predicting the effect on society.

You repeatedly confuse the virtue of justice" with “being just” (ie moral).

You repeatedly invent positions for me which you then demolish. Unless you respond to comments I’ve actually made you are not arguing with me but with a caricature of my position that you have created.

You are mistaken, the reason the State alone may sometimes judge that a killing is just is because individuals have no authority or ability for best determining what the common good may be in particular cases.

It is not that the individual lacks the ability to determine what is best, it is that he has no authority to do so. It is only the person who has been given the authority who has the right and duty to punish.

You seem to be distorting this view. Namely, because the State decides to execute therefore it must be for the CG and therefore it is moral. That is ridiculous.

Of course it’s ridiculous. That’s because you made it up and ascribed it to me. As I said, if you’re not citing my actual comments you’re just inventing stuff.

Ender

 

[Ender]

Perhaps you may like to helpfully explain your point…the relevance of which to my view is far from obvious.

I was providing you with a citation from JPII that supported the point you were making. Did you think there was some trap I was setting? Feel free to ignore the comment.

Ender

 

[Ender]

Jesus in Mt 5:38 begs to differ I suggest.
While equal retaliation may seem to curb rage it is surely better to curb the rage itself…whether it be of State or individual.

The passage in Matthew does not address the issue. That section deals with the obligation of the individual, which is to forgive, to turn the other cheek. That, however, is not the obligation of the State, which is to punish, and unsurprisingly this is what the church teaches today.* Legitimate public authority has the right and **duty **to inflict penalties commensurate with the gravity of the crime. *(CCC 2266)

Why do you reject the view that the purpose of LT is to limit vengeance’s contagious side effects (ie never ending rage and feuds).

Because that is not its purpose. The purpose is justice. Sin demands punishment. It is not an option.*A penalty is the reaction required by law and justice in response to a fault: penalty and fault are action and reaction. *(Pius XII)

While LT works to some extent it is hardly the last word on the underlying principle that the New Law in Mt 5:38 more perfectly fulfils by its command of those who would belong to the Kingdom. It is a standard observation.

It also is a misunderstanding of the difference between the obligations of the individual and those of the magistrate. Vengeance is forbidden the individual but is the duty of the magistrate.

Please state where I said that?

Post #377:* It never ceases to amaze me that the Lex Talionis only allowed from a loving desire to limit the escalation of vengeful killings in a hard of heart world, in better times is used by “Christians” to allow the State to do exactly what it was intended to limit…killing from pure vengeance …something ultimately reserved to God not man. *

I believe you will find that vengeance and proportionality motives are not enough to limit what God opposes in unjust CP. Requirements of the common good, objectively judged, must also be satisfied for such punishment to be legitimated for man - as indeed it is in God.

You keep repeating this point as if I have disputed it. I’m not sure what more I can say if you won’t take yes as an answer.

Ender:

What is just for God is just for his ministers.

What a ridiculously unsupportable universal this is.

Then again, maybe not quite so unsupportable as you imagine.And thus that which is lawful to God is lawful for His ministers when they act by His mandate. It is evident that God who is the Author of laws, has every right to inflict death on account of sin. For “the wages of sin is death.” Neither does His minister sin in inflicting that punishment. The sense, therefore, of “Thou shalt not kill” is that one shall not kill by one’s own authority. (Catechism of St. Thomas)

*I answer that the vengeance which public officers inflict is rightly called the vengeance of God, for they are the ministers of God, serving Him in this very matter. Hence St. Paul, after he had said, “Revenge is Mine, I will repay,” adds, “But if thou do that which is evil, fear; for he beareth not the sword in vain. For he is God’s minister; an avenger to execute wrath upon him that doth evil. *(St. Bellarmine)

Ender:

There are times when mercy is inappropriate

Irrelevant even if it were true (you will note Jesus was clearly merciful to the woman caught in adultery when expressions of contrition were NOT equally clearly presented to the reader).

It is certainly true, and it is not irrelevant.1847 *God created us without us: but he did not will to save us without us." To receive his mercy, we must admit our faults. *If God’s mercy is not always available it would seem that man should limit his accordingly. This means, even assuming LWOP is the merciful punishment, there are times (e.g. when there is no remorse) that it would be wrong to administer it.

Ender

 

[Blue_Horizon]

To return to the question Blue, what evil moral object do you “see” in an act of CP? My concerns about the morality of CP are connected with things like:

• A desire to appeal to the voters baying for “blood”;
• A desire to save the State the costs of incarceration;
• Corruption that see CP as a means to eliminate political foes;
• Harm arising from a numbing attitude to killing, and from a too ready forsaking on the aim of rehabilitation, etc
• etc.

It does not follow that an evil moral object attaches to the act (though it may).

Do you take this view in considering the possible scenario of CP as punishment for, say, spitting on the sidewalk (ie. punishment out of proportion to crime)? Do you take the view that CP is an act with a good moral object when the crime is a recidivist murderer?

Because the State is capable of murder in the guise of CP. An act with a different moral object.

And no one could find such a decision as without basis or merit. But nor is it binding (as Cardinal Ratzinger et al have stated) - per post #169.

Rau I think it is now your turn to put some skin in the game and answer some of my questions and challenges before I continue to respond.
That is surely a fair request?

 

[Rau]

Rau I think it is now your turn to put some skin in the game and answer some of my questions and challenges before I continue to respond,

Seriously? I must have missed them.

 

[Ender]

(a) No one has ever said that State Executions (CE) is intrinsically evil.

Agreed, therefore objections to its use are prudential, not moral.

You deny that these are “moral judgements” but strangely suggest they are morally irrelevant because they are “prudential”. Of course they are prudential - as is all information gathering. Yet such information gathering has very significant moral implications for judging the morality of any given State Execution surely?

There is no bright line dividing what is prudential from what is moral. In reaching a prudential decision that is also moral, one has to work within the basic guidelines the church has presented, but within those broad objectives we are free to determine for ourselves what we think is or is not best. In generalit is seldom warranted to hold that another person’s opinion is immoral, however mistaken we think it to be.

Fr Ruggero has already long ago observed your flawed thinking in this area - as have I.

Yes, well asserting it is a long way from demonstrating it.

You strangely believe such things as these common good, proportionality details are mere consequences of an already justified abstract act of CP.

You can tell what I believe from what I write. If I have not stated it you should not assume that I believe it. Deal with what I say, not with what you imagine me to mean.

(b) “…it is what is deserved”. This certainly does not make it just for a vigilante to impose the deserved punishment does it?

No. I have several times distinguished between the rights and duties of the individual as opposed to those of the State.

Clearly the remaining principle that must be satisfied is the serving of the common good. If there are a variety of ways to do this then the only moral and just way will be the one that is prudentially judged to do this best.

The only way for you to behave morally is to do what you prudentially judge is best, but what you believe is best places no obligation on me to agree. I am justified in believing the opposite if I truly believe it is for the best.

If bloodless means are reasonably within reach then the Magisterium categorically asserts the moral principles that define a just CP demand that such bloodless means be chosen under pain of sin.

No. There is no sin involved in disagreeing on a point of judgment.

However most would agree that mass imprisionment is now effectively a new option not readily available of old.

The claim is not that mass imprisonment is only now available, but that secure imprisonment is. A claim that seems doubtful.

Regardless, it also appears a clear, traditional and principled teaching that the common good must be served to make a CP just; and life imprisionment, when a feasible and reasonable option, is always and everywhere the better way for the common good than killing.

You say this as if it was a fact when in fact it is entirely your own opinion.

For the object of State Execution to be good or “just” (ie licit) requires more than satisfying “(retributive) justice”. It requires satisfying common good criteria also.

You keep making this distinction between justice and the common good, as if justice was not itself part of that good. Justice is an aspect of the good. Can you imagine for a moment that an unjust society could be a good one?

Ender

 

[Ender]

Why is this a problem?
Footnotes do not always indicate a source, often they simply acknowledge a similar point made elsewhere .
It’s good enough for me that it’s in an Ecyclical, even better it’s also in the CCC.

The problem is that if something really is the traditional teaching of the church then the documents that assert this ought to be able to provide some reference to where it was actually taught, but in support of this claim EV and the catechism each references the other as the source. There is no support for this claim.

Ender

 

[o_mlly]

Yes, if the object matter in a concrete example is adequately described and it is objectively judged to be disordered then the act as a whole is immoral if engaged in freely and knowingly…

I believe that is the correct understanding of the object of an act.

In the concrete, all willful human acts are either morally good or bad in their object. Only in the abstract can we speak of a willful human act as morally neutral.

Sexual intercourse, for instance, does not become adultery in circumstance for there is no sexual intercourse without a partner. The partner is one’s spouse or is not. A killer does not become a murderer in circumstance for there is no killing without one killed. The one killed is either innocent or an unjust aggressor.

Capital punishment in the concrete must specify the person to be executed and (EV’s development of doctrine) the security status of society’s penal system must be specified. Executing an innocent is always evil. Executing the guilty when LWOP is possible is evil. Executing the guilty in the presence of an insecure penal system is good if, and only if, the intention is to protects society.

 

[o_mlly]

The problem is that if something really is the traditional teaching of the church then the documents that assert this ought to be able to provide some reference to where it was actually taught, but in support of this claim EV and the catechism each references the other as the source. There is no support for this claim.

Ender

What do you understand as the Church’s teaching as to the just punishment for a person guilty of attempted murder in a state that lacks a secure penal system?

 

[Ender]

What do you understand as the Church’s teaching as to the just punishment for a person guilty of attempted murder in a state that lacks a secure penal system?

The just punishment for the crime of deliberate murder is death. Whether it is advisable to apply that punishment in a particular case is determined by the circumstances.

Ender